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ABSTRACT

This is a resource book on cutback management in public schools. It catalogs over 30 practices, provides policy models from 27 school districts in 17 states, and summarizes a decade of advice about decline management in light of recent research evidence on what works and what doesn't work in managing the politics of retrenchment. Its highlights include (1) syntheses of the research evidence on conflict management, on the political, neighborhood, curricular, and fiscal impacts of school closure, on the impact of declining enrollments on the school program, and on equity initiatives; (2) a coalition rather than consensus building model of conflict management and its implications for developing policies for community involvement; (3) two field-tested fiscal analysis procedures that clarify the cost and revenue implications of changes in enrollments and services; (4) procedures for documenting the impact of enrollment decline on curricular offerings at the high school level; and (5) a checklist for developing policies incorporating performance criteria into reduction-in-force policies. (Author/TE)

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MANAGING DECLINE IN SCHOOL SYSTEMS:

A HANDBOOK

FINAL DRAFT: JUNE 1983

Submitted to the
National Institute of Education

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by

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EA 016 261

"Thus, though enrollment declines and the creation of new facilities have eased our housing problems, they have become a substantial burden on the operating life blood of the school system.

The seriousness of the difficulties which are tied to operating costs is highlighted when one considers the impact of rising costs on the overall standard of living within the United States. The schools are no exception and are not immune to the eroding problems which result from double-digit inflation.

The resources necessary to operate our schools are responsive to two major realities which have arisen within the past seven years: the reality of the citizenry demanding control on taxation and their future inability to control hidden taxation inflation; i.e., and the factor of the waning of the political power of that group responsible principally for the growth of resources in the school -- the public school parent. Statistics now show that parents constitute only 28 percent of the electorate. Because of the lower percentage of parent-votes, schools do not fare as well as previously when they compete with other community needs for available funds.

As a result, over the past five years, our resources have grown by only 22 percent while inflation has risen by 61 percent. True, there are fewer students to educate; nevertheless, per-pupil resources have risen by only 34 percent. This means that the schools must do what individuals must do: modify their standard of living. The West Aurora Schools have chosen to drop or restrict programs and permit class sizes to rise in order to balance budgets. In doing so we have tended to accept as given expenses those necessary fixed costs which are required to operate and maintain our facilities. As our enrollments continue to fall below the optimal capacity or desired size of our facilities, the acceptance of fixed costs forces a further burden of retrenchment on program and staff. Those sections of this report that deal with the educational program and staffing within District 129 have indicated how burdensome this retrenchment can be. And yet, as we look at the areas of programming and staffing we find them least contributory to inflating costs. Rather, the dramatic increase in the cost of goods, energy, high interest rates, insurance, etc., seems to be more congruent with the Consumer Price Index."

-- Challenge of the Eighties. Managing Declining Enrollment: Analysis, Projection and Alternatives. Task Force Report of the Aurora (Illinois) West Public School District #129. September 1980. pp. 79-81 passim.

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ABSTRACT

This is a resource book on cutback management in public schools. It catalogs over 30 practices, provides policy models from 27 school districts in 17 states, and summarizes a decade of advice about decline management in light of recent research evidence on what works and what doesn't work in managing the politics of retrenchment. Its highlights include: (1) syntheses of the research evidence on conflict management, on the political, neighborhood, curricular and fiscal impacts of school closure, and on the impact of declining enrollments on school program, and on equity initiatives; (2) a coalition rather than consensus building model of conflict management and its implications for developing policies for community involvement; (3) two field-tested fiscal analysis procedures which clarify the cost and revenue implications of changes in enrollments and services; (4) procedures for documenting the impact of enrollment decline for curricular offerings at the high school level, and (5) a checklist for developing policies incorporating performance criteria into RIF policies.

The handbook is modularized to provide for user flexibility. Its contents can be re-assembled to provide seven topic-specific resource packets: Community Politics, Conflict and Participation; Finances; Curriculum; Equity; Managing High School Decline; School Closure; and Reduction In Force. The 130-item bibliography includes 41 research studies and 29 local school district reports. Also included is a 38-item annotated bibliography of other handbooks on decline.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Institute for Responsive Education (IRE) is privileged to present this handbook to educators and citizens working to improve the quality of public schools in these difficult times. The publication is the second and final one of a two year project on managing decline initiated and funded by the National Institute of Education to provide theoretical and practical help to school managers and policymakers as they face conditions of declining resources, enrollments, and political support. The first volume, which apppeared in March 1982, on which this handbook draws, was a detailed and comprehensive report on the literature and an annotated bibliography.

IRE, which was awarded a contract by NIE to do the work of the project, is a private, non-profit public policy research and advocacy organization with a ten-year history of studying, chronicling, and supporting citizen participation in local school policymaking.

The Institute's experience led to the assumption that the management of decline is more a political, rather than primarily a technical issue. This assumption was confirmed by the work of the project.

Whereas the literature of the 1970's focused on enrollment decline, -- decline in "demand" and, consequently, what to do about the problems of "excess capacity," -- the situation of the 1980's is complicated by the coincidental facts of fiscal decline -- budgetary constraints leading to a crisis of diminished capacity to offer "supply." The problems of diminished supply, having to spend less, lead to some predictable policy choices: when, how and whether to cut facilities, programs and staff.

In canvassing practical school managers, we were told again and again that their problem was not knowing what to do -- the decline management literature is full of options, promising practices and cookbook recipes -- nor was it knowing how to do it. Instead, the real problem is how to justify what had to be done and how to build public support for that which is necessary. One administrator offered the observation, echoed by many others, that the problem of decline management is "...how to do the rational while accomodating the emotional."

The problem of how to build public (i.e., political) support for what has to be done has received much attention in the literature on decline management. The more we analyzed that literature, and the more we discovered about local school system practice, and the more we learned from emerging research evidence, the more we became aware of profound gaps between what the "advice" literature -- itself voluminous -- told school managers to do and the research evidence about the impact of conventionally prescribed practices.

Bringing together and connecting the advice, practice and evidence became a focus of our handbook. It led to a reexamination of the conventional wisdom and our own assumptions about the community politics of decline management. That reexamination leads to a revisionist synthesis of almost a decade of writing and observation, advice and practice of decline management.

The revisionist synthesis is not likely to please either the superintendent who feels the need to close a school, or the community group mobilized to stop that closure. We offer more analysis than inspiration, more trade-offs than examples of promising practices, more caveats than recipes.

The revisionist synthesis will be useful to the superintendent, community groups, and to the local school boards which must ultimately choose. An identification of "what doesn't work" or of "what might go wrong" is useful in that it can prevent all participants from taking unproductive actions. This approach led us to focus on data, and methods for local data-gathering, which can clarify the policy choices facing each community contemplating closing schools, cutting programs, and/or reducing staff.

Our central assumption is that facts can make a difference; they can settle some policy conflicts, and they can create the constituency supporting retrenchment. Conflicts of interests not resolved, or narrowed by such facts, are either too local or too deep and fundamental to be resolved by this or any handbook.

One especially important part of the work of the project was consultation with potential users of the handbook -- administrators, school board members, and citizen leaders. Prior to the literature search we convened panels of potential users, one in Boston and one in Palo Alto, California. Further consultations were held by telephone, correspondence and site visits with dozens of practitioners and policymakers.

IRE wishes to acknowledge the important contributions made to this project by a number of individuals. Overall direction for the project was provided by Dr. W. Timothy Weaver, the principal investigator. Weaver is an Associate Professor of Education at Boston University and is widely known for his pioneering research and policy analyses on the allocation of educational resources and on the effects of teacher quality on declining enrollments and declining demand for teachers. Weaver contributed the Appendices to Sections Four, Six and Seven, and to Section Seven, Part D:2.3.

The project director and principal author of this handbook was Ross Zerchykov, IRE's Senior Policy Analyst. Zerchykov is an ABD in Political Science at Boston University, and is the author of several reports and articles on the politics of decline, school board responsiveness to interest group representation, and other aspects of citizen participation and school-community relations. Zerchykov was assisted by Project Staff Associates Owen Heleen and Georgia Glick.

Heleen holds an M.A. in English from Boston University and prior to joining IRE's staff worked at the Johns Hopkins University Press and at that University's Center for Organization of Schools. He not only edited this handbook, but helped organize the extensive note file for this project.

Glick holds an Ed.D. from Boston University and until September 1982 served as Director of Field Services for the Institute for Responsive Education. She was instrumental in identifying, documenting and cataloging the local school district practices contained in this handbook.

In addition, three consultants played key roles in various aspects of the project. Their work is reflected in the sections of the handbook which follow.

William L. Boyd, Professor of Educational Policy and Administration at Pennsylvania State University, contributed insights and original materials on the politics of decline management. His contributions are reflected in Section

Four. Boyd has recently completed a major comparative case-history of 15 suburban school districts' adjustment to decline ("School Governance in an Era of Retrenchment," NIE-G-28-00-86) and has recently published in Education and Urban Society, the Peabody Journal of Education, and the 1983 Annual Yearbook of the American Educational Finance Association on the topic of decline.

Guilbert Hentschke, Associate Dean and Professor of Education and Management at the School of Education, University of Rochester, designed and field-tested the fiscal analysis materials in Section Six. Hentschke has published extensively in the field of school finance and is on the editorial board of Educational Economics. His books include Intruction to School Business Management (McCutchan, 1980).

James Breeden, formerly with the Office of Operations and Planning of the Boston Public Schools, and now Director for the Center for Law and Education at Harvard University, guided our work on the equity issues posed by enrollment decline, and contributed Section Eight, Part C.

Breeden was assisted by Geoff Beane, also formerly of the Office of Operations and Planning of the Boston Public Schools.

Any errors of fact or interpretation in these contributors' sections remain the sole responsibility of the principal author, Ross Zerchykov.

Two other individuals, who although not part of the project team provided us with gratefully acknowledge pro-bono advice and suggestions on our discussion of curricular issues in Section Seven: Joan Wofford of Leadership and Learning, Inc., of Lincoln, Massachusetts; and Ronald Sealey, founder and past president of the Boston-based Institute of Law and Education. Wofford's suggestions guided our thinking on the issues and trade-offs posed in curriculum consolidation. Sealey was instrumental in pinpointing the fairness and due process issues involved in merit-based RIF.

IRE Office Manager and Secretary, Dana Rudolph, handled all of the typing and manuscript preparation in the most competent possible manner.

We are also grateful for the guideance and assistance of the NIE Project Officer, Lauren Weisberg, who was until the Spring of 1983 a part of NIE's Education Finance Group in the Educational Policy and Organizational Division.

Her support and criticism were very helpful at several key points in the project.

IRE welcomes responses and contributions from the users of this handbook in order that we can continue to refresh our understanding of the politics of planning and management in schools and communities.

Don Davies
President
Institute for Responsive Education

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS ADDRESSED IN THIS HANDBOOK

Managing organizations always involves managing people.

Managing public, commonweal organizations like schools involves managing (or rather negotiating with and among) people who have their own different and competing interests and stakes in the organization. Because schools are public organizations, the different interests can and do exercise their right to press their claims, rights against which managers of public organizations have few prerogatives.

Managing public organizations with a declining resource base involves negotiating with, and adjudicating among, interest and constituency group claims mobilized by the threat of losing something. Losing something is what cutback management is all about. The pressure to consume fewer resources means that the organization has to eliminate some of its operations or reduce others. That is the abstract definition of decline. In the concrete, decline means a loss of some benefit by somebody. That is what a "shrinking" of the organization and a reduction in its operations means in human terms.

Managing a declining public organization, therefore, means managing the fears (of potential cutbacks), the anger (engendered by actual cutbacks), and the dashed hopes of a school system's constituencies (of those whose claims for the future are aborted by the fact of decline).

THE IRONIES AND DILEMMAS OF DECLINE MANAGEMENT

The Ironies

The irony is that just as the problems get larger and more difficult to resolve, the manager's stock of problem-solving resources gets smaller, due to the same set of facts -- decline in resources -- which created or exacerbated the problems in the first place (see Section Three, "An Overview of the Problems of Decline Management").

For instance, first, the choices available to decline managers become limited to a series of equally unpalatable and unpopular options: close schools, or make targeted or selective program cutbacks, and in either case staff will have to be laid off. In either case, decline problem-solving dictates some kind of zero-sum solution -- some must lose (e.g., parents of a neighborhood school that is closed) in order that others will win or remain unharmed (e.g., the rest of the parents whose children enjoy lack of program and service cutbacks, made possible by the cost-avoidance effects of closing that neighborhood school). In the resulting "politics of redistribution," it is difficult to resolve interest group differences by "splitting the difference" or by making compensations or "side payments" to the losers.

Second, the most fiscally and educationally sound cutback strategies are the most unpopular politically, and hence, the most difficult to implement. The professional consensus is that reductions in fixed costs (excess facilities and staff) should be made to finance the preservation of program, and if that is not enough, targeted program cutbacks make more sense than across-the-board cutbacks in program. However, this is an instant recipe for conflict, because there is always a more vocal and intense opposition against closing schools than there is for preserving program. There is more intense opposition to targeted cutbacks in services and programs which focus losses than to across-the-board cuts which disperse losses. (See Section Four, Part B1. "An Analysis of Conflict and Its Sources.")

Third, at the same time that the ever present possibilities of external conflict place a premium on intra-organizational unity, the process of decline promotes disunity. Organizational sub-units jockey to protect their programs, their share of the budget, and their jobs. The larger school systems, like all complex bureaucratic organizations, are characterized by a downward flow of authority, and an upward flow of information. This control over information is one of the weapons used to protect the sub-unit interests, making it even more difficult for managers to apply the textbook ideals of rational strategic management.

Fourth, when it comes to dealing with outside interest groups, administrators' political resources are diminished by the same set of circumstances which cause retrenchment (see Section Four, Part B:2, "How Decline Depletes Manager's Stock of Political Resources"). For example:

(a) By being the source of controversial policy proposals, managers lose the political resource of neutrality -- the opportunity to act as arbitrators of community conflicts over schooling.

(b) Decline has coincided with, and may even have precipitated, increased role group conflicts of interest between central administration staff and boards of education. Under the politics of decline, the latter are much more sensitive to constituency group pressures. The changed political atmosphere itself has produced more successful single issue school board candidates.

(c) The strategy of closing schools to preserve program exposes a long standing cleavage between professional and lay opinion: the public likes small schools, professionals see them as economically and educationally unsound. This value conflict, plus the inconclusiveness of the hard research evidence about the quality of small school vs. big school, has diminished the normal deference to technical expertise previously enjoyed by school leaders.

(d) It is often the most loyal school supporters who turn out to be the most vocal and easily mobilized opponents to specific cutbacks. When this happens in the context of enrollment decline, cutback managers are faced with having to alienate supporters precisely when the primary constituency for public schools (parents of children in the schools) is shrinking.

In sum, decline deprives managers of the opportunity to arrive at non-zero-sum solutions to policy conflicts; it deprives them of the material resources necessary to placate the losers of a zero-sum solution; it deprives them of the comfort of assuming that the administration and the board will be united; it diminishes the political resources provided by deference to professional expertise, and it forces the alienation of important segments of an already numerically decreased constituency for the public schools.

DECLINE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A REVISIONIST APPROACH

The litany of problems and political pitfalls just described comes as no news to school managers and is documented, often most poignantly, in a decade of literature -- consisting of popular, professional and fugitive local school district reports (see Section Nine, "Readings and Resources") -- on decline, its problems and its management. The "people problem" of decline management has been long acknowledged in the literature.

We begin this handbook with the intent of cataloging the accumulated stock of advice about the people problem of decline management, and integrating it with an emerging set of research evidence about the politics of decline management (see Section Four, Part C:1, and Section Five, Part B:3). We conclude by noting the gap between the intents and assumptions behind that stock of conventional advice and the emergent research evidence about what works and what doesn't. This leads us to revise and re-interpret the conventional advice.

The gap is this: the conventional wisdom assumes that communication of the facts about the necessity of decline, and constituency (school and community interest) participation in the generation and analysis of those facts will "spread ownership of the decline problem," and produce consensus. The research evidence shows that neither comprehensive and detailed planning, nor participation produce consensus or will reduce conflict and opposition. But lack of opportunities for participation can itself become a conflict producing issue.

The re-interpretation is: that people-oriented solutions to the problem of decline "don't," as noted by William L. Boyd, our consultant on conflict management, "perform as advertised." It is misleading to define the problem of decline management as "how to do the rational while accomodating to the emotional" since the basis of conflict and opposition can often be the citizens' clear-sighted and rational apprehension of their interests at stake. Consequently, procedures which rely on technical planning, public relations and participation to produce a consensus are both futile and unnecessary.

These procedures are futile because they: (a) assume that it is possible to change people, i.e., that participation and rational documentation can lead potential victims of cutbacks to develop a sense of ownership in their own victimization; and (b) because they presuppose the existence of precisely those political resources (the opportunity to exercise leadership via non-zero-sum compromise, deference to the office and expertise of school leaders, and a professional-lay consensus on values) which decline has most seriously depleted.

The attempts at consensus are unnecessary because research about practice has shown that conflict can be managed by isolating opponents and developing a countervailing coalition. Lest this seem to be an advocating of unprincipled real-politik, consider what it takes to build such a supportive coalition (see Section Four, Part C:2).

The same assumptions about rational self-interested behavior on the part of oppositing constituencies are made here about potentially supportive constituencies. Getting people to follow you because of who or what you are is exercising leadership. Getting people to support you by providing them with reasons why based on their self-interest, a certain action would beneficial to them, is what we call bargaining.

Hence, the alternative or revisionist model developed herein (and in Section Four, Part C:2-4, and Section Five, Parts C:2-4) we call a coalition-building and interest group bargaining approach, as contrasted to the conventionally prescribed consensus building and human relations approach.

This revisionist approach does not mean that facts don't make a difference. Indeed, the possession and generation of the facts is the key resource which managers have in playing the bargaining game. However, not all kinds of facts make a difference. The facts that do make a difference are those that document what specific services and benefits would be foregone in not making a particular cutback. This strategy is captured in the concept of "opportunity costs," usefully articulated and applied to the decline problem by Robert Behn of Duke University, and then extended by William L. Boyd (the community conflict management consultant to this handbook). (See Section Four, Part C:3.)

The ability to document the existence of such opportunity costs is the key resource which managers bring to the bargaining game. Those documentations give particular constituencies specific and self-interested reasons for joining a supportive coalition. Such a condition is, after all, composed of constituencies, who for their own reasons, are part of the condition. Facts can not only persuade or mobilize this constituency, they can create it (e.g., information, or rumor, about a potential school closure can create, literally, overnight a constituency of angry parents and neighborhood residents).

The coalition building and bargaining approach does not mean an abdication of leadership. Leadership initiatives can be recovered by providing for *de jure* or *de facto* procedures for documenting the majority will represented by the coalition created through the strategy of documenting opportunity costs.

In relation to documenting the majority will, the use of referenda is discussed and analyzed by William L. Boyd, in Section Four, Part C. The argument there is that a formal expression of a majority will (even though, given electoral turnouts -- it may be a majority of a minority) can recreate some of the political resources "lost" in decline -- namely, the advantage of impartially executing the will of the community, as formally documented through a due process and not as informally interpreted by school managers.

Boyd's analysis suggests that when there are zero-sum solutions to policy problems, and when the community signals are unclear as to what zero-sum option it prefers, the "highest form of public leadership is knowing how and when to 'let go' and let, indeed, force the community to record its choice among incompatible goods."

FROM POLITICS TO POLICY: THE FINANCIAL AND PROGRAMMATIC ASPECTS OF DECLINE MANAGEMENT

The major implications of the approach just described is that purely political, i.e., public relations, tactics are not the most politically effective conflict management procedures. Where material, rather than emotional, interests are at stake, "facts" do make a difference. A major responsibility is to set the agenda for the community debate and to document the implications of different policy choices. Many of the remaining sections of the handbook (Sections Four through Eight) can be seen as a catalog of resources school managers can and have used to document what is at stake and guide their communities through the choices which need to be made.

Decline and Citizen Participation

Section Five discusses the ways and means in which citizen participation mechanisms can provide managers with: (a) the information about constituency interests necessary to pursue the targeted opportunity costs strategy described above; and (b) with surrogate or functional equivalents of referenda. In regard to this second point, a comprehensive and broadly representative network of citizen participation mechanisms can, if properly designed, give a less formal and non-binding record of the community will, and as such can give leaders a renewed mandate to exercise the tough leadership choices called for in decline.

The key phrase is "properly designed." The theory or conventional ideology on citizen participation is hopelessly muddled, or as Don Davies, President of the Institute for Responsive Education and a contributing author to that Section, has noted, "...everyone is for citizen participation, but everyone is for it for different reasons."

For instance: Managers recognize that citizens' access to decisionmaking is often a cultural imperative and a way of legitimating policymaking. But they ask citizen participants who join in to leave their "private interests" at the door, thereby negating the whole point of participation, which is: an opportunity to have a say (advocate a private interest) over public policy decisions which affect one's interests.

Citizens seek access and influence. Managers want support and help. Structures which are designed to solicit helpful and supportive participants screen out precisely that kind of participation which can pinpoint community conflicts of interest, thereby depriving managers of useful information. Such structures also "screen-in" only a certain kind, possibly unrepresentative kinds, of participants, thus diminishing the legitimating potential of citizen participation mechanisms.

The analysis and typology of citizen participation mechanisms presented in Section Five suggests that managers cannot have it both ways. The same kind of structures cannot equally effectively provide help in problem-solving and provide an airing of community views. School administrators often ignore the difference between "volunteering to help" and "participating to influence, to have a say." Both are equally valid and useful exercises of citizenship. But the confusion between the two, emanating from the assumptions behind the consensus building model, creates a version of "mission impossibles" for citizen participation, frustrating managers and alienating citizens. In this light, the research finding that more citizen participation does not lead to less conflict and opposition is not surprising. Our conclusion is that in developing policies for participation, managers face a fundamental trade-off: in order to create a shared ownership in the problem of decline, they have to share (and hence give up some control) over the definition of the problem and its resolution. Once again, the price of overcoming political isolation from the community is some form of "letting go."

Finances and Decline

Section Six provides some of the more technical resources -- data gathering and representation techniques -- useful for purposes of the kind of public information campaign accompanying the opportunity costs/referenda strategy of managing conflict. Specifically, Part C:1 and C:2 describe, step by step, two procedures which identify the revenue needs and costs of not cutting back (thereby confronting the community with a choice -- if you want things just as they are, here is the price tag). But no amount of sophisticated financial analysis can make the choices automatic. As Guilbert Hentschke, the contributing author to that Section, warns, "these models can answer the 'what if' questions, but not the 'is it worth it' questions."

Decline and Curriculum

More fact-finding and presentation procedures which can answer the "what if" questions central to a referenda campaign are contained in Section Seven. Specifically, a procedure for estimating and documenting the impact of enrollment declines on secondary school course offerings (Parts C:1 and C:2).

Another kind of resource for managers is general (not just local) knowledge about the impact of decline and responses to decline. Our summary of the research evidence on curricular and programmatic impacts of decline reveals an interesting irony and challenges the generally acknowledged assumption that references to the program implications of decline choices can be the touchstone of a consensus: everybody wants program to be preserved at all costs and everyone knows what a good program is.

In reviewing the evidence, we were intrigued by a seeming disparity of findings (Section Seven, Part B). On one hand, there is a consistent pattern of survey findings showing decline to be associated with: less pedagogical innovation; a narrower, more homogeneous curriculum; and longer materials replacement cycles. On the other hand, the same databases showed that when survey respondents were asked to assess whether harm or benefit has been done, the results were mixed both across and within the individual studies.

An important clue is provided in William L. Boyd's longitudinal comparative case studies of 15 declining school districts. Boyd (1982c) collected interview data eliciting respondents' perceptions of the effects of retrenchment upon program. He discovered that there was an ideological split among perceptions of program quality. Those who favored "back-to-basics" felt less negative about the loss of certain aspects (e.g., "frills") of the curriculum. It is intriguing to speculate that the inconclusiveness of earlier survey data about perceptions of program quality change stemmed, in part, from a lack of probing about respondents' criteria of quality. It seems that the very concept of diverse and differentiated curriculum may be contestible.

This introduces a final irony: all of the practitioner-oriented and practitioner-produced "literature" stress that decline and fiscal retrenchment requires a reduction of fixed costs (buildings and personnel serving fewer pupils) in order to preserve resources for maintaining core programs and services. It is for that reason that managers are enjoined to make targeted, rational, albeit unpopular cutbacks, and engage in rational fiscal analysis and to live with the inevitable conflict arising out of targeted cutbacks and use citizen participation -- messy as it can be -- to repair the damage done by redistributive decisionmaking. All of this is made necessary in the name of preserving the program. But "program" rather than being the touchstone for resolving all other policy choice conflicts, turns out to be, itself, controversial.

A NOTE ABOUT EQUITY

The impact of decline upon equity is a growing and not yet fully addressed problem. We, for example, did not find, and hence cannot report on any instances of locally-initiated practices for either turning decline and retrenchment into an opportunity to extend equity, or of any local initiatives to continue equity in the face of relaxed external mandates and/or declining funds. We found little discussion of equity issues among practitioners in the field, apart from an acknowledgement of local districts' obligations and repeated references to "external mandates" as part of the constellation of constraints and problems facing decline managers. In pursuing several interesting leads of local practices which seemed to be the exception to this rule, we ran into another kind of silence: that imposed directly or indirectly by ongoing litigation. This was especially true on the topic of RIF and affirmative action. Since we respected requests for anonymity and since the kind of materials we were after -- model policies and decision rules to be cataloged and disseminated -- could not be presented in a blind case study format, that silence is reflected in the pages of this handbook.

The reported increase in litigation is indicative of what is happening in the field of equity. We define equity operationally as: all those changes in decision rules (e.g., affirmative action in hiring and firing), in pupil assignment (e.g., school desegregation), and in pupil services (e.g., special education and compensatory education -- Chapter I, Bilingual, etc.), which provide special considerations and services for previously discriminated against and underserviced populations.

Survey research data about what has been happening to equity, as defined above, in the context of decline shows the following (see Section Eight, Part B for a more detailed and referenced presentation):

(1) Gains in special education have been held harmless, and, in fact, as enrollments and budgets decline, there has been both a proportionate and absolute increase in the resources allocated to special services.

(2) Districts under court-ordered desegregation have consolidated facilities in order to promote racial integration and are constrained to protect affirmative action gains in the context of RIF.

(3) School closures in districts not under court order have not resulted in more racial integration. The blind, non-punitive application of efficiency criteria (i.e., close schools which are older, smaller, less well equipped, and more costly to maintain) results in a disproportionate burden on poor and minority people who live in neighborhoods which tend to have schools of that type due to past patterns of inequity.

(4) Overall, the effects of RIF have fallen disproportionately on women and minorities due to seniority.

These survey data, admittedly spotty, do reveal a pattern: that which is externally mandated and paid for is protected; that which is not, suffers. A general conclusion is that all equity initiatives may be at risk given the coincidence of the ongoing initiative towards "de-regulation" -- giving more power back to the "locals" -- and the pressure towards lower levels of resource consumption, which is our operational definition of decline.

At the same time, de-regulation and defunding does not wipe out the constitutional basis for equity entitlements. Predictably, equity populations and their advocates will revert to litigation. This may lead to a repetition of the historical cycle in which civil rights court cases pushed the national schooling system into more comprehensive statutory and regulatory and programmatic responses to equity.

This possibility poses an interesting trade-off. There is now much practitioner, policymaker, and scholarly concern about two kinds of "over-burden" on local education agencies: (a) that imposed by externally legislated mandates and (b) that emanating from the growing "legalization" of education, introducing all kinds of procedural complexities into local education policymaking. On equity, at least, a relaxing of the first burden, through deregulation, may lead to litigation increasing the second burden. Once again, the general implication seems to be: you can't have it both ways.

One way out is offered by James Breeden, the equity consultant to this handbook, who, in Section Eight, Part C discusses an approach to equity which focuses on outputs -- instructional effectiveness for all children, irrespective of color, class or handicap -- rather than on inputs, i.e., special and expensive targeted services for targeted populations. Breeden's analysis notes that the "common" public school has since its inception been an instrument of equity. It is manifestly redistributive and exists by taxing the "haves" to provide education for children of families who otherwise would have no means to make private purchases of schooling. Its founding principle is one of equality of opportunity. The common school was designed to nurture talent and reward merit, irrespective of social status. Breeden's analysis is useful in that it reminds public educators of the historical roots and traditions of their profession.

IS THERE A SILVER LINING TO THE DARK CLOUD OF RETRENCHMENT?

It is hard for any observer of decline, and for any analyst of local school district documents, not to adopt the dark and gloomy tone set by the practitioners on this issue. Yet the solicitation which led to this handbook asked offerors to consider the claims made that decline will, or can, or should, or has led to improvements in education management.

These claims have their pedigree in a persistent strain of thought, throughout almost a decade of commentary on decline which sees "opportunities" in decline and "virtues" in adversity.* The argument goes something like this: schools like all organizations in a non-competitive environment have a tendency to develop inefficiencies and inertia. In times of growth, the inefficiencies remain hidden. Tough choices are postponed. Changes occur incrementally and via an additive response, in which innovations supplement rather than supplant what was intended to be changed. A growing system of public schooling results in an entrenched hodge-podge of unintegrated services, functions, programs and positions.

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* See Zerchykov, et al., 1982, Section One, for a review and history of that literature.

Decline is an alleged opportunity to break the hold of inertia and expose and deal with inefficiencies. Dealing with adversity -- the pressure to consume fewer resources -- can, it is argued, be an opportunity to achieve a "leaner and more efficient organization," provided that schools adopt sound management strategies. "Sound" management means acting more like a business corporation, as it is portrayed in the theories of management science.

Section Three presents an extended commentary on the above type of arguments. Summarizing the research on school retrenchment, it identifies some of the built-in impediments to the application of management principles derived from the practice of business corporations and firms. That Section concludes that because schools are public, commonweal organizations, principles of management based on private sector behavior and conditions are not only difficult to implement but also inapplicable.

This critique does not mean, however, that we found nothing good coming out of schools' experience with adversity (see Postscript).

The benefits have not come from adversity and retrenchment per se. We found no cases, nor did we find any practitioners offering the testimony that "less is better." There is research evidence (Section Seven, Part B) showing what "less" has meant: larger class sizes, fewer course offerings, fewer hours of co-curricular and extra-curricular activities, and longer curriculum materials replacement cycles.

The benefits have come not in the provision of services for children, but rather in management. They represent not a revolution, but a series of small evolutionary steps. Finally, these improvements were driven by the invisible hand of democratic politics and conflict, the latter usually seen as the scourge of decline managers.

For example: Teacher union contests, often leading to litigation over the introduction of non-seniority considerations into RIF, have led to a body of judicial reasoning that paradoxically shows educators how to employ truly educational considerations (i.e., what's best for children, "best" being defined in terms of pupil performance) in staff evaluations. The implications of that line of reasoning for performance, or merit-based RIF are explored in

Section Seven, Part D:2.2.

Community protests over school closure have introduced, often forcibly, educational, child-centered considerations into facilities decisions hitherto ruled almost exclusively by dollars and cents and bricks and mortar considerations (see Section Seven, Part D:1, "Examples Three" and "Four").

Community protests over closure and other cutbacks, generally, have pushed school districts into more refined, explicit and better documented decision rules about resource allocation. The fact-finding and analysis recipes presented in Section Six, Parts C:1 and C:2, and Section Seven, Part C:1, were developed out of a school district's need to provide its public with the facts about the tough questions of decline management. Similarly, the model policies and procedures, cataloged in Section Six, Part D, and in Section Seven, Part D, reflect improved management techniques in documenting the financial and curriculum issues at stake in school closure choices.

Finally, community conflict -- or the invisible hand of democratic politics -- has led to improvements in governance. For instance, we referred earlier to research indicating that one consequence of decline is that boards of education are likely to be less united, less automatically supportive to central administration staff, and more responsive to special community interests. This was cited, in the original (Cibulka, 1982a), and in our references, as a problem. However, having elected representatives be more responsive to their constituencies sounds like a textbook case of progress toward democracy.

Despite the theoretical muddle about citizen participation, local practice has been more impressive. The model policies cataloged in Section Five, Parts D:1 - 4, show a high degree of "constitutional" sophistication and attention to due process. Some local school districts have come a long way from the days when having community meetings (when the school board meeting room overflows), PTA bake sales, and occasionally taking 10 - 20 handpicked "citizens" and calling them a task force, was all that was meant by democratic participation.

We conclude with a final paradox: Decline, because it poses redistributive policy choices, has mobilized private interest group challenges to school policymaking. The resulting escalation of conflict has required school managers to provide more detailed and convincing justifications for their policy proposals. This in turn has led to increased sophistication in local fact-finding and documentation. As a result, schools have improved their management capacity. Those improvements, e.g., more attention to and monitoring of the relationships between inputs and outputs, more meaningful and precise measures of staff performance, increased sophistication in the forms of community participation, will be just as useful in what some observers now see as a compint period of growth in public school enrollments.

SECTION ONE

SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

This handbook is addressed to those who are responsible for, affected by, and are interested in how school districts manage, to use Charles Levine's (1976) definition, "...organizational change toward lower levels of resource consumption." This handbook makes no distinction about whether the drive to "lower levels of resource consumption" is by choice, or by necessity (fiscal or demographic). In either case, school districts are driven to make policy choices about cutbacks in those operations which consume resources: facilities, staff and program.

Such choices are the focus of our handbook. School districts presently driven to consume fewer resources, and to consider cutting programs, closing schools, and reducing staff, can profit from a decade of documented experience, contained in other handbooks and professional advice pieces, state and local task force reports, and more recently, research studies on the management of decline.

Presenting readers with a one volume summary of this documented experience is the objective of this handbook. The book summarizes and, in some cases, excerpts advice and how-to materials from other handbooks; it summarizes the research evidence, and it collects local district materials which provide examples of policy options and policymaking procedures. The handbook is, therefore, part encyclopedia, part state-of-the-art report, and part catalog of practices and resources. It is not, however, a cookbook of recipes or an action manual about the best way to manage decline.

Had we been able to discover the "one-best-way" for managing decline, we would have produced a cookbook or action manual.

Had we found that research evidence validates all of the most commonly offered prescriptions for "better ways" of managing decline, we would have cited those prescriptions and would have simply produced a resource directory.

SECTION ONE

Had research evidence shown that nothing works, we would have had nothing to put in this handbook. Some strategies for managing decline do seem to work better than others. These "better ways" of managing decline are those that recognize the limitations and political context of the decline management situation. These limitations are best described by Michael Berger's (1982a:23) observation that decline managers "need to 'fight fires' on a continual basis, without knowing exactly how to do so, or the ultimate effects of these efforts. [This is because] the twin factors of shrinking enrollment and rising costs create a constant crisis in the district from one budget year to the next. Policymakers attempt to respond to these crises but are constrained in their actual alternatives for doing so. Just as fire-fighters are limited by the length of hose on the truck, the location of the nearest hydrant, and the extent of fire involvement when they arrive on the scene, so too are education leaders constrained by seniority rights, government mandates and/or angry parents. Unlike fire fighters, however, board members do not have a theory of cause and effect, never see the fire go out, and do not often enjoy broad community support."

Responding to the requirements and limitations of this fire-fighting role defines the approach of our handbook. It is best seen (to continue the present metaphor) as a "fire-fighting" and "fire-prevention" manual. Specifically:

Section Two, "Users' Guide and Index," provides a readers' guide and map to the "fire analysis," "fire-fighting" and "prevention" materials contained in this handbook.

Section Three, "An Overview of Problems in Managing Decline," summarizes what is now known about the "nature of fire," and about the constraints facing "fire-fighters."

Sections Four and Five ("Managing Conflict" and "Preserving the Legitimacy of the Policymaking System") offer some fire-fighting strategies and present evidence of what works, and doesn't work in dealing with "angry parents" and generating community support.

Sections Six through Eight ("Reducing Costs," "Preserving the Integrity of the Curriculum," and "Preserving Equity Initiatives," respectively) focus on *fire-prevention techniques*, and present ways of defining, documenting and representing to the public the financial, programmatic and equity implications of cutback choices.

Parts A of Sections Four through Eight define the characteristic problems of pursuing the five objectives -- conflict reduction, legitimacy, cost reduction, curriculum preservation and equity -- in the context of decline.

Parts B in each case provide an analysis of the management choices within the context of research evidence on the impact of decline upon the available choices, and of the impact and efficacy of various policy options.

Parts C provide problem-solving approaches and strategies, consistent with the analyses and evidence we review in Parts B of each section.

Parts D in all cases provide a catalog of *fire-fighting equipment* -- exerpts from other literature, and especially examples of local policies and practices culled from local school district documents which exemplify the different problem-solving strategies that we discuss.

Section Nine contains a selected annotated bibliography, which includes more than 122 local school district task force reports and other documents which chronicle the variety of local practices and experiences.

A parallel volume, *A Review of the Literature and an Annotated Bibliography on Managing Decline in School Systems*, published by the Institute for Responsive Education in 1982, provides a comprehensive listing and discussion of the available literature.

SECTION TWO: USER'S GUIDE AND INDEX

PART A. OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS HANDBOOK

While the audiences for this handbook may have no other choice than to reduce their school districts' "consumption of resources," they do face choices about how to make such reductions: Whether to close schools and/or which ones? Programs to cut? Staff to reduce? And in making such choices, managers are faced with multiple and possibly competing policy constraints and objectives. The major sections of this handbook are defined in terms of five policy objectives and constraints and necessary outcomes -- dictated by the nature of the issues and reflecting the general goals of school managers, as revealed in the literature and in our contacts. These include:

Section	Desired Outcomes and Policy Objectives	Contents and Topical Focus
Four	Minimizing and Managing Conflict	Politics of retrenchment.
Five	Maintaining the Legitimacy of the Policymaking Process	Community involvement.
Six	Lowering Levels of Resource Consumption	Financial analysis.
Seven	Maintaining the Integrity of the Curriculum	Program and curriculum.
Eight	Preserving Equity Initiatives	Special and compensatory education; desegregation; affirmative action.

Organizing the handbook in this way highlights the policy trade-offs inherent in the retrenchment process and the application of trade-offs to specific categories of cutbacks -- in facilities, in program, and in staff. Table 1 on the next page gives a summary overview of the contents of this handbook showing how they are organized around two axes: (i) the policy objectives to be advanced and preserved in cutting back to lower levels of resource

TABLE 1. OVERVIEW TO THE CONTENTS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE HANDBOOK

TOPIC	SUBTOPIC	TYPE OF MATERIAL	SECTION, SUBSECTION OF THE HANDBOOK	CATEGORY OF CUTBACK
Trade-offs	Among competing policy objectives	Research review	Three, Part A:1	Program cuts
			Part A:2(a)	School closure
			Part A:2(e)	RIF
Politics	Conflict management	Issues analysis	Four, Part B	- - -
		Research review	Part C:1	School closure
		Policy guide	Part C:2-4	- - -
		Applications	Part D:1	School closure
			Part D:2	RIF
	Citizen participation	Research review	Five, Part B	- - -
		Policy guide	Parts C:1 - C:4	- - -
		Policy models	Parts D:1 - D:4	- - -
Finances:	Defining fiscal strain	Issues analysis	Six, Part B	- - -
	Measuring fiscal strain	Procedures	Parts C:1 - C:2	- - -
	Application of fiscal criteria to specific cutbacks	Research review	Part D:1 and Appendix	School closure School closure
		Policy models	Part D:2	School closure
Curriculum:	Impact of decline	Research review	Seven, Part B	School closure
	Measuring the impact on program, facilities and staff	Procedures	Parts C:1 - C:2	- - -
		Policy guide	Part C:3	Program cuts
		Policy models	Part D:1	School closure
		Policy guide	Part D:2.1	RIF
		Policy models	Part D:2.2	RIF
Equity	General; issues analysis and research review		Eight, Part B	- - -
	policy guide		Part C	- - -
	Special education: issues analyses and research		Part D:1	Program cuts
	Desegregation: issues analyses and research		Part D:2	School closures
	Affirmative action: issues analyses and research		Part D:3	RIF

consumption; and (ii) categories of cutbacks -- closing schools, cutting programs, and reducing staff.

PART B. USING THIS HANDBOOK: AN INDEX TO EIGHT RESOURCE PACKETS

One consequence of the organization depicted on Table 1 is that for each category of cutback -- school closure, for example -- we present a series of focused perspectives: on the political, the economic, the programmatic, and the equity choices involved in school closure decisionmaking.

A second consequence of this organization is that there is no one section which deals with school closure. But since this is a handbook rather than a book, we hope it will be used as well as read. To that end, its contents are, to the extent possible, "modularized." It is organized and formatted in such a way that different readers clip, copy and recombine materials from the different sections of the handbook.

Tables 2 - 9 (listed consecutively at the end of this section) provide an index to the "movable parts" of this handbook, which when reassembled, can provide the following resource packets.

- Resource Packet A: Politics, Community Conflict and Participation (see Table 2). This is composed of materials from Sections Four and Five. Inasmuch as the conflict management outlined in this handbook calls for technical as well as political processes, the packet includes selected materials from Sections Six and Seven.
- Resource Packet B: Finance (see Table 3).
- Resource Packet C: Curriculum (see Table 4).
- Resource Packet D: Equity (see Table 5).

Resource Packets B - D are based primarily on materials in Section Six, Seven and Eight respectively. The corresponding Tables serve as an index to the contents of those sections. And, as is the case with all of the Tables, on each topic we index the bibliographic materials referenced in Section Nine.

- Resource Packet E: Managing High School Decline (see Table 6). This is a topic which will become more salient in the near future. The packet is composed primarily of materials in Section Seven, with some references to materials from other sections providing examples from the secondary school setting.

- Resource Packet F: On School Closure. Table 7 which indexes the materials for this packet identifies all of the materials in the various parts of this handbook which deal with school closure.
- Resource Packet G: RIF. See Table 8, which like Table 7, performs similar indexing and integrating for the topic of RIF.
- Resource Packet H: Inventory of the Research Evidence on Decline and Its Management. See Table 9.

PART C. CATALOG AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDEX TO LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT PRACTICES

Perhaps the most valuable resource for local managers is the experience of other school districts facing similar problems. Tables 11 and 12 provide a geographic place name index and catalog, respectively, to the 27 school districts, in 17 states, whose materials and experiences are contained in this handbook.

PART D. A NOTE ABOUT THE USE OF SURPLUS FACILITIES AND ENROLLMENT FORECASTING

For reasons given in the Section One: "Introduction," above, we have not focused on these two topics. We recognize their importance. But we have also found that a voluminous and excellent practitioner-oriented literature already exists on these topics. The bibliography in Section Nine, Part A and the annotated listing of handbooks in Part B of that same section contains the following references:

RESOURCES ON ENROLLMENT FORECASTING	
SECTION NINE, PART A.	SECTION NINE, PART B.
1, 17, 18, 53, 61, 69, 73, 97-99	1, 15-18, 20-22, 26, 28, 31

RESOURCES ON ALTERNATIVE USE AND RE-USE OF EXCESS FACILITIES	
SECTION NINE, PART A.	SECTION NINE, PART B.
10, 17-19, 42, 53, 69, 95-99, 112	1, 4-15, 18, 23-24, 33

TABLE 2. RESOURCE PACKET A: ON COMMUNITY POLITICS AND PARTICIPATION

TOPIC AND DESCRIPTION OF MATERIALS	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Trade-offs between conflict reduction and other public policy objectives	Three	Part A:2	51
A conceptual framework explaining why the most educationally rational cutbacks are the most controversial	Four	Part B:1	69
How decline depletes managers' stock of political resources	Four	Part B:2	73
The conventional consensus building approach to conflict management	Four Five	Part C:1 Part B:2	77 149
The research evidence: What works, and what doesn't in managing conflict? What is the role of community participation in conflict reduction?	Four Five	Part C:1 Part B:3	78 152
Implications of the evidence: A bargaining and coalition building rather than a consensus building approach to managing community conflict	Four Five	Part C:2 Part C:3	87 175
Implications of the bargaining model for conflict management	Four	Part C:2	87
Coalition rather than consensus building: Six rules for managers	Four	Part C:2	88
Documenting opportunity costs as a way of building a coalition	Four	Part C:3	97
Documenting opportunity costs:			
Showing the financial and revenue implications of not cutting back	Six	Part C:1-2	259
Showing the curricular implications of enrollment decline and the necessity for school consolidation	Seven	Part C:1-2	329
Assessing the true costs of equity mandates	Eight	Part C	485
Using surveys to identify what different constituencies count as an opportunity	Five	Part D:1	209
Using referenda to convert a potential coalition into a mandate	Four	Part C:4	103
Five reasons for using referenda	Four	Part C:4	105
Three local school districts' experiences with using referenda	Four	Part C:4	108
Four steps for implementing referenda	Four	Part C:4	115

TABLE 2. RESOURCE PACKET A (continued)

TOPIC AND DESCRIPTION OF MATERIALS	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Conflict, and school closure: Five rules to minimize opposition	Four	Part D:1	118
How court ordered desegregation can reduce conflict over school closure	Eight	Part D:2	494
and RIF: The virtues of seniority	Four	Part D:2	121
and program: Identifying community preferences, policy tools from two school districts	Five	Part D:1	209
and equity: An interest group analysis of equity measures	Eight	Part B	473
How court ordered desegregation can reduce conflict and opposition to school closure	Eight	Part D:2	494
Implication of the bargaining model for community participation for managers	Five	Part C:3	178
Implication of the bargaining model for community participation for citizens	Five	Part C:3	184
Developing policies for citizen participation:			
Six rules for living with citizen participation	Five	Part C:2	169
Four questions to answer in developing policies for citizen participation: Why, How, Who and When	Five	Part C:4	189
A typology of the forms and functions for citizen participation Chart 5E	Five	Part C:4	193
Functions of citizen participation: Chart 5C	Five	Part C:4	190
Forms of citizen participation: Chart 5D	Five	Part C:4	191
Trade-offs: Chart 5F; Some forms and functions of citizen participation which do not fit	Five	Part C:4	194
Chart 5G; Who participates and how, a summary of policy considerations	Five	Part C:4	196
Chart 5I; Fitting forms to functions: A summary of trade-offs	Five	Part C:4	206

TABLE 2. RESOURCE PACKET A (continued)

TOPIC AND DESCRIPTION OF MATERIALS			SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Forms of citizen participation:	Use of public hearings:	Functions (Chart 5I)	Five	Part C:4	206
		Policy Models	Five	Part D:2	223
	Surveys:	Functions (Chart 5I)	Five	Part C:4	206
		Policy Models	Five	Part D:1	211
	Citizens Committees:	Use and Abuse	Five	Part C:1	157
		Functions (Chart 5I)	Five	Part C:4	206
		Policy Models	Five	Part D:3	227
	Comprehensive participatory planning mechanisms		Five	Part D:4	239
	Referenda		Four	Part C:4	103

READINGS ON COMMUNITY CONFLICT, POLITICS AND PARTICIPATION

SECTION NINE, PART A: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	SECTION NINE, PART B: REFERENCE NO'S.
1, 5-7, 9-16, 18, 26-29, 31, 37, 40-41, 51-54, 76, 93, 95-99, 117-118	1, 3, 4, 15, 28, 31, 33

TABLE 3. RESOURCE PACKET B. FINANCES

CONTENT AND DESCRIPTION OF MATERIALS	SECTION,	SUBSECTION	PAGE #
Trade-offs between financial considerations and other policy objectives	Three	Part A(2)	52
An explanation of how a school district may cut or freeze services, have lower enrollments, reduce expenditures and still be under fiscal strain	Six	Part B:1	251
An analysis of what factors can cause fiscal strain	Six	Part B:2	254
A six-step field tested procedure for estimating revenue needs in the context of: constant services but changing enrollments, prices, and revenues	Six	Part C:1	259
A five-step field tested procedure for documenting what factors led to expenditure increases, in light of changes in services, revenues, and enrollments	Six	Part C:2	273
Summary of evidence about the financial savings of school closure: how much money does school closing save?	Six Six	Part D:1 Appendix	283 297
Examples of three local policies applying building capacity and economic criteria to school closure decisions	Six	Part D:2	289

READINGS ON FINANCES

SECTION NINE, PART A: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	SECTION NINE, PART B: HANDBOOKS
9, 23, 26-29, 47, 62, 63, 65-69, 74-76, 89-93, 99, 104, 116	2, 3, 21, 22, 28, 31, 37

TABLE 4. RESOURCE PACKET C. ON CURRICULUM, PER PUPIL SERVICES AND PUPIL OUTCOMES

TYPE AND CONTENT OF MATERIALS	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Trade-offs between program preservation and other policy objectives	Three	Part A-B	53
Inventory of differences between high school and elementary level decline (Exhibit 7A)	Seven	Part B	309
A summary of strategies for dealing with high school decline (Exhibit 7B)	Seven	Part C:3	354
Summary of options in dealing with curriculum cutbacks (Echibit 7C)	Seven	Part C:3	356
Summary of the evidence on the impact of decline and retrenchment on program	Seven	Part B	308
Fact Sheet No. 5. Evidence of the impact of decline on program	Seven	Part B	314
Fact Sheet No. 6. Program effects of retrenchment and enrollment decline, as perceived in a sample of 15 suburban school districts	Seven	Part B	318
Evidence about the impact of school closure and consolidation at the elementary and high school level	Seven	Part B	316
Fact Sheet No. 7. Impact of school closure on elementary school children	Seven	Part B	321
Fact Sheet No. 8. What is the impact of high school closure and consolidation on pupil outcomes	Seven	Part B	323
A field tested six-step method for estimating the impact of enrollment declines at the high school level	Seven	Part C:1	329
A method of projecting enrollment in course offerings	Seven	Part C:2	349
A description and analysis of three strategies for dealing with the impact of enrollment decline and curriculum offerings	Seven	Part C:3	357
See Also Chart 7B	Seven	Part C:3	359
A compendium of 17 suggestions for preserving the curriculum in times of fiscal and enrollment decline (Chart 7C)	Seven	Part C:3	360
An analysis of the problems with Merit-based RIF	Seven	Part D:2.1	400

TABLE 4. RESOURCE PACKET C (continued)

TYPE OF CONTENT AND MATERIALS	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
An analysis of the various definitions of "merit" as applied to judgements about staff, in the context of RIF	Seven	Part D:2.1	401
See also "Exhibit 7E: Summary of the Definitions of Merit"	Seven	Part D:2.1	404
A summary of the evidence pertaining to various definitions of teacher merit	Seven	Part D:2.1	404
Three models of teacher performance evaluation and their applicability to RIF	Seven	Part D:2.1	406
A summary of the criteria courts have used in upholding teacher evaluation and dismissal criteria, and their implications for developing RIF materials	Seven	Part D:2.1	410
See also Exhibit 7F, "Teacher Evaluation and the Law"	Seven	Part D:2.1	411
Three decision rules for designing legally sound teacher performance evaluation instruments, useful for the development of merit based RIF policies	Seven	Part D:2.1	414
See also Exhibit 7G "Sample Exemplary Teacher Performance Evaluation Forms"	Seven	Part D:2.1	414
Eight steps for developing a legally sound and useful teacher performance evaluation procedure	Seven	Part D:2.1	416
See also Exhibit 7H	Seven	Part D:2.1	417
An 18-item checklist for developing merit-based RIF policies	Seven	Part D:2.1	420
A catalog and reference to hybrid RIF policies, incorporating merit considerations in ten school districts, in nine states (Chart 7D)	Seven	Part D:2.2	425
Examples from four school districts incorporating merit considerations into balanced RIF policies which take into account seniority, credentials, district service and performance evaluation data	Seven	Part D:2.2	423

TABLE 4. RESOURCE PACKET D (continued)

TYPE OF CONTENT AND MATERIALS	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Summary of the research evidence on teacher age and teacher quality	Seven	Part D:2.2	435
Case study of the impact on pupil outcomes of high school closure and consolidation	Seven	Appendix	445

READINGS ON CURRICULUM

SECTION NINE, PART A: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	SECTION NINE, PART B: HANDBOOKS
4, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 30, 34, 43-45, 56, 59, 66, 68, 76, 81, 89, 93, 101, 121	1, 15, 28, 31, 35

TABLE 5. RESOURCE PACKET D. ON EQUITY

CONTENT AND DESCRIPTION OF MATERIALS	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Trade-offs and conficts between equity and other objectives	Three	Part A(2)	51
A juridical definition of equity	Eight	Part B	471
Equity and conflict: An interest group analysis of equity	Eight	Part B	473
Discussion of the problems posed for equity by deregulation and retrenchment	Eight	Part B	474
Research evidence on the impact of decline and retrenchment on equity (Fact Sheet No. 9)	Eight	Part B	476
Discussion of the opportunities and benefits equity mandates provide for decline managers	Eight Eight	Part B Part D:2	474 497
How decline affects equity: The difference between the additive and redistributive solution to equity responsibilities	Eight	Part C	483
An output rather than an input model of evaluating schools equity responses	Eight	Part C	485
Evidence on the impact of decline on special education	Eight	Part D:1	488
Are special education mandates a burden or a benefit (Chart 8A)	Eight	Part D:1	475
Four strategies for preserving special education in light of fiscal constraints	Eight	Part D:1	490
Review of evidence on desegregation and retrenchment	Eight	Part D:1	494
Political, i.e., conflict opportunities posed by court ordered desegregation	Eight	Part D:2	497
Program, opportunities offered by court ordered desegregation	Eight	Part D:2	497
RIF and affirmative action	Eight	Part D:3	499

TABLE 5. RESOURCE PACKET D (continued)

READINGS ON EQUITY

SUBTOPIC	SECTION NINE, PART A	SECTION NINE, PART B
General	20-23, 29, 49, 69, 87, 110	18
Special Education	15, 43-45, 65, 69, 77, 92	18
RIF and Affirmative Action	50, 65, 69, 92	18, 19, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38

TABLE 6. RESOURCE PACKET E. ON MANAGING HIGH SCHOOL DECLINE

TYPE AND CONTENT OF MATERIALS	SECTION, SUBSECTION	PAGE #
A summary of the differences between high school and elementary decline and their implications for management	Seven Part B	307
	Exhibit 7A	309
Research evidence: National survey data on the impact of enrollment decline on school program	Seven Part B	308
	Fact Sheet No. 5	314
Case data on the impact of high school closure and consolidation on pupil outcomes	Seven Part B	316
	Fact Sheet No. 8	323
	Seven Appendix	445
Case data on the impact on curricular offerings of enrollment declines	Seven Part C:1	329
Case data on the impact of retrenchment on pupil services	Seven Part B	316
	Case Example 4B	104
Strategies: Nine strategies for coping with high school decline	Seven Part C:3	354
	Exhibit 7B	354
Four different approaches for making curriculum cutbacks	Seven Part C:3	356
	Exhibit 7C	356
An analysis of three strategies for preserving the curriculum in times of decline and retrenchment	Seven Part C:3	357
	Chart 7B	359
A compendium of 17 suggestions, from the literature and from local school district task force reports, on curriculum preservation and consolidation	Seven Part C:3	360
	Chart 7C	360
Procedures: Fact-finding: A field-tested six-step procedure for estimating the impact of enrollment declines on curriculum offerings	Seven Part C:1	329
A method for projecting enrollments in courses at the high school level	Seven Part C:2	349
A calendar and activities for easing transition of students from the closed to the host high school (Sequoia Union High School District in California)	Seven Part D:1	368

TABLE 6. RESOURCE PACKET E (continued)

TYPE AND CONTENT OF MATERIALS		SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Procedures: For community involvement:	Using surveys	Five	Part D:1	209
		Policy	Tool 5A	211
	Using public hearings	Five	Part D:2	223
		Policy	Model 5A	224
	Citizens committees and task forces	Five	Part D:3	227
		Policy	Model 5C	229
	Participatory planning	Five	Part D:4	239
		Policy	Model 5G	241

READINGS ON MANAGING HIGH SCHOOL DECLINE

SECTION NINE, PART A: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	SECTION NINE, PART B: HANDBOOKS
18, 21-24, 34, 43-45, 48, 58, 59, 76, 93, 123, 124	9, 11

TABLE 7. RESOURCE PACKET F. ON SCHOOL CLOSURE

TYPE AND CONTENT OF MATERIALS		SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Analysis and overview of the typical trade-offs in school closure policy choices		Three	Part A:2 (a-d)	51
Research evidence:	On what works and what doesn't in minimizing conflict and opposition to school closure	Four	Part C:1	77
		Fact Sheet No. 1		79
		Five	Part B:3	152
		Fact Sheet No. 4		153
	On the political fallout of school closure	Four	Part C:1	83
		Fact Sheet No. 2		83
	On the impact of closing schools' on neighborhood ecology	Four	Part C:1	84
		Fact Sheet No. 3		84
	On the cost savings of school closure	Six	Part D:1	283
		Six	Appendix	297
	On pupil outcomes at the elementary level	Seven	Part B	316
		Fact Sheet No. 7		321
	On pupil outcomes at the secondary level	Seven	Part B	318
		Fact Sheet No. 8		323
		Seven	Appendix	445
Policy Development Guides and Models	Closing schools: a checklist of what does and does not work (Exhibit 4B)	Four	Part C:2	93
-- Conflict and community participation	Six rules for minimizing conflict and oppositions to school closure	Four	Part D:1	118
	Using surveys to solicit community opinion about school closure criteria	Five	Part D:2	200
		Policy Tool 5A		211
	Using public hearings	Five	Part D:2	223
		Policy Model 5A		224
		Policy Model 5B		226
	Using citizens' advisory committees: An analysis of the use and abuse of advisory committees	Five	Part C:1	157

TABLE 7. RESOURCE PACKET E (continued)

TYPE AND CONTENT OF MATERIALS		SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Policy development guides (cont'd.) -- Conflict (cont'd.)	Examples of local policies using advisory committees	Five	Part D:3	227
		Policy	Model 5C	229
		Policy	Model 5D	230
		Policy	Model 5E	233
	Five reasons for using bond issue/referenda in order to resolve conflicts over school closure	Four	Part C:4	105
	Experiences of three school districts using referenda and bond issue elections	Four	Part C:4	108
		Four	Appendix	127
	Four steps in using the referenda strategy	Four	Part C:4	115
-- Finances	Three examples of local policies applying capacity and economic criteria to school closure decisionmaking	Six	Part D:2	289
-- Program: Curriculum and pupil outcomes	Fourteen suggestions on how to minimize disruption due to school closure	Seven	Part D:1	369
		Exhibit 7D		369
	Four examples of local district policies which incorporate program and curricular considerations into school closure criteria and procedures	Seven	Part D:1	368
	Use of instructional effectiveness criteria in school closure rules	Seven	Part D:1	390

READINGS ON SCHOOL CLOSURE

SECTION NINE, PART A : GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	SECTION NINE, PART B : HANDBOOKS
1-5, 10-15, 17, 21, 23, 27, 31, 39-41, 47, 51, 54, 58, 68, 71, 72, 74, 77-81, 88, 91, 95-101, 103, 109, 123, 124	1, 3-8, 10-13, 15, 18, 21-24, 28, 31, 33, 36, 37

TABLE 8. RESOURCE PACKET G. REDUCTION IN FORCE

TYPE AND CONTENT OF MATERIALS		SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Research Evidence:	On teacher characteristics and pupil performance	Three Seven	Part B:3 Part D:2.2	53 404
	On teacher age and teacher quality	Seven	Part D:2.3	435
	On the impact of RIF on affirmative action	Eight Fact Sheet No. 9	Part D:3	499 476
Policy issues and trade-offs	Summary of the trade-off choices in RIF policy development	Three	Part A(2)e	53
	RIF and conflict management: Virtues of seniority	Four	Part D:2	121
	RIF and curriculum preservation: Merit based RIF	Seven	Part D:2.1	399
	RIF and equity: Affirmative action	Eight	Part D:3	499
Policy development guides on merit considerations in RIF	Discussion of various definitions of teacher merit	Seven	Part D:2.1	401
	Three approaches to teacher evaluation and their applicability to merit based RIF	Seven	Part D:2.1	406
	A summary of the criteria courts have used in upholding teacher dismissal and evaluation procedures	Seven	Part D:2.1	410
	Three decision rules for designing legally sound teacher performance evaluation instruments	Seven	Part D:2.1	412
	Eight steps for developing a performance that is legally sound and useful for introducing merit considerations in RIF	Seven	Part D:2.1	416
	An 18-item checklist for developing merit based RIF policies	Seven	Part D:2.1	420
Practices and policy models	A catalog and reference to hybrid RIF policies from nine school districts in ten states that introduce merit considerations	Seven	Part D:2.2	423

TABLE 8. RESOURCE PACKET G (continued)	
READINGS ON RIF	
SECTION NINE, PART A: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	SECTION NINE, PART B: HANDBOOKS
6, 7, 9, 15, 50, 60, 65, 67, 69-72, 91, 94, 97-99, 102, 106-108, 115, 125, 126	1, 14, 15, 19, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36-38

TABLE 9. RESOURCE PACKET H. RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON DECLINE AND ITS MANAGEMENT

TOPIC AND SUBTOPIC	SECTION, SUBSECTION	PAGE #
About the intra-organizational sources of conflict and the impediments to rational planning	Three Part C	57
Research evidence about the political fall-out of school closure; do communities in closed schools continue to express their dissatisfaction in negative voting, etc.	Four Part C:1	83
	Fact Sheet No. 2	83
What is the neighborhood impact of school closure	Four Part C:1	84
	Fact Sheet No. 3	84
Guidance about what "works" to reduce conflict and opposition, and of the effectiveness of community involvement mechanisms in reducing conflict	Four Part C:1	78
	Fact Sheet No. 1	79
	Five Part B:3	152
	Fact Sheet No. 4	153
Cost-savings made by closing schools	Six Part D:1	283
	Six Appendix	297
Impact of enrollment decline on school program: impact of retrenchment on school program	Seven Part B	308
Impact of school closure on pupils: Elementary	Seven Part B	316
	Fact Sheet No. 7	321
Secondary	Seven Part B	318
	Fact Sheet No. 8	323
	Seven Appendix	445
What is known about teacher characteristics and teacher effectiveness that is relevant to merit based RIF policies	Seven Part D:2.1	404
Impact of retrenchment on equity: SPED, desegregation, and affirmative action	Eight Part B	476
	Fact Sheet No. 9	476
	Eight Part D:2	493

READINGS, SECTION NINE, PART A (ONLY): 2, 4, 9-16, 24-33, 39-41, 43-45, 49, 50, 54, 60, 65, 70, 65, 70, 87, 93, 95, 96, 103, 104, 106-109, 117, 118, 123-125, 128. 129

TABLE 10. LIST AND REFERENCE TO FACT SHEETS

TOPIC AND SUBTOPIC		NO.	TITLE AND DESCRIPTION OF CONTENTS OF INDIVIDUAL FACT SHEETS	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
Conflict:	General	1.	Managing Conflict: What Works and What Doesn't	Four	Part C:1	79
	School Closure	2.	What is the Political Fallout of Closing Schools?	Four	Part C:1	83
		3.	What is the Neighborhood Impact of Closing Schools?	Four	Part C:1	84
	Citizen Participation	4.	What Works: The Weight of the Evidence on Community Involvement in Decline Management	Five	Part B:3	153
Program:	Curriculum in General	5.	Evidence on the Impact of Enrollment Decline on Program	Seven	Part B	314
		6.	Evidence of the Impact of Retrenchment on Program	Seven	Part B	318
	Pupil Outcomes	7.	What is the Impact of School Closure on Elementary School Children	Seven	Part B	321
		8.	What is the Impact of High School Consolidation on Student Outcomes	Seven	Part B	323
Equity:		9.	What is the Impact of Decline and Retrenchment, on Equity Initiatives NOTE: Contains available data on affirmative action, desegregation, and special education.	Eight	Part B	476

TABLE 11. A GEOGRAPHICAL PLACE NAME INDEX

STATE	LOCALITY	SECTION, SUBSECTION		PAGE #
CA	Redwood City, Sequoia Union High School District	Five	Part D:1	211
		Six	Part C:1-2	259
		Seven	Part C:1	329
	San Diego Unified School District	Five	Part D:3	233
		Six	Part D:2	289
	San Jose Unified School District	Four	Part C:4	104
		Five	Part D:4	241
		Six	Part D:2	289
CN	Woodbridge, Amity Regional High School District	Seven	Part C:3	360
CO	Adams County Schools	Seven	Part D:2.2	425
IL	Aurora West Township	Seven	Part C:3	360
	Des Plaines (East Maine Township Public Schools)	Five	Part D:1	212
	Elmhurst	Seven	Part D:2.2	433
	Glencoe	Seven	Part D:2.2	425
MA	Lexington	Seven	Part D:1	371
	Lincoln-Sudbury High School District	Five	Part D:4	244
MD	Rockville, Montgomery County Public Schools	Five	Part D:2	224
		Five	Part D:3	229
MI	Birmingham	Six	Part D:2	292
		Seven	Part C:3	360
	Flushing Community Schools	Seven	Part D:2.2	426
	Jackson	Seven	Part C:3	360
MO	St. Louis, Mehlville School District	Seven	Part D:2.2	429
NC	Statesville, Irredel County Schools	Seven	Part D:2.2	432
NY	NYC Community District 12, the Bronx	Seven	Part D:1	390
PA	Waynesburg	Seven	Part D:2.2	427
UT	Salt Lake City	Four	Part C:2	92
		Five	Part D:2	226
		Seven	Part D:2.2	407

TABLE 11. A GEOGRAPHICAL PLACE NAME INDEX (continued)

STATE	LOCALITY	SECTION, SUBSECTION	PAGE #
VT	Springfield	Seven Part D:2.2	427
VA	Fairfax County	Four Part C:4	103
	Prince William County	Seven Part D:2.2	427
WA	Seattle	Four Part C:3	100
		Five Part D:3	235
WI	Jamesville	Seven Part D:2.2	430
WV	Preston County	Four Appendix	127
		Six Appendix	297
		Seven Part B	323
		Seven Appendix	445

REFERENCE NUMBERS CONTAINING LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT POLICY MODELS

IN SECTION NINE, PART A: GENERAL	IN SECTION NINE, PART B: HANDBOOKS
19-23, 34, 48, 54, 66-68, 76-84, 88, 89, 92, 93, 100, 101, 105, 122	9, 19, 24, 25, 32, 36-38

TABLE 12. LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS CITED IN THE HANDBOOK

PLACE NAME		TYPE OF MATERIAL	SECTION AND SUBSECTION	PAGE #
STATE	LOCALITY			
CA	Redwood City, Sequoia Union High School District	Policy Tool 5A: Use of community surveys to establish a consensus on school closure criteria.	Five Part D:1	211
		Procedures for estimating revenue needs, and for accounting for rising costs in the context of changes in enrollments.	Six Part C:1-2	259
		Procedures for estimating impact of enrollment decline on curriculum offerings.	Seven Part C:1	329
		Policy Model 7A: Transition procedures for handling pupils whose schools have been closed.	Seven Part D:1	368
	San Diego Unified Schools	Policy Model 5E: Federated multi-level structure of citizens advisory committees.	Five Part D:3	233
		Procedures for assessing building capacity.	Six Part D:2	289
	San Jose Unified	Case Example 4B: Slow Death of a Public High School.	Four Part C:4	104
	San Jose, Belmont School District	Policy Model 5G: Multi-level participatory planning structures for school closure decisionmaking.	Five Part D:4	241
	San Jose Unified	Use of class-size norms in assessing building capacity.	Six Part D:2	289
CN	Woodbridge, Amity Regional High School District	Increase of high school core requirements as a way of preventing the deterioration of the curriculum due to enrollment decline.	Seven Part C:3 Chart 7C	360
CO	Adams County Schools	RIF policy giving weight to "Merit" defined as academic credentials	Seven Part D:2.2 Chart 7D	423

TABLE 12. LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS CITED IN THE HANDBOOK (continued)

PLACE NAME		TYPE OF MATERIAL	SECTION AND SUBSECTION	PAGE #
STATE	LOCALITY			
IL	Aurora West Township Schools	Pair high schools in order to consolidate and preserve under-enrolled courses.	Seven Part C:3 Chart 7C	361
	Des Plaines (East Maine Public Schools)	Policy Tool 5B: Sample survey questionnaire to identify community priorities about cutbacks.	Five Part D:1	212
	Elmhurst	Policy Model 5G: RIF policy, merit considerations, based on performance evaluation, give absolute protection to the top 50 percent rated teachers in each building.	Seven Part D:2.2	433
	Glencoe	RIF policy giving proportional weight to seniority, performance evaluations, experience, credentials and service to the district.	Seven Part D:2.2 Chart 7D	423
MA	Lexington	Closing schools and financing program improvements.	Seven Part D:1	371
	Lincoln-Sudbury Regional High School District	Policy Model 5H: a participatory planning process involving multiple interest group input into retrenchment decisionmaking.	Five Part D:4	244
MD	Rockville, Montgomery County Public Schools	Policy Model 5A: Board policy on community hearing in school closure sessions.	Five Part D:2	224
		Policy Model 5D: Use of citizens advisory committees in school closure.	Five Part D:3	230
MI	Birmingham	Policy for defining and assessing school building capacity in light of changing philosophies of education as well as enrollments.	Six Part D:2 Example Three	292
		Reorganize grades in order to protect courses at the high school threated by under-enrollment.	Seven Part C:3 Chart 7C	360

TABLE 12. LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS CITED IN THE HANDBOOK (continued)

PLACE NAME		TYPE OF MATERIAL	SECTION AND SUBSECTION	PAGE #
STATE	LOCALITY			
MI	Flushing Community Schools	Hybrid RIF policy incorporating seniority, merit, and service to the district.	Seven Part D:2.2 Chart 7D	423
	Jackson	Pair high schools in order to preserve low volume courses and programs.	Seven Part C:3 Chart 7C	360
MO	St. Louis, Mehville School District	Policy Model 7D. Hybrid RIF policy in which seniority is the tie breaker should merit criteria lead to a draw.	Seven Part D:2.2	429
NC	Statesville, Irredel County Schools	Policy Model 7E. RIF policy weighted towards merit, using an earned point scale.	Seven Part D:2.2	432
NY	NYC Community School District 12 (in the Bronx)	Instructional effectiveness criteria applied to school closure decisionmaking.	Seven Part D:1 Policy Model 7C	396
PA	Waynesburg	Hybrid RIF policy in which seniority breaks a tie due to the application of RIF criteria.	Seven Part D:2.2 Chart 7D	423
UT	Salt Lake City	Policy Model 4A: a due-process for closing schools.	Four Part C:2	92
		Policy Model 5B: use of citizens committees and public hearings in resolving school closure controversies.	Five Part D:2	226
		Staff evaluation and dismissal.	Seven Part D:2.1	407
VT	Springfield	Hybrid RIF policy. Twenty percent of staff can be terminated without regard to seniority.	Seven Part D:2.2 Chart 7D	423

TABLE 12. LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS CITED IN THE HANDBOOK (continued)

PLACE NAME		TYPE OF MATERIAL	SECTION AND SUBSECTION	PAGE #
STATE	LOCALITY			
VA	Fairfax County	Use of independent citizens study committees in school closure controversies.	Four Part C:4	103
	Prince William County	Hybrid RIF policy. Merit criteria used as a tie-breaker when seniority creates a draw.	Seven Part D:2.2 Chart 7D	423
WA	Seattle	Case Example 4A: Politics of school closings.	Four Part C:3	100
		Policy Model 5F. Using citizens task forces to develop policies for citizen participation.	Five Part D:3	235
WI	Janesville	Policy Model 7E. Hybrid RIF procedure giving proportional weight to merit, credentials, and seniority.	Seven Part D:2.2	430
WV	Preston County	Case history of voting patterns in referenda arising out of school closure and consolidation controversy.	Four Appendix	127
		Impact study of the cost-savings of school closure.	Six Appendix	297
		Longitudinal impact study of pupil achievement outcomes of high school closure and consolidation.	Seven Part B Fact Sheet No. 8	323
			Seven Appendix	445

SECTION THREE

SECTION THREE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS IN MANAGING DECLINE

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SECTION THREE: AN OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS IN MANAGING DECLINE

INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF CREATIVE DECLINE MANAGEMENT

At one time, some observers welcomed decline in enrollments and even in finances as an opportunity for school systems to rethink and reshape their mission, and to become "leaner" and more efficient (e.g., Bellon, 1977:16; Culbertson, 1977:42-44; Scott, 1977:22 and 30). More recently, a similar theme was raised by Robert Behn, a public finance economist at Duke University. In a 1980 conference on urban public economics at Tulane University, he argued that "cutback management in education is (relatively) easy" (Behn, 1980:35):

> By "easy," I mean that if I had to be responsible for managing retrenchment in a school system, the recreation department, the sanitation department, state highway department, the Bureau of Land Management, or whatever, I would prefer to manage the school system. That is not because I think retrenchment in a school system is trivial, but simply that I think it is possible. (Behn, 1980:47, n. 1.)

He concluded that (p. 48) "a creative public manager [can] take such a public organization through the 'throes of retrenchment' and emerge with a competent, functioning -- perhaps even 'better' -- school system."

The record of decline management, however, provides an eloquent argument against this contention. Some of the problems encountered in guiding an organization through the "throes of retrenchment" stem from the very nature of the decline situation, others stem from lack of knowledge and information, still others stem from the characteristics of schools as complex, formal and public organizations.

PART A: PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE NATURE OF THE DECLINE SITUATION

PROBLEM NO. 1: OPTIONS ARE LIMITED

It is hard to be creative when options -- practical, not theoretical

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-- are very limited. William Keough, Jr., a veteran school superintendent and an early analyst of decline, observes (1978b:351-352) that "districts caught in a fiscal crunch have only a few possible alternatives: reduce staff and cut program, consolidate facilities, raise local taxes, or operate under deficit budgets. When deficit budgeting is illegal under state laws, or tax increases are just not possible, the alternatives are reduced to making trade-offs between program and facilities."

PROBLEM NO. 2: OPTIONS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED BUT OFTEN EQUALLY UNPALATABLE

(a) The most rational cutbacks are the ones most likely to arouse intense opposition. In its exploration of the trade-off between program and facilities, a Task Force report from the Aurora (Illinois) school district noted (Illinois, Aurora, 1980:81) that "each dollar spent to meet fixed costs is a dollar not available for the program," thereby succinctly posing the classic rationale for school closure. The public, although it wants tax relief and expects school managers to preserve the program, can often be dramatically intolerant of fixed cost reductions which require the closure of their neighborhood school. Successful opposition to such a measure can be devastating. Keough (1978:352) warns that "...perhaps the greatest threat to program comes not from a plan to cut program, but indirectly as a result of district's thwarted effort to consolidate facilities." When such an effort is thwarted, often late in the budget process, school managers find themselves in a "dead-end." Keough writes that, in this situation, "...quick decisions have to be made [and] only program is left -- and here lies the real threat. Program cut decisions are made under pressure, quickly and without a well thought out plan."

(b) Planning is necessary to avoid precipitous decisionmaking, but it can lead to the kind of conflict it is meant to avoid. A recently completed (Berger, 1982b) case survey of the correlates of community opposition to school closure found that: (i) more vs. less technical planning made no difference as far as levels of conflict and opposition, and

(ii) the longer the decisionmaking process (three years or longer), no matter how technically sound the planning process, the more likely it is that conflict and opposition will arise.

(c) *Community involvement may be necessary to legitimate policymaking, but it can increase conflict and reduce efficiency*. Lack of opportunities for involvement can be a source of conflict in and of itself (Cibulka, 1982b), but whether this issue -- how decisions are made, as opposed to what decisions are made -- becomes a focus of contention depends on community norms and expectations about how much involvement is necessary (Boyd, 1979 and 1982). Generally, however, neither the amount nor type of community involvement made any difference as far as levels of conflict and opposition (Berger, 1982a). And, the longer the decisionmaking process, the more likely it is that conflict will occur (Berger, 1982b). To the extent that community involvement (like technical planning) prolongs that process, the more likely it is that it may produce rather than reduce conflict. Also, the longer the cutback decisionmaking process, and the more "community consultation" it involves (Cibulka, 1982b), the more likely it is that the original criteria for which schools to close become diluted to include non-economic criteria. This can mean that the schools actually closed would save less money. Less money saved can mean fewer dollars left over for the program, and, hence, a diminished ability on the part of the school system to demonstrate what it has saved as a result of closing schools.

(d) *The most economically efficient cutbacks in facilities may not be the most equitable*. There are many ways to measure the cost-efficiency of a school building. Some common measures are: building size and age; the smaller and the older, the less efficient. The strict, and seemingly impartial application of these economic criteria, can, as is shown in Colton and Frelich's (1979) study of school closings in St. Louis, adversely and disproportionately affect poor and minority populations. Such populations are apt to live in older neighborhoods, whose school buildings are also older and smaller. Thus, school closings may tend to continue prior patterns of inequity.

(e) *The most educationally desireable staff reduction policies may clash with equity and conflict reduction objectives*. The most educationally desirable reduction-in-force policy would be based solely on those qualifications and behaviors (objectively identified and assessed) which -- as the courts would say -- "the weight of the research evidence suggests" are most closely correlated with improved student learning. Such a "pure" merit-based RIF policy would also have to be equity-blind. Affirmative action (and seniority rules as well) introduce non-pedagogical criteria into decisions about staffing. There is also evidence (Johnson, 1982; Phelan, 1982b) that some school systems which initially had begun using merit in RIF have since reverted to policies which, once again, emphasize seniority. Because merit criteria in RIF are politically controversial, they often get contested through costly and time-consuming litigation. Seniority-based RIF, on the other hand, reduces intra-organizational conflict but it saves less money, and diminishes control over program. At the secondary level, a loss of control over *who* is to be left teaching can decrease control over *what* can be taught.

PART B: PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE LACK OF INFORMATION

PROBLEM NO. 3: EQUALLY UNPALATABLE OPTIONS HAVE UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES

Choosing the lesser of two or three, or more, evils would be easier if managers had available a stock of general knowledge which tells them "what will happen if we do X rather than Y." Unfortunately, much more is known about the effects of decline than is known about the effects of different responses to decline.

Little is known about the comparative efficiency of different kinds of cutback decisions and strategies. The cost-inefficiencies of underutilized facilities are easy to represent, and so are, given certain assumptions, the projected savings of consolidation. But studies of the fiscal impact of facilities consolidation (Berger, 1982b:19-20; Cibulka, 1982b:8) have found that it is notoriously difficult to document the actual savings of closing schools. What is true for school closure is also true for other cutbacks. Neither Berger (1982a), nor Cibulka (1982a) could find any pattern suggesting that either higher levels of cutbacks or that certain kinds of cutbacks are associated with decreasing spending. There is also little evidence about the efficacy of different ways of going about making cutbacks. Berger's (1982a) case survey failed to identify any correlation between spending decreases and two different approaches to cutbacks: one approach emphasizing "equity" -- dispersed or across-the-board cuts designed to make every part of the school system share the burdens of retrenchment; the other approach emphasizing "efficiency" -- cuts targeted to make the best use of scarce resources. Not finding any systematic difference, Berger concludes (pp. 23-34): "...it is conceivable that retrenchment decisions have little to do with either efficiency or equity. Instead, they are directed at another aspect of educational leadership, namely the need to 'fight fires' on a continuous basis, without knowing exactly how to do so, or the ultimate effect of those efforts."

There is little theory or data about cause and effect which can guide RIF choices. On one hand it is clear that a strict seniority-based RIF can diminish cost-savings, and may jeopardize control over program. On the other hand, there is little clear-cut evidence about the costs and benefits of alternatives to seniority.

Early retirement incentive plans: These are often suggested as attractive alternatives to RIF (the highest paid teachers leave, younger teachers get to stay, fewer people get angry and demoralized over the prospects of losing their job). But some analyses suggest that any program with a strong enough incentive for teachers to retire early would also be prohibitively costly -- quite quickly reaching the point of diminishing financial returns (Ellsworth, 1977). The "educational returns" of early retirement systems are not clear. The research evidence about teacher age vis-a-vis teacher effectiveness is inconclusive, thereby clouding discussions of the programmatic effects of RIF policies which keep older as opposed to younger teachers. Some of the inconclusiveness is due to methodological and philosophical debates about what counts as "effectiveness."

Merit-based RIF: Lack of clarity and consensus about what counts as teacher effectiveness also bedevils discussions of and decisions about merit-based RIF. Because such policy initiatives are contested, many end up in litigation. The growing and ever-changing case law on this issue (in this case, "what works" is all but synonymous with "what will stand up in court") adds another source of uncertainty. One of the many evolving court tests for upholding merit-RIF is the criterion of "reasonableness" whereby teachers are evaluated objectively on those performances which the "weight of the research evidence" suggests is associated with effective teaching and learning.

PROBLEM NO. 4: BUREAUCRATIC HIERARCHY INHIBITS ACCURATE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DATA GATHERING

General social science knowledge of cause and effect is probably no better and no worse in education than in other areas of social practice. For policymaking, however, the decisive facts are facts about the local situation. Accurate information upon which to base decisions about trade-offs among competing values (or, as is often the case, among equally unpalatable options) is difficult to obtain, especially when data gathering is a special crisis-oriented activity rather than an institutionalized standard operating procedure.

For example, a number of studies (Berger, 1982b; Cibulka, 1982b; Colton and Frelich, 1979; and Dean, 1981a and b and 1982) have noted that urban systems have more difficulty closing schools than do suburban and rural school systems. One explanation is offered in Colton and Frelich's (1979) analysis of 37 school closings in St. Louis. Noting that "...high levels of bureaucratization are a prominent feature of urban school systems, and particularly of the central offices which must initiate and

Exhibit 3A: Fairness in Teacher vs. Administrator Rates of RIF

Another dimension to RIF decisions is fairness in the burdens shared between teaching vs. administrative staff. There is data showing (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) that teachers often bear a disproportionate share of the burden. The fairness of this share can be debated.

Boyd (1982b:37-38) cites recent data from New York City and Quebec that suggests that the elimination of administrative positions may not have a salutory impact on the teachers themselves. More specifically: (i) as positions get eliminated, administrative time gets shifted towards the "housekeeping" -- financial, planning, and administrative -- functions of decline management, and away from providing direct instructional and curriculum support and supervision; and (ii) in consequence, in order to make "absentee supervision" easier, teachers are burdened with extra paperwork -- more detailed lesson plans and course objectives, for example -- at the same time as they are having to cope with larger classes and diminished resources.

Cuban (1979:379) notes that the elimination of administrative positions can further demoralize teaching staff by blocking the path of upward mobility, leaving "...shrinking systems [with] the impotent aspirations of effective young teachers."

implement school closing decisions" (p. 397). Colton and Frelich focus on the effects of several features of bureaucracy. These include (p. 397, emphasis not in original):

- Specialization. Unless there is a special interoffice arrangement for school closings, it seems probable that the building department, the curriculum and instruction department, the finance department, the management department, and the transportation department may approach the problem of closings differently. And they may not know it.
- Rules. In the case of school closings, rules pertaining to pupil-teacher ratios, building capacity, attendance areas, and special programming may be particularly pertinent -- whether functional or not.
- Hierarchy. Information flows up and down the hierarchy, and responsibility may be lodged at one point, many points, or none at all within the hierarchy.

As a result of hierarchy and specialization, top administrators become dependent upon information flowing up the chain of command and "...somewhere along the line, cost considerations and instructional considerations are supposed to be merged" (p. 409).

As it turned out in St. Louis, however, the two -- cost considerations and instructional considerations -- were not merged and accurate data about cost considerations (defined in terms of excess space as identified by building principals) were not forthcoming. Instead "...principals -- far down in the hierarchy -- were able to manipulate data on building utilization. To them, the availability of excess space is an asset, not a liability. Given that view, and further given the absence of a sophisticated data-gathering system at the top, principals can hide surplus space"* (p. 414).

PART C: PROBLEMS INHERENT IN SCHOOLS AS COMPLEX, FORMAL, COMMONWEAL ORGANIZATIONS

The fact that the principals in St. Louis would want to, consciously or unconsciously, distort "capacity" data is perfectly understandable. The fact that they were able to says something about the nature of schools as organizations. And, that nature explains some of the additional difficulties facing decline managers.

PROBLEM NO. 5: BUREAUCRATIC FRAGMENTATION CREATES MULTIPLE AND INCONSISTENT DEFINITIONS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL INTEREST

School systems are so organized that it is difficult to apply the most oft-cited principles of sound management. A classic statement of those principles can be found in Bellon (1977:14):

> Sound management of a school district is dependent upon *clarity of organizational responsibility*, *authority*, and expectations. When this clarity has been accomplished, *unity of purpose* can be achieved. When there is unity of purpose, it is much easier to focus on and allocate resources to the *high priority goals*. (Emphasis not in original.)

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* Such a phenomenon had been predicted by Katherine E. Eisenberger, a pioneering analyst of and consultant to management of decline. Writing in 1974 (pp. 33-34), she encouraged administrators to realize "that there are no loyal *district* supporters, only loyal *school* supporters" and that even principals may not have the same perspective as district officials.

As formal organizations, schools do have "clarity of authority" expressed in rules establishing a hierarchical chain of command.

As complex organizations, schools do or can, through additional rulemaking, clarify "organizational responsibility" either by codifying existing areas of functional specializations or by establishing new divisions of labor.

Because large school systems are not face-to-face organizations, all of the above definitions of authority and responsibility are embodied in rules. By prescribing behavior, rules do signal management's "expectations" and the sum total of those expectations strive to create an organizational "unity of purpose."

Rules also establish spheres of autonomy for those whose behavior is being prescribed: that which is not explicitly demanded, cannot be required.* As such rules about division of labor create sub-organizational interest groups. Rules, in general, protect those interests and allow them to be mobilized defensively in times of retrenchment.

In other words, organization members' interests, and their responses to decline, are defined by their role in the organization. In retrenchment, those whose programs or positions are threatened by potential cutbacks "discover" that they have a common interest separate from the interests of the organization as a whole. Because of specialization, problem-solving becomes informed and muddled by many competing "definitions of the problem." These definitions come into play when organization members lower in the hierarchy are given the responsibility to provide data upon which retrenchment problems are defined and resolved.

PROBLEM NO. 6: AMBIGUITY ABOUT GOALS AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT TECHNOLOGY PROMOTES AD-HOC BARGAINING RATHER THAN RATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING

In manipulating data about capacity, the St. Louis principals (to pursue the current case example) were acting in pursuit of separate, not common and united, purposes. Following rules, they still managed to insinuate their own definitions of the situation into the policymaking mill.

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* This second dimension of rules is captured in such sayings as "work to rule" or "minimums become maximums," or "freedom is having a standing rule to live by."

The problem for managers is this: further elaboration of formal rules will be self-defeating. Face-to-face negotiation and discussion in a large school system is impractical. Exhortation to rally around a common purpose and definition of the situation is apt to be fruitless -- where organization members have property rights to their job (through tenure and seniority rules) leadership depends on followership, and potential victims of cutbacks make poor followers. And, finally, because the technology of teaching is uncertain, management cannot have recourse to many non-bureaucratic forms of control.

In some organizations with more certain technologies such as garbage collection or postal delivery, managers can enforce a unity of purpose in employees' behavior by closely monitoring employees' output -- e.g., garbage is not collected. Output measures are clear and unambiguous, and more importantly, the outcomes being monitored are within the control of the employees if they followed established procedures.

In education, such control and predictability is lacking. The nature of the teaching and learning process is such that there is no surefire way to produce desired results. "What works" is uncertain, and different prescriptions for "what should work" fall in and out of favor as public and professional expectations about what counts as a good education change.

Such ongoing shifts introduce a constant uncertainty about the goals of schooling, and hence, about any school district's "unity of purpose." Trade-off analysis becomes murky because in the absence of clarity of purpose, it is not clear what is being traded off for what, especially when cutback proposals make reference to the program. As a result, it is difficult for the public to even understand, let alone support the necessity for some kinds of retrenchment decisions. Boyd's early (1979:363) case studies of decline management found that:

> ...interviews with superintendents and school board members pointed up the vagueness which clouds attempts to calculate the trade-offs between "educational" considerations and "cost" or "budgetary" considerations in retrenchment decisions. This, of course, is not surprising given the high degree of ambiguity which surrounds the ends and means of education. One board member summed up the problem when he commented that he would like to know "What is the educational program that the staff assured us is being preserved within, or weakened by, proposed cuts."

PROBLEM NO. 7: NO ONE "OWNS" THE PROBLEM OF DECLINE

Schools' capacity to make, and justify, the tough choices necessary under retrenchment is impeded by bureaucratic fragmentation. This fragmentation is exacerbated by uncertainties in the technology of teaching and learning. Part of that uncertainty in the "means" to accomplish something (in this case, learning) stems from an instability in the goals of the system (the "ends" or what is to be learned and taught).

The goals of schools would be much less uncertain and ambiguous if they could be set and generated internally. That they cannot is what makes schools "open systems" and "commonweal" organizations.

The distinction between a "closed" and "open" system is relative: an "open" system is more dependent upon and vulnerable to its environment. School systems are uniquely vulnerable because they are not only "open" but also "commonweal" organizations.

For example: a private corporation, operating in a non-competitive market with inelastic demand for its product and enough revenue to generate its own capital is a relatively closed system. It can relatively reliably predict demand for its products and it can finance supply out of its own revenues. It is relatively untouched by the price of capital (i.e., interest rates). Management can set their own goals, even when demand unexpectedly fails.

A small proprietary business firm in a competitive market is a relatively more open system. Demand fluctuates and is unpredictable. Investment and operations have to be sometimes financed out of borrowing, thus making the organization vulnerable to shifts in the market for capital. The owner, however, defines the goals of the organization and this definition guides resource allocation decisions.

A public service organization, because it is public, is vulnerable and is a more open system. It has no control over demand: its services are entitlements "delivered" to the public. Its supply is financed by forces which, to a large extent, are divorced from the level of demand. Because such organizations are public, their goals are generated outside of the system; that is, consumers have a say, in principle, over what the product should be.

A school as "commonweal organization" is a particular type of public organization. The essence of a commonweal organization is that it provides a good or service which is consumed or benefits some, but is paid for by all. A secondary feature of commonweal organizations is that there is a separation of ownership and control of management (i.e., boards of education vis-a-vis the school administration) and, in the case of schools, ownership is exercised through governing bodies which represent, are accountable to, or at the very least, are vulnerable to those who benefit directly (i.e., parents) and those who pay but do not directly benefit (non-parent taxpayers).

These two sets of "owners" may have incompatible interests (e.g., "spend less, no matter what services need to be cut" vs. "keep my services no matter what"). Even amongst the direct beneficiaries, there may be conflicts of interest, given that a school's curriculum is differentiated and becomes more differentiated during periods of growth. Even among those direct beneficiaries, the school's natural and presumably most loyal constituency, it is difficult to get a consensus on the relative values which underlie trade-offs. Morgan and Wofford (1977), reporting on their leadership and participation in a systematic, comprehensive participatory planning effort in Lincoln-Sudbury (Massachusetts), were led to conclude that, ultimately, the purposes of schooling are constituted by different constituencies' interests in specific aspects of a school's program in concrete situations (p. 155):

> We learned that we could not locate a consensus for retrenchment. It did not exist out there waiting for us to discover and understand it. We came to view this as hardly surprising, given our realization that schools have built a consensus for expansion by responding to varied special interests through adding a variety of programs. A metaphor of a stone wall is useful here. The wall got built stone by stone in response to differing needs and interests. People therefore tend to see the wall differently depending on their focus on particular parts of the wall. If we then say, "Which stones shall we now remove?" the initial response is, "save mine, take his." That hardly provides much guidance to policy makers, who are left with the question they started with.

No one, therefore, "owns" the problem of decline (except for the hapless superintendent forced to "change his/her organization toward lower levels of resource consumption"). It is difficult to use a "unity of purpose" as a compass to guide retrenchment, because purposes/goals are generated from outside the organization by its constituency. This constituency is not one unified body, but is, in fact, many constituencies with multiple and competing purposes.

CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF CREATIVE DECLINE MANAGEMENT, RECONSIDERED

As the school organization is driven by choice or necessity to move toward levels of resource consumption, its options are limited to making trade-offs among often equally unpalatable choices. But the analysis of these trade-offs is confounded by: lack of knowledge about cause and effect, lack of knowledge about the consequences of alternative courses of action, and lack of full control over the information generating and decisionmaking operations of the organizations.

Lack of control stems from bureaucratic pathologies which schools share with other complex, formal organizations -- fragmentation resulting from rules, specialization and division of labor -- and from other characteristics, specific to schools: namely, uncertain technologies and ambiguous goals. The latter depletes managers' stock of non-bureaucratic control mechanisms (outcome measures and goal consensus).

Technology is uncertain, in part, because goals are shifting and diffuse.

Goals are shifting and diffuse, in part, because they are not internally generated but come from outside of the organizations. School organizations' constituencies are multiple rather than unitary, and retrenchment creates new lines of cleavage and interest group conflict.

Now consider, once again, Robert Behn's (1980, op. cit.) claim that decline management in education is relatively easy. To repeat:

> By "easy" I mean that if I had to be responsible for managing retrenchment in a school system, fire department, recreation department, sanitation department, the Bureau of Land Management, or whatever, I would prefer to manage the school system.

Let's focus on the comparisons. Like schools, the fire, police and sanitation departments are public service delivery organizations. All are financed out of tax monies, not fees for services. All have no or little control over their market, i.e., demand is not generated by supply.

In the sanitation department, its public union employees may have de facto and de jure property rights in their jobs, but the technology of garbage collection is quite certain and the goals are clear.

The police department does suffer from an uncertain technology (i.e., crime may go up or down due to factors outside of the control of professional crime-fighters and, as in education, incremental improvements in technology and capacity are only weakly linked to the desired outcomes -- less crime). But, every taxpayer pays for police and fire protection and everybody is in an equal position to receive the benefits of law enforcement.

In the case of schools, everybody pays, but only some are served. And, schools, unlike sanitation, fire and police, have separate governing boards elected out of and, at least, accountable to those who pay and those who benefit. Only schools, of all organizations compared, have this constituency conflict built into their governing structure.

SECTION FOUR

SECTION FOUR: MANAGING CONFLICT AND REDUCING OPPOSITION

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CONTRIBUTORS: We gratefully acknowledge the help provided by William L. Boyd of Pennsylvania State University, our consultant on the politics of retrenchment. Boyd contributed to Part B:1, below, and authored Part C:4. Boyd has recently completed a comparative case study of 15 suburban school districts' experiences with decline, School Governance in an Era of Retrenchment, NIE G-78-0086. The Appendix, the Preston County, West Virginia, case-study of consolidation, was prepared by W. Timothy Weaver, Principal Investigator of the project which produced this handbook. Weaver is Associate Professor in the Boston University School of Education. Weaver was assisted by Ron Binkney, graduate assistant at the School of Education.

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SECTION FOUR PART A

PART A: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND OVERVIEW

This is the first of two sections dealing, generally, with the "politics" of decline management. We give primacy to the "political," and specifically to the policy objective of conflict reduction, because unless conflict is managed, successful opposition can nullify the most painstaking planning for retrenchment. In making cutbacks, managers can either use a meat cleaver or a scalpel. The paradox is that use of the scalpel, i.e., making targeted and focused rather than across-the-board cuts, is more apt to arouse the kind of intense opposition which can succeed in nullifying the best made plans.

The irony is that decline and school managers' responsibilities for managing that decline has changed local school politics in ways which deplete managers' stock of political resources, at the same time as those resources are more needed than ever before.

The problem is that recently emerging evidence about the politics of decline management indicates that conventionally prescribed and practiced ways of reducing opposition do not work.

The several parts of this section address the challenge of rethinking the politics of education within the context of decline.

Parts B:1 and B:2 address the paradox that cuts which affect the few rather than the many are more apt to arouse more intense opposition, and the irony of depleting political resources, respectively.

Part C lays the groundwork for an alternative political strategy for managing conflict in decline. C:1 reviews new research evidence about the politics of decline and identifies what does and what does not work. C:2 develops the implications of that evidence and outlines a bargaining coalition-building, rather than a public relations/consensus-building model for conflict resolution. C:3 and C:4 provide a more complete discussion of two key elements of that model: documenting opportunity costs in order to create a constituency for necessary retrenchment decisions; and letting that potential constituency register its will through referenda and other mechanisms which allow (in fact, force) the community to decide among irreconcileable options and values.

Part D provides a focused summary of the political implications of school closure (D:1) and RIF policy options (D:2).

PART B:1. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND ITS REDUCTION

Rational cutbacks are focused, targeted cutbacks. One could assume that, in this case, what makes sense educationally also makes sense politically: focused cutbacks affect fewer people. The paradox is that because such cuts affect the few rather than the many, they are most likely to arouse the most intense competition.

William L. Boyd, a consultant to this handbook and a contributing author of this section, has developed multi-year comparative case-histories of how a sample of 15 suburban school districts have adjusted from the politics of growth to the politics of decline. In these case histories, he develops the following framework for understanding the paradox.

The framework adopts the perspective of the conflict-producer -- the aroused and angry parent and citizen. It begins by asking: When is it likely that that person will get angry; and when is it most rational for him/her to turn that anger into action.

From that perspective, it is rational to become involved, in opposition and protest, when either the outcomes of a policy decision harm (or benefit) some salient interest, or it is not likely that others will mobilize to protect or advance the interest in question. If action by others is likely, then it is rational to become a "free rider" and let other people incur the opportunity costs of political action.

Whether the issue is salient, and whether it provides an opportunity to take a free ride depends on the immediate and potential outcome of a policy decision. These outcomes can be seen in terms of the kinds of "goods" resulting from these decisions. Goods can be either "collective" or "separable." A collective good is enjoyed by everybody. Like "clean air," observed Boyd, in an earlier analysis (1979:351), "it has the property that when it is provided to one member of a community it is simultaneously provided to all members of that community." Other examples of collective goods more pertinent to the topic at hand include cost effectiveness in the operation of a school system or a standard minimum class size.

A "separable" good (or burden), on the other hand, confers a benefit (or harm) to one segment of the community. The continued operation of a specific neighborhood school is an example of "separable good." What distinguishes a "good" as separable is the concentration of its benefits, or costs should it be eliminated, from the point of view of those who bear the costs or enjoy the benefits. To put the same point differently, there are some interests which unite a whole community ("we all want efficiency and a good program") and there are some interests which divide a community ("'we' have an interest in our neighborhood school, 'they' have an interest in theirs"). The former are collective interests; the latter are separable interests. The latter provide reasons for citizens to mobilize and organize politically; the former -- the common, public interests -- are overridden by separate interests, and because of the "free rider" problem (e.g., the "good" of clean air), do not provide incentives for political mobilization. Typically, a proposal for closing a school takes the form of immediate and "separable" harm to some, and a potential "collective" benefit to all. In this situation, one can expect opposition from the specific interests threatened and not expect (because of the "free rider problem") any countervailing support from the publics which potentially may benefit collectively. That is why focused cutbacks, like closing schools, though they may be more rational on fiscal and pedogogical grounds, are more politically difficult to implement.

Not only do targeted cuts like school closure create more opposition, they also are least likely to gain countervailing support, if justified on rational, general interest grounds. This latter dimension -- who should support, rather than who would oppose it -- is addressed in a framework provided in James Cibulka's ten-city study of decline management. Borrowing from and extending Boyd's analysis, Cibulka's framework is designed to answer the general question: "When is it easier and more difficult for an administration proposal to win a majority of school board members" (given that such board members are all to some degree vulnerable and responsive to constituencies mobilized as a result of the conflicts of decline).

Like Boyd, Cibulka locates the wellspring of political action in actors' rational perceptions of the type of good involved in any given policy proposal, and he (1982b:37) makes the following distinctions. "Consider," he writes, "that there are four ways a political good can be distributed and these four patterns express two underlying dimensions -- whether a good's impact is uniform ("collective" in Boyd's schema) or differential ("separable" in Boyd's schema) and whether the good is a gain or a loss."

EXHIBIT 4A: CIBULKA'S TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL GOODS

Whether the Good is a Gain or a Loss	How The Good Is Distributed	
	Uniformly Distributed	Deferentially Distributed
Increment: A Gain	Example: Installation of microcomputers in every classroom at all levels of schooling	Example: Implementation of a program in advanced chemistry at the high school level
Decrement: A Loss	Example: Policy allowing for across-the-board increases in class size	Example: Selected and targeted closing of neighborhood schools

Source: Adapted from Cibulka (1982b:37-39). Examples do not come from the original.

From this it follows that policy decisions, the authoritative allocation of political goods, can take four forms:

1. A uniformly distributed increment. This is the easiest policy to pass since everyone benefits.

2. A differentially distributed increment. This can be passed if there is an opportunity for logrolling among representatives (in Cibulka's case, school board members who may be indifferent to a particular benefit) or are temporarily and relatively disadvantaged by its distribution, but

who are nevertheless willing to support it in exchange for some future good.

3. A decrement uniformly distributed. Everyone loses, but all lose equally -- e.g., across-the-board cuts in school programs.

4. A decrement differentially distributed. In this case, not everyone loses. The loss is visibly redistributive -- some suffer a decrement in order to offer, or "hold harmless" an increment for everybody else in general. In agreement with Boyd, Cibulka (pp. 38-39) notes that this type of policy decision, of which school closure is a paradigmatic example, is "the most difficult to build a winning coalition for."

PART B:2. HOW DECLINE DEPLETES MANAGERS STOCK OF POLITICAL RESOURCES

There is now a rich stock of evidence and reports from experience about the differences between the politics of growth and the politics of decline.* Perhaps the most significant difference is that in decline, as opposed to growth, managers' decisions or proposed decisions rather than community demands become the single most important source of conflict and controversy. This fact has a number of important implications.

First, managers lose the political advantages accruing from neutrality.

In growth, as in decline, school systems are often faced with demands to do additional "things" (offer new services, change existing service for the better, etc.). Often, such demands are multiple and incompatible. With an expanding resource base, managers can resolve such inconsistencies by "splitting the difference" ("yes, we will have both a gifted program and expanded athletics, only not, in either case, as extensive as proposed"), or by an additive response ("no, we will not adopt open education [or 'back-to-basics'] systemwide, but we will set up an open education pilot or magnet school"). Neither option is available under a contracting resource base. But, still, managers can, in the latter case, say "no -- nothing new like that is possible, given the current constraints on our resources." Those constraints, moreover, can be objectively demonstrated. In this, as in cases under growth, the political advantage is with those defending the status quo. More importantly, school managers can still, in either case, play the role of referee. In proposing cutbacks, the referee role is not available. Managers become parties to, and in fact, sources of conflict.

Second, the loss of neutrality devalues the advantage accruing from the public's normal deference to professional expertise.*

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* See the review of the literature in Zerchykov, et al., Managing Decline in School Systems: A Review of the Literature and an Annotated Bibliography. Institute for Responsive Education, 1982. Section 2.13 and 5.3.

Managers' ability to marshall data and technical arguments for and against a policy choice is a potent resource. When invoked to justify unpopular management-initiated cutback measures, the resource of deference loses some of its "magic." Three factors account for this loss.

- When invoked to justify a management-initiated change, rather than to referee a set of incompatible community demands, the data begins to look partisan.
- The data not only look partisan but also flimsy (we emphasize "looks" -- in politics, appearances are as important as reality), because the data makes reference to "what may or will be" (e.g., "unless this school is closed we will have to...., or we will not be able to..."). The discussion turns on rival interpretations of probabilities rather than actualities. Command over the "facts" about what is is easier to demonstrate and is less contestable and hence more persuasive than command over future probabilities.
- Predictions and projections also make more manifest the value choices underlying policy proposals. When it comes to values, professionals and laypeople are on equal footing (logically and politically). Moreover, evidence about the decline experience suggests that on several key value questions there is a distinct lay vs. professional difference of opionion: professionals place more value on preservation of the total program than on the preservation of neighborhood school buildings (Boyd, 1979:359-360); professionals see that the "neighborhood" created by a school attendance area is an artificial creation, born out of bureaucratic convenience, while citizens see the neighborhood as real and the preservation of the neighborhood school as not only of

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* We owe this insight, and the subsequent discussion about expertise to William L. Boyd, a consultant and contributing author to this section of the handbook.

educational value but also of social value, a "right" and entitlement, not just a convenience (Boyd, 1982; Stefonek, 1979). The public tends to like smaller schools, often for non-rational sentimental reasons; professionals tend to see small schools as inefficient and inadequate (see Andrews, 1979; Cuban, 1979; Colton and Frelich, 1979; and Massachusetts, Lexington, 1976).

Once these value conflicts come to the surface, the technical justifications for retrenchment decisions become suspect. Deference to technical expertise can no longer be assumed.

Third, the result of loss of neutrality (and the inability to use the additive response), and the devaluation of expertise, change the office of leadership from an asset into a liability.

The superintendent becomes the bearer of bad news, rather than the representative and articulator of a better and brighter future.

As the proponent of a cutback, he becomes a protagonist rather than an "above-politics" professionally expert mediator and referee.

As such he becomes a public official rather than a leader and in so doing loses the resource of "charisma."* In its technical (not popular) sense, charisma refers not to the personality of the leader, but to the relationship between leaders and followers. Even more specifically, it refers to the reasons followers have for following a leader. Followers follow a charismatic leader not because of his power to coerce them, not because of his formal status, and not because he can offer them material benefits (on a *quid pro quo* basis), but because his vision is or has become their vision.

The professional literature on school management recognizes, albeit implicitly, this charismatic dimension to school administration. The frequent use of "school leader," as a synonym or substitute for "school administrator" indicates a regognition that, due to the organizational nature of schools (see Section Three, Part C, above), much of what a superintendent is able to accomplish is based on his abilities to persuade, rather than on his powers to command. Put succinctly, a public administrator has subordinates and clients; a public leader also has constituencies and followers.

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* An excellent review of the theories of leadership and their application to case-studies of superintendent behavior in retrenchment can be found in Paula Wilder, *Political Leadership and Budgetmaking: A School Superintendent and Fiscal Decline*. Doctoral dissertation, Boston University, School of Education, 1983.

Proposing cutback measures can quite rapidly reduce a public leader to a public official. In proposing a cutback, he is being a leader on an issue in which there may be no followers. As a protagonist in a contest over a cutback which he has proposed, the superintendent becomes just one political actor, among many, albeit one with a unique responsibility and special access and ability to generate information. In this situation, he has to bargain rather than lead.

PART C:1. THE EVIDENCE. NEW RESEARCH ON DECLINE POLITICS: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T

WHAT IS SUPPOSED TO WORK

Don't act precipitously or in an ad hoc manner. Take your time. Do your homework. Plan, and plan comprehensively. Don't do it alone: involve the community, and all affected interests. These are some of the main tenets of a voluminous literature advising school managers about handling the conflict which often accompanies cutback decisionmaking.*

Those tenets, first enunciated in Sargent and Handy's (1974) influential Fewer Pupils/Surplus Space, have been characterized by William Boyd (1982a:22) as the "plan and agree" approach. The main principles are as follows:

Plan	Agree
Do not act precipitously.	Do not act unilaterally.
Take the time and build up the technical rationale and data base for cutbacks.	Do involve the community. Allow for and nurture the participation of all affected interests.
Do comprehensive planning, make the cutback part of a wider master plan for the school system.	Maintain solidarity among the school board members and between the superintendent and the board.

The planning "rule" enjoins administrators to document that what may not be popular is indeed necessary.

The "agree" rule encourages administrators to create a consensus for that which is necessary.

Typically, this means opening up the process of decisionmaking so that one's potential opposition becomes support because, as a result of their involvement, they (the potential opposition) develop ownership in the intractable problems posed by decline, and through their participation in and exposure to the technical planning process they will accept the necessary cutbacks, no matter how painful.

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* That literature is reviewed in Zerchykov, et al., (1982). See especially Section 3.3.2 and Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.

WHAT DOES AND DOES NOT WORK

In the past several years, there has emerged a cluster of research studies which not only investigate how decline has affected the politics of education, but also the effectiveness and impact of the conventionally prescribed approach to conflict management.

Their findings, in terms of the key management practices which are supposed to work, are depicted on Fact Sheet No. 1, on the pages immediately following. Some of the more important implications are as follows:

(1) In general, whether communities plan comprehensively or seek widespread involvement and agreement makes little difference in terms of the level of conflict. Some communities play by these rules and get much opposition and conflict (Berger, 1982b); others violate these rules and get by with no political trouble at all; still others are successful in using the "plan and agree" approach (Boyd, 1982b).

(2) Whether there is community involvement or not, whether task forces are used, and whether the task forces are representative or not makes little difference (Berger, 1982b), but lack of community access to cutback planning can become an issue in and of itself (Cibulka, 1982b).

(3) The longer the planning process, the more likely it is that conflict and opposition will occur (Berger, 1982b). If comprehensive technical planning lasts longer than two years, it is associated with more conflict. "Association" or correlation, of course, is not causality. The fact that there is opposition may prolong a planning process. But the general point is the same: longer decisionmaking processes may not cause more conflict, but they do provide opposition groups with the time to mobilize, and the inherent rationality of the longer more comprehensive planning process does not protect decisionmakers

FACT SHEET NO. 1: MANAGING CONFLICT. WHAT WORKS, AND WHAT DOESN'T.

WHAT IS SUPPOSED TO WORK: MOST COMMON PRESCRIPTIONS IN THE ADVICE LITERATURE	SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT PRACTICE	RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS RELEVANT TO EACH SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT PRACTICE	REFERENCES (Note: an "*" denotes a single case study)
Plan: Take your time and engage in long-term	Use of outside consultants	Makes no difference for levels of conflict and opposition	Berger, 1982b
	Long-term, master planning	Ad-hoc cutbacks create no more opposition than comprehensively planned cutbacks	Boyd, 1982b
		Taking too much time (over 2 years) is associated with more conflict and opposition	Berger, 1982b
		Technical inadequacies and inaccuracies can be sources of opposition: too much technical complexity can breed suspicion and mistrust	Cibulka, 1982b
Agree: Involve all affected interests in participatory planning and consensus building procedures	Teacher involvement	Does make a difference. Is associated with lower levels of conflict and opposition	Berger, 1982b
	Citizen involvement	Amount and types of involvement make no differences for levels of conflict and opposition	Berger, 1982b; Boyd, 1982b
		Participation is just likely to articulate rather than reconcile interest group conflicts, and may polarize rather than suppress conflict	Edlefson, et al., 1977*; Morgan and Wofford*, 1978; Nuttall, 1977*
		Lack of citizen access to decisionmaking can become a source of conflict and opposition	Cibulka, 1982b

FACT SHEET NO. 1 (continued)

WHAT IS SUPPOSED TO WORK (continued)	SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT PRACTICE	RESEARCH EVIDENCE (continued)	REFERENCES (cont.)
Involve all affected interests (cont.)	Use of task forces and community advisory committees	Neither the presence nor the representativeness of a community advisory committee or task force makes any difference for levels of conflict and opposition	Berger, 1982b
		Task force proceedings reflect rather than reconcile interest group conflicts	Nuttall, 1977*
Maintain board solidarity and solidarity between the board and superintendent	Board solidarity	No data on whether unanimous vs. split board decisions are in any way related to community opposition and conflict	
	Superintendent/board solidarity	Does make a difference. But is more difficult to achieve because decline and other coincidental factors have led to more special interest and delegate (rather than trustee) type of board representatives	Cibulka, 1982b
	Increase of board involvement	Active involvement in all phases of planning can reduce community conflict and opposition	Cibulka, 1982b
In closing schools, pay attention to, and involve the community	What happens to a school when it is closed	Whether there is a plan, and whether the school is to be mothballed, sold or leased makes no difference for levels of community opposition to school closure	Berger, 1982b
		Provisions to retain property (in the school system) and make it available for public, communal, neighborhood oriented use did decrease opposition	Narver, 1982*
		Prior consultation with the community is associated with managers' perceptions of reduced conflict	Cibulka, 1982b

against conflict.

(4) The sheer complexity of comprehensive, technical plans can create suspicion (Cibulka, 1982b): that which is not understood is apt to be not trusted.

(5) To the extent that community involvement prolongs the planning process, it can contribute to the conditions associated with more conflict and opposition.

The news, however, is not all bad.

Despite the presumption that the conflict associated with such controversial cutbacks as school closure will profoundly alienate the school system's primary constituency and have profound political after-effects, the evidence, spotty as it is, suggests otherwise. (See Fact Sheet No. 2, on page 83.)

Secondly, there is similarly no concrete evidence that closing a school adversely affects the surrounding neighborhood. The presumption and fear is that it will. Opinion data suggest that residents feel that closure adversely affects the neighborhood. But as Fact Sheet No. 3 (on page 84) shows, a series of increasingly methodologically sophisticated studies have failed to establish that school closure either causes or accelerates neighborhood decline as measured by objective measures -- i.e., what people as voters, homeowners and investors do, as opposed to what they say and feel. (Please note: there may well be a confounding factor in this. Previous research indicates that the schools which tended to be closed were the ones that were oldest and smallest [Andrews, et al., 1974]; more likely to be in poor and deteriorating neighborhoods [Colton and Frelich, 1979] -- which is where the oldest buildings are apt to be located; and in neighborhoods with low voter turnout for school boards [Bornstein, 1978b]. The latter neighborhoods are apt to be poor, transient, and already declining in economic vitality and political clout.)

Third, there is evidence of an emerging statecraft developed in practice of managing conflict and reducing opposition. Specifically, some management practices are associated with reduced conflict and opposition. Some tactics do work. This evidence is summarized in Chart 4A, on page 86. It lists, in three columns, the research evidence about what works, what does not work, and what makes no difference. The implications of that evidence will be developed in Parts C:2 through C:4, and in Part D, below.

FACT SHEET NO. 2: POLITICAL FALLOUT OF CLOSING SCHOOLS

Incidence and scope of conflict accompanying school closure	Conflict and opposition are not inevitable. In almost half of all cases school closure decisions were uncontested	Berger, 1982b Boyd, 1982c	Case survey, nationwide (1970-1980) N:82 Comparative case-data from 15 suburban school districts in Illinois and NY state
Impact on public satisfaction with the schools	Levels of satisfaction did not change after school closure. There was, if anything, a slight increase in satisfaction after closure	Cuban, 1979	Local public opinion poll data from Arlington (VA): before and after school closure
	Percentage of the community holding the opinion that educational quality has decline is higher in school closure neighborhoods	Eismann, et al., 1976	Local public opinion poll data comparing school closure with non-closure neighborhoods in Seattle, Washington
Impact on public political support for the school system	School levy election results showed no increase in community negative voting after closure of that community's school	Eismann, et al., 1976	See above
	School superintendents involved in contested school closings are not, as a result, more likely than others to lose their jobs	Cuban, 1979 Boyd, 1982c	Informal survey of Washington, D.C. metropolitan area See above
	School board members involved in contested school closings are not placed in electoral jeopardy	Boyd, 1982c	See above
	School board members involved in contested school closings are in electoral jeopardy	Nuttall, 1977 Bornstein, 1978	Single case-study, anon. Comparative case-study of 12 N.J. suburbs

FACT SHEET NO. 3: THE NEIGHBORHOOD IMPACT OF SCHOOL CLOSINGS

REFERENCE	DESCRIPTION OF STUDY		SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN NEIGHBORHOODS IN WHICH SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED
	SCOPE AND DATA-BASE	METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND TYPES OF DATA	
Andrews, et al., 1974	Nationwide survey of 60 school districts which had closed neighborhood elementary schools	Content analysis of 20 school districts conducted evaluations of the impact of school closure on neighborhoods. The evaluations were methodolgically heterogeneous. Include "soft" (perceptual) and "hard" (objective) data on neighborhood conditions	Residents felt that their neighborhoods did suffer in viability and quality of life Property values declined Crime rates increased
Eismann, et al., 1976	Local impact study of conditions in 9 neighborhoods in Seattle	Impact measures included both perceptual, behavioral and objective data on neighborhoods and the opinions and behavior of residents Impact inferences based on comparisons between experimental neighborhoods (which had or expected to have schools closed) with matched control neighborhoods without school closures	No increase in crime rates Residents felt that neighborhood would change for the worse No difference in assessed land evaluation The closure neighborhoods did experience -- an absolute drop in the sale value of resident property -- less residential investment than in control neighborhoods -- more commercial investment The percentage of residents holding the opinion that educational quality has declined is higher in closure than in control neighborhoods

FACT SHEET NO. 3: THE NEIGHBORHOOD IMPACT OF SCHOOL CLOSINGS

REFERENCE	DESCRIPTION OF STUDY		SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN NEIGHBORHOODS IN WHICH SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED
	SCOPE AND DATA-VASE	METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND TYPES OF DATA	
Eismann, et al., 1974 (cont'd.)	(continued)		School levy elections showed no increase in community negative voting after closure of that community's school
Amlung, 1980	Fact-finding report on six neighborhoods which had their schools closed in NYC. Relies on descriptive hard data on conditions in those neighborhoods		No change in the economic viability of those neighborhoods Crime and vandalism in the immediate vicinity is lower than when a closed school is re-used rather than mothballed
Andrews, 1982	Impact study of five neighborhoods with closed schools, based on a longitudinal comparison of neighborhood conditions before and after school closure	Hard data on several ecological variables -- especially building and demolition of new structures, property values, occupancy rates, and resident composition -- measuring neighborhood economic vitality was collected for each neighborhood for a number of years after and before school closing Analysis of trend data permitted inference about the impact of school closure: what difference did it make for ongoing changes in neighborhood conditions	School closure did not accelerate or reverse most of the demographic or economic trends already in progress Only ongoing trends towards less school age children in a neighborhood were accelerated after school closure

CHART 4A: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. A SUMMARY

PRACTICES WHICH MAKE NO DIFFERENCE	PRACTICES ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED CONFLICT	PRACTICE WHICH MAY WORK TO REDUCE CONFLICT
Use of outside consultants		Change superintendent Involve teachers
Amount or type of community involvement Establishing special community involvement mechanisms such as task forces How representative a task force is	Lack of access for citizen participation, if participation is the norm in that community on other issues	Prior consultation with the community. Adherence to local participation norms
Quality or quantity of technical planning: master plans are no less conflict producing than ad hoc cutbacks	Taking too long to plan, over 2 years Technical inaccuracies and too much technical complexity	Move quickly on firm under 2 year schedule
Prior announcement of whether a closed school is to be mothballed, sold or leased		Building-in communal public use of school buildings, owned by the school district, into a school closure proposal
	Proposing to close a limited number of schools at once	Proposing to close a number of schools at once Reorganizing grades before closing schools Phase-in school closings Adopt a bargaining strategy and propose more cutbacks than are needed now
	Conflict between the board and the superintendent	Involve the board in all phases of the planning

PART C:2. A BARGAINING RATHER THAN A CONSENSUS BUILDING APPROACH TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

In summing up the results of research reviewed in Part C:1, above, and in concluding his own multi-year study of the politics of retrenchment, William L. Boyd (1982c:24a) noted "the inability of the rational planning approach to perform as advertised." That is, more planning and more community involvement do not necessarily bring more agreement. He also concluded that "managers need not be deterred by this inability." That is, complete agreement may not be necessary. The latter is based on evidence about what those school managers who have successfully implemented controversial cutbacks actually do (Boyd, 1982c; Cibulka, 1982b), as opposed to what they are advised to do.

CONSENSUS BUILDING VS. BARGAINING MODELS

Managers are advised to try and eliminate opposition by generating agreement among all affected interests, including and especially those who may be adversely affected. Successful managers contain the opposition and overcome opponents by mobilizing countervailing constituencies. Managers are advised to seek a consensus; successful practitioners build minimum winning coalitions.

The contrast between "what is supposed to work" and "what works" can be grasped by re-examining the conventional assumptions about the sources of opposition, and about what level of agreement and among whom, is either necessary or possible to obtain.

The key assumptions of the consensus building and bargaining approaches are summarized on Chart 4B, on page 88. Chart 4C, immediately following, focuses on the different roles superintendents need to adopt in the bargaining vs. consensus building models. The practical implications of the distinctions are contained in the following rules applying the bargaining model to decline management.

CHART 4B: CONTRASTING ASSUMPTIONS OF TWO MODELS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

CONSENSUS BUILDING MODEL	BARGAINING MODEL
Achieve consensus and persuade the opposition that what has to be done is necessary and right.	Overcome the opposition by building a winning counter-balancing coalition of interests benefitting from a cutback.
Win over those adversely affected by a proposed cutback program by involving them in the decisionmaking process, thus spreading ownership in the problem. Make appeals to the general public interest.	Bargain with those adversely affected by offering compensating benefits in return for withdrawal of opposition, or mobilize other interest groups. Make specific targeted appeals to group interests.
Rational documentation of the public interest necessity of a given cutback; data make reference to the state of school system.	Rational documentation of the opportunity costs for specified constituencies of not cutting back; data make reference to specific services and/or benefits offered by the school system.
Opportunities for participation can moderate conflict and opposition; participation can create a consensus. Members of participatory planning mechanism should "leave their private interests at the door."	Participation is just as likely to mobilize participants and polarize interests; participation can create a working compromise. All interests are "private." Participants become participants in order to represent their interests and this is normal in a democratic society.

RULE NO. 1: DO NOT TRY TO CHANGE PEOPLE

One lesson of the evidence reviewed in Part C:1, above, is that human relations approaches do not work in a retrenchment situation where there will be clear-cut winners and losers. At some point in a retrenchment planning process, no matter how consensual it is, the policy options begin to identify losers, and at that point consensus breaks down. No amount of documentation and no amount of opportunities for involvement will lead the victims of a proposed cutback -- parents whose school is to be closed, teachers to be RIF'd --

CHART 4C: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF TWO CONTRASTING MODELS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

IN THE CONSENSUS BUILDING MODEL, THE SUPERINTENDENT IS...	IN THE BARGAINING MODEL, THE SUPERINTENDENT IS...
A school leader who articulates the common interests of the school and community.	Chief executive officer and hired public servant (in proposing cutbacks he may find himself acting as a leader without followers).
Above the politics of community conflict over retrenchment.	One of many political actors and interest groups. Brings to the bargaining process the special interest and perspectives of his office.
The spokesman and the vehicle for an objective public, systemwide, interest definition of the problem.	Uniquely situated because of authority, expertise, and information resources, to clarify the implications of policy positions taken by other interest groups.
To educate and lead public opinion to change attitudes and beliefs.	To set the parameters for public discussion of options. To provide the data-base for such discussions. To act as a bargainer and create incentives for others to support a given policy.
To be the next to the last place at which the "buck passes" and after study and consultation, reconcile interest conflicts and propose a plan for board ratification.	If the planning process did not by itself reconcile interest groups, then "pass the buck" providing the board with options, or Set the agenda and create mechanisms which allow and indeed force the community to make a choice among irreconcileable values.

to plan and agree to their victimization.

Efforts to secure agreement on the part of potential victims may be futile and risky (because the extra time taken to try and get that agreement provides time for opposition to mobilize -- Berger, 1982b). Such efforts also assume that documentation and the processes of involvement can somehow change hearts and minds (cf. Eisenberger's observation that the task is to recognize that there are no "loyal district supporters, only loyal school supporters" (1974:33) and then work to transfer those loyalties to the district level.)

The bargaining model assumes the worst case: that people remain essentially private, rather than public-regarding (especially when vital interests are at stake). And, when vital interests are at stake, it is futile to try and change opinions. It is possible, however, to change or influence behavior by creating or documenting incentives for people to support or follow a policy: people may stubbornly stick to their self-interest but they do from time to time re-calculate their definitions of self-interest, based on changing incentives and information.

RULE NO. 2: DO NOT SEEK CONSENSUS

There is a big difference between trying to get everyone to agree to a policy proposal and getting enough people to agree so that their support will contain and outweigh any actual or potential opposition to that proposal.*

RULE NO. 3: CONTAIN THE OPPOSITION BY SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERING TO A DUE PROCESS

If opposition stays focused on the material interests at stake in the substance of a policy proposal, its scope is limited to those and only those whose interests are affected. If the process of policymaking provides opponents with an opportunity to challenge its fairness or its rationality, then that issue can create a wider coalition. Other interest groups, hitherto acting as spectators (because they are not yet affected), join the contest because what is at stake is the rules of the game which they may have to use later on.**

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* Another way of putting this is: substitute the principle of majority rule for the ideal of consensus decisionmaking.

** Cibulka's (1982b) 10-city study found that inaccuracies in the planning process, too much complexity in the data used to justify cutbacks (thereby breeding suspicion), and lack of citizen access to decisionmaking can be sources of conflict in and of themselves. Boyd (1979) and Boyd and Wheaton (1982) found that whether citizens' access became an issue depended on local norms and expectations about access.

How much due process is due and how participatory it has to be depends on this local context and on local norms about the proper way to do business. (See Policy Model 4A at the top of the next page.) Recent history is the best indicator of what those norms are. A good rule of thumb is: provide for as much participation in retrenchment as you used to provide in growth, e.g., the process of closing schools should be as "open" as the process of building new schools used to be.

Democracy, therefore, can be good politics if its potential and limitations are understood. Put differently, planning and involvement may be necessary (depending on local context) but not sufficient to reduce conflict.

RULE NO. 4: BARGAIN RATHER THAN LEAD

There is a big difference between (a) getting someone to agree with and support a policy by trying to demonstrate to him that it is the right thing to do and (b) getting someone to support that policy because you have made it in his self-interest to do so, either because: (i) what you want will benefit him, or (ii) because in getting his support for what you want, you have given the other person something else that he wants.

Strategy (a) is implicit in the consensus building model. Strategy (b) is explicit in the bargaining model. This difference has one important implication: it targets attention on those who could have a specific interest in supporting a cutback. It focuses energies on identifying and mobilizing the potential beneficiaries of a cutback rather than on converting the opponents of a cutback.

RULE NO. 5: BUILD A COALITION BY IDENTIFYING AND TARGETING SPECIFIC CONSTITUENCY INTERESTS

There is no general constituency for retrenchment. Cibulka's study (1982b) found that the taxpayer/tax cutting interests, even when it was their efforts which helped to create the conditions leading to retrenchment, did not step forward to support the school management in their specific cutback proposals.

Cutting costs (i.e., taxes), as suggested in the analysis in Part B:1, above, is one of those "public goods" which benefit everybody across the board and, hence, lead specific interests to take a free ride.

POLICY MODEL 4A: A DUE PROCESS FOR CLOSING SCHOOLS: THE SALT LAKE CITY APPROACH

Conviction requires credibility. Technical arguments seem suspect and will be accepted only under conditions of trust. Trust is engenedered by a scupulous adherence to a due process of making decisions. Don Thomas, Superintendent of Schools in Salt Lake City, offers the following guidelines:

1. Make all information public at the same time it is given to the Board of Education.
2. Hold only public meetings. Agree not to have executive sessions during a school closure process.
3. Send all reports to community decisionmakers.
4. Establish tentative solutions and show modifications made because of public hearings.
5. Work closely with the media -- keep them informed at all times.
6. Keep parents and students informed. Make out newsletters, invitations to public hearings, summary of tentative solutions, and modifications considered.

Source: Communication to the Institute for Responsive Education, July 1982.

Indeed, the literature on decline management is united in warning managers not to expect that financial rationales will arouse much support.

Despite the fact that enrollment decline may have shifted the balance of potential voters in favor of non-parent taxpayers, our conversations with local school board members reveal that they still see the direct consumers (i.e., parents) of schooling as their primary constituency and assume (whether correctly or incorrectly) that their electorate -- those who actually vote -- is still dominated by parent taxpayers.

Direct consumers may have a reason to support a given cutback if it can be demonstrated that it either forestalls a greater harm (greater because it affects a larger number of specific interests), or because it makes possible (via the cost avoidance effects of a given cutback) some improvement in the school program.

This strategy builds a coalition for (not a consensus on) a given cutback by collecting enough private interests in favor of a cutback in order to

EXHIBIT 4B: CLOSING SCHOOLS. WHAT REASONS DO AND DO NOT WORK

A 1978 Handbook for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts notes: "Many school departments have far underestimated the anger and vehemence of public response to apparently thoughtful, responsible proposals." Then, acknowledging that "...there is no foolproof formula for gaining support in school closings the handbook offers the following suggestions":

What Doesn't Work	What Might Work
● The public will not welcome sudden decisions.	● Before there is any indication of what the implications of enrollment decline will be, the citizens must believe that it is a real problem...
	● The process of school closings or major grade reorganization requires at least 2 years advance planning.
● If costs savings alone justify change, public opposition will be intense.	● Maintaining the quality of educational programs should be central to all discussions of school closings or grade reorganizations.
● If the public is presented with only a single plan, it will probably reject that plan in favor of the status quo.	● ...develop several sets of options in response to enrollment decline.
● The school committee's final decision should not be made during the same meeting in which public hearings are made.	● Public hearings should be held for citizen response. Those hearings should be carefully planned so that they allow for extensive but orderly community response.

Source: JOHNSON, S.M. (1978). Declining Enrollments in Massachusetts Public Schools: What It Means and What To Do. Boston: Massachusetts State Department of Education, page 29.

"outweigh"* the private interests opposed to a cutback. The strategy maximizes a key political resource still available to school managers even in times of retrenchment: access and ability to present information about what is, and what might be. The implications of this strategy are spelled out in Part C:3, below, which deals with demonstrating and documenting the opportunity costs of not cutting back.

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* There is an old cliche "all politics is local politics." How much is enough to "outweigh" depends upon (a) the intensity of the opposition and (b) the local school board's susceptibility and responsiveness to the various interests, directly or indirectly affected by a cutback. It is, after all, the school board which has to decide, or at least ratify, any cutback.

Put briefly, the strategy of documenting opportunity costs says: do not demonstrate the general necessity for a cutback, rather demonstrate the (a) specific benefits possible as a result of a given cutback, and (b) the specific burdens which will result of that cutback is not implemented.

RULE NO. 6: MOBILIZE A CONSTITUENCY FOR RETRENCHMENT BY LETTING THE PUBLIC DECIDE

At the end of our overview in Section Three, we noted that "no one owns the problem of decline, except for the hapless superintendent...." In Part B:2, we suggested that one of the political disabilities facing managers of decline is that school managers become the bearers of bad news (something has to be cut) and as such become the protagonists rather than the arbitrators of community conflicts over what to cut.

One way to recover the political advantages accruing from being an arbitrator or "servant" of the public will is to allow the public to record its decision that something has to be cut back. In that way, school managers have a mandate which is stronger than their "say-so" that some cutbacks are necessary, and this cutback is the best one possible.

Part C:4, below, discusses the potential uses of referenda as ways of documenting a public will to cut back.* The strategy is as follows: the documentation of the opportunity costs of not cutting back can create potential constituencies for the necessity for doing something -- for making some cutbacks. A referendum forces the voters to decide whether it is better to continue to pay the costs, including the opportunity costs, of doing nothing, or whether it is better to pay the costs of retrenchment.

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* Especially produced for this handbook by William L. Boyd, based on his historical study of decline management (see Boyd, 1982c).

Whatever the outcome, a recourse to a referendum strengthens the political position of school managers (even if its results run counter to their professional judgements). It puts managers in the position of implementing a majority will.

PART C:3. BUILDING A COALITION BY DOCUMENTING OPPORTUNITY COSTS

INTRODUCTION

The objective is to provide reasons for different constituencies to support necessary cutbacks. This strategy utilizes a key political resource: managers' access and possession of data.

Data can create a constituency. For example, a rumor about a potential school closure can create or mobilize an opposition group. Similarly, documentation that unless that school is closed, the school system will not be able to maintain a quality (and among the remaining buildings, an equitable) science program in the upper elementary grades may create a countervailing constituency.

DEFINITION OF AN OPPORTUNITY COST

Arguments such as the one immediately above (and more importantly, data supporting those arguments) are what Robert Behn (1980) means by the notion of opportunity costs.

Arguing that leaders need not face opposition all alone, Behn suggests a two-pronged strategy: first, make it clear what the specific consequences for individuals and groups of individuals are of not cutting back; and second, show who will benefit from the cutbacks.

Opportunity cost arguments have two important features.

First, an opportunity cost argument is positive. It makes reference to some present or future good not obtainable unless an unpleasant or unpopular action is taken, and not to some greater evil which can happen if that action is not taken.

Second, it asks people to balance one good against another -- the "good" of preserving and/or improving the science program vs. the "good" of having a neighborhood school. One advantage of posing the question this way is that more people are likely to have an interest, albeit less intense, in a better science program than in the existence of a particular neighborhood school. (Keep in mind: "majority rule," not consensus, is the guiding principle).

STRATEGY OF USING OPPORTUNITY COST
ARGUMENTS: SOME DO'S AND DONT'S

If we combine Robert Behn's notion of opportunity costs with William L. Boyd's model of the sources of political conflict and participation (in Part B:1, above), then the following strategy rules make sense.

[1.] The definition of the "opportunity" and the "cost" in question must be specific enough to appeal to some particular interest. An argument based on "the vitality of the school system" has no such appeal. Even a reference to "strengthening the program" is too vague -- everyone has some interest in program, and because of the "free rider" phenomenon, everyone will expect and assume that some other person or group will go to bat to preserve and strengthen the program. As noted in Part B:1, people are motivated to act, politically, by the prospect of particular losses and particular benefits.

There are no particular group benefits or costs for the objective of fiscal savings (and the research reviewed in Part C:1, above, shows there is no constituency for cost-reduction per se either). Once again, school leaders wishing to build a coalition run into the free-rider problem. The most active constituencies for public schools have other overriding interests more salient than the natural desire to pay less taxes (everyone is, in principle, in favor of cost-efficiency unless and until it means cutting their benefits).

[2.] Target the definition and dissemination of information about opportunity costs. In thinking about and documenting a benefit possible only if a given cutback is made, think simultaneously of the beneficiaries -- who they are, how many of them there are, and how can they be reached.

For example: Suppose that the evidence is such that unless high schools are consolidated, the science and math programs at each remaining high school will suffer -- due to lack of students to fill high level elective courses, severe diseconomies of scale, etc. A general announcement and documentation of this problem is useful, if it can show that closure and consolidation will preserve and strengthen the science curriculum. Even more useful, however, would be a targeted mailing (or some other dissemination) program to those families whose students, based on their record of course selection, are the prime consumers and beneficiaries of the school system's math and science program.

[3.] In order to target the dissemination of data about opportunity costs, identify the constituencies affected by the certain losses and the putative benefits of a given cutback. Instead of thinking abstractly about what the costs and benefits of a particular cutback decision are, think concretely of who will benefit and who will lose, and what kinds of pay-offs (countervailing benefits) can be offered to the losers (see "Case Example 4A" on the next page).

[4.] Use existing community involvement mechanisms as sources of information about constituency group interests and preferences. Community involvement mechanisms are traditional in many locations. Managers are almost universally advised to involve the community in retrenchment planning. As will be seen in Section Five, community involvement is expected to perform many, often incompatible and sometimes impossible, functions. Community involvement can, however, in this context, provide data about constituency interests. For instance:

- Community polls and surveys can be structured so as to elicit data about respondents' choices (on survey items which pose trade-offs rather than elicit wish lists), their role -- e.g., parent, by school and grade-level, or non-parent taxpayer, and their activism -- based on prior and current involvement in school affairs.
- Informal "sociometric" observation of heated public hearings can provide "data" about who feels how strongly about what.
- Observations or records of citizens advisory committee proceedings and deliberations (even when such groups become deadlocked and, hence, from the school manager's perspective unproductive) can provide similar data about intra-community conflicts of interests.

CASE EXAMPLE 4A: SCHOOL CLOSINGS IN SEATTLE

Seattle (Washington), in part, because it has a tradition of much civic involvement in school affairs, has had an extremely difficult time in closing schools, despite a precipitous decline in enrollments in the early 1970's and a fiscal crisis in the late 1970's. A useful analysis of that experience is provided in Betty Jane Narver's (1982a and b) case history of citizen protest over school closures.

On February 11, 1981, the Seattle School Board voted to close eighteen of the district's 112 schools, fourteen of them by June 1981. Since 1962, Seattle schools had lost more than half their children and this action by the board culminated nearly 10 years of debate over how the district should respond to declining enrollments, rising costs, and growing constraints on its financial base. The debate was carried on in the midst of tensions created by unmet public expectations for the schools, significant changes in the student population, continuing uncertainties about school funding, and the divisive effects of a massive desegregation program carried out without a court order.

The Seattle history includes three phases. Traditionally, and prior to 1974, the district perceived its primary responsibilities as determining the number of students to be served, the amount of space available, and the physical conditions of the facilities. Both Board and administration saw their decisions as primarily dependent on technical criteria and as relatively self-contained in impact. There appeared little need to consult with affected neighborhoods or the city if a building were being considered for closure. Between 1883 and 1973. forty-one school buildings had been closed within the district, with little public questioning.

All this changed in 1974. That year, the School Board proposed closing seven schools. Citizens from affected neighborhoods were outraged. For the first time, they began to realize the power they could muster by developing their own information for use by community advocates. They also found that neighborhood and citywide political pressure could be very effective in bringing decisionmaking to a grinding halt.

The period of 1974-1978 was highlighted by another School Board attempt at large-scale closure. However, a citizen-inspired court action forced them into a holding pattern. These events were complicated by the impact of the city's desegregation plan.

Finally, in 1978, in recognition that the community must be meaninfully involved in the planning process, the superintendent appointed a broadly constituted 80-member District Planning Commission (DPC).

A major contribution of the DPC as well as an ad hoc citizens'

CASE EXAMPLE 4A: SCHOOL CLOSINGS IN SEATTLE (continued)

coalition was their perspective on surplus school buildings. Where the district had perceived extra buildings as liabilities, the citizens' groups came to view them as community assets. The citizens insisted that attention be focused on broader policy and administrative issues of property management. Hence, they began to look for alternative uses that would benefit their neighborhoods. As a result of their recommendation to the School Board, a property manager was hired to seek alternate uses for surplus buildings. A year later, of the 14 schools closed in June 1981, only three were still unoccupied; only one of these was not being actively planned for.

It is interesting to note that over time the Seattle citizens' movement evolved from a reactive stance ("don't close our schools") to a proactive stance ("let's, finally, do something about facilities"); and from a private-regarding orientation. Of special interest is how this movement evolved. Over time, the issue became not closing schools (for or against) but rather using school buildings. Reflecting upon this change, Narver notes:

> They [the community] were no longer merely protesting closures ...by 1979 citizens were insisting that district attention be focused on the broader issues of property management. Their point of view was derived from an attitude about school buildings as public facilities. Citizens saw buildings as a community resource susceptible to a variety of other uses than the traditional one of providing a place for school activities.

In short, the focus moved away from sacrifice and towards a tradeoff, away from a certain loss and towards a possible benefit accompanying that loss (new communal uses and benefits of school buildings which remain public buildings providing services to neighborhood residents); away from a focus on school closure and towards a focus on "better property management." The coalition, and, ultimately, it was a winning coalition, was organized around the benefit/increment of better communal use of excess facilities.

SUMMARY

Thus far, we have been urging readers to take the research evidence into account, and think differently about the problem of conflict, to try to do what is possible -- namely, to make clear what community interests will benefit from a proposed cutback, or will hurt if it is not implemented -- rather than doing what is improbable -- namely, getting the potential victims to a cutback to "plan and agree" on cutting back.

An approach based on documenting and communicating the opportunity costs of not cutting back, if it is seen as a "political" as well as a technical task, may (nothing is guaranteed) surface interests and interest groups who will support retrenchment. It may also indicate that while no one supports retrenchment, the "community" has many, often incompatible preferences, some of which are more intensely held than others. In the latter case, a specific cutback may be documented and presented, and ultimately accepted as a lesser of two evils.

The specifically political task of decline management is how to surface those many preferences and document a firm and clear declaration of a "community's will" (which need not be unanimous) that: (i) retrenchment is necessary, and (ii) that subsequent cutbacks will be made on the basis of considerations a, b, c..., etc. Part C:4, below, explores the use of referenda as a means of transforming potential constituencies into a coalition mandate for retrenchment.

PART C:4. USING REFERENDA TO DOCUMENT A SUPPORTING COALITION FOR CUTBACKS*

INTRODUCTION

Much of decline management consists of trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. Reflecting upon a long period of conflict over school closures, an administrator in Fairfax County (Virginia) noted that his district has for each proposed or potential cutback devised a procedure whereby the staff and any interested community groups independently prepare their own assessments, study reports, and position papers on the cutback at issue. Procedurally, all such reports are to be given "equal weight" and are to be simultaneously submitted to the school board for action and resolution.

This strategy, perhaps born out of desperation, is politically rational and democratically sound. As noted by the school administrator, "it makes it clear the decline problem is not just a staff problem." The strategy throws the problem and its resolution onto the backs of the local school board.

Shifting the "problem" from the staff to the board does not, however, make its solution any easier. Boards, too (to the extent that they are responsive to and representative of constituency opinion), are also likely to be torn. What makes the problems of decline management often so intractable is that either the "community" as a whole or else different segments of the community, each with a legitimate right to articulate their interests, have different and perhaps irreconcilable views.

One of the highest arts of leadership in a democratic system is knowing when to and be willing to "let go," to put the responsibility of the solution back onto its ultimate source: the community. For a radical version of this strategy, see Case Example 4B, on the pages which follow, which contains a summary and abridgement of very poignant analysis, found in the June 1980

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* This subsection relies extensively on materials prepared by William L. Boyd, Professor of Educational Administration at Pennsylvania State University.

CASE EXAMPLE 4B SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

Perhaps School Personnel Could Retrench and Let the Community Decide What Level of Services It Finds Tolerable

Some schools are closed through deliberate planning. Others experience a less swift and more painful process of deterioration -- death by starvation. Such schools meet their end by the steady diminution of their resources: money, personnel, facilities, and equipment. News stories merely monitor the gradual destruction of a school, however.

San Jose High School is an example of a school dying by starvation. Authors suggest the wisest move may be for school personnel to publicize all the tasks that can no longer be undertaken because of cutbacks. Instead of trying to spread fewer personnel over the same number of responsibilities, San Jose High administrators could retrench, letting the community decide if it is willing to tolerate the reduction in services.

The following duties already seem impossible to accomplish with existing personnel...

- Follow-up on chronic truants and class cutters
- Orientation for transfer students
- Remedial reading instruction for students reading above the fifth-grade level
- Campus supervision, including monitoring of smoking, strangers, class cutters
- Individual college and vocational counseling
- Crisis counseling
- Provision of well-balanced student activities programs
- Special programs for disaffected students and potential dropouts
- Special programs for gifted students

San Jose High is an inner-city school. More than 65% of the school's 1,400 students are Mexican-American. Another 15% are blacks, Portuguese and Asian "boat people." The socioeconomic status of most students is lower than average. Many of limited or no English speaking ability.

Recent years have witnessed a variety of austerity decisions by the local

SOURCE: Abridged from: DANIEL L. DUKE and ADRIENNE M. MECKEL, "The Slow Death of a Public High School," in Phi Delta Kappan, June 1980:674-677.

CASE EXAMPLE 4B (continued) SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

school board. Teachers felt the effects of budget cuts first. For example, by 1980 the teacher/student ratio was 1:31. Department chairpersons and curriculum resource personnel have been eliminated. Teachers teach all periods, with no periods available for class preparation or individual tutoring of students. Counselor time has been halved so counselors concentrate on state mandated programs for special needs students and competency testing.

Students show their discontent in a variety of ways. So far, the most common is cutting classes (in many the cut rate is 50%) and absenteeism. Student misbehavior has increased and there are fewer staff to monitor such individuals. Follow-up efforts with parents or social agencies is time-consuming. Sometimes, therefore, the most difficult students are quietly allowed to drop out. Parents of more able students are withdrawing their children.

Will telling the story of San Jose High cause the community to provide strategic resources? Time will tell.*

issue of Phi Delta Kappan, of the "slow death of a public high school." The authors suggest that the most rational strategy is not to try and hide or ameliorate the situation via Band-aid approaches and publicly admit that without extra support there are some things the schools will simply not be able to do. That is, the authors say, "let the community see, and face up to, and decide about what it is and is not willing to pay for."

A less radical and more preventative strategy is offered by William L. Boyd who, based on his studies of decline and retrenchment (Boyd, 1982c), argues that referenda are a useful, but under-utilized way of resolving conflict about retrenchment in school districts.

RATIONALE: FIVE REASONS FOR USING REFERENDA

Reason No. 1. The History and Practice of School Governance Provide Lots of Precedents For the Use of Referenda. In many parts of the country, school bond issue elections, or tax levy elections, have been and are a normal way of soliciting and documenting the "community will" on major issues of school administration. If elections can mandate the construction of new schools, why can't they also be used to either mandate (a) the continued operation of existing schools, even if that means spending and raising more monies, or (b) the closing of schools?

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* Note: As this handbook goes to press, a May 24, 1983 issue of the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported that the San Jose Unified High School District is literally and formally declaring itself bankrupt.

Reason No. 2. Referenda Really Do Document the Community Will in a Clear and Binding Manner. Managers often use community surveys either to ascertain what the community wants or to confirm and legitimate their assumptions about what the community wants. But unless such a survey is a systematic door-to-door survey of all of the homes in the school district -- a cumbersome task -- the results may be challenged as unrepresentative. Furthermore, the results, in any event, will not have the legal and political weight that a referendum on the matter would have. As will be suggested below, however, well-designed surveys are a useful component of the strategy of using referenda.

*Reason No. 3. Referenda, Because They Are Binding, Provide School Managers With the Opportunity to Recover a Key Political Resource -- The Role of Neutral Non-Partisan Arbitrators and Implementers of the Public Will.** In our political system, there is nothing so sacrosanct or legitimate as the results of an election. Those results, whatever they may be, create a mandate for action and a political resource for school managers. Either way (whether the community votes to tax itself more in order to avoid cutbacks and school closures, or it refuses to tax itself thereby necessitating retrenchment), school managers' positions are strengthened.

Reason No. 4. Referenda Provide Managers With Unequalled Information About What the Community Wants; and Possibly With a Mechanism for Making Silent Constituencies For Retrenchment More Visible.

(a) What the Community Wants: "Community" is plural, rather than singular. What "it" wants is many inconsistent things. Research surveyed in Part

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* See Part B:2, above.

C:1, above, suggests the futility of trying to build a consensus. Decision-makers, therefore, are often forced to work in the dark. School boards, like other representative bodies, often face policy decisions where it is difficult to know what the majority of their constituents favor. In the case of retrenchment decisions, boards can be sure of opposition to cutbacks; but just how widespread this opposition may be is often unclear. Those immediately affected by cutbacks are sure to oppose them, but they also may enjoy support from others who sympathize with their situation. At the same time, it is usually quite unclear how many may favor the cutbacks.

In routine matters, the usual approach of school boards is to do what they think is best for the school district. Indeed, the prevalent "good government" ideology argues that school boards should only act on the basis of what is factually the best and should ignore political considerations. In highly sensitive policy decisions, however, this approach is likely to encounter resistance. In retrenchment decisions, the facts seldom point unambiguously to one clear course of action. Moreover, on such decisions community members are unlikely to accept any claim that unanimity on the board necessarily reflects what a majority of the community wants. And, as extensively documented in this handbook (see Section Five, Parts B:2 and C:1), the creation of citizen advisory committees usually will not produce a consensus either within the committees or the community about what should be done.

(b) Turning a Silent Constituency Into a Visible Coalition. The main difficulty school officials face in making needed cutbacks is nicely summed up by Behn's (1980:116) observation that "there is no lobby for efficiency." In other words, while there always are groups that will speak against cutbacks, there seldom is much organized support for overall efficiency, except for occasional taxpayers associations that may or may not be very active or politically significant. Rather than leaving the issue to be fought out by the interest groups that are active, a referendum gives the whole electorate a chance to make its preferences known. Thus, a referendum makes an invisible constituency visible for the moment, giving officials a clear mandate on which to act.

In political and economic terms, the case for holding referenda to clarify sentiment about proposed cutbacks has been stated well by Cibulka who argues that "when school officials attempt to close schools or to lay off teachers [the] consumers [immediately affected] can generate opposition, including reprisals such as electoral defeat of board members. Despite cost data provided to consumers, they feel free to demand non-optimal service levels because they can enjoy the marginal benefits without fully incurring the marginal costs. Only when all consumers are asked to express their preferences in a referendum are such inefficiencies likely to be disapproved, since for many consumers the marginal costs are unmatched by commensurate benefits."*

Reason No. 5. The Referenda Strategy Has Worked To Clarify Policy Options, and Provide Mandates for Retrenchment. In a study of retrenchment in fifteen suburban school districts, Boyd found several instances where a referendum, or an attempt to obtain one, helped to clarify how the majority of district residents felt about cutbacks.

In one working class district, parents from the neighborhoods of two schools slated for closing persuaded the school board to try again, with their help, to pass a referendum to increase the tax rate. The board agreed to keep their schools open for two more years if this referendum passed. Several attempts to pass a tax rate referendum had failed in recent years, but none of these efforts had enjoyed any significant citizen support. With the help of the parents from the affected neighborhoods, the referendum was passed. The district not only benefitted from the increased tax revenue but avoided further conflict over the closing of the two schools. At the end of the two-year reprieve, parents were more reconciled to the need to close the two schools since enrollments in them had dwindled even further.

In another school district, the opponents of a school closing sought

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* Cibulka, James G. (1983). "Urban Educational Finance and the Management of Decline: A Political Economy Approach." Paper presented at American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, April 13th.

EXHIBIT 4B: PRO'S AND CON'S OF USING REFERENDUMS TO LEGITIMATE CUTBACKS. VIEWS OF SUPERINTENDENTS AND SCHOOL BOARDS IN THREE SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

Especially for this handbook, interviews were conducted, in May and June of 1982, by Dennis Wheaton, of the University of Chicago, with superintendents and board members in three declining school districts which had closed schools. Wheaton is a colleague of William Boyd, a consultant to this handbook and a contributing author to this section on conflict management. Interviews were conducted in three of the 15 school districts included in Boyd's case study (Boyd, 1982c). One of the districts, "District One" (by prior agreement we are respecting the anonymity of places and persons) did hold a referendum, the other two -- "District Two" and "District Three" faced similar circumstances but either did not consider such a strategy and chose not to pursue it ("District Two") or did not consider the referendum approach ("District Three").

Respondents were asked the question: "Did your district ever consider holding a referendum over whether to raise taxes specifically to avoid closing schools; and if you did consider the possibility, why didn't you do it?"

Note: Responses below are in the language of the respondents. We have abridged those responses in order to highlight generic issues and avoid revealing proper names, or references to local events unknown to a general reader.

DISTRICT NO. 1: WHICH DID USE THE REFERENDUM STRATEGY

Respondent A: Assistant Superintendent

Yes, we did hold such a referendum: the one held in October 1980. We said we would like to increase the tax rate because we were operating two junior high schools. We went to the public starting that August and said: Here's the choice. We can't operate at a deficit at both junior high schools, and we need to raise the Educational Tax rate from $1.81 to $1.94.

No, we did not sell it as an "or else" proposition, and we didn't mention the possibility of closing ________Junior High -- the one slated to be closed -- on the referendum ballot. But it was generally understood from what happened at the board meetings that we would not close [that] junior high for two years if that referendum had passed.

The money from the tax rate increase would go not only to maintain [that school] but the rest of the schools, too. But we said we needed X number of dollars more than we had to operate both junior highs, and it was defeated. The last referendum had been defeated with 3500 votes against, and we had 50 workers in each of the seven precincts. If each of them could have gotten ten votes, we thought, we could match with yes votes the number that defeated us before. But the opposition found people we didn't know existed in the nursing

EXHIBIT 4B (continued)

homes and living in the old community south of D Avenue, and they beat us 5000 to 3000.

Yes, I think it could be a helpful strategy to frame a referendum in such a way, if you don't specify which schools will be closed. It provides a mandate for closing a school if it fails. The board can then look those people opposing closing schools straight in the eye and say: "Why didn't you support us financially?" It gives the board a stronger hand in dealing with the public because the board can look them straight in the eye and say: "Where were you when we needed you?"

Respondent B: School Board Member

We held the referendum (of April 1980) after the decision to close ___________ and __________schools -- and the referendum failed in the Maple area -- the little old ladies defeated us. Tobin [Illinois' version of Howard Jarvis] came into the area two days before the election and got the vote out. I don't know how he organized the opposition that fast -- I went to the first meeting he held and there were only four or five there, but somehow they got the vote to soundly defeat us.

But no, we didn't make an explicit pledge [not to close schools if the referendum passed] and we probably wouldn't have kept them open even if it had passed (actually these two schools had already been shut down two years before the referendum). It might have made a difference with _______Junior High. It was held a year before we closed it, and it might have made a difference. ...It's an interesting strategy, but our district is too diverse for such a pledge to make a difference. One area couldn't pass a referendum, and the rest wouldn't go along. People here are still upset five years after their schools were closed...

DISTRICT NO. 2: CONSIDERED BUT DECIDED NOT TO USE THE REFERENDUM STRATEGY

Respondent A: Superintendent

Yes, we did, and we chose not to pose that question to the voters for the following reasons: First, it was the opinion of the board that as enrollment declined, it was not educationally sound to operate schools with very small enrollments. They felt the advantages of having larger numbers of children in fewer schools to facilitate grouping outweighed the necessity to maintain the neighborhood concept. The second reason was that in their attempt to be accountable, the board felt it was not financially responsible to run the district less efficiently than it could be run by closing schools. So they felt they could not defend even asking the question, since they were elected to provide the best educational opportunity possible...we might have been able to operate one of our schools a couple of more years, but the other we couldn't have -- the enrollment at the kindergarten level was down to 11. So, yes, we could have kept one school open for maybe three years if there could have been a proviso that could have guaranteed we could close the school after a specific period of time.

Respondent B: School Board Member

It did come up as I recall; but we ran our referendum attempts with the understanding that if they passed, we would not be able to keep schools open anyway -- in order to be fiscally responsible, we could not keep all the schools open. We thought there was no way we could ask for enough money to keep schools open. Even with the closing of two schools, we were not asking for enough money. [About the pledge not to close schools if the referendum passed]...I'd be surprised if it wasn't suggested by some parents group, but we were working with figures that showed that even if the referendum passed we had to close schools. It just would not have been responsible thinking to do otherwise. Maybe in a smaller district they could do so, but not with as many neighborhood schools as we have. [About how effective it was]...I was surprised at the kind of response we got from the community -- the response was: don't ask for more money. If you want to close schools, go ahead. Just don't close ours. I was surprised to learn that we were more parochial than we thought. The attitude here was "this is our school and the rest can go fly a kite." ...It [the strategy] would only work in a small district because in a large district parents supporting schools under threat of closing couldn't get sympathy or support on a referendum from the other community members around other schools -- couldn't mobilize a majority in a district with many neighborhood schools...

DISTRICT NO. 3: REFERENDUM NOT CONSIDERED

Respondent A: Superintendent

No, it wasn't considered here. Oh, there was probably some discussion by parents interested in doing so as the process of closing schools was going on. But the whole concept of raising taxes -- taxes are very high here. We have no industrial base -- it's all on homeowners except for the small downtown area. In the last four years all that saved our tails was a big increase in assessed valuation. The bad side of that is that the community is quite tax conscious. So the whole question of such a referendum is almost too absurd to consider. You have to understand the tax climate in this part of [the country]. Taxes in the past five years have doubled. One board member says her property taxes have quadupled in ten years.

The idea might have been a nice exercise, but it's so far out with our situation here it wouldn't be seriously considered. At least that's my analysis, and I think it's accurate.

support from candidates running for the school board and also proposed a district-wide referendum on the closing of their school. But they were unsuccessful in both ventures. There was insufficient support even to hold the referendum. The school closing affected only a small segment of the district's population and there were many voters who were more concerned about the district cutting back on expenses.

Finally, in a third district, the opponents of a decision to close two neighborhood schools did succeed in petitioning for a referendum to keep the schools open by raising taxes. But the referendum was defeated by an overwhelming margin.* Moreover, in the same election, candidates supporting the board's school closing decision were elected to the board over candidates opposing the decision.

Whether successful or not, these efforts at referenda on whether to pay the costs of keeping schools open had the advantage of documenting, in a convincing way, how most school district residents felt on the subject.

SOME PROCEDURES FOR USING THE REFERENDA STRATEGY

To repeat: using referenda is a useful but under-utilized strategy. Exhibit 4B on the next few pages contains interview data from three of the 15 school districts, revealing school reactions to, and experiences with, the concept of using referenda. The perceptions and reactions are representative of what the Institute for Responsive Education was told in its informal queries of school managers. The general impression is that managers are gun-shy of using referenda. They feel it is too much of a gamble.

There is good reason for this feeling. Referenda can be a loose cannon on the deck of decisionmaking. If following the "good government" ideology, managers first decide what they think is best, and then go to a referenda to

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* A similar sequence of events enabled Preston County, West Virginia, to resolve a long-standing political stalemate over school closure and consolidation. See that case-history in the Appendix to this section.

EXHIBIT 4C: USING REFERENDA TO INFORM AND CONVINCE THE PUBLIC

A Minnesota handbook advises the use of referenda in order to document the community's "will" on retrenchment issues. The handbook notes that "the more 'open' the school district is about program costs, the better," and that holding "a referendum requires a major public information effort...planning for a referendum means giving citizens a mini-course in school finance." Such a "mini-course" includes providing citizens with information on:

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[1] Comparability of the District with Others of Similar Size on Such Factors As:

- (a) Staff per 100 students
- (b) Average class size
- (c) Net current expenditure per pupil unit of instruction
- (d) Number of administrators per 1000 students
- (e) Dollar expenditures for salaries
- (f) Percent net current expenditure for salaries
- (g) Ratio of administrators to teachers
- (h) Total school tax levy
- (i) Ratio of teachers to non-classroom professionals

[2] Unit Costs of Specific Programs

- (a) Cost of non-mandated programs, e.g., elementary physical education
- (b) Cost of supplemental pay, e.g., for coaches, class advisors, etc.

[3] Historical and Trend Data

- (a) Example: teaching staff configurations -- percent at Step 1 and Step 12 in 1971-72 vs. percent at Step 1 and Step 12, current.

SOURCE: MINNESOTA STATE PLANNING AGENCY (1976). Planning Assistance Manual: Managing School Districts with Declining Enrollment. Prepared in cooperation with the Minnesota State Department of Education and the Minnesota Association of School Administrators. Pages 67-68.

EXHIBIT 4D: DOCUMENTING FINANCIAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC: SOME STRATEGIES FOR BOARD MEMBERS' CONSIDERATIONS

Here is a list of suggestions offered by a 1978 National School Boards Association handbook on decline management.

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[1] Break out per-pupil costs and number of pupils by category: This is a good way to dramatize the rising numbers of students and the high cost of special education.

[2] Compare the status of school costs with those of the local city or county government. In many cases a decline in enrollment is part of an overall decline in city population. Has the cost of fire, police and other services gone down as the number of residents decreases? Consideration may be particularly important for school boards that receive their monies from city and county councils as part of an overall government budget.

[3] Publicize net savings where they do occur. A public perception of the Board as cost-conscious and responsible will greatly enhance support in the event other costs increase.

[4] Present the reasons for which the overall budget won't go down by explaining other uses for the money in terms of budget "bonuses" or transfers: An attempt should be made in budgeting materials to show the public visually and graphically how the money saved by reducing staff or closing a school will be used. Charts and other techniques can show, for example:

- "10 fewer first grade teachers @ $15,000 -- will be used to buy three more hours of kindergarten for 250 children" in a district that has long wanted to expand to an all day kindergarten program.
- Similarly, "net reduction in closing one junior high school @ $500,000 (principal, librarian, custodians, utilities, maintenance, 5% of teachers) -- will be used to buy one adult education for 1,000 city residents."
- Use of "book allotments @ $25 for 2,000 less students ($50,000) to buy one additional new book for each of the remaining students" is but one more example.

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from: NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION (1978). Declining Enrollments: Its Challenge to Urban School Boards. A Report of the Committee on Declining Enrollments, Council of Big City School Boards. Washington, D.C. Page 13.

get support, they risk a vote of no confidence which can be devastating to superintendents and board members. If referenda are held precipitously and without prior groundwork, their mandate may be ambiguous.

The approach offered here sees the use of referenda as part of a comprehensive approach to clarifying policy choices and resolving conflict. Such an approach could consist of the following procedures.

Step One: Using the kind of community surveys and public opinion polls described in Section Five, Part D:1, below, identify (a) what services and benefits are most highly valued, and (b) what choices and trade-offs different segments of the community are willing to make.

Step Two: Using the financial analysis procedures described in Section Six, Part C:2, identify the costs necessary to maintain those school services most valued by the community as revealed in the data produced in Step One. This will identify the price-tag of maintaining popular services.

Step Three: Using the Financial Analysis Model presented in Section Six, Part C:1, to estimate the local tax levy necessary to continue to pay for the school services. The figure arrived at as a result of this operation defines the content of a possible referendum question.

Step Four: Using the data gathered in Steps Two and Three, conduct a public information campaign (see Exhibits 4C and 4D) via community meetings, public hearings and forums as described in Section Five, Part D:2.

A FINAL NOTE

What is offered is an overview of a possible way for managers to use the time-honored principle of majority rule and the existing institution of referenda to make concrete the strategy of coalition building by documenting opportunity costs.

One implication of this approach is that purely political, i.e., public relations and propagandizing, tactics are not the most politically effective conflict management procedures. Where material, rather than emotional, interests are at stake, "facts" do make a difference. The strategy we outline maximizes one of a school manager's key resources unaffected by decline; access to, and capacity for generating information. "Letting go" and forcing the community to decide does not mean the abdication of school leaders' professional responsibilities.

Another implication is that the referenda strategy is neither a quick nor an easy fix. Whether the use of referenda is an appropriate strategy in a given school district is a question that local officials have to decide. In some cases, they may feel, as did some school officials we questioned, (see Exhibit 4B, above), that in their situations it would be "educationally unsound" or "fiscally irresponsible" to do so. While such objections may be valid in some instances, it is important to remember that in the final analysis the public schools belong to the citizens. There is much to be said for the use of democracy in resolving conflict.

In Section Five, we explore some of the problems and opportunities of using democracy in decline management.

PART D:1 CONFLICT REDUCTION AND SCHOOL CLOSURE.

INTRODUCTION

If minimizing conflict were the only or overriding policy objective, then closing schools would be the last resort, and the least rather than the most frequent category of cutbacks. That, however, is not the case. The practical policy issue is this; other things being equal, what considerations and decision rules should enter into the criteria for choosing which schools should be closed, if the objective is to minimize conflict and opposition?

In posing such a question we are being purposefully myopic, concentrating only on the political considerations. Such a concentration can lead to decision rules which are unheard of, unrealistic, and, for many other reasons, undesirable. But that is exactly the point being made here. Taking political considerations to their logical conclusion can help sharpen the trade-off choices and clarify what is at stake in the principles of public policy which guide cutback decisionmaking.

BACKGROUND

This is a different sort of question from the "how" issue addressed in earlier parts of this section. Despite a voluminous advice literature on winning support, most of it devoted to the problem of closing schools, we found no discussion of the question "which schools to close." Not surprisingly, we also found no policy models which explicitly incorporate conflict-reduction objectives into formal criteria for assessing which schools to close. (There is, however, one often-used criterion -- "walking distance to the next nearest school" -- which does have the latent function of minimizing conflict and opposition.)

STRATEGIES AND RESOURCES

What we can offer are some practical rules of thumb which capture the emerging statecraft of closing schools and managing conflict. This statecraft comes from three sources -- the research evidence reviewed in Part C:1, above; off-the-record observations offered by school managers (including anonymous interview data in the aforementioned research), and the author's contacts with citizen and parent activists trying to prevent their school from being closed.*

SOME RULES OF THUMB ABOUT CLOSING SCHOOLS: DO'S AND DON'T'S

Rule No. 1. Do Not Close Newer Schools.

Especially in suburban but also in all neighborhoods, the newer buildings are a source of pride and a symbol (often as a result of some earlier successful political fight over site placement of new buildings) of neighborhood pride and vitality. Such schools often have the facilities which are used for other neighborhood functions. And closing a recently built school invites criticism like -- "why did we vote for that bond issue not too long ago, if the school is to be closed now?" -- and introduces further skepticism about the technical expertise of school managers.

Rule No. 2. Do Not Close the Smaller Schools.

Both research and anecdotal data show the public, as opposed to professional educators, to have a sentimental attachment to smaller schools. This attachment is also rational: smaller schools cover a smaller attendance area and hence are closer to home; it is easier to get to know staff and administration in smaller schools.

Rule No. 3. Do Not Close Instructionally Effective Schools.

Typically, parents opposing a closing of their school "feel" that it's a good school, and better than others which are not slated to close. If there are data confirming that belief, these data can be used quite effectively to question the technical validity of retrenchment plans, and call into question the whole rationale behind the strategy for retrenchment. "If we are looking for ways in which to cut back which can preserve the educational program, why close this particular school whose instructional program is demonstrably effective?" This is a powerful argument.

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* The Institute for Responsive Education, which is publishing this handbook, is a recognized advocate of citizens' and parents' right to have a say (_not_ the right to always have their way) in public policy about education.

Rule No. 4. Do Not Close Schools With High Levels of Parent Involvement.

Involvement can take many forms -- aides and volunteers, PTO/PTA's, and other school-based groups including highly active (in comparison to other schools) parent advisory committees of various kinds. Some comparative aggregate measure might well be included in criteria for assessing which school ought to be closed.

First, the kind of involvement just described is often a goal of school districts. Politically, any cutback which violates a school district's goals and philosophy gives ammunition to the opposition.

Second, participation indicates commitment, and the higher the level of commitment, the more intense the opposition is likely to be.

Third, whenever there is participation and association, there is organization, and organization equals power. Parents used to working together on bake sales and other volunteer activities can quite quickly become organized into a political opposition group. Such parents are, as Salisbury (1980) discovered, the pool from which political activists are born. Involved parents are more apt to vote for school boards, campaign, and run for election.

Rule No. 5: Incorporate School District Goals and Philosophy into the Criteria for Choosing Which Schools to Close.

If managers don't do this, then parent opponents to school closure will. When this happens, the political advantage will be with the parents.

They become the defenders of commonly agreed upon aspirations, and can mobilize the same in fighting against the closing of their school.

SOME TRADE-OFFS

There are of course many obvious fiscal, educational and logistical considerations which can override the aforementioned rules. The application of some of these rules may also have adverse equity implications: specifically, the "transient neighborhood," the "old school," and the "instructional effectiveness" criteria. The former two place low SES neighborhoods at a disproportionate risk of losing their neighborhood school. The latter, the "instructional effectiveness rule," can also have the same effect unless building-by-building achievement data is disaggregated by SES. The statistical association between higher SES and higher achievement is well known. The blind application of this rule can thus also single out schools in poor and minority neighborhoods as the most likely candidates for closure.

PART D:2. CONFLICT AND RIF: SOME VIRTUES OF SENIORITY.

INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY ISSUE

Other things being equal, RIF of tenured faculty by seniority is the least conflict-producing (not to mention the sometimes only available -- due to state statute or contract) personnel policy.

On this issue, it is important to differentiate between internal (within the school organization) and external conflict. RIF can produce internal conflict, but except on civil rights issues involving affirmative action, there is little intense community pressure and conflict over alternative RIF procedures.

BACKGROUND: SOME FACTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

While there is diffuse public support for keeping the "good" teachers and letting go the "mediocre" or "bad" ones, no matter how experienced we found no instances in practice or in the literature of an organized public constituency support for school managers when "push comes to shove" and districts try to propose or implement merit RIF procedures. On the other hand, trying or using merit criteria in RIF is more likely to get a school district into court or into arbitration (Phelan, 1982a and also Education USA, May 22, 1981).

Because of these difficulties, a six-district study of personnel practices nationwide (Johnson, 1982) found that even school districts that initially set out to use performance as the main criterion in RIF eventually shifted to seniority.

Phelan's (1982a and b) study of 16 Massachusetts school districts (encompassing the onset of Proposition 2-1/2 -- that state's successful local tax-cap measure) found that a majority of principals and teachers wanted some kind of performance evaluation included as a RIF criterion. But the teachers, especially, viewed many existing or proposed evaluation procedures as arbitrary and subjective. And, to a certain extent, the courts are apt to agree (Sealey, 1981), especially if school districts implement a new evaluation procedure in the same year that RIFs are to occur and for the specific purpose of laying off tenured faculty using new non-seniority criteria. (Please see Section Seven, Part D:2.1, below.)

IMPLICATIONS: SOME RULES AND STRATEGIES

Here is a summary of the observations made by the analysts who have explored the costs and benefits of alternative RIF procedures, and have confronted the research evidence on what actually happens when retrenching school districts try to deviate from seniority-based RIF. Their collective wisdom can be expressed in two general principles: do not change staff evaluation procedures in the first year in which tenured faculty have to be RIF'ed, and concede on the issue of seniority and use it as a bargaining chip in order to introduce more productivity (and productivity measures) into school personnel management.

Do Not Act Precipitously.

Earlier literature (e.g, Sargent and Handy, 1974; AASA, 1974) almost universally prescribed RIF by seniority. Over the years, due to a heightened concern over teacher productivity and affirmative action, seniority RIF fell out of favor, even though it continued to predominate in practice. There is now, however, almost universal agreement, even among the strongest partisans of merit-based RIF, that school systems should not attempt to employ a newly instituted merit RIF procedure in their first year of tenured staff layoffs. The resulting trouble is not going to be worth it. The danger is that a failed attempt and a reversal to strict seniority (see Johnson, 1982, op. cit.) may "kill" the evolution of a more performance-based personnel policy.

Recognize the Intangible Political Benefits of Seniority-Based RIF.

Robert Behn (1980), whose analyses of decline management have often faulted school managers for being less than assertive in their management prerogatives and leadership responsibilities, offers the following reasons why seniority remains the basic decision rule (Behn, 1980:21).

One, it is easy to measure, and less ambiguous and liable to conflicts over subjective interpretation.

Two, it appears equitable -- similar persons, in similar circumstances, are treated alike.

Three, and more pragmatically, seniority reflects the "power position within the teachers' union" and thus represents the "teachers' collectively expressed and official preference."

Phelan (1982b) adds that respecting this preference is important for the preservation of what he calls (p. 7) "a legitimate order of management" in school systems, an intra-organizational consensus even more necessary, when under retrenchment, ranks have to be closed and morale maintained. Noting that schools are imperfect bureaucracies, and noting the impediments to strict hierarchical lines of control inherent in the very nature of teaching as it is now organized (see a discussion of this theme in Section Three, Problem Nos. 4, 5 and 6, above), Phelan warns against the "internal dissensions" which can shatter this internal order by rushing to ill-conceived, merit-based RIF procedures which run a high risk of being successfully contested in the courts. When that happens, managers lose not only their initiative, but the loyalty of staff.

Bargain for Improved RIF Procedures

There is now a trend (see Behn, 1980; Boyd, 1982b; Johnson, 1982; and Murnane, 1981) to consider how, through more creative collective bargaining, the benefits (and constraints) of seniority can be kept whilst doing away with its most pernicious features -- namely, a "Peter Principle" type of bumping in which length of service in an unrelated area entitles one to a first claim upon a teaching position for which that teacher is not at all prepared.*

For example, Behn (1980:33) suggests a bargaining strategy which plays upon teachers' natural and legitimate concerns for job protection while still invoking the advantages offered by being in a buyer's market. Managers, he suggests, may as a result of "pressure for cutbacks," be "in a better bargaining position on other important issues." For instance:

> ...in return for no or smaller cutbacks, significant concessions can be extracted. In the case of school system retrenchment, incentives can be created from the increase in per pupil resources that comes from declining enrollment. Teachers will want to use these resources to maintain their jobs (indeed, to make them more pleasant) by letting the pupil/teacher ratio decline with enrollment. Meanwhile, managers have other concerns, including improving the effectiveness and competence of teachers. Decreasing the pupil/teacher ratio can be justified if it does, in fact, improve student learning, though that is unlikely to happen if the teachers are not competent. Thus, school system managers can use the incentive of employment to extract from the teacher unions a concession on the emotional issue of competency testing and the dismissal of ineffective teachers.

If such concessions are formally conceded to, through bargaining, managers can still maintain the value and atmosphere of what Phelan has called the "legitimate order of management."

THE TRADE-OFFS

These are quite obvious. Any long-term reliance on or short-term concession to seniority RIF drives up per-employee salary costs. Hence, either other areas for cost reduction have to be found, or more teachers will have to be laid off to effect the necessary reduction in expenditures. The latter may require deeper cuts in services, and can increase internal conflict -- the more jobs that are at risk, the greater the outcry. Also any rule, like seniority, which reduces managers' discretion can jeopardize efforts to preserve the integrity of the curriculum: If you lose control over who is teaching, you begin to lose control over what is or can be taught. Finally, equity considerations cut across the other values at stake. There is a well-publicized clash between seniority vs. affirmative action. There is also a potential clash between affirmative action and merit-based RIF, where merit is measured solely on pedagogically relevant teacher behaviors, and not characteristics or qualities.

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* This may explain why earlier writings about decline, e.g, Sargent and Handy, 1974; AASA, 1974, did not see seniority as that much of a problem. At that time the pedagogically disastrous effects of bumping were not yet felt. As the teacher force ages, and older teachers retire, this problem may resolve itself. The worst abuses of bumping occur as a result of wide-open certification practices of earlier years, e.g., in Massachusetts many older teachers are certified to teach from grades 1 to 12. Subsequent tightening of certification requirements has, of course, "grandfathered" those old certifications.

APPENDIX: POLITICS AND SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION: A CASE ANALYSIS OF PRESTON COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA*

INTRODUCTION

Much attention is paid to the question of who opposes school closure and consolidation, and to the issue of how that opposition can be met and overcome. In Part C:3, above, we suggested, however, that rather than eliminating opposition and rather than trying to convert opponents into supporters, school managers may want to consider building minimal winning coalitions for such cutbacks by documenting the opportunity costs of not cutting back.

In this section, we present a specially commissioned case study of a school consolidation contoversy, based on data from 1973-1977, in Preston County, West Virginia. Answers to the question -- "Who, i.e., what segments of the community, in this case, supported consolidation" -- are based on an analysis of voting results in four bond elections (1973, 1974 -- two elections -- and 1976) which were benchmarks in the resolution of conflict surrounding that district's consolidation of eight high schools into three.

THE SETTING

Preston County (population 25,455) is sparsely settled and relatively poor. It lags behind the United States averages on most SES indices. 1980-81 enrollments in all schools, grades K-12, was 6,606. Enrollment projections show a continued gradual decline, leveling off at approximately 5,363 students in 1984-85.** In 1976, there were eight high schools in the county, ranging in size from 24 seniors to 108 seniors. In addition, there were 25 elementary schools organized in a variety of ways (for example, 1-8, K-6, and so on). The elementary programs ranged in size from 22 to 141 pupils in 1976.

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* This section is authored by W. Timothy Weaver (with assistance by Ron Binkney), Principal Investigator for the project which produced this handbook.

** The school district is coterminous with county boundaries and has one Board of Education with five members elected at large (with no more than 2 from any single magisterial district). The administration of the school system is centralized under a superintendent, assistant superintendent, and administrative staff.

Several of the school buildings were antiquated and two elementary school buildings were acknowledged to be structurally unsafe. The generally poor physical condition of the county's schools was uncontested by all parties in the consolidation debate.

THE HISTORY OF CONSOLIDATION

1965-1968: Radical Consolidation Proposals

Early proposals for consolidation were driven by educational rather than demographic or even cost considerations. These early proposals were far more drastic than what the consolidation actually approved, and also reflected the premises of an earlier age that "more and bigger is better."

For instance, in 1965, the Preston County Board of Education hired two consultants to study education in the county. Their report urged the elimination of all existing high schools in the county and the construction of one consolidated school to which all county high school students would be bused. This new high school, with a projected enrollment of 1,300 to 1,400 students, would have been built in the largest community with a "branch" offering academic instruction in a second community. This plan presented no alternative for high school organization other than consolidation. No action was taken by the Board to implement the recommendations.

The Board commissioned another consultant study in 1968. Once again, the consultants called for the construction of one central high school which would eventually house all county students in grades 9 - 12. The plan called for an environmentally oriented curriculum for the high school, referred to by the planners as a "living and learning laboratory." All other high schools would be closed. In addition, this plan recommended consolidation of the elementary school programs, then in 21 different locations, into eleven elementary school centers. All told, the consultants recommended the closing of 34 school buildings in the county and the major renovations of two buildings. The plan presented no alternatives for reform other than consolidation. Again, no action was taken by the School Board to implement the plan.

Early 1970's: An Incremental Approach

The School Board sought still another study in 1971 -- this time by a university consultant team. However, noting past resistance to consolication, the consultants' strategy was more explicitly political. As their own report (Conrad, et al., 1971) states:

> The purpose of this study is to plan an intermediate step to improve the educational facilities which exist in this county, and, at the same time, provide a step toward the realization of the long range plan. The need for this intermediate step became known when the plan proposing one high school met some resistance in the county. Assessment of public opinion indicated that moving to the one high school plan immediately is a more drastic step than will be accepted by the local constituency. For this reason, an intermediate step (of consolidating into four high schools) is suggested.

Although no immediate action was taken by the School Board, this strategy was later incorporated into a Comprehensive Facilities Plan implemented in 1977.

CONFLICT OVER CONSOLIDATIONS: 1973 - 1977

Overview: Bond Issue Elections and Consolidation

The failure of a citizen group (opposed to aspects of the district's Comprehensive Facilities Plan) initiated bond election paved the way to the closure of three out of eight high schools in the Spring of 1977. Litigation followed but the schools remained closed. The resort to bond issue elections was not part of a conscious conflict-management strategy (as suggested in Part C:4, above). Rather, it came out of the district's response to a new state policy.

In 1973, a state constitutional amendment was approved which provided approximately $250 million to rehabilitate or replace unsafe school buildings. Under the provisions of the amendment, Preston County received approximately $3.4 million for renovations and new construction. The amendment required a local plan for the use of these funds. The Preston County Superintendent of Schools and his staff eventually produced such a plan, referred to here as the Comprehensive Facilities Plan (CFP). Matching funds were encouraged, but counties were not legally required to pass a bond issue for the matching funds. However, most, including Preston County, tried to pass a bond.

Beginning in September 1973, the School Board presented the first of three bond referenda designed to raise the matching funds for a reorganization of the schools.

The events between September 1973 and May 1976 show two phases. During the first phase, September 1973 - March 1976, the Board of Education attempted, unsuccessfully, to develop a political consensus and majority approval for some form of school consolidation. No efforts was made to compromise with the organized opposition and no alternative to consolidation was ever seriously considered. The second phase, March 1976 - May 11, 1976, might be called "reluctant compromise." It began with organized citizen protests and ended with a fourth bond issue in May 1976 prepared by a citizen group (calling itself "Equality for All Prestonians," or EAP) which also failed to pass. Failure of the last bond election meant the Board could proceed to consolidate the schools with its share of state amendment funds.

First Bond: September 1973

On September 18, 1973, a special election was held in Preston County to vote on two issues. One was a special levy to produce approximately $3.6 million over five years for various renovations and for operational and maintenance expenses for the schools. The special levy was passed by a 5 to 1 margin. The other was a bond issue that sought to raise an additional $4.9 million for school consolidation. The bond failed.

The consolidation bond was to be used for new construction, site acquisition, and improvements. It would have combined eight high schools into four. The bond issue had been widely publicized by the Board of Education and the local newspapers. Numerous meetings were held around the county to explain the plan to the voters.

The largest high school in the county was to be moved to an adjoining district as part of this plan. The data will later show that student travel to and from proposed high schools was an important factor in defeating the bond, perhaps the key factor in this election and the three that followed.

Second Bond: October 1974

On October 8, 1974, a second bond issue to raise $5.3 million for school consolidation was presented to the voters. This time, the Board proposed a different combination of schools. The most notable change in the plan was the return of the high school to the largest magisterial district on the assumption its removal in the first plan was a significant factor in the plan's defeat. The second bond issue also failed. A reversal in the largest magisterial district vote produced an overall increase in the percentage of votes cast for the bond, but the total still fell short of the required 60 percent for passage.

Third Bond: November 1974

On November 23, 1974, a third bond, essentially the same as the second, was presented to the voters. The third bond was also defeated. The three bond issues all called for similar amounts of money ($4.9, $5.3 and $5.3 million, respectively). The vote totals for the three bond issues are shown in Table A.

The School Board's Comprehensive Facilities Plan and Citizen Protest

In February 1975, the Preston County Board of Education publicly presented its plan to qualify for funds under the Better Schools Amendment, despite the defeat of the three bonds. In essence, the plan would eventually reduce the number of high schools from eight to three.

On January 16, 1976, an injunction was brought by the organized

TABLE A: RESULTS OF THREE BOND ISSUES, PRESTON COUNTY

	Registered Voters	Ballots Cast	Percent Voting	Votes For	Votes Against	Total Votes	Percent For
1st Bond	13,701	5,783	42.21	2,674	2,060	4,734	46.63
2nd Bond	13,809	6,014	43.55	3,445	2,569	6,014	57.28
3rd Bond	14,190	6,983	49.21	3,437	3,546	6,933	49.22

citizens group (EAP) against the Preston County Board of Education seeking to stop implementation of the Comprehensive Facilities Plan.

On February 27, 1976, students organized a protest against the school consolidation plan. School buses were blocked in some communities and students boycotted schools.

On March 4, 1976, all Preston County schools were closed because of the countywide protesters. A Board of Education meeting was disrupted by protesters and forced to end without considering bids on the new buildings to be constructed under the Comprehensive Facilities Plan. Mines, businesses and manufacturing plants were closed by pickets. A countywide protest march was held. The Board of Education agreed to a special meeting on March 10, 1976, to hear a plan prepared by the citizen action group.

On March 10, 1976, an alternative to consolidation was presented by the citizens group to the Board of Education at a special meeting. The plan called for seven high schools, shared resources, and a curriculum identical to the Board's own plan. The basic difference between the plans was number and size of schools to be retained.

The Fourth Bond: May 1976

This was the decisive event in the political history of Preston County's school consolidation effort. On March 15 (following the citizen group's presentation of an alternative plan, the Board of Education voted 4 - 0 to present a bond proposal to the voters, on May 11 (1976), as part of the state primary elections. The bond was to incorporate the citizens' plans.

That bond issue was defeated by a vote of 5,773 to 5,035. Like its predecessors, this bond required 60 percent of the votes for passage. It received only 47.9 percent of the vote.

The 10,508 votes tallied represented 67.4 percent of the eligible voters -- a higher voter turnout than for any of the previous bond elections. The voting pattern of the May 1976 bond election differs significantly from the pattern of the November 1974 bond. Those communities that strongly opposed the November 1974 bond, as well as the two previous consolidation bonds, strongly supported the May 1976 bond. Conversely, those communities that strongly supported the November 1974 bond, and thus endorsed consolidation, voted strongly against the May 1976 bond.

The election results show that the three communities scheduled to retain their schools, whether this fourth bond passed or not, voted most heavily against the bond.

DATA ANALYSIS: WHO SUPPORTED CONSOLIDATION

The Research Overview

Who, what kinds of voters, and hence, what kind of community interests supported consolidation? And, what accounts for the reversal of community sentiment in the May 1976 election? A "no" vote in the previous three elections was _de facto_ a vote against school closure. A "no" vote in the 1976 election was _de facto_ a vote for consolidation and a vote against the costs of preserving the status quo. The 1976 election had a higher voter turnout, and lower "yes" vote than the previous election. Could it be that the 1976 election, because it posed the opportunity costs of maintaining the status quo, mobilized a hitherto silent constituency (note: the higher turnout) which supported consolidation?

Data Base and Method

The _unit of analysis_ is the electoral outcome in 49 of the county's 51 voter precincts (two remote precincts could not be matched with SES data and were therefore dropped).

The _criterion_ variable (that which is to be explained) is the percentage of favorable votes case in each precinct in each of the four school bond elections.

The eight predictor variables include: (a) the number of registered voters in the 49 precincts (ranging from 58 to 944 in May 1976); (b) the estimated travel time by school bus route from voter precinct to the proposed high school to be attended by students of the precinct; and (c) six SES variables from the 1970 census, fifth count, averaged and matched with voter precinct: average family income, percent of families below poverty income, percent of 25-44 year olds completing high school, percent of 25-44 year olds completing one or more years of college, percent of workers employed in professional, technical or like occupations, percent of families receiving public assistance.

Table B, on the next page, shows the means, standard deviations, and minimum-maximum ranges of the variables studied.

Correlation Analysis: The Effects of Income and Education

From the correlation matrices (Tables C, D, D, E and F, at the end of this section) it is obvious that none of the SES variables is significantly associated with voter preference in the first election but all except poverty level and public assistance are associated with voter preference in subsequent elections. For instance, the income coefficient in the September election is .028, but in the following three elections, the income coefficients range from .462 to -.424. Similar ranges appear within educational attainment and occupation. The explanation of the discrepancy between the first and following elections seems to rest with removal of a large high school to an adjòining district in the first bond election and its return in subsequent elections. The precincts which feed that particular school have above average incomes and levels of education. Those precincts voted heavily against the first bond, heavily for the second and third bonds and heavily against the last bond.

The change in school location acts, in effect, as a "manipulation" of the distance variable. Removal of the school produces not only a negative

TABLE B: LIST OF CRITERION AND PREDICTOR VARIABLES

VARIABLES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	RANGE OF VALUES	
			MAXIMUM	MINIMUM
1. Average Family Income	6,435	1,531	11,81y	4,294
2. Percent Below Poverty	.288	.138	.900	.000
3. Percent Completing High School	.521	.170	.950	.280
4. Percent Completing One or More Years of College	.077	.095	.430	.000
5. Percent in Professional, Technical or Like Occupation	.110	.097	.380	.000
6. Percent on Public Assistance	.049	.045	.180	.000
7. Number of Registered Voters (Sept. 1973)	274.6	165.4	771.0	35.0
8. Student Travel (minutes) (Sept. 1973)	42.3	28.4	110.0	0.0
9. Percent Favoring School Bond (Sept. 1973)	.498	.248	.880	.070
10. Number of Registered Voters (Oct. 1974)	276.6	168.8	811.0	35.0
11. Student Travel (minutes) (Oct. 1974)	36.1	24.3	103.0	0.0
12. Percent Favoring School Bond (Oct. 1974)	.549	.230	.970	.050
13. Number of Registered Voters (Nov. 1974)	284.2	175.1	864.0	35.0
14. Student Travel (minutes) (Nov. 1974)	37.5	24.6	103.0	0.0
15. Percent Favoring School Bond (Nov. 1974)	.467	.242	.888	.020
16. Number of Registered Voters (May 1976)	311.6	188.8	944.0	58.0
17. Student Travel (minutes) (May 1976)	25.4	16.8	70.0	0.0
18. Percent Favoring School Bond (May 1976)	.509	.331	.990	.040
19. Student Travel (minutes CFP) (1976)	51.5	38.0	130.0	0.0

vote within the community losing the school but also within precincts some distance away which feed the school. A further accidental "manipulation" of this sort results from the fourth bond election. One might ask, what would be the effect of student travel on voter preferences if the travel variable were held constant, i.e., if a plan were presented to the voters which entailed no additional travel time? The May 1976 election answers that question. Contrary to the previous three bonds, the May 1976 bond called for a status quo solution. The plan required no additional travel. Student travel time ceases to significantly correlate with voter preference in the May 1976 election. However, when a second travel factor, that required in the Board's Comprehensive Facilities Plan (which went into effect immediately upon the defeat of the May 1976 bond) is substituted in the equation, student travel becomes a highly significant correlate of voter preference. It is of further interest to note that the large high school removed in the first election, producing the heavy negative vote, is not removed in the last election. Yet, the community in which the school is located and the surrounding precincts voted heavily against the last bond. The voters apparently were convinced that the Comprehensive Facilities Plan which went into effect upon defeat of the bond was a more attractive proposal.

The correlation matrix shows that income and travel are significantly related. The greater the travel distance of students, the lower the incomes of parents in those precincts. Such a relationship would be expected in rural areas. Due to school location, the greatest burden of travel is felt by the poorest families. The smallest relationship is seen between income and travel in the May 1976 bond which in effect represents the status quo. The coefficient is -.175. The coefficients enlarged with each previous election, rising from -.210 in the September 1973 election to -.376 in the November 1974 election. The initial coefficient (.327) in the May 1976 election falls below significance (-.175) when travel required of the Board plan is entered into the regression. Educational attainment (high school and college) show similar patterns, correlating negatively with travel distances.

Given these intercorrelations, SES variables with travel and voter preference, the expectation would be that the old assumptions are suported about "ignorance-as-a-cause-of-resistance-to-school-progress." However, the size of the coefficients between travel and voter preference (ranging from -.710 to .816) suggest further analysis is needed to sort out the relative effects. Step-wise regressions are performed on the data and are reported in the next section.

Finally, as expected, income, occupation, and educational attainment are themselves intercorrelated positively, and with poverty level and public assistance, negatively. The latter two variables appear unrelated to voter preference.

Step-Wise Regressions: The Importance of Travel Distance

The data were further analyzed using step-wise multiple regression analysis. The expectedly large relative effects of the travel variable on voter preference are verified. The adjusted beta coefficients for all SES variables are shown in Table H. In each of the elections, travel becomes the overwhelming factor, washing out, in effect, the impact of SES variables on voter patterns. The proportion of the variance of election results reduced by the travel variables is shown separately in Table G, which follows, for each of the elections. The percentage of variance explained by travel ranges from 41 percent in October 1974 to 66 percent in May 1976.

The reversal of the income coefficients between September 1973 and October 1974 appears to be a result of the removal of a proposed school (September 1973) and the return (October 1974) to the largest magisterial district in the county (discussed earlier).

The complete reversal of results between November 1974 and May 1976, of course, reflects the differences between the proposed bonds. The November 1974 bond would have consolidated eight high schools into four. The May 1976 bond essentially left the schools intact. The precincts which strongly supported the previous consolidation bonds now opposed the

TABLE G: PROPORTION OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY TRAVEL VARIABLE

	Sept. 1973	Oct. 1974	Nov. 1974	May 1976*
Proportion of variance of Y reduced by travel factor	.503	.411	.483	.668
F for analysis of variance	47.543	32.825	43.991	94.421
Adjusted beta coefficient for travel when all SES variables are added to equation	-.808	-.642	-.664	-.798

* Travel time of Comprehensive Facilities Plan (CFP) substituted for travel in the bond plan. The CFP was to go into effect immediately if the bond was defeated.

non-consolidation bond (see election results discussed earlier).

The differences in the May 1976 results in Columns (4) and (5) (Table 1.6) reflect simply a change in one variable -- the travel estimate. In column (4) the travel variable represents the length of busing under minimal busing conditions, i.e., under the so-called EAP community school plan which left seven high schools essentially where they historically were located. In column (5) the minimal busing variable is replaced by an estimate of the travel required under the school board's final reorganization plan (Comprehensive Facilities Plan). Voters were aware that defeat of the May 1976 bond would mean the Comprehensive Facilities Plan automatically went into effect. Travel time is greatly increased under the Board's final plan (raising the percentage of high school students bused one hour or more each way from 15 percent to 32 percent).

The relative effect of income remains significant but the relative proportion of variance of voter results explained by income after travel is added to the regression is quite small, in no case exceeding 7 percent.

The effects of the other SES variables are relatively smaller than income as shown in Table I, following. In none of the cases does the

TABLE I: PROPORTION OF ELECTION RESULTS EXPLAINED BY SES VARIABLES AFTER THE TRAVEL VARIABLE IS ADDED TO THE REGRESSION

Variables	Sept. 1973	Oct. 1974	Nov. 1974	May 1976
Percent below poverty	.000	.023	.017	.005
Percent of 25-44 year olds completing high school	.004	.015	.020	.011
Percent of 25-44 year olds completing one or more years of college	.001	.001	.001	.050
Percent in professional technical and like occupations	.002	.013	.014	.001
Percent families receiving public assistance	.002	.003	.001	.009
Average family income	.001	.058	.063	.012
Cumulative variance reduced by SES variables	.010	.113	.116	.088

combined effects of income, poverty, high school completion, years of college, occupation and public assistance explain more than 12 percent of the variance in election results in any of the four elections.

The size of the voter precinct is significantly related to election results but again the proportion of variance explained is relatively small. Once travel is entered into the regression, in no case does the size of explained variance exceed 11 percent. (The proportions of variance reduced in the four elections respectively were: .106; .031; .024; .064.)

The combined effect of all variables, other than travel, explains, at a maximum, an additional 15.2 percent of variance in election results (May 1976 election).

CONCLUSIONS

Travel time, in this area where the school bus ride can often exceed one hour, tends to be the dominant factor in determining support or non-support of school consolidation plans. SES variables appear to be relatively unimportant by comparison. One may assume that attitudes other than those determined by education and income, perhaps parental protection needs, tend to override other considerations such as promised regular benefits of larger schools. The findings may not be generalizable to urban settings where distances are shorter and resistance to busing is constituted on different parental motives.

TABLE C: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE SEPTEMBER 1973 ELECTION

Variable	Income	Poverty	H. S. Educ.	College Educ.	Occu-pation	Public Assistance	Voters	Travel Distance	Favorable Vote
1. Average family income	1.00	-.681	.447	.606	.492	-.436	.386	-.210	.028
2. Percent below poverty	-6.81	1.000	-.574	-.485	-.303	.242	-.213	.156	-.076
3. Percent completing high school	.447	-.574	1.000	.655	.524	-.264	.402	-.136	.032
4. Percent completing 1+ years of college	.606	-.485	.655	1.000	.506	-.224	.382	-.100	.005
5. Percent in professional, technical and like occupation	.492	-.303	.524	.506	1.000	-.147	.268	-.188	.048
6. Percent receiving public assistance	.436	.242	-.264	-.224	-.147	1.000	-.261	-.058	.090
7. Registered voters	.386	-.213	.402	.382	.268	-.261	1.000	-.240	-.146
8. Travel time to school	-.210	.156	-.136	-.100	-.188	-.058	-.240	1.000	-.710
9. Percent favoring consolidation	.028	-.076	.032	.005	.048	.090	-.146	-.710	1.000

TABLE D: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR OCTOBER 1974 ELECTION

Variable	Variable 10 Voters	Variable 11 Travel	Variable 12 Favorable Vote
1. Average family income*	.398	-.369	.462
2. Percent below poverty	-.215	.181	-.226
3. Percent completing H.S.	.409	-.127	.240
4. Percent completing 1+ years college	.386	-.284	.319
5. Percent in professional, technical and like occupations	.274	-.320	.276
6. Percent receiving public assistance	-.268	-.081	-.126
10. Registered voters	1.000	-.333	.125
11. Travel time to school	-.333	1.000	-.641
12. Percent favoring consolidation	.125	-.641	1.000

TABLE E: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR NOVEMBER 1974 ELECTION

Variable	Variable 13 Voters	Variable 14 Travel	Variable 15 Favorable Vote
1. Average family income*	.407	-.376	.494
2. Percent below poverty	-.223	.237	-.299
3. Percent completing H.S.	.417	-.203	.326
4. Percent completing 1+ years college	.328	-.344	.438
5. Percent in professional, technical and like occupations	.281	-.362	.327
6. Percent receiving public assistance	-.277	.065	-.114
13. Registered voters	1.000	-.325	.165
14. Travel time to school	-.325	1.000	-.699
15. Percent favoring consolidation	.165	-.699	1.000

* For intercorrelations of SES variables see Table C.

TABLE F: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR MAY 1976 ELECTION

Variable	Variable 10 Voters	Variable 19 Travel	Variable 18 Favorable Vote	Variable 17 Travel (2)
1. Average Family Income	.402	-.327	-.424	-.175
2. Percent Below Poverty	-.201	.174	.244	.104
3. Percent Completing High School	.396	-.272	-.350	-.054
4. Percent Completing 1+ Years College	.330	-.336	-.487	-.455
5. Percent in Professional, Technical and Like Occupations	.259	-.356	-.417	.119
6. Percent Receiving Public Assistance	-.246	-.170	-.193	-.397
16. Registered Voters	1.000	-.503	-.236	-.384
19. Travel Time[1] to school, CFP	-.503	1.000	.816	.347
18. Percent Favoring Consolidation	-.236	.816	1.000	.218
17. Travel Time to School EAP[2]	-.384	.347	.218	1.000

NOTE: [1] CFP -- Comprehensive Facilities Plan doubles percent bused 1 hour or more.

[2] EAP -- Equality for All Prestonians Plan entailed no additional busing beyond current conditions at the time of the elections.

TABLE H: BETA COEFFICIENTS

Variables	(1) Sept. 1973	(2) Oct. 1973	(3) Nov. 1973	(4) May 1976	(5) May 1976[a]
1. Average family income	-.082	.450*	.415*	-.553*	-.351**
2. Percent below poverty income	-.011	.274	.238	-.249	-.194
3. Percent 25 - 44 years old completing H.S.	.057	.323	.284	-.150	-.186
4. Percent 25 - 44 years old completing one or more years college	.084	-.036	.061	-.274	-.143
5. Percent in professional, technical and like occupations	-.050	-.142	-.150	-.008	.040
6. Percent families receiving public assistance	-.057	-.063	-.035	-.481**	-.154
7. Number of registered voters	-.366**	-.302*	-.275*	.033	.342**
8. Estimated travel time	-.080**	-.642**	-.664**	.157	.798**

* .05

** .01

[a] Travel time as required in the School Board's Comprehensive Facilities Plan was substituted in the equation for the travel time of the May 1976 plan as represented in the bond.

SECTION FIVE

SECTION FIVE: MAINTAINING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POLICYMAKING SYSTEM

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PART A: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND OVERVIEW

The superintendent of the Palo Alto, California, school system offered the authors of this handbook the observation that "decline has created a legitimacy crisis at precisely the same time that we need to rely on the support provided by legitimacy." That is, each contest and controversy and each concession to an opposition group erodes that base of support which all public officials have to rely upon, especially in times when many of their decisions are apt to be unpopular.

Legitimacy, therefore, is like a political safety net. It allows public officials to justify their decisoins by demonstrating that the decision was made by the right people, in the right way.

In our civic culture, one of the right ways in which to make decisions is to involve those affected by them in the process of decisionmaking. The legitimacy afforded by such a demonstration of citizen involvement is one of the few remaining political resources left to managers of decline. However, citizen involvement can have multiple and unpredictable effects. If "abused" in vain atempts to achieve a consensus for a cutback among the victims of a cutback, it can backfire. If the structures in which citizens are invited to participate do not fit the functions intended by managers, or the expectations of participants, then the result can be more rather than less alienation.

Part B explores the problems that managers have with citizen participation -- you might have trouble living with it, but you can't live without it -- and re-examines the advice and the evidence about citizen participation in decline, in light of the legitimacy function.

Part C draws out the practical implications of this re-examination.

Beginning with a focused summary on the uses and abuses of citizens' task forces and advisory committees, it outlines a "bargaining" rather than "public relations" model of community involvement, and challenges both school administrators and citizen activists to think differently about how to relate to each other. Decline may make consensus politics impossible; it need not, however, result in constant confrontations and hence successive erosions of legitimacy.

It offers a typology of the various forms and functions of citizen participation as they are found in the literature and in practice, and provides an analysis of the trade-offs of each form and function, using legitimacy as the criterion, and summarizes that trade-off analysis and offers a policy development checklist, focusing on the key questions of: When? (to involve citizens), Who?, Why? and How?

Part D offers a catalog and description of locally practiced policy models exemplifying the various forms of participation, including: public hearings, community polls and surveys, advisory committees, and comprehensive participatory planning mechanisms.*

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* Throughout this handbook, the Parts D of Sections Four through Eight will often contain the kinds of materials which other handbooks traditionally put into appendices.

PART B: PROBLEM ANALYSIS

1. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMACY

When it comes to community involvement, school managers justifiably feel trapped in a Catch-22 situation: more involvement does not produce more agreement; lack of involvement can, by itself, be a source of disagreement. Disagreements over the way in which policies are made challenges the legitimacy of the school policymaking system. That legitimacy -- a perception that "even though I might not like the policy outcome it was arrived at in the right way" -- is one of the few political resources available to managers of decline.

In our democratic culture, one of the right ways to make policy is to involve the citizenry. The Catch-22 is that such involvement may be necessary to build support for the policymaking process; it does not, however, necessarily breed support for specific policies themselves.

2. CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES TO CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: A MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?

The literature and the practice of decline management is not unaware of the cultural imperative to involve the citizenry, or of the political necessity ~~to deal~~ with citizen involvement. Professional expectations about what citizen involvement can produce, however, fail to distinguish between support for the policymaking process and support for the policies themselves.

What Is Supposed To Work

Typical of the conventional expectations about citizen participation is the following passage from a 1978 National School Boards Association manual on managing retrenchment:

> Citizen participation must not be based on "token" or trivial involvement. A good many school districts are learning that genuine community participation in planning facilities and programs equals increased understanding, empathy for education problems/concerns, and, most important, a sense of ownership of the community's public school system. It can only lead to a more positive portrayal of the school district. That is human nature. We all know that if a

> project is ours, or partly ours, and we are responsible for making it happen, we care about the results, for they too are ours; we gain understanding about what goes into the making of a final decision about our project; we tend not to be critical of the final decision which we had a part in making. Encouraging the public to participate, to know that its contribution is invaluable, to gain a sense of ownership of the schools, is one of the best ways for a school board to allay fears, suspicions, and public criticism, fostering vital support of school programs. (NSBA, 1978:7)

Katherine Eisenberger, who has focused much attention on the issue of community involvement in decline management, urges that community involvement be seen as a way of transferring local, school-centered loyalties to a districtwide perspective. A districtwide perspective makes it more likely, it is said, for those affected by a cutback to accept its rationality. Such a perspective can be nurtured by different ways of involving and consulting the community. These are said to include:

(1) Public Hearings in which the community hears the district, and the district hears what is on the "community's mind."

(2) Community Polls and Surveys.

(3) Engagement of Existing School Community Groups in Decline Policy-making. For instance, Katherine Eisenberger (1977:39) urges school managers to engage existing groups, such as PTA's and School Advisory Councils, in decline issues and suggests aggregating such school-based groups into a federated districtwide structure.

(4) Task Forces and Advisory Committees. Eisenberger and others (most notably Sieradski, 1977) also propose that the community not only be seen as a supportive constituency (or a potentially hostile audience to be won over by public relations), but also as a partner in the planning process. The institutionalized expression of such a partnership is typically a community task force or advisory committee. There is general agreement that such a group should:

- Be "broadly representative"
- Be "carefully selected" so as to include key community leaders and people whose talents/skills can increase

the school system's capacity in the planning process

- Report to the superintendent
- Be a working group with a specific charge, rather than a deliberative, advisory or policymaking body

Eisenberger stresses the involvement of key community leaders on task forces because they, as "opinion leaders," provide a conduit for getting the public at large to be informed and supportive, and because they, in turn, keep the task force and the school administration in touch with local public opinion.

Sieradski, while stressing the working nature of a task force/citizens committee, also notes that one function of such groups is that very process of grappling with technical planning details provides for a reconciliation of interest group conflicts.

Some communities (e.g., Edlefson, et al., 1977; and Morgan and Wofford, 1977) engage in comprehensive participatory planning processes incorporating many of the above mentioned forms. Typically, such processes have a school or a community task force at their nucleus. These are charged with policy development, and in fulfilling that charge they may include and initiate other forms of community involvement -- "special-purpose" public hearings, polls and surveys, and advisory subcommittees and special issue fact-finding task forces.

The Expected Functions of Citizen Participation

Several themes are reiterated in the brief survey of the most influential* discussions about citizen participation in the management of decline. To summarize, involving the citizenry is supposed to:

- Improve school-community relations
- Improve school-community communication
- Build wider support for retrenchment decisions

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* See Zerchykov, et al. (1982) Sections 3.3.2 and 5.3.

- Have a moderating effect on potential opponents/victims of cutbacks
- Improve the schools' planning capacity by enlisting citizens' talents and expertise
- Surface conflicts of interest before they erupt into last-minute opposition
- Reconcile conflicts of interest early on in the planning process

The Evidence: What Does and Does Not Work

Survey and spot data show that, to a large extent, practice follows advice. A 1976 National School Public Relations Association survey of 102 declining school districts revealed that a little over 75 percent (78 out of 102) used some form of community participation in their retrenchment process (NSPRA, 1976:38-39). Of the more than 90 school districts from whom or about whom we have materials, almost all make some formal provisions for community involvement.

Data about impact, however, are scarce. What little hard evidence there is, is summarized in Fact Sheet No. 4, on the page immediately following. The implications of that evidence can be summarized as follows.

3. THE CHALLENGE: RETHINKING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Based on what evidence is available, citizen participation (like the "plan and agree" approach discussed in Section Three, above) does not perform as advertised. Part C, below, re-examines the advertisements for citizen participation. That re-examination suggests some possible missions for specific forms of citizen participation. It offers some trade-offs rather than any one recipe. It focuses not on how managers can and should relate to the community, but on what formal structures can be set up as a matter of policy to provide different kinds of opportunities for citizen participation.

Two major considerations lie behind this emphasis on formal structure and institutional design. First, institutional design lies within the

FACT SHEET NO. 4: THE WEIGHT OF THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE ABOUT COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN DECLINE MANAGEMENT: A MIXED MESSAGE

MAJOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION	REFERENCE	STUDY DESCRIPTION
Participation far from building ownership in the decline problem is apt to make manifest differences between lay vs. professional priorities about schooling	Boyd, 1982b	Longitudinal, comparative case study of 15 suburban school districts, based on documentary, interview and observation data
Participation can and has decreased deference to professional opinion on matters of education policy	Boyd, 1982b	See above reference, already cited
Participation has the effect of requiring more detailed documentation, and more well developed rationales for public policy	Dumanowski, 1978	Descriptive case study of Lexington, Massachusetts, school closure controversies
	Narver, 1982	Descriptive case-history of Seattle school closing controversy
Lack of participation can be a source of conflict and opposition...	Cibulka, 1982b	10-city comparative case study based on decisionmaker interview data
But, whether lack of participation becomes an issue or not depends on local political culture	Boyd, 1982b	Already cited
Participation can lengthen and protract the decisionmaking process	Cibulka, 1982b Narver, 1982b	Already cited
Participation -- that is, more consultation with the community -- was reported to lead to less conflict, and less adversarial relations with the public	Cibulka, 1982b	Already cited

FACT SHEET NO. 4: (continued)

MAJOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION	REFERENCE	STUDY DESCRIPTION
Comparison of the level of conflict -- overt opposition -- in communities which had or invited more vs. less participation, showed that it made no difference -- more participation was not associated with less conflict and more consensus	Berger, 1982b	Case-survey of 70 case-studies of school closure decisions
	Boyd, 1982b	Already cited
Participation can, hosever, lead to a consensus among organized public opinions on the need for a retrenchment decision, although this is different from a consensus between managers and the public	Narver, 1982	Already cited
Task forces and citizens committees: neither the presence nor absence of a task force, nor its degree of representativeness, is associated with less conflict	Berger, 1982b	Already cited
Task force/committee proceedings are as likely to crystallize and polarize constituency group interest conflicts as they are to reconcile conflicts	Nuttall, 1976	Case history of the decision-making process of a "citizens advisory committee on declining enrollments" in one upper-middle class community
Participatory planning and consensus-building participation is likely to articulate and crystallize rather than reconcile conflicts or create consensus	Nuttall, 1976	Already cited
	Edlefson, et al., 1977	Case-history of participatory planning in Palo Alto, Calif.
	Morgan and Wofford, 1977	Case history of a planning effort to address enrollment decline in the Lincoln-Sudbury (Mass.) regional high school district

authority and ability of school managers. There is little else that school managers can do to control (or create) citizen participation. Participation is a right. It may or may not happen, no matter what school managers do or don't do. The only kind of community involvement over which public officials (boards of education) and public servants (superintendents) have some control is that structured by formal policy guidelines.

Question	Answer
Does Community Involvement...	
• Improve school-community relations?	Yes
• Improve communication and a two-way flow of information?	No evidence
• Build up support for retrenchment decisions?	No evidence
• Reduce conflict and opposition by having a moderating effect on potential opponents?	No
• Mobilize community resources and improve a school system's planning capacity?	No evidence
• Surface conflicts of interest?	Yes
• Reconcile conflicts of interest?	No

Second, unless there are formal standing opportunities to participate, the presence of citizen participation mechanisms may not serve the legitimacy function. Indeed, a lot of informal consultation with and responsiveness to citizens and citizens' groups may have the opposite effect. Time and resource constraints set limits on how many interests and groups can thus be consulted and brought into the policymaking process. Those who are left out may feel (rightly or wrongly) that public policymaking is dominated by private interests.

In short, in discussing the forms of citizen participation, we will not discuss the many ways in which parents and citizens organize themselves into neighborhood or districtwide private groups. We will, however, be discussing formal mechanisms which allow such groups to represent their interests.

PART C:1. THE USE AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND TASK FORCES*

INTRODUCTION

The citizens' task force (or study committee, or advisory council -- such structures, similar in form and function go by different names) is such an ubiquitous and familiar structure of the landscape of school-community relations. For that reason, a discussion of the potential and limitations of this form of citizen involvement can exemplify many of the policy choices and pitfalls surrounding the issue of citizen participation.

SYMPTOMS OF SOME PROBLEMS WITH CITIZENS' COMMITTEES

The experience with citizens' committees has been widespread. It has not necessarily been always happy.

Citizen members of task forces/committees often complain that despite their efforts and countless hours of volunteer time, their recommendations are not enacted by school authorities (e.g., Cohen, 1982). They register this complaint even though at the outset it was clear that the appointment of a task force did not delegate or abrogate the school board's responsibility to make the final, publicly binding decision. Task force members can develop a strong sense of ownership in the problem of decline and an equally strong sense of ownership in *their* proposed solutions.

Citizens who did not serve on a task force, and whose interests are adversely affected by its recommendations, complain that the task force is after all only representative of its members, and will ask pointedly, "who chose these people anyway, and why?"

School administrators have been known to complain that the committees dissolve into debating societies, they don't come up with anything new.

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* The contents and analysis in this section reflect the Institute for Responsive Education's five-year ongoing study of citizens' advisory councils, much of it funded by the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, with some support in 1976-79 from the National Institute of Education.

Members may also use the committee as a forum to grind their own axes and act in bad faith by not leaving their private interests at the door.

In two highly documented planning processes for dealing with declining enrollments (in Lexington, Massachusetts and in Sequoia Union High School District in California's Bay Area), superintendents felt driven to publish dissenting reports taking issue with the conclusions of the task force reports.*

One California school administrator described to us how his district successfully used a federated structure in which school based citizens' committees sent delegates to a districtwide planning committee. Another California school administrator (this time a superintendent) advised that including building-level delegations in any citizens' committee contemplating school closure is the surest recipe to produce a deadlock. A school official from a suburban Virginia school district reported that in his district, citizens and school staff prepare their own independent study reports and deliver them to the school board at the same meeting.

Researchers have found: that neither the presence nor absence, nor the representativeness of a citizens' task force, is associated with less conflict and opposition (Berger, 1982b); that ambiguities and conflicting perceptions about the role and function of a citizens' committee can in themselves be a source of conflict and a source of challenges to the legitimacy of the policymaking system (Boyd, 1982c); and that task force processes are just as likely to crystallize and polarize conflicts of interest as they are likely to reconcile them (Nuttall, 1977; see also Edlefson, et al., 1977; and Morgan and Wofford, 1977).

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* For Lexington, the Task Force Report is The Lexington Elementary Schools: A Report to the Lexington School Committee by the Education Program Study Committee, February 1976 (Massachusetts, Lexington, 1976). The superintendent's response is in An Analysis of School Closings, January 1977 (Massachusetts, Lexington, 1977). For Sequoia, see the superintendent's analysis in School Closure Recommendation to the Board of Trustees, December 16, 1981.

Advisors of managers of decline have warned against the phenomenon of "takeover citizens' committees" (DeJong, 1978) and against vague and open-ended function: "Give them [the task force] a specific charge. Don't let the task force flounder, studying nebulous areas. Provide them with information. If they have no source of reliable information, they will go through old board minutes dredging up all sorts of issues. They'll do what the media people euphemistically refer to as 'investigative reporting'" (Eisenberger, 1977:37).

A sample of potential users of this handbook -- administrators, board members and citizens -- when asked "what topic on the general issue of citizen involvement should we focus upon?" most frequently answered, "The use and abuse of citizens' committees."

DIAGNOSIS: THE IMPORTANCE OF FITTING FORMS TO FUNCTIONS

Both citizens and school managers expressed a concern with the use and abuse of citizens' committees and task forces. It became clear, however, that each role group had a slightly different notion of "abuse." This is where the problems begin.

Consider the "ideal" task force as described in the literature advising managers of decline.* Its forms and functions are as follows:

Functions: Uses and Expected Outcomes	Forms: Structural Arrangements
Improve school-community communications. Mobilize community talent to improve the school's planning capacity. Build public support for the necessity of retrenchment by widening the ownership in the problem of decline. Reduce opposition and conflict by surfacing and reconciling interest group conflicts.	Membership is to be carefully selected so as to be broadly representative and so that it includes community opinion leaders. It should be responsible and report to the superintendent and not directly to the board and to the community. It should be a working, rather than a talking or deliberative body with a specific work assignment.

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* See Beck, 1978; Eisenberger, 1976, 1977; Hess, 1979b; NSPRA, 1976; NSBA, 1978; AASA, 1974; Sargent and Handy, 1974; Sieradski, 1978.

On their face, the functions and forms as separately listed seem reasonable enough. But the problem is that the form prescribed in the right-hand column may not be able to perform all of its intended functions. For example:

1. A working task force with a specific assignment, with carefully selected members, and which is small enough to be a working group, can -- if it refrains from turning into a "deliberative group" -- do much to increase a school system's planning capacity. Such a task force, if its members are appointed at large, would only spread the "ownership of the decline problem" to those 10 - 20 members. Even if such a group were to include interest group representatives, selected by their peers, it would not -- if it keeps on task -- be likely to surface interest group conflicts, let alone resolve and reconcile them.

2. A representative "talking" committee, free to deliberate and offer advisory opinions, whose members are appointed at-large to include "community leaders" may enhance the legitimacy of the policymaking processes, but only in small socially homogeneous communities in which there is still deferrence to such leaders. Such a group will not directly and materially improve planning capacity. It will "talk," rather than "work." This kind of group may reconcile conflicts of interest but the reconciliation will merely reflect the opinions of the members, and not of the community.

3. A representative "talking" committee, free to deliberate, composed of peer-selected, "instructed delegates" of constituency groups, which is instructed to report to the superintendent rather than the board and the public, may surface interest group conflicts but is not likely to reconcile them. Such a group will have no incentive to do so, and no sense of the need to compromise. Absent the possibility of presenting its own plan in public, such a group will fail to develop a collective need to come up with anything. Whatever the group comes up with is channelled to the superintendent who then integrates it into an omnibus proposal to the board and/or community. In that situation, the most rational course of action for each group member,

provided she/he is accountable* to some constituency, is to stick to their guns and not to compromise, thus ensuring that their interest-group perspective makes it into the final policymaking mill.

Such a group is not useless. Because some of its members are "instructed delegates," they will pass much information back and forth between the school and constituency interests. Even if it gets deadlocked, the group will provide school managers with a clue as to the content and intensity of some "bottom line" interests, even though there may be few clues as to what policies or compromises can produce a winning coalition for retrenchment decisions.

4. A peer-selected advisory committee charged with coming up with a non-binding advisory opinion, which it presents to the public and board, as well as to the superintendent, is more likely to surface and, within its group process, resolve interest group conflicts. It will do this because of the pressure of "going public." (See Exhibit 5A, following.)

This latter type of group can, like all deliberative committees, serve as a useful "sounding board." Like all peer-selected groups, it has potential for being a good communications vehicle and a mechanism for surfacing interest group conflicts.

On the other hand, such a group will not directly improve a school system's planning capacity. It may, in fact, overburden it. Its recommendations may be a "loose cannon" -- the compromise advisory opinion may be at odds with the constraints faced by the board and superintendent.

Peer-selected groups have the potential of widening the ownership in the decline problem and its resolution. But, the final compromise may only be

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* Without this accountability -- some concrete link between the representative and the "represented," i.e., by peer selection or ex-officio status, a "citizens' committee" has no legitimacy function. The kind of politically aware and sophisticated citizens/parents who can cause trouble for the school system, especially those likely to be affected by cutbacks, are not going to be impressed by the mere fact that, in addition to the board and superintendent, 10 to 20 "other citizens" are involved.

EXHIBIT 5A: THE PROBLEM OF OWNERSHIP. SHOULD ADVISEES BE ON ADVISORY TASK FORCES AND CITIZENS' COMMITTEES?

Bill DeJong, of the Council for Community Education Facilities Planners, has analyzed and consulted on the topic of participatory planning. One common pathology which he has identified is the "no ownership process" -- "a planning group can function for six months or so and develop recommendations, only to have them rejected by the school board (or some other critical body). Why? -- no ownership on the part of the school board." One possible solution is to have the critical bodies -- the superintendent and the school board -- sit on the task force or study and advisory committee. A 1976 handbook from the National School Public Relations Association (NSPRA, 1976: 42) offers the following arguments for and against such a solution.

For: Why Superintendents and Board Members Should Be Represented on a Task Force.	Against: Why Superintendents and Board Members Should Not Be On a Task Force.
The superintendent or other administrator can facilitate the group's work	The superintendent is best advised to take as low a profile as possible during this phase
Unless board members understand the process of arriving at recommendations, they may still back off from making a final decision -- especially if the opposition becomes intense before the vote	Board members who sit on the task force are in the strange position of making recommendations to themselves, but they can observe the meetings in order to understand the process
Many staff members are also community residents and are thus entitled to representation. They also have the advantage of a working knowledge of the school system	District staff members should serve as resource persons, providing the task force with the benefits of their special knowledge -- but the task force should be essentially a lay citizens committee

indicative of the dynamics of the group process and not of a consensus "out in the community" represented by such a group. The group, because it goes public, will develop an ownership in its recommendations. The worst case in this situation is that its proposal will embody one of many competing and irreconcileable definitions of the problem and its solutions. The irony, in this case, is that the very mechanism which was supposed to reconcile interest group perspectives becomes itself an interest group with ownership in a particular perspective.

Finally, the "productivity" of such a group is unpredictable. It may become deadlocked and offer a final recommendation so ambivalent as to have no clear policy implications. This situation may also provide an opportunity. School managers, looking at the sources of the deadlock and the record of the preceeding deliberations, have very good data about what it would take to build a winning coalition for retrenchment being necessary on fiscal and pedagogical grounds. This strategy puts school managers into the enviable position of being seen as mediators rather than villains.

SOME TRADE-OFFS IN FITTING FORMS TO FUNCTIONS

The preceeding discussion suggests that it may take four different forms of citizen committees to fulfill the functions expected of a task force or citizens' advisory committee. The benefits and drawbacks of each are summarized in Chart 5A, on the next page.

Material on that chart reveals what the central policy choices have to with: how membership is selected, to whom the group reports, and what is its task.

STRUCTURE CHOICES		FUNCTION CHOICES:
Membership Selection	Accountability and Reporting	WHAT IS THE TASK
Appointed or self-selected at-large membership.	To the superintendent only.	Working group.
Peer group selected, instructed delegate membership.	Directly to the board and the community.	Deliberative, "talking" policy advisory group.

A second look at the "structure choices" and the way that those are related to the possible use and outcomes (i.e., function), shows that a key question is how much control managers are willing to give up for the sake of certain functions.

CHART 5A. ON USING TASK FORCES AND CITIZENS' COMMITTEES

We first distinquish between "working" vs. "deliberative" groups and then for each type and subtype summarize the trade-offs -- uses and most likely outcomes for each subtype.

Type and Subtype of Group	Trade-Offs: Uses and Likely Outcomes
Working Groups: In general these improve school system planning capacity -- they mobilize community resources -- time, talent, and skill, and can perform data-gathering and analyses functions.	
Task force, appointed by and directly reporting to the superintendent.	High productivity. Can spread "ownership" of the decline problem, but to the immediate members only.
Task force, established by and reporting to the board, with ex-officio and peer-group selected membership.	Ownership of decline problem is spread to constituency groups sending delegates to the task force. Productivity is less certain. More highly representative and accountable groups are likely to introduce political considerations into technical processes.
Deliberative Groups: Not likely to improve planning capacity directly. These groups are more likely to be a source of data -- about community concerns -- than data-gathering and analysis mechanisms.	
Citizens advisory committee, appointed by and reporting directly to the superintendent, with some peer-group selection of members.	Good "sounding board" and good vehicle of communication of community concerns to the school administration. More likely to surface interest group conflicts, not likely to reconcile them.
Citizens advisory committees, dominated by peer-group selected members, charged with developing policy options, and reporting directly to the board and community, as well as to the superintendent.	Very good sounding board and good vehicle for two-way communication between school and community. Most likely to surface interest group conflicts, and more likely to reconcile them.

HIGH DEGREE OF CONTROL	LOW DEGREE OF CONTROL
Choices:	
Membership appointed or self-selected.	Membership is peer-group selected.
Representation is at-large.	Members are instructed delegates of constituency groups.
Group reports to the superintendent only.	Group reports directly to the board and the superintendent.
Task force is a working group with a specific data-gathering and problem-solving charge.	Task force is a deliberative body.

One implication of this analysis is that if managers want to spread the ownership in the problem of decline, they may have to share the risk of (and indeed, letting go of) the problem-definition of decline. This will inevitably introduce an element of risk. Participation mechanisms charged with problem definition as well as problem-solving may indeed be loose cannons. In this as in all policy choices, there are trade-offs. And, as seen in Exhibit 5B, immediately below, there are also risks and costs in not involving the community.

EXHIBIT 5B. TRADE-OFFS IN DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES

OPTION A: SUPERINTENDENT AND STAFF DO AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE MEANING OF DECLINE AND PRESENT ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE BOARD FOR ITS JUDGEMENT AND ACTION.

Advantages	Disadvantages
• Time necessary to do the study is controllable. • The nuances of the data could be more accurately arrayed by the superintendant and his staff. • The board has considerable freedom in its decisionmaking. • Cost to the board for study could be nominal.	• Unilateral action by board could be aborted by limited community understanding of the issues. • This plan fails to take advantage of community resources. • Superintendent may have limited staff resources to do the study; as a result, he could neglect the daily adminstrative demands of his position.

EXHIBIT 5B. TRADE-OFFS IN DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES (continued)

OPTION B: AFTER EXAMINING THE DATA SUBMITTED BY THE CHIEF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR, THE BOARD DEVELOPS A SET OF PROPOSALS FOR REVIEW WITH THE PUBLIC VIA A SERIES OF MEETINGS.

Advantages	Disadvantages
● Gaps or oversights in data and proposals could be minimized by public exposure.	● The process of public exposure will stretch out the time or delay the final board action.
● A fuller understanding of the issues can be assured.	● Public exposure will not assure public or voter acceptance.
● Varied competencies of district residents can test the accuracy of the data.	● Deep political cleavages can develop among community groups.
● Support can be strengthened for future board measures.	

OPTION C: EMPLOY A CONSULTANT TO DO A STUDY AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS.

Advantages	Disadvantages
● Opportunity is given for independent objective judgements.	● Costs are increased.
● The consultant presumably is an expert in the process and on the topic and as a result the recommendations would be more trustworthy.	● Consultant probably would not know the nuances of the data or be familiar with community attitudes; as a result recommendations can be unrealistic.
● The chief school officer is freed to carry on the day-to-day administration of district affairs and responsibilities.	● Community may not be receptive to studies done by "outside" experts.
	● If consultant firm is located some distance from the district, communication and scheduling efforts can be difficult and inefficient.

OPTION D: APPOINT AN AD-HOC COMMUNITY TASK FORCE

Advantages	Disadvantages
● The many talents of district residents can be tapped.	● A prolonged period of study is usually needed to bring about closure.

EXHIBIT 5B. TRADE-OFFS IN DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES (continued)

OPTION D: APPOINT AN AD-HOC COMMUNITY TASK FORCE (continued)

Advantages	Disadvantages
• A deeper understanding of the various issues can be developed among district voters. • Members of the committee can be used to communicate the outcomes of the study to the community.	• Study outcomes can be distorted by members of special interest groups on committees.

SOURCE: Adapted from: NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (1976). Enrollment Trends: Programs for the Future. A Planning Guide for Districts with Declining Enrollments. Pages 14-16.

PART C:2. SOME RULES FOR LIVING WITH CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

Because community involvement is so deeply ingrained in our civic culture and because it is so much a part of the conventions about good practice in school management, it is tempting to simply follow precedent and do that which has traditionally worked in times of growth. The discussion in Part C:1 showed the problems inherent in a mechanism as conventional and seemingly time-tested as the citizens' task force or advisory committee. That discussion suggests that the changing politics of decline requires a change or re-examination of conventional assumptions about citizen participation.

Such a re-examination is presented in the six "rules" which follow, and in subsequent materials (i.e., Parts C:3 and C:4) in this section.

RULE NO. 1: RECOGNIZE THAT CONTESTS OVER THE APPROPRIATENESS OF PARTICIPATION MECHANISMS MAY ALSO PRODUCE CONFLICT

This adds yet another source of complexity to the "people problem" in decline management. There may be conflict and opposition over the substance of a policy. Opposition may arise over the fact or allegation that citizens and other affected interests had no access to the decisionmaking procedures which produced that policy. And, as seen in the discussion in Part C:1, conflict may arise over the appropriateness of the formal access that school managers do provide. Such conflict is, of course, often partisan and self-serving in origin. Those who don't like the outcomes will challenge the process. Nonetheless, sometimes the conflict is inevitable, given lack of congruence between what school managers explicitly or implicitly expect to be the outcomes of a participation process and the motives of participants for participating. Since it is not possible to change motives, the burden is with school managers to clarify (for themselves, at least) what outcomes are hoped for and then design the appropriate institutional mechanisms (see Part C:4, below, "Fitting Forms to Function").

RULE NO. 2: ADOPT THE PERSPECTIVE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPANTS IN DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS FOR PARTICIPATION

Institutions are best seen as channels for activity, as opportunities for doing something. Different kinds of opportunities attract different kinds of participants, who differ in their motives for participation. The trouble -- contests over the appropriateness of different forms of participation -- begins when the motives of participants are not in sync with the expectations of managers.

RULE NO. 3: RECOGNIZE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BUILDING SUPPORT FOR A POLICY AND MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR THE POLICYMAKING SYSTEM

Conceptually, the distinction is easy to make. In practice, of course, it gets trickier. In many cases, those who don't like a policy outcome will challenge and contest the policymaking process. But ignoring the present distinction can lead managers into futile expectations for this or that form of citizen participation to create a consensus for a retrenchment policy. Such a consensus may emerge, but that is a gamble not sure enough to justify citizen participation. In the alternative model being developed in this section, the function of citizen participation is not to build consensus, but to provide legitimacy for the decisionmaking process and thereby protect managers from the charge that their policymaking is illegitimate because it is *un*democratic.

RULE NO. 4: RECOGNIZE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND CITIZEN VOLUNTEERING

Once again, it *is* sometimes helpful to quibble over terms and split hairs. In periods of decline, as in periods of growth, some citizens participate out of a public spirited sense of civic duty. There is a continuum of this kind of involvement ranging from acting as a field trip monitor to service on a study group or task force in order to help solve the school system's decline problem. In either case, the phenomenon is best described as volunteering.

In either case, citizens are giving of themselves in order to increase the school system's capacity. In one case the activity helps with a curricular activity, in the other case the activity helps in the development of policy.

There is another kind of involvement in which citizens seek to influence policy or represent their view in order to advance or protect their interest. This kind of involvement is what we and most observers term "participation." Nonetheless, much of the conventional approach to citizen participation expressed in statements like "members of citizens' committees should leave their private interests at the door" or "task forces and citizens' committees should be working rather than deliberative bodies" signal that what is wanted are volunteers, not participants.

Mere evidence of volunteering, although it can serve other functions, does not enhance the legitimacy of the policymaking system. Legitimacy is enhanced by evidence that affected interests have had access to policymaking -- their day in court, so to speak. Also, those whose interests are affected are not likely to leave their private interests at the door or to simply work at a pre-assigned task.

RULE NO. 5: ADOPT A BARGAINING POSTURE TOWARDS CITIZEN PARTICIPANTS

Conventional approaches to citizen participation rest on the sound premise that schools and communities need each other. Their interaction should be collaborative rather than adversarial. The "community" is a partner in a joint problem-solving and policy development process.

This ideal is difficult to realize in the context of the divisive and re-distributive politics of decline. Under conditions of growth, partnership was possible even though the "community" is not one but many, and its many interests were not always immediately congruent. School leaders could create congruence among competing interests and partnership between school and community by giving everyone a stake in a common vision of improvement and expansion of the school system.

As often noted in our discussion of conflict management, it is difficult to articulate, let alone create a common consensual vision of retrenchment.

There will be few partners for retrenchment.

Nevertheless, the legitimacy objective dictates that community interests, often initially adversarial to the retrenchment options, cannot be ignored. Where there are definite and irreconcileable interest cleavages among community interests and between the community and the schools, the process of policy development rests on bargaining rather than partnership.

The definition and implications of such a posture are spelled out more fully in Part C:3, below. That section extends the interest-group bargaining model, presented in Section Four, in our discussion of conflict management.

RULE NO. 6: THERE IS NO SINGLE BEST WAY TO INVOLVE CITIZENS

Some citizens participate out of a sense of duty to help the schools solve a problem. Some participate in order to become better informed about what is going on and have a specific axe to grind -- an interest to protect often in opposition to school managers' reading of the objective requirements of retrenchment.

Managers create the opportunities for citizen participation (i) because they have to -- lack of access casts doubt about the legitimacy of the policy-making process and creates a larger opposition coalition to the outcomes (already likely to be controversial) of the process; (ii) because they (the managers) want to test the waters and see what range of options will be acceptable; (iii) in order to identify allies and spread "the ownership of the problems of decline," and (iv) in order to broaden the perspectives and expand the pool of talent (i.e., citizens' study committees) available for the school's problem-solving.

The above outline suggests the multiplicity of motives and expectations regarding citizen participation.

Our discussion of the use and abuse of citizens' committees suggested that no one type of committee can realize all of the expectations and functions typically assigned to such committees. The same applies to other forms of citizen participation. Each form serves some purposes better than others. Part C:4, "Fitting Forms to Function," discusses the trade-offs among different ways of involving citizens.

PART C:3. BARGAINING AND LEGITIMACY*

INTRODUCTION: PARTICIPATION IS A RIGHT

Some kind of citizen involvement is unavoidable. Parent and citizen involvement in the policy affairs of the public schools is a right, not a privilege granted by school boards and school administrators. Citizens have a right to seek to influence school policies because as citizens they have a right to seek to influence policies of any governmental body that affects their lives. Parents have a right to participate because they are citizens and beyond that because as parents they have a legal right to protect and represent the interests of their children who are affected by school policies. These rights are not forfeited because the political or social views of a citizen are partially or largely at odds with prevailing community views or with current school policies and practices.

Despite these absolutes of rights, parent and citizen participation in public school affairs has been limited in scope and significance and has been usually carefully controlled and minimized by school officials. Neither school board members nor superintendents -- with some notable exceptions -- typically welcome parent or citizen involvement except when it is intended to offer support. The trials of retrenchment have induced most school officials to seek various kinds of supportive community involvement -- often, as the data indicate with results quite different than those anticipated and with considerable frustration for both management and citizens.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN RELATIONS AND BARGAINING APPROACHES

Objectively, participation is a right. Subjectively, citizens will use participation mechanisms to represent and advance their own interests. Subjectively, school managers hope and try to influence participation in order to support their professional judgements about what policies are possible and necessary. Trouble begins when these two subjective interpretations about what the right to participate means in practice.

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* This sub-section was prepared by Don Davies, President and founder of the Institute for Responsive Education.

The Human Relations Approach

The expectation that participation can convert participants into supporters is based on several assumptions in the conventional, and what we can call the human relations, approach to citizen participation.

A central assumption is that school policymaking is or should try to be above politics, not only in the colloquial sense that it should be free of patronage but in the more fundamental sense that some issues (i.e., schooling for children) are too important to be held hostage to the pull of competing interests. That is, there is an objective and rational solution to public policy issues which can be arrived at if all participants share the same information and commit themselves to good faith efforts to achieve a consensus.

From this it follows that the sources of conflict are emotional not rational. Specifically, community conflict and opposition is due to lack of information and understanding and to lack of trust and communication. The literature advising school managers about citizen involvement is full of perceptive analysis and perscriptions about ways of increasing communication, trust, and commitment. Note the repeated use of expressions like "transfer school loyalties to a district loyalty," or "widen the ownership in the problem of decline." The presumption is that participation can change participants' attitudes.

A Bargaining Model of Citizen Participation

Participation can change participants but often in unpredictable ways: their self-interests become clearer and more polarized, they become more rather than less alienated. The difficulties managers experience in getting the right kind of change stem from the fact that sources of conflict and opposition are not rooted in misinformation and misunderstanding, but stem from the fact that decline management re-distributes real losses. Citizens may have knowledge and information, and they may trust the integrity and expertise of policymakers but may still disagree with and oppose their policies.

The redistributive politics of decline exposes the reality that in a democratic society, making school policies is a political process. At every step, managers, elected officials, and parents and citizens affected by school policies confront the fundamental political questions: Who gets what, when and how? This is true in times of growth and prosperity, as well as in times of decline and retrenchment.

School policymaking should be a political process. It is most usefully viewed as a process of bargaining and negotiation through which conflicts are resolved.

The bargaining framework, developed by social scientists to explain public policy decisionmaking in organizational settings (e.g., Allison, 1971), is helpful in understanding both the constraints and opportunities facing decline managers. It recognizes that:

(1) There are genuinely and often intensely conflicting interests in the society in general and in every community in particular. Conflicting parties may share the same information, may trust each other, and may still disagree.

(2) These conflicting interests are natural and healthy in a democratic society. In other forms of government, conflicting interests are typically either ignored or suppressed.

(3) Interest-holders are not equal in power and authority, they are interdependent, but each has some power such that no one interest will automatically carry the day. For example, the citizens' right to participate (and the legitimacy loss resulting from any appearance of a denial of that right) is an independent source of power. Pluralism is also introduced because, as noted at the end of Section Three, schools are public commonweal institutions with a separation of ownership and management and divided ownership.

(4) In such a pluralistic setting, conflicting interests are resolved largely through a process of bargaining and negotiation, which depends on compromise. Compromise achieved through bargaining allows policies to be

formed and decisions to be made.

(5) Participants -- all those with the right and an interest to be involved -- exercise power as they seek to have their positions, interests and ideologies prevail in the process. Each participant -- whether superintendent, school board member, parent or community organization leader -- pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion in order to advance his conception of institutional, group and personal interests.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL MANAGERS

Chart 5B on the pages immediately following, provides a detailed contrast between the human relations and the bargaining approaches to citizen participation. Here we will note three general implications of adopting a bargaining orientation to citizen participation.

Implication No. 1: Pass The Buck And Let Go

The almost universal prescription that task forces and citizens' committees report to the superintendent rather than directly to the school board and public is symptomatic of an attitude that somehow (miraculously) the office of the school superintendent can and should aggregate and reconcile different points of view into a consensus policy package.

The bargaining model recognizes that this is often impossible and is not necessary or useful. In that model, the office of the superintendent is but one of many competing actors and centers of interests.

School district officials in Fairfax County (Virginia) report that after a typically frustrating history of conflict over school closure, their current practice is to have the school staff prepare a study report, and invite any and all citizens' groups to prepare similar reports (with access to district data and resources -- e.g., office support) independently of the staff reports. All of the reports are then presented to the school board at the same time for public hearing, debate and action. As one district official put it, "this makes it clear that decline is not just a staff problem."

This clarification is useful and for school administrators politically

CHART 5B. CONTRASTING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

ITEM OF COMPARISON	HUMAN RELATIONS MODEL	BARGAINING INTEREST GROUP MODEL
Assumptions About Problem Definition	There is or can be an objective definition of the problem of decline, defined in scientific management terms as a gap between what is, and what is a desired norm.	What is a problem, depends on one's role in the school organization, and on one's relationship to the benefits and burdens of operating a school system. No one problem-definition is any more rational or non-partisan than another.
Primary Source of Conflict and Opposition	The priority of local, parochial and private interests over the needs and constraints of having to retrench.	Same.
	Lack of information and understanding of the problems of decline.	Clear understanding of how one's own interests are affected by decline, and could be affected by different responses to decline.
Functions of Citizen Participation	To build support for retrenchment policies: eliminate or diminish opposition to retrenchment policies.	To legitimate the policymaking process by protecting it against charges of being undemocratic: eliminate or diminish opposition over the policymaking process.
	Create a consensus on policy.	Create a mandate for or against a given policy option.
	It is a resource.	It is a right, which school districts have to honor and live with.
	Participation mechanisms can increase school districts' planning capacity by mobilizing community talent and resources.	Participation mechanisms provide valuable information about community interests, and interest group conflicts, and can test policymakers' assumptions about constituency interests.

CHART 5B. CONTRASTING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (continued)

ITEM OF COMPARISON	HUMAN RELATIONS MODEL	BARGAINING INTEREST GROUP MODEL
Assumptions (Empirical and Normative) About Participant Behaviors	The participation process can change participants.	Same.
	The process of participation can moderate attitudes and create a consensus.	Participation processes are just as likely to articulate and crystalize conflicts of interest.
	Little distinction between volunteering and participation.	A recognition that volunteerism does not legitimate the policymaking process.
	A presumption that participants should be engaged in problem-solving.	A recognition that participation is an opportunity, a democratic right, to represent an individual or group interests.
	Members of participation mechanisms like task forces, study and advisory committees should leave their private interests at the door.	All interests -- individual, group and institutional/official -- are private. The opportunity for citizens to petition public officials with their private interests is what democracy has been all about. Denying access to private interests means denying access to precisely those constituencies who are most likely (if access is denied) to challenge the legitimacy of the policymaking process and turn that challenge into community-wide opposition.
School Managers' Responsibilities and Strategies	Try to involve as many people as possible.	Provide formal structures for all affected interests to "have their day in court." Participation is a right; if it is not exercised, that is not the fault or responsibility of school managers.

CHART 5B. CONTRASTING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (continued)

ITEM OF COMPARISON	HUMAN RELATIONS MODEL	BARGAINING INTEREST GROUP MODEL
School Managers' Responsibilities and Strategies (continued)	Educate public opinion about the realities of decline and the need to retrench.	Recognize that "management" is only one of many interest groups. Advocate the management perspective. Document the opportunity costs (see Section Three, Part C:3) of not cutting back.
Managers' Most Important Resources	The ability to document that a lot of citizens have been involved in the development of a given policy.	The ability to document that all interested parties have had a chance to make their views known, and that as a result there is either (a) a consensus, (b) a mandate (based on the majority rule principle), or (c) a complete deadlock of community interests. Either outcome allows managers to take some action.
	Ability to lead and educate public opinion.	Authority to create opportunities for the opinions of different segments of the public to be surfaced, to come into conflict, and to be compromised.
	Professional expertise and judgements about the public interest, i.e., what's best for children and for the school system.	Technical expertise in projecting the impact of alternative policy choices upon the values held by different community interests.
		Access to data showing the opportunity costs of alternative options. Note: information creates a constituency.

advantageous, while at the same time meeting the community access/legitimacy objective. Because many of the most intractable problems of decline management stem from the twin facts that (a) the community has a right to be involved and (b) that different segments of the community may have mutually exclusive interests, it makes sense to let go, to push the problem back onto its source.

Another strategy of letting go is presented in William L. Boyd's discussion of policy referenda in Section Three, Part C:4, above. He argues that letting, indeed, forcing the public to make choices among irreconcileable values, choices which set the policy direction for retrenchment, can be a highly effective form of leadership. Mechanisms such as policy referenda which record these choices can give superintendents and school board members the mandate to do what is fiscally necessary and educationally sound, within the limits prescribed by the public's choices.

In terms of the bargaining framework, "letting go" offers some interesting resources to the school official. The superintendent and/or school board member maintains positional power, while at the same time increasing the legitimacy of the decisions ultimately made because the public was allowed to make policy choices in a visible and legitimate way. The superintendent and/or school board member maintains power based on information from internal planning and evaluation, but expands his/her information base (and hence, his/her power in bargaining) by obtaining authenticated information about the needs, opinions and choices of diverse constituencies. Finally, by "letting go," school officials increase their capacity to identify and hence mobilize the necessary elements of a winning coalition of support for ultimate policy decisions.

Implication No. 2: Do Not Become Preoccupied With The People Problem Of Decline Management

Neither the bargaining view of decisionmaking or the idea of "letting go" as a letigimate form of leadership should be taken to suggest a causal, passive, or plan-less approach to thinking about community involvement. Quite to the contrary, effective political bargaining benefits from good information and systematic planning for community involvement. Good planning equips the manager with some valuable resources in the bargaining process. Consider these "resources": (a) a clear strategic advantage over those who lack the skill or resources to plan well; (b) a cost and benefit analysis of alternative forms of involvement; and (c) the existence of a systematic plan which allows the involvement and deployment of multiple members of the leader's team (staff and supporters) in order to overcome limitations of the leader's time and energy.

Implication No. 3: Recognize The Political Resource Potential Of Existing Citizen Participation Mechanisms And Groups

The tendency to see retrenchment as a temporary problem appears to lead many school officials to rely on "temporary" mechanisms for community involvement (e.g., appointing a special task force on school closings). Since for most American school districts the era of retrenchment will last for many years, it makes sense for school officials to stress community involvement through existing organizations and mechanisms or to create such permanent organizations and mechanisms if they don't already exist. For example, voluntary organizations such as the League of Women Voters can be called upon to undertake special studies, evaluations, or citizen surveys. Existing school advisory councils at the district and building levels can be asked to deal with retrenchment policy issues as a part of their regular agenda (or such councils can be created). Strengthening a permanent structure for community involvement should contribute positively to the creation of legitimacy.

BARGAINING AND RATIONALITY

The bargaining mode in school politics does not mean that for either school managers or parents and citizens that slick, wheeler-dealer behavior should prevail, or that civility and integrity should be lost. Nor does accepting a political theory of decisionmaking mean that facts do not make a difference and that expertise is unimportant. The best players -- professional or lay -- will get and use data, will analyze choices rationally against the values they wish to maximize, and use the most sophisticated available models for data analysis.

Both schools and communities will benefit as the players in the process of educational politics become more experienced and sophisticated with the bargaining mode. And, most importantly, educators and citizens can jointly contribute to creating and recreating the legitimacy of the political process and of the schools as vital public institutions.

POSTSCRIPT: BARGAINING AND PARTICIPATION: A NOTE TO CITIZENS

Thus far, all of the material in this handbook has been addressed simultaneously to "school leaders" defined as superintendents, central office administrators, school board members, and citizens in groups with formal assignments in the policy process. This note is addressed to activist parents and citizens with no power derived from a position within the system, who have diverse and sometimes conflicting interests which are often different from the institutional interests of the schools. Citizen groups which intend to influence school district policies in a time of retrenchment will need to become skillful players in the political process, building in all possible legitimate ways the power that they bring to that process. Like school managers, some of the rules of the bargaining game require new ways of thinking about the process, and the costs and benefits of different forms of participation.

Bargaining and Access

The bargaining style of school politics greatly increases opportunities for parent and citizen participation. The traditional school management approach was firmly rooted in the professional expertise of superintendents and other managers operating within the general policy guidelines set by school boards who viewed themselves as trustees of the public good rather than representatives of constituencies or interests. Parent and citizen efforts to influence school decisions were seen as unwarranted political intrustions into an orderly scheme of rational planning and management. In the bargaining approach to the politics of retrenchment in school districts, the activities of various parents and community interests to influence policies and decisions are both inevitable and legitimate. Hence, when parent and citizen groups are recognized as players in the process, their power is increased.

Bargaining and Influence

Access to policymaking does not automatically translate into influence over policies. And, in the bargaining model, there is no reason that it should. All interests are equal. No one has a monopoly on the right answers. The citizens' interest is not thereby anymore special or privileged than any other interest. There is no unitary citizens' interest anyway. The interests of your group are but one of many possible community interests. How persuasive the representation of your group interest is depends (just as it did for school managers) on the ability to compromise and to trade using the political resources available to citizen groups.

Bargaining Resources and Strategies For Citizens' Groups

(1) Be Prepared to Compromise and Persevere. Because of the dependence of the political-bargaining process on compromise as the mechanism for conflict management, parent and citizen groups working effectively in the political system must be prepared for some give and take. Compromise is hard to accept, particularly for groups whose organizational strength depends on ideology ("the neighborhood school") or emotional commitment ("the needs of mentally retarded children"). Nonetheless, an unwillingness to compromise will render a parent and citizen organization largely ineffective in the policy process except in those rare cases where the group has such unchallenged power that it can prevail on an issue without engaging in the normal bargaining process.

The resources of the school system are usually far greater than those that the parent and citizen groups can muster. The influencing of school policies through community involvement in various forms is often slow, tedious, difficult and frustrating work. Parent and citizen groups often fail to achieve their objectives, they lose in the political process to those who have more power. To be effective in the continuing bargaining process requires being willing to lose and bounce back to seek other objectives without being excessively discouraged. To be effective in the bargaining mode of school politics requires perseverance.

Effectiveness requires initiative. If school officials control the "agenda" of the public debate on retrenchment issues, citizen groups will continually be "involved" primarily by reacting to school officials' questions and issues. In relation to the trading-off strategy recommended to school officials in the above section, activist parents and citizens should consider putting their priority interests and demands "on the table" early and clearly. If they do this, they can influence the direction of public discussion and the content of the bargaining process. If they fail to do so, the increment-linked-to-decrement-strategy becomes a one-sided process, with the power heavily weighted on the side of the institutional representatives.

(2) Use Numbers To Persuade. The only natural advantage that parents have over school officials and educator interest groups is that there are more of them. Similarly, the only natural advantage that poor people have is their numbers. Numbers can be used as a base of power in the bargaining process -- in ways other than conventional protest and confrontational tactics. These include voter registration and turnout at elections, turnout at hearings and forums, and the meetings of school boards and other public bodies, and rallies and forums designed to demonstrate the numerical strengths of a particular constituency.

(3) Increase the Strength of Numbers by Forming Coalitions. Coalition building, an important tool for managers, is equally important for parent and citizen activists. Coalitions by their nature are seldom permanent; they are best put together in relation to a particular issue or series of related issues. Citywide public-interest type education (see Narver, 1982) associations have been shown to be in a particularly good position to convene disparate

groups for coalition building purposes and to provide planning and organizing skills necessary to keep such groups together in order to achieve a mutually-desired objective in the political process.

(4) Know the Territory. Knowing who is interested, in what, is an important part of the coalition building process. To engage effectively in the political bargaining process requires a basic knowledge of who the players are, and what their sources of power are likely to be.

(5) Plan and Get Information. There is nothing inconsistent about good, systematic rational planning for groups seeking to influence school policies in a bargaining mode. This advice was offered a few pages earlier to school officials; it is equally important for parents and citizens. Good planning and access to good data are sources of power and legitimacy for parents and citizens in the process as much as they are for those who are superintendents or board members. Data is also a tool for coalition building. The rule of thumb -- information creates a constituency -- applies to all actors in a pluralistic bargaining game.

Much of the information needed for being an effective player in the bargaining process is available from the school system itself. Inside groups such as advisory committees need to decide what they want and ask for it. Outside groups need to know what they want and seek it through regular channels. Federal and state freedom of information laws give the public access to nearly all important documents.

However, many effective parent and citizen groups generate their own data and in doing so increase their own power and legitimacy in the bargaining process. For example, a citizen group can conduct its own surveys to determine constituent preferences on policy choices. Similarly, groups can obtain by telephone or written inquiry information on policies and practices from other cities and towns and the opinions of outside experts to buttress claims and bargaining positions.

PART C:4. FITTING FORMS TO FUNCTIONS: A CHECKLIST FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Task forces and citizens advisory committees are not the only mechanisms for community involvement. But our analysis of the choices involved in establishing such groups (in Part C:1, above) has application to other mechanisms. What they can accomplish depends, in part, on who is involved. What they should accomplish depends upon at what stage of the policymaking process they [the mechanisms] are to be used. The key questions, therefore in designing participation mechanisms, are "Who is to participate? When? How? and Why?

WHY?

The "why" question is central. In fact, there are two questions: why managers want participation, and, why participants should want to participate. The bargaining model which was developed in Parts C:2 and C:3, above, suggests that there is a multiplicity of motives on the part of citizens, and hence a corresponding multiplicity of possible functions or outcomes for managers. This range of motives and outcomes is depicted on Chart 5C, below.

HOW?

As suggested in our analysis of the use and abuse of citizen participation, some forms of participation are more suited for some functions than others. Managers cannot predict or control participation. What they can do is provide citizens with different types of access to decisionmaking through existing policymaking processes, they can establish or create new relationships with existing school-community constituency groups, or they can provide new avenues and structures for citizen participation.

Chart 5D, below, summarizes these three options available to managers. The middle column lists the forms of citizen participation.

Chart 5E which follows gives a two-column listing of the forms and functions of citizen participation, thus summarizing our two-dimensional typology

CHART 5C. WHY? THE FUNCTIONS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

MOTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPANTS	CORRESPONDING OUTCOMES FOR SCHOOL MANAGERS. THE FUNCTIONS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
To help solve school-community problems: the volunteer motivation.	Mobilize community resources -- free time and talent -- in order to increase school district's planning capacity.
To be involved, to understand and influence policy, even though there is no immediate material stake in the policy outcome.	Share the burden of retrenchment, i.e., spread ownership in the problem of decline.
To seek to influence policy in order to protect or advance an individual or group interest.	Information about: -- Conflicts of interests within the community i.e., participation mechanisms can surface conflicts early in the planning process -- Areas of compromise. Participation may resolve conflicts. -- Potential constituencies for retrenchment, i.e., those who may suffer the opportunity costs of doing nothing. -- Political feasibility of various policy options.

of why (functions) and how (structure).

Armed with this typology, it is possible to become clearer about the policy choices involved in deciding upon what kind of citizen participation to nurture or create. Chart 5F, following, gives a summary of the tradeoffs. For each form of participation, it lists the most and least likely outcome.

WHO PARTICIPATES

Different forms of participation not only have different outcomes, but also attract or screen out different kinds of participants. This screening affects the outcomes of participation. This point is developed on Chart 5G,

CHART 5D: HOW? THE FORMS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS	FORM OF PARTICIPATION	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE TO MATERIALS ABOUT EACH FORM
Rely on existing processes	Public hearings	See Part D:2.
	Engage existing participating mechanisms	If there are PTOs, or already existing advisory councils, use those as the avenues through which citizens participate, see Part D:2
Establish new relations with existing groups	Informal consultation with organized interest groups	See Section Four, Part C:2, and Section Four, Part D:3
	Invite independent citizen groups to do their own studies	e.g., a district-wide citizens' group challenges the premises or the factual basis of a retrenchment proposal. The board (or administration) then invites any and all private organized representative civic groups to do their own study, or come up with a counter proposal.
Provide new avenues and and structures for citizen participation	Community surveys	See Part D:1
	Policy referenda	See Section Four, Part C:5
	Working task forces appointed by and reporting to the superintendent	See Part C:2 and Part D:3
	Working task forces, peer selected and reporting to the board	
	Deliberative advisory committees, peer-selected and reporting directly to the superintendent	

CHART 5D: HOW? THE FORMS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (continued)

STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS	FORM OF PARTICIPATION	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE TO MATERIALS ABOUT EACH FORM
Provide new avenues (continued)	Deliberative advisory committees, peer-selected, and reporting directly to the board	
	Comprehensive participatory planning mechanisms	A small representative task force forms the nucleus. Its members chair special subcommittees and/or study groups which involve more participants. These groups in turn hold hearings, consult with interest groups, do surveys, etc., which involve more members of the community. See Part D:4.

CHART 5E. A TYPOLOGY OF THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

FUNCTIONS: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION MECHANISMS CAN...

- Increase school district's planning capacity by mobilizing community talent and volunteer resources.
- Sustain the legitimacy of the policymaking process by demonstrating access by interested constituencies.
- Improve school-community communication.
- Surface conflicts of interest.
- Reconcile/compromise interest group conflicts.
- Widen public, i.e., constituency group, ownership in the problem of decline.
- Test the political feasibility of various policy options.
- Create a mandate for or against a given policy or set of policy options.
- Identify a potential constituency for specific cutbacks.

FORMS: STRUCTURES FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION INCLUDE...

- Public hearings.
- Community polls and surveys.
- Policy referenda.
- Independent citizen and other constituency group study committees.
- Working task forces appointed by and reporting to the superintendent.
- Working task forces peer-selected and reporting to the board.
- Deliberative advisory committees peer-selected and reporting to the superintendent.
- Deliberative advisory committees peer-selected and reporting to the board.
- Comprehensive participatory planning mechanisms.
- Consultation with existing constituency interest groups.
- Use of existing participation mechanisms.

below. The left-hand column lists the form of participation, the middle column indicates "who" will be able to participate, the right-hand column identifies the likely outcomes of having one kind of participant rather than another.

The kind of analysis presented on Chart 5G is useful, because the "community" is plural not singular. There are many community interests. If these did not conflict, there would be no conflict management problems and no legitimacy issue to worry about. Some community interests are organized; some are not. The unorganized interests may be precisely those constituencies who may benefit by a proposed cutback or those adversely affected by

CHART 5F. SOME FORMS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH DO NOT FIT. A SUMMARY.

FORM OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (STATED IN ABBREVIATED FORM)	MOST LIKELY FUNCTIONS FOR EACH FORM	LEAST LIKELY FUNCTIONS FOR EACH FORM
Public hearings	Sustain legitimacy Surface conflicts of interest	Increase planning capacity Widen public ownership in the decline problem
Community polls and surveys	Test political feasibility Identify a potential constituency	Increase planning capacity Reconcile conflicts
Policy referenda	Create a mandate for or against policy options Sustain legitimacy	Increase planning capacity Compromise or reconcile conflicts
Consultation with existing school-community interest groups	Test political feasibility of various policy options Surface conflicts of interest	Reconcile conflict Increase planning capacity
Use of existing participation mechanisms	Sustain legitimacy Increase planning capacity	Identify a potential constituency for specific cutbacks
Independent study committees	Surface conflicts of interest Widen public ownership in the problem of decline	Reconcile conflicts of interest
Working task forces: appointed by and reporting to the superintendent	Increase planning capacity	Sustain legitimacy Widen ownership in the decline problem
Working task forces, peer-selected, reporting to the board	Widen public ownership in the problem of decline	(Neutral in their impact on most other functions)

CHART 5F. SOME FORMS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH DO NOT FIT. A SUMMARY. (continued)

FORM OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (STATED IN ABBREVIATED FORM)	MOST LIKELY FUNCTIONS FOR EACH FORM	LEAST LIKELY FUNCTIONS FOR EACH FORM
Deliberative, peer-selected advisory committees reporting directly to the superintendent	Test political feasibility Surface conflicts of interest	Increase planning capacity Reconcile conflicts of interest
Deliberative, peer-selected advisory committees, reporting to the board	Surface and reconcile some interest group conflicts Create a mandate	Increase planning capacity

CHART 5G. WHO PARTICIPATES, AND HOW. A SUMMARY OF SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

HOW: FORMS OF PARTICIPATION	WHO PARTICIPATES	SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS OF THE "WHO" PARTICIPATES QUESTION
Public Hearings	Anyone who shows up.	Low cost of participation to participants. Provides access to unorganized individuals and interests. Little opportunity for participants to actually influence policy.
Community Polls and Surveys	Participation restricted only by the sampling criteria.	Low cost to participants. Provides input, albeit far removed from actual policymaking, to people otherwise not active or vocal. Good vehicle to improve communication. Because it is interactive people take more of its contents. Good vehicle to identify the interests of silent minorities or majorities, thus identifying potential constituencies for retrenchment.
Policy Referenda	Available to all voters. Participation restricted only by voter apathy.	Useful "high legitimacy" tool to create a mandate for the necessity to do something.
Consultation With Existing Interest Groups	Interests which are (a) organized, and (b) consulted	Who participates and how many citizens are involved depends upon how many interests are organized and the constituency base of those organizations. This practice may be challenged as only dealing with organized special interests.
Use of Existing Participation Mechanisms	Those already active on or represented by existing mechanisms such as PTO's, or school councils.	Limits pool of participants to those already active in school affairs, but then these are precisely the people most apt to (a) oppose cutbacks, or (b) become convinced of the opportunity costs of not cutting back, and/or (c) challenge the legitimacy of decisionmaking processes which deny citizen access.

CHART 5G. WHO PARTICIPATES, AND HOW. A SUMMARY OF SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. (continued)

HOW: FORMS OF PARTICIPATION	WHO PARTICIPATES	SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS OF THE "WHO" PARTICIPATES QUESTION
Use of Existing Participation Mechanisms (continued)	Those already active... (continued)	This pool of participants is also most likely to include those who will volunteer to help in school problem-solving. How much community access and hence legitimacy is provided by this strategy depends on how representative the existing participation mechanisms are in the first place.
USE OF CITIZENS COMMITTEES AND TASK FORCES OF VARIOUS KINDS		
Independent Study Committees	Interest groups with the organization and capacity to do studies.	A high cost type of participation, for participants. Likely to be engaged in by "elite" (most powerful and higher SES groups). No guarantee that the groups, even the most avowedly public spirited and non-partisan represent anybody but themselves. This strategy is most useful in (a) highly politicized, pluralistic communities in which there is a number of education interest groups, and/or (b) when there is a strong focused and highly organized opposition.
Working Task Forces Appointed By and Reporting to the Superintendent	This form will tap civic elites and those who are involved as volunteers.	This kind of participant can do much to increase school districts' planning capacity. But appointed, at-large memberships do little to increase legitimacy. And this form would exclude the very groups most likely to oppose cutbacks -- they do not own the problem of decline enough to engage in such high cost participation which requires leaving their private interests at the door.

CHART 5G. WHO PARTICIPATES, AND HOW. A SUMMARY OF SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. (continued)

HOW: FORMS OF PARTICIPATION	WHO PARTICIPATES	SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS OF THE "WHO" PARTICIPATES QUESTION
USE OF CITIZENS COMMITTEES AND TASK FORCES OF VARIOUS KINDS (continued)		
Deliberative Advisory Committees With Peer-Selected, Instructed Delegate Membership, Reporting Directly to the Board	This is like a "presidents' council" (NSPRA 1976:45) -- a representative constituent assembly of various affected interests.	The legitimacy of such a group will depend on how representative are the constituencies involved and how accountable its delegate members are. A truly representative and accountable group may be too large and too inflexible to do anything but deliberate. If it arrives at a consensus on policy options, this outcome can be both an opportunity and a problem for school managers. Problem: If the recommendations (which are made public) are overturned, then there is increased likelihood of multi-interest group opposition coalition to any alternative decision. Opportunity: The outcome can have a high legitimacy value. It comes close to being a mandate for the policy options.
Comprehensive Participatory Planning Mechanisms	A nucleus task force which creates other kinds of participation mechanisms. Includes the spectrum of participants included in the other aforementioned forms.	This form incorporates all of the advantages of other forms of participation. Provides multiple opportunities and multiple levels of participation thereby engaging participants who can incur varying costs of participation, and engaging participants of varying motives, i.e., volunteer to problem solve vs. lobby to protect or advance an individual or group interest.

CHART 5G. WHO PARTICIPATES, AND HOW. A SUMMARY OF SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. (continued)

HOW: FORMS OF PARTICIPATION	WHO PARTICIPATES	SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS OF THE "WHO" PARTICIPATES QUESTION
USE OF CITIZENS COMMITTEES AND TASK FORCES OF VARIOUS KINDS (continued)		
Comprehensive Participatory Planning Mechanisms (continued)	A nucleus task force... (cont'd.) Includes the spectrum... (cont'd.)	Legitimacy is quite high, but outcomes are unpredictable. At all levels there will need to be clear decision rules about how information is to be used. Disputes about how information (results of surveys and studies, committee recommendations) are at the root of many conflicts about the legitimacy of citizen participation mechanisms. Form is initially costly. It requires much "care and feeding." In the long run, it employs citizen volunteer participants who then coordinate other forms of citizen participation.

by the opportunity costs of not cutting back.

One issue to consider, therefore, is what avenues can be created to draw out such constituencies and what resources managers can use -- e.g., the power of appointment.

Another issue to consider is scope of involvement -- how many people (parents, non-parent taxpayers, and school staff) with varying degrees of commitment and free time for civic involvement are provided with opportunities to be involved. Please note: The wider the network of opportunities the more likely it is that school managers will be able to identify a countervailing coalition against highly vocal groups which can be expected to oppose any cutback affecting their interests.

The answer to "who" participates, then, involves many pragmatic considerations. At a minimum, consider including all of the losers _and_ beneficiaries of a potential cutback, and all groups (inside or outside of the school department, resident or non-resident) who have _de jure_ or _de facto_ access and influence with the local board of education.

WHEN

The "when" question refers to stages of the policymaking process. A useful model of policymaking stages typical of school districts has been developed by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management at the University of Oregon. An adaptation of their model, with examples typical of a retrenchment decision such as school closure, is presented in Chart 5H.

The "when" question is pertinent because it can get school managers into all sorts of trouble.

Frustrated expectations, on the part of citizen participants, can breed more alienation and hostility than if there were no policies for community involvement. For example, policy provisions for extensive wide-open involvement at Stage Three, or Four, will be seen or very quickly experienced as an invitation not to participate but to support (or veto) a policy direction already formed. The issue is not either/or with respect to involvement in different stages of the policymaking process, but rather what forms of citizen

CHART 5H. A MODEL OF STAGES OF POLICYMAKING

STAGE	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLE OF A RETRENCHMENT DECISION SUCH AS SCHOOL CLOSURE
1. Proposal Development	Need for action is articulated. One or more policy alternatives are suggested.	Enrollment and capacity data are gathered. Fiscal projections are made. Trade-offs are documented and posed.
2. Executive Recommendation	Various policy alternatives become real and are submitted to the board of education.	A consolidation plan is proposed.
3. Legislative Action	The board makes a binding policy decision, expressed an order from it to school employees.	Guidelines on school closure which can include one or more of the following: ● a decision on which schools are to be closed ● guidelines establishing the criteria upon which school closure decisions are made ● guidelines governing how such decisions are made and implemented.
4. Supplementary Decisionmaking	Legislative intent is translated into practice by rule-making -- administrative procedures and practices necessary to carry out board policy.	An implementation plan for school closing, or -- operational indicators for establishing the criteria for governing school closing.
5. Implementation	Schools are closed following the guidelines and decision rules resulting from stages four and five.	
6. Policy Review	This can be a post-hoc assessment, a mid-course correction, or an attempt to overturn or reverse the original decision.	Examples include -- a staff report on the impact of consolidation; a revision in the procedures for closure, a citizens' court challenge to a closure proposal.

SOURCE: Adapted and abridged from: TUCKER, H.J. and ZEIGLER, H.L. (1980). The Politics of Education Governance: An Overview. Eugene, Oregon: ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, pages 3 - 8, passim.

involvement are desireable and possible in different stages of the policy-making process.

There is yet another pitfall with respect to the question "when." Our civic culture, and hence, more importantly public opinions, are divided and ambivalent about the legitimacy of interest-group involvement in policymaking past the "legislative action" stage.

On one side, there is the position that once a community has, through its elected representatives, expressed its collective will on an issue, the duty of public services in the executive branches (of all levels of government) is to carry out that will. Any modification in the implementation (Stages 1 and 5) of that policy which comes about as a result of consultation with "affected interests" can be seen as an illegitimate form of participation -- one that holds public policy hostage to private and special interests. Others, however, will argue that the every essence of our democratic system is that public policy must, at all stages, involve and consult the affected interests, even after a majority will has been formally registered.

On a more pragmatic level, concessions made to affected interests may smooth implementation but can create troublesome precedents. If one group (or neighborhood) is seen as winning some concessions, others will be encouraged to try to do so when their case comes up.

SOME TRADE-OFFS AND COSTS OF VARIOUS FORMS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Two kinds, or meanings, of "costs" are at issue here. One concerns the fiscal impact of decisions arrived at through widespread participation. The other concerns the costs in terms of the management resources -- time, effort, materials (and the price-tag for those "inputs") -- devoted to establishing various community involvement mechanisms.

Financial Impact of Participatory Planning

Evidence reviewed in Section Three, above, suggested that one effect of more involvement, in such cutbacks as school closure, is that "criteria get broadened" in such a way that the schools ultimately closed are not the ones whose closure would have produced the maximum in projected cost-savings. Although general impact data is lacking, these findings (Cibulka, 1982b -- that where there is more community involvement fewer schools get closed and it takes longer to close them) do suggest a classic trade-off between democracy and efficiency.

Management Costs and Participation

In reflecting upon a highly rational, lengthy and participatory planning process for school closure decisionmaking in his district, the then (1978) superintendent of public schools in Lexington (Massachusetts) publicly expressed his misgivings that the process had reached a point of diminishing returns: planning for lower levels of resource consumption was itself eating up resources diverting time and energy from curriculum improvement, the rationale for cutbacks in the first place.

Similar comments about this administrative overload were made by Larry Cuban (Cuban, 1979) when he was superintendent of schools in Arlington (Virginia).

Both comments articulate what may be another classic trade-off between democracy and efficiency. It may be posed as follows:

For purposes of conflict management, the more different kinds of constituencies that are involved the more likely it is that managers can identify the elements of a potentially supportive coalition. For purposes of legitimacy, the closer the participants are to influencing policy (i.e., "depth" of involvement), the more likely it is that ownership of the decline problem is broadened and that a potential coalition becomes actual.

But everything has a price-tag; for every benefit there is a cost. Some community involvement mechanisms use up more resources -- staff time, energy, and, therefore, money -- at the very time when the school system is moving toward "lower levels of resource consumption."

The rank order -- from high to low -- of the various forms of community involvement, in terms of their cost, their scope, and their depth, is as follows:

Cost	Scope	Depth
Comprehensive participatory planning mechanisms	Polls and surveys	Comprehensive planning mechanisms
Deliberative advisory committees and task forces	Comprehensive planning mechanisms	Deliberative advisory committees
Polls and surveys	Using existing groups	Use of existing groups
Use of existing participation mechanisms	Public hearings	Working task forces
Public hearings	Deliberative advisory committees	Public hearings
	Appointed and working task forces	Polls and surveys

In the absence of hard impact data about the different forms of involvement, the above rankings are more suggestive than definitive. They represent reasonable inferences, drawn from the very nature of the forms as well as from testimony from participants. For example: except for unusual circumstances, more people respond to surveys than attend public hearings; a deliberative advisory committee with peer group selection involves and represents more people than a 10-20 member appointed, at-large working task force; a comprehensive planning mechanisms with a mandate to explore and define the policy issues has more potential influence over policy than does an advisory committee exploring and testing a more limited range over policy than a working task force charged with coming up with alternate solutions to a pre-defined problem.

Notwithstanding possible disagreements about the rank order of each form, in the middle ranges, two main policy implications do emerge.

One, there is a trade-off between cost and conflict management. That form -- comprehensive participatory planning processes -- which would have the best combined conflict management and legitimacy ranking (more people -- scope, plus more influence -- depth) is also the costliest.

Two, if the ranking were precise and numerically weighted, and if it were possible to make precise cost-benefit calculations, then "using existing school-community participation" mechanisms presents the best balance between costs and legitimacy -- that form can involve more people significantly at less cost since management resources have already been invested in the establishment and nurturing of such groups. And, it is precisely such mechanisms which involve the school districts' key constituency -- those parent activists and "loyal oppositionists" whose continued support is most necessary and whose knowledge, experience and access to local boards of education can make them most formidable opponents.

Cost, Control and Productivity: A Final Summary of Trade-Offs

In our earlier discussion on the use and abuse of advisory committees, we suggested a trade-off between "control" -- being able to manage and predict the outcome of any citizen participation -- and legitimacy. We suggested that "if managers want to spread the ownership in the problem of decline, they may have risk sharing in the problem definition of decline." Furthermore, the most "productive" forms of participation (small, carefully selected working task forces and study groups) may not be the best vehicles for legitimating the policy outcomes or the study recommendations. Again, we see a classic trade-off between democracy and efficiency.

The same sorts of trade-offs apply to all of the forms of participation as shown on Chart 5I, which concludes the discussion of the policy choices involved in providing citizens with access to decisionmaking.

CHART 5I. FITTING FORMS TO FUNCTIONS. A SUMMARY OF TRADE-OFFS.

FORM	POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS			
	Legitimacy	Control	Productivity	Costs
Public Hearings	HIGH: Formal and open access. No restrictions on who can participate.	MEDIUM: Outcomes are unpredictable but not binding.	LOW	LOW
Community Surveys and Polls	MEDIUM: Provides input for non-organized, non-vocal publics.	MEDIUM: Outcomes not binding.	LOW	MEDIUM
Policy Referenda	HIGH	LOW: Results are unpredictable and are binding.	LOW	HIGH
Consult with Interest Groups	MEDIUM: Leaves out unorganized interests.	HIGH: Who to consult and the use of results are discretionary.	LOW	MEDIUM
Use Existing Participation Mechanisms	HIGH: Such mechanisms are representative institutions in their own right.	MEDIUM: The cast of characters is familiar, but their input cannot be ignored.	HIGH	LOW
Task Forces and Citizens Committees of Various Types				
Independent Study Committees	HIGH	LOW: Outcomes are unpredictable and findings are apt to be partisan.	MEDIUM	LOW
Appointed Committees Reporting to the Superintendent	LOW: At-large representation on a working committee, do not provide much legitimacy.	HIGH: Membership and agenda are predictable. There is some discretion over outcomes.	HIGH	LOW

CHART 5I. FITTING FORMS TO FUNCTIONS. A SUMMARY OF TRADE-OFFS. (continued)

FORM	POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS			
	Legitimacy	Control	Productivity	Costs
Task Forces and Citizens Committees of Various Types (continued)				
Committees With Peer Selection Who Report Directly to the Board	HIGH: Peer selection and instructed delegation makes this a representative instituion.	LOW: No control over membership. Little control over results even though they are not binding.	MEDIUM	MEDIUM

SECTION FIVE PART D:1

D:1. COMMUNITY SURVEYS AND POLLS

Often suggested and sometimes used, community surveys and polls are not always used to their full potential. Consistent with the conflict management strategy outlined in Section Four, above, consider using polls and surveys as relatively low-cost and low-risk surrogates for referenda and bond elections. To this end, survey items should elicit choices and not opinions or preferences. The questions should be as close in form as possible to those presented in a referenda.

Unlike real referenda, surveys can elicit intensity -- how strongly that choice is made -- and respondents' background data, including role and constituency group, and history of activism in school affairs.

Data generated by this kind of survey gives clues about what kinds of policy choices are preferred, how strongly, and by what segments of the public. Given this function, the most appropriate time for such surveys is between the stages of "proposal development" (in which the choices presented on the survey are identified and documented) and "legislative action."

Surveys can be general or targeted. It may be useful to "poll" individuals -- the school system's central constituency -- those who routinely attend board meetings, serve on school initiated and/or independent permanent citizens-parents groups, and those attending public hearings on the relevant issues. Targeted survey data is most useful for strategic purposes -- it identifies the policy choices of the most vocal set of constituents.

Whether targeted or general, the survey can be administered through the mail, by phone, or in an interview. Which is used is an issue of pragmatics rather than principle. In large districts, with large samples, interviewing is not feasible. Phone surveys get a higher rate of return, but are labor intensive and costly.

A word about rates of return: A targeted survey is best used for internal, strategy planning purposes. A general survey can also, if there is a clear pattern of responses, be used to legitimate and support a policy choice (i.e., on "executive recommendation"). If so used, it may be challenged on the grounds of its rate of return. This will almost always be a political rather than a methodological challenge. It is useful to remember that survey results are not binding. School board decisions are binding. Yet, voter turnout in school board elections is notoriously low. Typically, a majority of a minority of eligible voters elect a school board. This fact may be disturbing but it does not prevent a board from making binding decisions.

By extension, any survey's percentage rate of return which equals or comes close to equalling the percentage of votes cast for the victorious candidates at the last election divided by the total number of eligible voters. (This criterion applies to surveys conducted and commissioned by school systems and by independent citizens-parents watchdog organizations.)

Some useful "nuts and bolts" kinds of information on survey design and development can be found in the "Conclusion" of Wachtel and Powers (1979), Rising Above Decline, and in Burges (1976), Facts for a Change, both published by the Institute for Responsive Education which produced this handbook. A 1974 American Association of School Administrators' handbook Declining Enrollment: What to Do, also contains (pages 19-23) some useful hints about survey design and use.

In the materials which follow, we offer sample survey formats and items used in three school districts.

Policy Tool 5A comes from the Sequoia (California) Union High School District. It is a straightforward opinion poll asking respondents to rank-order the criteria they think should be decisive in school closure decisions.

Policy Tool 5B comes from Des Plaines, Illinois. That instrument is a good example of the plebiscitory function that surveys can perform. Note how it solicits choices and not just preferences.

Policy Tool 5C was used in Lincoln-Sudbury, Massachusetts. It was administered at public meetings. It, too, solicits choices and very usefully identifies conflicts of community interests.

POLICY TOOL 5A: COMMUNITY SURVEYS TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR SCHOOL CLOSING. FROM SEQUOIA (CA) UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT*

PUBLIC INFORMATION SURVEY

Please complete the following survey and return to district staff or D.C. C. representatives at the meeting tonight or fold completed survey (being sure printed address is visible) and mail to the district office at your earliest convenience.

CRITERIA TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINATION OF THE SCHOOL OR SCHOOLS TO BE CLOSED

_____1. Adequacy of Facility

_____2. Enrollment/ADA Factors

_____3. Location

_____4. Maintenance of the Desegregation/ Integration Program

_____5. Cost Savings

_____6. Transportation

_____7. Maintenance of Educational Programs and Services

_____8. Community Impact

_____9. Resale Value and/or Disposition of Property

Using a rating scale from 1 to 5, assign a numerical weight to each of the criteria. ("1" would indicate least important, while a "5" would indicate most important.)

Suggestion(s) regarding redistricting (new boundary lines): ____________

Suggestion(s) for disposition of closed site: ____________

Suggestion(s) for generating additional income: ____________

Suggestion(s) relating to district curriculum: ____________

Additional comments: ____________

I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SERVING ON THE DISTRICT: CURRICULUM COMMITTEE__

FINANCE COMMITTEE_____

Name (optional) ____________ Address, Phone Number ____________ School ____________

*SOURCE: Communication to the Institute for Responsive Education.

POLICY TOOL 5B: COMMUNITY SURVEYS TO GUIDE POLICY DEVELOPMENT. EXAMPLE ONE: FROM THE EAST MAINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (DES PLAINES, ILLINOIS) DISTRICT 63

As noted in our discussion of conflict management the most useful type of surveys serve the function of a plebiscite -- i.e., rather than solicit opinions, they solicit choices, and identify what the citizenry would choose under real world constraints. The following excerpted survey items are a particularly good example of this approach.

SURVEY ITEMS SOLICITING RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON POLICY DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA. (FOR EACH ITEM RESPONDENTS WERE ASKED TO CHECK OFF ON A FIVE-ITEM -- "STRONGLY AGREE" TO "STRONGLY DISAGREE" -- SCALE.

Listed below and on the next page are 17 statements followed by a series of answer boxes ranging from strongly agree with the statement to strongly disagree. Each statement describes some option other school districts have taken to reduce the deficit in their education budgets. Please read each statement carefully and place an "X" in the box that best describes your opinion as to whether or not the option described would be a feasible way to reduce the education budget deficit without lowering the quality of education.

a. An early retirement program should be started to replace highly paid teachers and administrators by lower paid teachers and administrators.

b. Field trips should be eliminated because they do not add greatly to the quality of education.

c. Wholly vacant facilities should be leased to organizations which are approved by the education code.

d. Services such as principals should be cut back.

e. Partially vacant facilities should be leased to organizations which are approved by the education code.

f. Services such as counselors should be cut back.

g. Wholly vacant facilities should be sold.

h. Services such as secretaries should be cut back.

i. Facilities should be shared with private schools.

j. Vacant property should be sold.

k. Services such as librarians should be cut back.

* SOURCE: Communication to the Institute for Responsive Education, May 1981. The survey was designed and conducted for the school board by Market Facts, Inc., of Chicago, with monies provided by Federal Title IV-C grant in 1979.

POLICY TOOL 5B: (continued)

l. Services such as custodians should be cut back.

m. Sometimes it is necessary to close individual schools and consolidate students to maintain an overall high level of education.

n. A neighborhood committee should be formed to work closely with the superintendent and Board to explore all options before school closings.

o. An investigation should be made of possible low tax assessments on large commercial property located in the school district.

p. The amount of money budgeted for such services as administrators, secretaries, custodians, reading coordinators, and librarians should be based on the number of pupils enrolled in each school.

q. It is more important to keep a neighborhood school than it is to have a full time principal, librarian, administrators, reading coordinators, and custodial staff.

THE NEXT TWO ITEMS EXPLICITLY SOLICIT RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ABOUT REAL POLICY OPTIONS FACING THE SCHOOL BOARD.

3. One option presented to the Board of Education to substantially reduce the projected budget deficit is to reorganize the staffing practices at each of the schools by increasing the student/teacher ratio. The student/teacher ratio is the average number of students allowed by the Board to be taught by one teacher. The present student/teacher ratio is 23:1 for grades K through 3, and 27:1 for grades 4 through 8.

The option presented to the Board shows that a substantial cost savings could be gained by increasing the student/teacher ratio for grades K through 3 to 25:1 and increasing the student/teacher ratio for grades 4 through 8 to 29:1.

3a. Do you feel that the budget deficit should be reduced by increasing the student/teacher ratio to the levels described above?

Yes... ☐ No... ☐

3b. Which one of the following statements best describes your feelings about the proposed change in the student/teacher ratio?

The student/teacher ratio is a critical factor in the quality of education a child receives and therefore an increase would lower the quality of education............. ☐

The student/teacher ratio is an important factor in the quality of education for some children but other factors are more important; therefore the increase would have little or no effect on the quality of education.......... ☐

POLICY TOOL 5B: (continued)

The student/teacher ratio is of little importance to the quality of education a child receives; therefore the student/teacher ratio should be increased.......... ☐

4. Another option presented to the Board to reduce the projected deficit is to reorganize the grade levels of each school. At present, schools are organized into those schools serving grades kindergarten through 6 and those schools service grades 7 and 8.

If the Board was to reorganize the grade levels served by individual schools, the new grade level organization would have schools serving grades kindergarten through 5 and schools serving grades 6 through 8. This change in the grade level organization would also result in a major reorganization of educational programs in these schools.

4a. Do you feel that the grade level organization should be changed from the present structure (kindergarten through 6 and 7-8) to the proposed reorganized structure (kindergarten through 5 and 6-8)?

Yes... ☐ No... ☐

4b. Which one of the following statements best describes your feelings about the proposed change in the grade level organization of the schools in District #63?

Grade level organization is unimportant to the quality of education a child receives............................ ☐

Grade level organization is important for some children but other factors are more important; therefore, the grade level reorganization would not lower the quality of education.. ☐

Grade level organization is a critical factor in the quality of education a child receives; therefore the grade level reorganization would raise the quality of education... ☐

Grade level organization is a critical factor in the quality of education a child receives; therefore the grade level reorganization would lower the quality of education... ☐

THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS REQUIRES RESPONDENTS TO MAKE TRADE-OFF CHOICES RATHER THAN SUBMIT A WISH LIST. NOTE ALSO HOW THE PREAMBLES TO THIS AND OTHER SURVEY ITEMS SERVE AS A MEANS TO INFORM AND EDUCATE THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE POLICY ISSUES AND CONSTRAINTS FACING THE SCHOOL SYSTEM.

5. At present, there are special area teachers that teach classes in music, art, and physical education. This practice allows the

children to be instructed in these areas by teachers who are specifically trained in these special areas. It also allows the regular classroom teacher to spend some time planning for traditional classroom subjects.

5a. Would you approve of eliminating one or more of these special area teachers and having the regular classroom teacher teach classes in music, art, and physical education in order to reduce the budget deficit?

Yes... ☐ No... ☐

5b. Which of these statements best describes your feelings as to which of these special area teachers should be eliminated and have the regular classroom teacher teach these subjects? ("X" one box below.)

Each of these subjects should be taught by the regular classroom teacher, all special area teachers should be eliminated.. ☐

Music should be taught by the regular classroom teacher while art and physical education should be taught by special area teachers.. ☐

Art should be taught by the regular classroom teacher while music and physical education should be taught by special area teachers.. ☐

Physical education should be taught by the regular classroom teacher while art and music should be taught by special area teachers....................................... ☐

Music and art should be taught by the regular classroom teacher while physical education should be taught by special area teachers.. ☐

Art and physical education should be taught by the regular classroom teacher while music should be taught by special area teachers....................................... ☐

Physical education and music should be taught by the regular classroom teacher while art should be taught by special area teachers....................................... ☐

5c. If special area teachers were not eliminated, would you be in favor of reducing the amount of time spent on instruction in these special areas in order to reduce the projected budget deficit?

YES... ☐ No... ☐

POLICY TOOL 5B: (continued)

5d. Which of these statements best describes your feelings as to which of these special areas should be reduced? ("X" one box below.)

Each of the areas should be cut back equally.............. ☐

Music should be cut back while maintaining art and physical education at their current levels................ ☐

Art should be cut back while maintaining music and physical education at their current levels................ ☐

Physical education should be cut back while maintaining art and music at their current levels.................... ☐

Music and art should be cut back while maintaining physical education at its current level.................. ☐

Art and physical education should be cut back while maintaining music at its current level.................... ☐

Physical education and music should be cut back while maintaining art at its current level...................... ☐

ITEM TESTING THE WATERS FOR A REFERENDUM

7a. It has been suggested that a referendum be held to seek permission to add 30¢ per $100 assessed evaluation to the present educational fund tax rate.

Based on your answers to this questionnaire, if a referendum were held this spring asking the citizens of the school district to approve an increase in the education fund, would you approve such a referendum?

Yes... ☐ No... ☐

7b. Would you actively campaign to seek passage of the referendum?

Yes... ☐ No... ☐

8a. Do you feel the Board of Education has not taken into account some important option for the solution of reducing the projected budget deficit?

Yes... ☐ No... ☐

8b. What option? ____________________

POLICY TOOL 5C: USING SURVEYS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT. EXAMPLE TWO: FROM LINCOLN-SUDBURY MASSACHUSETTS HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT.*

Like the previous example from Des Plaines (Illinois) this survey by design was intended to function as a quasi-plebiscite and elicit community responses to developed policy options (themselves arising out of a participatory planning process, see Policy Model 5 , on page , for related materials) to be presented by a Task Force committee to the Board.

Those options were presented and explained at a public meeting. After presentation, members of the Task Force committee led small group discussions among the 800+ people attending the meeting (in a school system with slightly less than 2,000 high school pupils at the time of this survey -- 1975). Then each participant filled out an 18-page questionnaire at the meeting, some items of which are excerpted here.

ITEMS PERTAINING TO RESPONSES TO THE THREE POLICY OPTIONS. NOTE: THE WORKING COMMITTEE RECOGNIZED THE TRADE-OFFS INVOLVED AND SAW EACH OPTION AS BASED SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EDUCATION. SURVEY ITEMS WERE INTENDED, IN PART, TO TEST FOR CONGRUENCE BETWEEN THE COMMITTEE'S ASSUMPTIONS AND THOSE OF THE COMMUNITY.

OPTION ONE. Maintain the high school program as is -- with a highly diversified curriculum, maximum freedom of student course selection, and a heavy emphasis on individualization.

1. Do you feel the following aspects of this alternative are positive, neutral, or negative.

(Please check appropriate box next to each aspect.)

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
a. It tries to meet the needs of every student.	☐	☐	☐
b. It tries to develop student responsibility for educational choices.	☐	☐	☐
c. It leaves room for students to try out different subject areas.	☐	☐	☐
d. It reduces the need for ability grouping by enabling students of different levels of achievement to pursue diverse interests.	☐	☐	☐
e. It gives teachers room for incentiveness in teaching.	☐	☐	☐

* SOURCE: MORGAN and WOFFORD (1977). *Declining Enrollment -- Rising School Costs*. Pages 77-79 and 226-244.

POLICY TOOL 5C: USING SURVEYS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT (continued)

OPTION ONE: Maintain the H.S. program as is (continued)

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
f. It encourages teachers' developing relationships with students as individuals.	☐	☐	☐
g. It requires parental involvement in student choice of courses.	☐	☐	☐
h. It tries to balance costs and program needs.	☐	☐	☐

OPTION TWO: A Program of Essentials: Restricts present curriculum diversity and choice, It sees a school with fewer courses being offered, less free time for students, more time spent in class or study halls, and more supervision by teachers.

2. Do you feel the following aspects of this alternative are positive, neutral, or negative?

(Please check appropriate box next to each aspect.)

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
a. It tries to transmit a uniform body of knowledge and skills.	☐	☐	☐
b. It strengthens school controls over educational choices.	☐	☐	☐
c. It reduces student uncertainties about what are important subject areas.	☐	☐	☐
d. It increases the need for ability grouping of students of different levels of achievement.	☐	☐	☐
e. It enables teachers to focus on standard courses with less need for outside preparation.	☐	☐	☐
f. It encourages teachers to develop relationships with students in groups.	☐	☐	☐
g. It reduces parental involvement in student choice of courses.	☐	☐	☐

POLICY TOOL 5C: USING SURVEYS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT (continued)

OPTION TWO: A Program of Essentials (continued)

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
h. It can decrease costs by reducing staff and:			
1. increasing class size or	☐	☐	☐
2. increasing number of class sections per teacher.	☐	☐	☐

OPTION THREE: Three Year Program With Option for a Fourth Year. This alternative is based on the premise that four years is longer than is necessary or desirable for most students to complete high school.

3. Do you feel the following aspects of this alternative are positive, neutral, or negative?

(Pleae check appropriate box next to each alternative.)

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
a. It enables students to complete the basic curriculum in less time.	☐	☐	☐
b. It demands of most students that they work harder, mature faster.	☐	☐	☐
c. It can provide advanced courses in Senior year, while restricting options in earlier years.	☐	☐	☐
d. It will increase ability-grouping as students identify with varying learning needs.	☐	☐	☐
e. It gives some teachers the opportunity to teach more advanced subjects.	☐	☐	☐
f. It facilitates teachers' developing relationships with 4th year students as individuals.	☐	☐	☐
g. It requires increased parental involvement in student choice of 4th year options.	☐	☐	☐

POLICY TOOL 5C: USING SURVEYS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT (continued)

OPTION THREE: Three Year Program With Option for a Fourth Year (continued)

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
h. It can decrease taxpayer costs by:	____	____	____
1. reducing length of time in school to graduate	____	____	____
or	____	____	____
2. charging tuition to parents for 4th year options.	____	____	____

The school district which developed and used this survey was a single high school district faced with cost-reduction pressures due to enrollment decline. As a single high school district it had no options but to effect cost-reductions by reductions in staff, and this, in turn, required restructuring the school's increasingly diversified curriculum.

Recognizing that diversity arose out of past commitments to a particular kind of educational philosophy, the task force/working committee realized that the policy decision turned on philosophy and ideology about public spending and about education. To that end, its survey items were designed to surface the ideological commitments of the various school and community constituencies and did not, like the earlier Des Plaines survey model, focus on nitty-gritty policy choices.

SURVEY ITEMS ON FISCAL IDEOLOGY (FOR EACH ITEM, RESPONDENTS WERE GIVEN A 7-POINT SCALE EXPRESSING INTENSITY OF AGREEMENT WITH THE TWO BI-POLAR PROPOSITIONS EXPRESSED IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE SURVEY QUESTION).

- Do you anticipate that the financial condition of the towns will worsen or improve in the next few years?
- Do you anticipate that your own financial condition will worsen or improve in the next few years?
- If financial conditions worsened, would you favor or oppose towns reducing their current level of financial support of education?
- If you believe that education at the high school could be significantly improved by increasing expenditures, to what degree would you oppose or favor an increase?
- If you believed that education at the high school would be significantly worsened by decreasing expenditures, to what degree would you oppose or favor a decrease?

POLICY TOOL 5C: USING SURVEYS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT (continued)

ITEMS DEALING WITH EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. (NOTE: FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS RESPONDENTS ARE ASKED TO CHECK-OFF ON A 7-POINT SCALE. FOR EXAMPLE, ON ITEM 7 IMMEDIATELY BELOW, THE RANGE WAS #1 "MUCH MORE TOWARD UNIFORM KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS" TO #7 "MUCH MORE TOWARD DIVERSITY..." POINT #4 IN ALL CASES WAS "ABOUT THE SAME AS NOW."

7. Should the high school more toward transmitting a uniform body of knowledge and skills or toward transmitting a diversity of knowledge and skills according to differing student needs?

8. Should the faculty move toward uniform teaching procedures or use a diversity of teaching procedures according to differing student needs?

8a. Should the school structure move toward protecting adolescents from choice making (by making decisions for them) or toward demanding that students make their own choices?

9. In order to increase student achievement, should the faculty put more emphasis on requiring student effort or on stimulating students' own interest in their school work?

PART D:2. USE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS

Often used, often necessary, and sometimes unpleasant, emotional ordeals, public hearings provide school managers with: data about interest group cleavages, data about the intensity of interests, a pool from which to recruit members of task forces and advisory committees, and mailing lists for targeted community polls and surveys.

The following pages present two local policies from Montgomery County (Maryland) and from Salt Lake City. The practices are interesting because, in each case, provision for hearings is part of a highly formalized due process for citizen access, a process which includes other avenues for citizen participation as well.

POLICY MODEL 5A: USE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS. THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY (MARYLAND) APPROACH.

After a study process, any proposed solutions (regarding school closure and consolidation) are formally presented to the board before being presented to the public. Then, the following provisions for community involvement come into force.

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT PROVISION	RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM THE LOCAL POLICY STATEMENT	
	School Administration Responsibilities	Citizens Rights and Responsibilities
Public Notice and Feedback	Send copies of the preliminary plan to the PTA/PTSA...and other school/community organizations and civic associations within each school's service area and/or future school site area for review and comment. A standardized reaction form should be developed and distributed so that comments can be obtained with some consistency.	Individuals, schools, and/or community organizations shall send reactions to the recommendations for their school to the superintendent no later than two months after the preliminary plan is distributed.
Consideration of Community-Initiated Alternatives	Develop a recommended final plan after considering individuals' and community groups' reactions and proposals, and submit it to the Board of Education within three months after the preliminary plan is distributed. All reaction forms, letters from individuals and groups, and community-developed proposals will be shared with the Board.	If an individual or community group wishes to develop an alternative proposal affecting its school and others in ther area, it shall inform the Board of its intention within four weeks after the preliminary plan is distributed...any community plans should be delivered to the superintendant not later than two months after the preliminary plan is distributed.

POLICY MODEL 5 A: USE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS (continued)

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT PROVISION	RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM THE LOCAL POLICY STATEMENT	
	School Administration Responsibilities	Citizens Rights and Responsibilities
Representativeness Requirement		Any community group wishing to develop and submit an alternative proposal should indicate how the group makeup is representative of all school communities affected by the plan or describe efforts to secure such representation.
Appeal and Hearing Process	Any community that does not support the Superintendent's final recommendations affecting its school may, within 30 days after the Superintendent's final recommendations are presented to the Board of Education, appeal the recommended action and request a hearing before the Board. That hearing will be limited to one hour. All individuals and groups within the school community who wish to testify concerning a recommended action must do so within one hour. If there are more requests for oral testimony than can be heard in one hour, written testimony will be accepted.	

SOURCE: MARYLAND, MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1982). Policy Statement on Long-Range Facilities Planning. Adopted March 11, 1982. Pages A-2 and A-4.

POLICY MODEL 5B: USING CITIZENS' COMMITTEES AND PUBLIC HEARINGS: THE SALT LAKE CITY APPROACH

Step 1. Establish a comprehensive citizens' committee to study the problem and make recommendations to the Board of Education.

- a. Provide assistance to the committee.
- b. Have them operate under a specific charge.
- c. Set a date for the final report and do not extend the time.
- d. Make the report public at the same time it is given to the Board of Education.

Step 2. Hold public meeting to discuss the report, to develop tentative solutions, and to receive additional information.

- a. Discuss implications of conflict on school district.
- b. Present problem-solving process to public.
- c. Give and receive information.
- d. Record all information presented at public hearings.

Step 3. Develop alternative solutions and modify them if necessary.

Step 4. Present final solution at general public meeting.

Step 5. Take action at an official Board of Education meeting.

Step 6. Implement Board of Education decisions.

SOURCE: Communication to the Institute for Responsive Education: July 1982.

PART D:3. USE OF COMMITTEES AND STUDY GROUPS

The following pages contain four examples from three large school districts -- Montgomery County (Maryland), San Diego Unified, and Seattle -- of how citizens advisory committees are used as part of a larger strategy of involving citizens.

Policy Model 5C depicts the policy for a one-time advisory task force on high schools in Montgomery County. Note: the attention paid to how the information generated by the group will be used.

Policy Model 5D, also from Montgomery County, describes a different use of citizens' advisory committees. The planning process is ongoing. Each year, as enrollments change, certain clusters of schools are identified for study and possible facilities changes. There is a formal calendar for conducting the study and making decisions. As certain schools become placed on the list for possible closure, a "Local Evaluation Committee" is formed at the school site. These committees provide citizen input and they can either advise the superintendent or develop their own plans and give independent, possibly dissenting advice to the board. The board becomes the final arbiter should there be dissenting reports.

Note also that in this policy there is a provision for citizen input (into the implementation of school closure decisions) via Community Education Advisory Committees.

Policy Model 5E, from San Diego, represents a similar approach in which citizens' committees are created and recreated as different constituencies become potentially affected by retrenchment decisions. Like Montgomery County, San Diego has an ongoing planning process for facilities consolidation. That process also targets specific clusters, in this case a high school and its feeder schools, for study and decisionmaking. The decisionmaking is by the board. The "study" is done by the District Steering Committee, providing for citizen participation at the district level, which also coordinates the establishment of community cluster committees with citizen representation from all of the schools in a given cluster. San Diego has developed a federated system of citizens' committees which broadens the scope of participation but ties it to an ongoing technical planning process.

Policy Model 5F comes from Seattle. Like Montgomery County and San Diego, there is a formal calendar of study and decisionmaking (described in Figure 5A). Planning is coordinated by a district-level community task force. That task force is split into three subcommittees, one of which is charged with developing ways and means for involving local communities potentially affected by school closure. As was the case in San Diego, citizen participation is used to create more citizen participation.

The four policy models illustrate some of the best uses of citizens' committees.

First, in each case the creation of one committee was not the end-all-and-be-all of citizen participation. District-level committees represented and/or established local school and/or neighborhood committees. Part of the charge given to local committees was to involve other citizens, e.g., through meetings and hearings at the grassroots level.

Second, in each case there is a tight and predictable calendar of decisionmaking. Remember, the research evidence on conflict management and community involvement showed that protracted and open-ended decisionmaking when combined with community involvement creates more conflict. These models have balanced the need for conflict management with the requirement for democracy.

Finally, this section has focused on large school systems because it is relatively easier for a small suburban school district to establish reasonably representative committees thus meeting the requirement of democracy and centrally coordinated planning. For large school districts, it is much more difficult and the literature on this topic is almost exclusively directed at the small suburban case -- e.g., Beck, 1976; Eisenberger, 1976 and 1977; Hess, 1979b; NSPRA, 1976; AASA, 1975; Sargent and Handy, 1979. The policies which follow represent pragmatic solutions to the problem of democracy in large school systems.

POLICY MODEL 5C: GUIDELINES FOR AN ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON SECONDARY SCHOOLS. AN EXAMPLE FROM MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND (1975-76). ANNOTATED AND ABRIDGED.*

POLICY PROVISIONS	RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM THE POLICY GUIDELINES
Functions: Deliberate and Offer Advice to the School Board	...Help the Board of Education review and analyze staff-developed alternatives related to planning the new secondary schools in the FY 1976 capital budget..."to meet with the Board" to identify the advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives, ensuring that community viewpoints are expressed and considered.
Act as a Working Study Group	...To study long-range secondary school utilization in the county and report to the Board of Education...present to the Board and superintendant a written report containing its findings, alternative approaches, discussion of findings, supporting documentation, conclusions, and recommendations.
Structure: Peer-Group Nominated Membership	The Board of Education will appoint the task force members on February 11, 1975, from nominees identified by Board members, superintendent, area assistant superintendents, PTA and community representatives.
Representation Criteria	The task force should be broadly representative of citizen attitudes in their administrative areas.
Size	23 persons, including three district staff.
Lines of Reporting and How the Outcomes are to be Used	As an advisory group the task force meets directly with the Board. As a study group the Board will not participate in the work sessions. MCPS will publish and distribute the task force report. The Board of Education will schedule a public hearing on the report following evaluation and comment on it by the superintendent.

* MARYLAND, MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1976). Advisory Task Force on Secondary Schools. Phase II: Final Report. Appendix A, "Guidelines for Advisory Task Force on Secondary Schools," pages 79-80. Adopted January 27, 1975.

POLICY MODEL 5D: USE OF CITIZENS' COMMITTEES IN ANNUAL STUDY PROCESSES. POLICY GUIDELINES FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY (MARYLAND) PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1977-1982 (ANNOTATED AND ABRIDGED*)

POLICY PROVISION	RELEVANT EXCERPT FROM THE POLICY DOCUMENT
Facilities Decisions Are To Be Made On The Basis Of Long-Range Comprehensive Planning.	RESOLVED: That the superintendent shall develop a comprehensive long range, five-year plan which addresses changing enrollment patterns and the corresponding changes in educational program and facilities needs; and be it further RESOLVED: That each year the superintendent shall initiate a study process in those MCPS study areas which are specified in the comprehensive plan as becoming critical for study of some modification of such operating patterns for the following school year, except that once a decision has been made to close a senior high school, at least one full school year will elapse before the actual closure date, unless earlier closure is requested by the community and the school staff...
Closure Decisions Must Follow A Due-Process	Every MCPS facility shall be assigned to one of the identified MCPS study areas and excess capacity, under-capacity or other enrollment-related situations shall be identified within each study area, but no individual school shall be named for closure or modification of its operational pattern except as provided under the annual study process.
THE ANNUAL STUDY PROCESS: CALENDAR AND PROVISIONS	
Early Notice Of What Schools Are Not Candidates For Closure	1. On or about May 15 of the school year immediately preceding the study year, the superintendent shall prepare and forward to the Board, for its action on the lists of schools and to all schools within each area to be studied these materials...(b) for each study area, the superintendent's preliminary analysis which separates those schools which definitely should not be candidates for closure or other major modifications of operating procedure from those which may be candidates after further study, and which states the rationale for this division.
Establishment Of Local School Committees Providing For Citizen Involvement (LSC's)	2. Prior to the close of the school year, the area assistant superintendent shall arrange with the principal, PTA president or comparable leadership, and community of each school which has been designated for closure or other major modification of operating procedures to form a local evaluation

POLICY MODEL 5D: (continued)

POLICY PROVISION	RELEVANT EXCERPT FROM THE POLICY DOCUMENT
Establishment of Local School Committees Providing for Citizen Involvement (LEC's) (continued)	committee (LEC) according to membership and operational guidelines which shall be developed by the superintendent. Such a committee will terminate at the end of the study process. 3. On or about October 15, the superintendent shall provide to the Board and each LEC any up-dated data or modifications to his tentative recommendations which become necessary due to budget actions, September enrollment data, or other factors which were not available the previous May 15.
LEC's Function Direct Contact Between the Board and LEC's Provision for Alternative Proposals	4. On or about November 1, each LEC shall submit to the superintendent (with copies to the Board) a written advisory statement which addresses any of these points: a. the planning process as it affects the specific school or study area, b. the superintendent's tentative proposal, including preferences among his options, c. suggested other options, and d. the LEC's recommendations for resolving the problem.
Provisions for Wider Community Involvement	5. During November, the superintendent shall meet in public session in each study area with the LECs and school administrators to discuss the various proposals and LEC statements. Other schools which have not formed LECs but which may be affected as receiving schools for additional enrollment resulting from decisions made in the study area should be invited to these sessions.
Formal Board Consideration of Community Input	6. On or about December 1, the superintendent shall forward to the Board and the LECs his final recommendations for each study area, including fiscal data and tentative educational program information; and these recommendations shall provide evidence of how the LECs advisory statements have been evaluated as part of the recommendations. 7. At this same time, any LEC may submit a further advisory statement to the Board. 8. a. During December and January, the Board shall review the material submitted to it, shall frame the basic issues existing between the superintendent's and the community's views as to the solution, and...

POLICY MODEL 5D: (continued)

POLICY PROVISION	RELEVANT EXCERPT FROM THE POLICY DOCUMENT
Public Hearings	Shall hold public hearings on these issues.
Preservation of the Board Role as Final and Neutral Arbiter via Non-Involvement in Early Stages of the Study Process	Although nothing in the law or Board policy precludes communication between Board members and their constituents and although individual Board members may wish to participate unofficially as observers in various parts of the study process, the Board itself will generally not intervene prior to the December 1 recommendations of the superintendent.
Waiver of Due-Process If There Is a Consensus on the Part of the Affected Community for Closing a School	For any school, this study process may be abbreviated or waived and the superintendent's final closure recommendations brought directly to the Board if the school and its community either request closure or agree to accept the superintendent's preliminary analysis and identification of the school for closure...such school-community agreement to be evidenced in the responses of the principal, the PTA executive committee, the LEC, if one has been formed, and civic and community groups.
Citizen Participation in the Implementation of School Closure Decisions	Immediately following the Board decisions affecting school operations for a following year, the superintendent and area assistant superintendents shall establish Community Educational Advisory Committees with representation from all schools affected by each decision, according to membership and operational guidelines which shall be developed by the superintendent, to provide community advice regarding educational matters pertinent to the modified school or schools.

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* Source: Maryland, Montgomcery County Public Schools. Policy and Guidelines on the Use of School Facilities in Light of Changing Enrollment. Adopted October 24, 1977.

POLICY MODEL 5E: FEDERATED MULTI-LEVEL CITIZENS' COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IN SAN DIEGO (1982)

LEVEL AND NAME OF THE COMMITTEES	FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES*	STRUCTURE: COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION*
Districtwide Steering Committee	Establish the Cluster Committees, coordinate their work, and provide logistical support and data for their study process. Review all recommendations of the Cluster Committees and present the recommendations to the Board of Education by February 1st of each year. Provide periodic updates on utilization and possible alternate uses of school facilities and other district properties to the Board of Education.	...the district steering committee [is to] be composed of seven to eleven representatives appointed by the Board of Education...The steering committee shall also have a voting representative selected from each Cluster Committee. ORGANIZATION ...the steering committee [will] continue as a Board of Education committee, with all meetings open to the public...the time, place, and format of the meetings as well as the selection of its leaders should be left to the discretion of the steering committee.
Community Cluster Committees (based on the cluster of under-enrolled schools in each high school feeder area)	Study the facilities problems in each community's particular cluster. Present recommendations to the District steering committee for review and presentation to the Board of Education.	Community Cluster Committees report to the District steering committee. Membership composition: it is recommended that each Cluster Committee be composed of at least two parents from each school within the cluster. The principal and teachers from each school in the cluster may serve as non-voting members of the Cluster Committees. Also meetings will be attended by a member of the District steering committee.

POLICY MODEL 5E: FEDERATED MULTI-LEVEL CITIZENS' COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IN SAN DIEGO (continued)		
LEVEL AND NAME OF THE COMMITTEES	FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES*	STRUCTURE: COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION*
Community Cluster Committees (continued)		Membership selection: a meeting shall be held at each school within the cluster to inform the community of the formation of the Cluster Committee. At that meeting, the method of selecting parent representatives shall be determined by a majority of parents present. Cluster Committee selects its own leadership, and develops its own operating procedures and organizational structures. Steering committee members would be available to assist in this process. The meetings of the Cluster Committee will be open to the public.

*SOURCE: Relevant language excerpted from: CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO (UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT), 1982. Report of the Advisory Committee on Utilization of School Facilities, Section II.

POLICY MODEL 5F: USE OF TASK FORCES. A FLOW CHART OF THE SEATTLE MODEL (ABRIDGED*)



SUBCOMMITTEE TASK AND STRUCTURE.	RESULTS AND DATA-BASES CREATED BY THE WORK OF EACH SUBCOMMITTEE	CONSENSUS INFORMATION: HOW THE RESULTS ARE USED BY THE FULL COMMITTEE	FINAL OUTCOME AND RECOMMENDATION
Facilities: Sub-committees -- Identify criteria for school closure -- Rank order the criteria in terms of relative importance for costs and for education -- Establish "ideal" ranges within which criteria should fall	A method for identifying candidate schools for closure	Criteria to be applied to facilities decisions	Recommendations for use and/or closure of facilities
	Data showing how the alternatives will affect district costs for both long and short range	The priority of alternatives considered best for educational uses of facilities in light of educational and cost considerations	
Alternative sub-committee -- Identify options for use of extra space -- Study feasibility and acceptability of alternative uses	Suggestions and costs and benefits of alternative uses of extra space	Policy guidelines -- decision rules and decisionmaking rules which can be applied to consistently differing situations, i.e., facilities about which some use or or closure decision is to be made	
Community sub-committee -- Identify who is affected and their concerns	Plans for informing involving the community	Development of a process for involving the community	

POLICY MODEL 5F: USE OF TASK FORCES (continued)

SUBCOMMITTEE TASK AND STRUCTURE	RESULTS AND DATA-BASES CREATED BY THE WORK OF EACH SUBCOMMITTEE	CONSENSUS INFORMATION: HOW THE RESULTS ARE USED BY THE FULL COMMITTEE	FINAL OUTCOME AND RECOMMENDATION
Community subcommittee (continued) -- Consider processes by which the community is involved and informed →	Identification of constituencies and their interests →	Identification of important community factors to be involved in making decisions ↑	

* SOURCE: Washington, Seattle (Highline) Public Schools (1976). Report on the Task Force on Declining Enrollment: Third Revision.

POLICY MODEL 5F COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT THROUGH PARTICIPATORY PLANNING: THE SEATTLE MODEL

PHASE AND TIMELINE	PURPOSE	METHOD	SPECIAL CONCERNS
Phase 1. Orientation to Declining Enrollment and its Ramifications. July - September	Informational stage for general and broad awareness for all publics affected. This includes process for involving the community on facility evaluations and alternative uses of space.	Methods of communication described as one-way would be expected to predominate.	Garnering support of key groups. District staff and area media people should be among first to be involved and in more detail due to type of involvement, understanding and support needed of them.
Phase 2. Input/output. September - December	Offer opportunity for people in community to express opinions, suggestions, ask questions, etc. Allow district to present more specific information and receive input on a more personal or interest basis.	It is intended that all community input concerning a school should be presented for consideration prior to Phase 3. Exploration of specific alternatives will be a part of this phase. Described in "exchange of information" section most heavily relied on. The two-way exchange should be applied in a manner so that opportunity for community input will be considered prior to implementing Phase 3.	

(continued)

POLICY MODEL 5F: COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT THROUGH PARTICIPATORY PLANNING: THE SEATTLE MODEL (continued)

PHASE AND TIMELINE	PURPOSE	METHOD	SPECIAL CONCERNS
Phase 3. School Board's Decision and Post-Decision Information Dissemination January - February	To communicate the use of community input in the decision-making process, rationale for decisions and the decisions to be implemented.	Such methods as the following might be used: • News releases • Home School publication • School Bulletins • Staff meetings • Neighborhood meetings • Meetings with special interest groups	The decision should be communicated with feeling of certainty or "finality." In order to do so, it is important that enought time be allowed during Phase 2 for all input to be gathered and considered prior to Phase 3.
Phase 4. Implementation March through implementation	Insure smooth transition.	Communications during this period are to be considered equally important to pre-decision communications. The community, or communities, should be informed regarding all the implementation steps and provided input and evaluation by those affected in order to facilitate a positive transition for students, parents and community groups.	

PART D:4. COMPREHENSIVE PARTICIPATORY PLANNING MECHANISMS

In the pages which follow, we present two examples from Lincoln-Sudbury (Massachusetts) and from Belmont (California) of planning processes which incorporate a variety of different forms of citizen participation. Such processes create an umbrella structure which includes all types of involvement, thus reconciling some of the trade-off choices identified in our discussion in Part C:4, above.

Typically, these mechanisms begin with a core group -- a board-administration task force, which then expands its membership by inviting and appointing representatives from different school and community interests. The larger group can then divide into subcommittees which can act as working task forces and study groups on various issues and provide for different mechanisms -- polls and surveys, neighborhood or constituency hearings -- for involving still more people.

Such comprehensive mechanisms can perform many functions and incorporate many opportunities for different types of involvement by many different people at different times.

The structure is like a pyramid. At its top the core representative group acts as a deliberative policy advisory body and is a de-facto subcommittee to the board of education. The middle layers consist of fact-finding and study groups and processes. The bottom layers provide for mass involvement.

Conflicts of interest are identified and surface at the lower layers. The facts which constrain or open up policy options are identified in the middle layer. The top layer is where interests and facts come together, and interests get aggregated and reconciled.

Belmont, California, is a constituent district of the San Jose Unified High School District. Its model, however, is applicable to large districts interested in structuring broad-based, participatory but coordinated planning (see Figure 5B). The nucleus is a district level task force. It is a representative deliberative body providing policy recommendations to the superintendent. It does so on the basis of data and recommendations it receives from eight local area task forces, whose responsibilities are to study building use options in each area. Technical assistance with data gathering and analysis is provided by a Technical Advisory Planning Group composed of specialists from local government and businesses. Accountability and more opportunities for participation are provided by local panels of reactors, who in turn advise and provide community feedback on building use options being entertained by the area task forces. Each task force has a corresponding 80-member reactor panel.

The Belmont model (see policy model 5G, below) provides for multiple levels and types of participation and involved as many as 800 participants.

The Lincoln-Sudbury model (see Policy Model 5H) offers a similar example of a hybrid process involving different forms of participation -- a task force, public hearings, and community surveys conducted at the public hearings. That model managed to involved 800 citizens, in a single high school district of slightly under 2,000 pupils.

POLICY MODEL 5G: MULTI-LEVEL PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES IN BELMONT (CALIF.) SCHOOL DISTRICT (1979)*

LEVEL	STRUCTURE AT EACH LEVEL	FUNCTION	SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES
District	District Task Force	Deliberate and advise	Review recommendations of local area task forces and formulate an overall policy recommendation to the superintendent.
	Technical Advisory Planning Group: Specialists from Local Businesses and Governments	Improve planning capacity of the participation mechanisms	Identify information needed by local area task forces. Advise on methodologies and instruments of data-collection. Review data for accuracy and validity. Identify need for inter-agency coordination (e.g., changes in law, zoning and services needed to make possible a preferred solution).
Local: Eight School Attendance Areas	Local Area Task Forces	Study and advise: these are working task forces	Basic responsibility is to study and identify the feasibility of alternative uses of excess school space, and to report their recommendations to the District Task Force. Specific charges include: Identify issues related to alternative uses of school buildings (example: should a private beauty shop be placed in an elementary building?). Identify legal constraints (example: zoning currently prohibits operation of a private business in a school building). Recommend goals for building useage (example: use excess facilities to house activities conducted by others). Generate alternative solutions for achieving goals (example: lease facilities to private firms, encourage other public agencies to move projects to the buildings). Propose model ordinances needed to implement alternative solutions.

*SOURCE: CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (1979). Final Report of the District Study Committee on Declining Enrollments. Appendix B:"Belmont School District's Long Range Plan for Avoiding School Closure."

POLICY MODEL 5G: MULTI-LEVEL PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES IN BELMONT (CALIF.) SCHOOL DISTRICT (1979)* (continued)

LEVEL	STRUCTURE AT EACH LEVEL	FUNCTION	SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES
	Local Reactor Panels: 80-member panels in each of the 8 school attendance areas	Widen the scope of involvement and ownership in the planning process Increase the legitimacy of the policy process Deliberate and advise local area task forces Surface conflicts early in the planning process	(Note: The provision of local reactor panels brings in an additional 640 citizens into the planning process, and provides an opportunity for participation which does not entail a heavy, and for some, prohibitive investment of volunteer time and energy.) Specific responsibility is to review "the acceptability of goals established by the local area task force."

FIGURE 5B: DIAGRAM OF THE MULTI-LEVEL PARTICIPATORY PLANNING MODEL USED IN THE BELMONT (CALIFORNIA) SCHOOL DISTRICT, 1979*

NOTE: ------- Denotes lines of accountability
——— Denotes lines and direction of reporting and advice


BOARD OF EDUCATION
DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT
DISTRICT TASK FORCE
TECHNICAL PLANNING AND ADVISORY GROUP
EIGHT LOCAL AREA TASK FORCES: ONE IN EACH SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AREA
EIGHT, 80-MEMBER LOCAL REACTOR PANELS, ONE IN EACH ATTENDANCE AREA
THE "PUBLIC" -- PARENTS, CITIZENS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

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* FOR THE SOURCE AND FOR A RELATED HANDOUT, SEE THE POLICY MODEL 5G:, ABOVE

POLICY MODEL 5H: A PLANNING STRUCTURE INVOLVING MULTIPLE CONSTITUENCIES. THE LINCOLN-SUDBURY (MASSACHUSETTS) MODEL*

MECHANISM	STRUCTURE: MEMBERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY	FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES CARRIED ON BY EACH MECHANISM
Coordinating Committee	3 superintendents from the H.S. district, and from the two feeder elementary districts and school board and staff representatives of the 3 systems.	To avoid unilateral action on the part of the H.S. which would impact the feeder systems. Provided ongoing communication about the planning process. Preliminary identification of the problem.
Working Committee	Reports to the H.S. district school board. 6 school board members, 4 faculty, 2 administrators, 4 students, and 10 citizens, ex-officio and peer-nominated membership.	Identify policy options and report to the school board on community consensus about those options. Conduct fact-finding and fact-analyses in order to identify and develop policy options for cost-reduction at the high school. Present the policy options at public hearings and systematically identify what segments of the community favor what policy options, and what trade-offs the community would support. The latter would be revealed through an 18-page questionnaire filled out after small group discussion (Policy Tool 5C). Analyze questionnaire results and advise the school board about constituency support for various policy options.
Public Hearing	Open to all. Attended by 800 people. The H.S. had slightly below 2000 students.	Inform the public about the fact-finding and deliberations of the committee. Systematically solicit and document constituency group support for policy options.

* SOURCE: MORGAN, H.M., and WOFFORD, J.W. (1977). Declining Enrollment -- Rising School Costs: One School's Response. Final Report, NIE-G-74-033.

FIGURE 5C: THE PROCESS OF INVOLVING MULTIPLE CONSTITUENCIES IN PLANNING. A FLOW CHART OF THE LINCOLN-SUDBURY (MASSACHUSETTS) MODEL* (FOR RELATED HANDOUTS SEE POLICY MODEL 5H AND POLICY TOOL 5C.)


INITIAL IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM BY THE SCHOOL BOARD
PROBLEM EXPLORATION AND DEFINITION BY A WORKING COMMITTEE
BRAINSTORMING COST-REDUCTION OPTIONS WITHIN EXISTING STRUCTURE OF PROGRAMS
REALIZATION THAT PROGRAMATICALLY SOUND COST REDUCTIONS CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT PROGRAM REDESIGN
INFORMATION SEARCH FOR OTHER ALTERNATIVES CONSISTING OF: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM BUDGET
PROBLEM REFINEMENT: DEVELOPMENT OF SEVEN POLICY OPTIONS CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL NEEDS AND ALTERNATIVES SUGGESTED IN THE LITERATURE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COST-REDUCTION
INFORMATION SEARCH. TEST FEASIBILITY OF THE SEVEN OPTIONS BY LOCAL FACT-FINDING EFFORTS
REDUCTION OF SEVEN POLICY OPTIONS INTO THREE POLICY ALTERNATIVES
INFORMATION SEARCH: TEST CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT FOR THE THREE POLICY OPTIONS BY A STRUCTURED PROCESS OF SOLICITING CONSTITUENCY VIEWS IN PUBLIC HEARINGS INVOLVING PRESENTATIONS, SMALL GROUP DISCUSSIONS, AND QUESTIONNAIRES AT THOSE PUBLIC HEARINGS
FINAL PROBLEM REFINEMENT: ANALYSIS OF WHAT CONSTITUENCIES WILL SUPPORT WHAT COST REDUCTION STRATEGIES AND POLICY OPTIONS
POLICY DEVELMENT: PLANNING DATA AND ADVICE ON THE FINANCIAL, PROGRAMMATIC, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF COST-REDUCTION OPTIONS

* SOURCE: Adapted from MORGAN and WOFFORD (1977). Declining Enrollment -- Rising Costs.

SECTION SIX

SECTION SIX: REDUCING COSTS

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APPENDIX: DOES CONSOLIDATION SAVE MONEY? A CASE ANALYSIS OF PRESTON COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA 297

CONTRIBUTORS: Parts B and C were prepared by Guilbert Hentschke, Finance Consultant to this handbook and Dean of the Graduate School of Education at Rochester University. The Appendix, the Preston County Case Study, was prepared by W. Timothy Weaver, Principal Investigator for this handbook and Associate Professor in the School of Education at Boston University. Weaver was assisted by Ron Binkney, graduate assistant at the Boston University School of Education.

PART A: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND OVERVIEW

A Rhode Island school superintendent told us, "the root problem is dollars: if there were an infinite amount of money, I wouldn't care about either 'excess' or 'strained capacity,' my enrollments wouldn't matter, and you people wouldn't be doing a handbook." It is, of course, finances that drive retrenchment and financial analysis is a necessary and initial stage in any retrenchment management. The general objective is, in all cases, to reduce costs to the level at which the cost of maintaining the necessary and most valued operations equals the revenues available.

Materials in this section will not tell readers how to reduce costs or which cost-factors can be cut so as to please everybody. They can, however, help managers to decide and represent what needs to be done in the arena of public discussion.

More specifically, Part B, below, offers a discussion and analysis of fiscal strain and its generic causes, some of which are beyond anyone's local control -- i.e., enrollments and price inflation, and some of which are the result of past choices which lock in given levels of expenditures. That discussion models a way of communicating to the general public some of the counter-intuitive factors in school finance. The discussion also defines the vocabulary and assumptions constituting two methods of financial analysis, offered in Part C.

The two methods are literally recipes for collecting and presenting existing school district data in order to portray the relationships between service levels in a given school district and the costs and revenues associated with providing those services.

"Method One" (in Part C:1) can be used to identify what revenues are going to be required in order to maintain a given level of services in the face of changes in the mix of services (e.g., more special needs children are now being served), in enrollments, in the costs of purchases necessary to maintain that mix or level of services, and in changes in revenues. More technically, this method describes how to measure and depict changes in:

enrollments, inflation, mixes of services/inputs, assessed evaluation, tax rates, and state aid.

For decisionmakers, it identifies what level of taxation would be necessary to maintain a given level of services.

For constituents of decisionmakers, the method organizes data which can answer the general question -- "why are expenditures and tax rates continuing to rise even though enrollments are falling and services are cut back or held constant?" (If services have increased, then the method will depict that increase also.)

For both decisionmakers and constituents, the method poses the central question: do we increase taxes, make across-the-board cuts in the level of services, or make targeted cuts by reducing the mix of services?

Method Two (in Part C:2) uses the same data base as Method One and depicts the spending requirements associated with maintaining a given level and mix of services in the context of changes in enrollments and in changes in price levels either due to inflation or (in the case of salaries) to contractual agreements. Whereas Method One focuses on revenue requirements and is forward looking, Method Two focuses on expenditures and is backward looking. It provides a way of portraying what major factors have caused expenditure increases. By presenting a recipe for determining the impact that changes in enrollments, mix of resources, and price-levels have had on a district's total expenditure, over time, it can answer the question: "Where have the increases in expenditures gone to?"

Part D turns its attention toward the more general topic of "economic cost-reduction" considerations, and, at the same time, to the focused question of factoring economic considerations into decisions about school closure. As was the case in the "Part Ds" of the preceeding two sections, our focus will be purposefully narrow: "if cost-reduction were the only policy objective, how can economic factors be built into the decision-rules and criteria governing school closure?"

PART B: PROBLEM ANALYSIS: DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF FISCAL STRAIN

(1) A DEFINITION OF FISCAL STRAIN

School managers experience strain when conditions over which they have no control change in such a way as to reduce their discretion in making resource allocation and consumption decisions, and the resulting new alternative choices to them are, as a group, less preferable than those facing them before conditions changed.

Thus defined, "fiscal strain" makes no reference to real or nominal decreases in revenues. In fact, fiscal strain can occur even if revenues (and expenditures) are rising in real or nominal dollars. Strain occurs because decisionmakers have values, or preferences: they would rather spend on one thing, rather than another. It is the gap between what is necessary and possible versus what is desirable, that defines strain.

What is desirable (which is often what the community thinks is desirable as dictated to decisionmakers directly, or indirectly via the mechanism of anticipated reactions) can be inferred from decisionmakers' behavior as consumers of resources.

School districts "buy" teachers at specified levels of compensation, put them into classes of specified sizes and combinations, hire administrators for a specified number of school buildings, approve a specified array of courses, and so on. In making such purchasing decisions, managers are buying preferred goods and services, assembling them in preferred combinations, and using them to provide schooling. The preferred combinations -- the mix of goods and services purchased for schooling -- will hereafter be referred to as "bundles of schooling inputs."

In assembling such bundles of inputs, managers make choices from among available options. The mechanism which forces those choices is the balancing equation of revenues and expenditures, i.e., the amount of money which can be used to purchase these inputs is limited by the amount of revenues received.

The latter will be called a "budget constraint."

By definition, any budget constraint in any given year reduces discretion. Not everything wanted or needed can be paid for. But although budgets always constrain, the "hurt" is greater under some circumstances than others. A budget constraint which permits increasing levels of consumption allows for more discretion than a budget in which the level of consumption is merely maintained. A budget in which the current level of consumption is maintained provides more discretion than one which forces a reduced level of consumption.

Any given budget constrain determines the level of purchases for goods and services; it does not necessarily, however, always determine the specific mix of goods and services. When conditions dictate a specific and less preferable mix of purchases, decisionmakers are under fiscal strain, rather than just a budget constraint.

Let's consider a hypothetical case. Observing a school district's consumption history, we find that not all "wants" are equally valued. The district had recently approved a purchase of new uniforms for its band. It only purchased one set of uniforms. It did not purchase two sets: one for home football games, another for away games. "Band uniforms" have what economists call "diminishing marginal utility," which simply means that the satisfaction (utility) which results from purchasing one unit of a good (the first set of band uniforms) is greater than the satisfaction resulting from the purchasing of the second (marginal) unit of that good (i.e., the second set of band uniforms for away games). More formally, the principle of diminishing marginal utility can be stated as follows: the more that decisionmakers consume of one input, all other things being equal, the less they value an additional increment of that input.

Like individual household consumers, our hypothetical district chose among utilities: it instituted a gifted program rather than buying two sets of band uniforms. Also, like the individual household, it makes necessary and desirable purchases (e.g., making mortgage payments vs. taking a vacation trip). One such necessity, common to both households and school districts, is heating oil. In the recent past, our district has routinely purchased a given amount of fuel oil, determined by policy -- norms about health and comfort -- and by physics -- the thermal efficiency of school facilities.

Now consider a typical scenario of fiscal strain. In the current budget year, our district has a steady enrollment and no new mandatory obligations to provide additional services. This year's budget is identical (the bundle of inputs is the same, the constraint is the same, and the price of all other inputs is constant) in all respects to the previous year's budget, with one exception: a gallon of fuel oil had doubled in price. In this instance, district decisionmakers have a number of alternatives: adjust health and comfort norms to allow for lower temperatures; spend extra money to insulate buildings; close some facilities thereby changing norms about class-size and/or the value of neighborhood schools; or reduce purchases of some other input, e.g., cut or reduce the gifted program.

Because the school district had not hitherto proposed changes in norms about class size or comfort, or facilities closures, or program cutbacks, we know that this year's range of alternatives are less preferable than last year's. (Among other things, the past behavior of the school board indicates it would avoid paying more for fuel if it could. That is, there is a finite limit to how much oil is needed. Oil, also, is a good which has a diminishing marginal utility.) Because fuel oil, despite price increases, still has to be purchased, managers have less discretion than previously. Because oil prices are subject to market forces, they represent conditions over which district managers have no control.

The above hypothetical scenario illustrates the main elements of our definition of fiscal strain -- uncontrollable changes in conditions, reduced discretion, and less preferable alternatives. It also suggests that one characteristic of fiscal strain is that it forces purchasing choices to be made under duress. Purchasing choices are made under duress when, in order to purchase that which is necessary, decisionmakers have to forego or reduce purchasing that which is not only necessary but also more desirable.

Armed with the concept of diminishing marginal utility, we can offer a more formal and complete definition of fiscal strain. Fiscal strain occurs when:

(a) Changes in conditions over which decisionmakers have no control -- i.e., revenues and price-changes in non-discretionary purchases -- change the range of alternative purchases in any one given budget year.

(b) The new range of alternatives forces district level decisionmakers to purchase bundles of "school input mixes" which differ from the current bundle of inputs and which are less preferred.

(c) Bundles of inputs are less preferred when the available options require continued purchases of inputs for which there is diminishing marginal utility at the expense of purchases for which there is less diminishing marginal utility.

(2) SOURCES OF FISCAL STRAIN

Changes in four general conditions -- budget constraints, price-levels, mixes of inputs, and enrollments -- can separately, or in combination, produce fiscal strain.

(a) Changes in the Budget Constraint: Consider again our hypothetical school district facing doubled prices for fuel oil. If oil prices had not changed but revenues had decreased for a corresponding amount, its decisionmakers would still be faced with a set of less preferable choices. The sources of lower budget constraints are many, including: changes in state and Federal aid, changes in the tax base, and in tax rates. Method One in Part C:1, below, outlines procedures for factoring in estimates of such changes into district financial analysis.

(b) Changes in Price Levels: Our hypothetical school district was driven into fiscal strain by one price change alone. But even if the budget constraint (i.e., revenues) was rising, it may not be rising as fast as prices. Moreover, some prices are rising faster than others. This is especially true of purchases for such items as fuel, health insurance, and teachers' salaries. (Teachers' salaries are included here because of the compound effect of wage settlements and an aging work force).

Decisionmakers first respond to such changes by attempting to reduce consumption of those inputs whose prices have risen most dramatically. (The utility to the decisionmaker of consuming these inputs is intimately associated with its opportunity costs, i.e., the other inputs which could not be purchased.) Some of these attempts are not possible. Others cannot go far enough to reduce spending to the prior equilibrium. Hence, in order to live within a given budget constraint, not all of the reductions fall on the disproportionately high-priced inputs, and consumption of other inputs is also reduced. Declining marginal utility works "in reverse" here: the utility of the last unit of an input foregone or sold off is less than the utility attached to those not yet foregone or sold off. It "hurts" more to forego each additional increment of an input. Cutting back energy consumption by 10% is easier than cutting it back by 10% a second time.

(c) Changes in the Mix of Inputs. The impact of a price increase of any one given input is a function of that particular input's proportional share of the bundle of schooling inputs. If changes in that bundle of inputs are imposed legislatively by other than local decisionmakers without a corresponding increase in the budget constraint, district decisionmakers are forced to forego other purchases. Spending to comply with P.L. 94-142, for example, means spending less on something else.

(d) Changes in Enrollments. The coincidence of declining enrollments, reforms, state school finances, inflation and taxpayer revolts -- all occurring and accelerating in the latter half of the 1970's -- has clouded our understanding of the fiscal impact of enrollment changes, up or down. The specific and independent impacts of enrollment decline on fiscal strain stem from these general effects of enrollment decline: increases in fixed costs per pupil (and declining pupil-staff ratios); average salary bracket creep; and district wealth bracket creep.

(i) Increases in Fixed Costs Per Pupil. As enrollments decline, the fixed costs per pupil increase, everything else being equal. Many costs of schooling are not totally variable. When a district's enrollment changes from

400 to 300 each of the remaining students "carries" a little more of, for example, the superintendent's salary. Fixed costs per pupil and hence total costs per pupil go up when enrollments decline. Though this phenomenon is widely acknowledged, few studies have attempted to derive fixed-variable cost ratios for individual districts. The declining staff-pupil ratio phenomenon is no more than a variation on the fixed variable phenomenon. The district with 400 pupils and 1 teacher for each of 12 grades that one year loses one student in each grade can not very well let a teacher go. The net effect is a reduction in pupil-teacher ratios from 1:33.3 to 1:32.3. Per-pupil costs are an arithmetic measure. It is not changes in that fraction *per se* which create fiscal strain. The problem is that the fixed-cost inputs cannot be reduced proportionately to enrollment decreases -- they cannot be "sold off" in fractions. The net result is that decisionmakers have to settle for a less-preferred bundle of inputs. They are consuming at a lower level and are forced to overconsume lumpy inputs.

(ii) *Average Salary Bracket Creep*. As seniority rules force younger (less expensive) teachers out of the schools (or at least reduces their rate of entry), the average age and expense of staff increases disproportionately. This results in the average teacher salary creeping up the salary schedule.

(iii) *District Wealth Bracket Creep*. At the same time as the first two factors are at work driving up costs, this third factor (district wealth bracket creep) is driving down revenue. School districts across the U.S. receive about one-half of their operating revenues from the state and Federal governments. This aid is awarded largely on the basis of numbers of children per district (counted either as enrolled in school or attending). Consequently, with fewer pupils the district receives less total financial assistance. In some instances this aid is further reduced because the district appears to be wealthier and hence deserving of less state financial aid. Districts with low amounts of property wealth per pupil usually receive more aid than districts of the same size with greater property wealth per pupil because state governments attempt to equalize revenues available to "rich" and "poor" districts.

As a district's enrollment declines, the amount of property wealth available per pupil increases. The district which loses enrollment appears to be richer, although it has only lost pupils, not gained in total property wealth. Because it appears richer, the state automatically provides less state aid per pupil to the district than would have been the case had the district not lost pupils. Because most enrollment-driven aid formulas are based on average rather than marginal (additional) cost concepts, districts which lose enrollment must resort to retrenchment even though state level policy does not have the intent of causing retrenchment.

PART C:1. METHOD ONE: ESTIMATING FUTURE REVENUE NEEDS

FUNCTIONS OF THE METHOD

The function of this method is to estimate what levels of taxation are necessary in order to continue the present mix and level of services. The estimate is arrived at by identifying and representing the combined impact of *changes* in enrollments, in inflation, in the mix of inputs, and in state aid and assessed valuation of tax wealth. The process of depicting the impact of these changes can also address the question "why are costs rising while enrollment is falling."

INGREDIENTS

Ingredients include the following data: (i) cost-volume relationships for major items of expenditures; (ii) estimates of change in enrollment over the next several years; (iii) estimates of changes in the costs of groups of items due to inflation or contractual agreements; (iv) estimates of changes in non-local revenues; (v) estimates of changes in assessed valuation of local property.

PROCEDURES

Step One: Determine Short Run, Fixed and Variable Cost Elements

Identifying which costs vary with enrollment is the objective of this step. The expenses of operating any enterprise may be divided into two groups: (i) *fixed costs* -- those that do not vary within a relevant rate of changes in activity; and (ii) *variable costs* -- those expenses that vary in direct proportion with the volume of operations. Together, these two groups of expenses describe how total costs vary with changes in volume. If average unit costs (in our case, per-pupil costs) are considered, the situation is reversed: the fixed costs are variable when expressed as unit or average costs.

What the distinction between fixed and variable costs shows is that only a portion of total costs can be reduced as enrollment declines.

Identifying that portion and portraying those cost items which vary with enrollment is a necessary part of this first step. Costs, however, are not inherently fixed or variable. They acquire these characteristics as a result of managerial decisions. Consequently, any discussion of the short-run costs which face a school district must incorporate a rather definitive statement of which costs management considers fixed and which costs it considers variable.

Some fixed costs may be relatively "pure" in that they will continue to be incurred regardless of management policy or level of enrollment (e.g., capital financing costs, certain insurance expenses, and executive salary expenses). Other fixed costs may be determined by management policy or union contract (e.g., supervisory salary expenses, building management expenses, and certain utility costs). These costs are fixed in the sense that, based on present managerial policy as expressed in the current budget, these costs will not change with limited variations in the volume of operation.

Variable costs may include such items as direct labor and certain supplies. These costs will vary as some function of increasing and decreasing enrollments. However, this will only occur when district decisionmakers establish and enforce procedures that will appropriately affect the size of the labor force in relation to student enrollment. The concept of fixed vs. variable cost elements, then, is based as much on managerial policy as it is on accountants' inferences.

The school district which used the method described here chose to aggregate costs into eleven classifications. (See Exhibit 6.3, at the end of this subsection.) Of those eleven, two were considered "pure" fixed. The other nine were found to vary with different ranges of enrollments.

Having identified and presented the data depicted in Exhibit 6.3, the district then was able to graph and portray the short-run total cost relationships it faced (see Exhibit 6.4). The same data base (as shown in Exhibit 6.3) also allowed the district to graph its short-run, unit-cost relationships over a range of enrollment changes (see Exhibit 6.3).

Step Two. Construct the Short-Run Cost Relationships That Will Face the District in the Next Several Years

The procedures in Step 1 identified a general relationship between costs and volume, by graphing what happens to given categories of costs given arbitrary but uniform changes in enrollment (see Exhibit 6.3). Reality, however, is always messier. Enrollments do not drop or increase at uniform rates.

Step 2 requires substituting real estimated enrollment figures over the next three years. Our district followed this procedure. The results are portrayed in Exhibit 6.4.

The situation in the district using this method was as follows: For the next three years (1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85) overall enrollment will decline at 5, 2.4 and 1.4 percent respectively. The declines in total costs for the same three years are 0.2, 1.1 and 0.9 percent, respectively. Per-pupil (or unit costs), however, are expected to increase 3.8, 1.3 and 0.5 percent. Movement in these three components can be summarized as follows.

Component	Percentage of Change by Year		
	Year One	Year Two	Year Three
Enrollment	- 5.0	- 2.4	- 1.4
Total cost (in current year dollars)	- 2.0	- 1.1	- 0.9
Per-pupil, i.e., unit costs	+ 3.8	+ 1.3	+ 0.5

These estimates get the district a little closer to portraying the messiness of reality, but they still do not convey its full dimensions. Other important factors may be also changing at the same time. From our general analysis of the sources of fiscal strain, we can expect that the district will also feel the effects of changes in price-level and in budget constraints. Steps 3 and 4 are designed to uncover and depict those effects.

Step Three. Estimates of Changes in Expenditures Due to Inflation and Contractual Settlements

Constant dollar estimates must be adjusted to reflect the impact of inflation in order for them to be relevant for district decisionmakers. However, the cost classifications most appropriate for fixed-variable analysis are not useful for estimating inflation effects. Their criteria for grouping are different. Costs should be accumulated on the basis of similarity of estimated effects.

The first procedure in Step 3, therefore, is to accumulate cost data into labor vs. non-labor categories.

Then, the second substep is to estimate the probable impacts of new wage settlements and the effect of inflation on non-labor costs. This can be done by incorporating a range of possible estimates into a single "expected" value. For example, labor settlements could result in a 4 percent increase in the average salary of personnel (an optimistic estimate). On the other hand, a more expensive contract might result in an annual 10 percent salary increase. It is possible to incorporate these and other possible outcomes into a single expected value by specifying the probability of occurrence of each possible outcome. (The probabilities of occurrence should add up to 1.00, which means that all possible outcomes have been considered.) Examples of three estimates of increase in labor and non-labor costs are illustrated in Exhibit 6.5. Labor costs are estimated to increase between 4 percent and 10 percent: each has 20 percent chance of occurring. (The likely increase in labor cost is 7 percent with 60 percent chance of occurring.) Non-labor costs are estimated to increase 10 percent, 8 percent, or 6 percent. These increases have the probabilities of occurrence of 20 percent, 60 percent and 20 percent, respectively.

Third, once the inflation effects have been estimated, adjust labor and non-labor costs to reflect changes in enrollment (these are represented in Exhibit 6.5 as reductions in total cost in the column labeled "less reduction per ratio formula"). That reduced amount is then adjusted back up to reflect inflation/contract effects. The resulting project expenditures, or expected values, are simply the estimated changes weighted by the probabilities of occurrence.

The process is then repeated for the second and third planning years. Notice that, between planning years, the reductions subtracted from each possible occurrence are placed in the corresponding box for the following year. For example, between Planning Year 1 and Planning Year 2, $204,000 is subtracted from the "pessimistic planning year 1 figure" of $20,430,000 and the remaining $20,226,000 is placed in the "pessimistic planning year 2 labor" box.

As a result of the "cooking procedures" in step 3, users of this method have an estimate of how much money will need to be spent, given changes in enrollments and in prices. Steps 4 through 6 calculate how much revenue will be needed and from where, in order to match this spending.

Step Four. Estimate the Impact of Changes in Non-Property Tax Revenue

Using much the same general approach and procedures as described in Step 3, estimate the revenue from non-property tax sources. In the particular district whose financial state is being described through this sub-section, all changes in state aid estimates are zero or negative. District decisionmakers who used this method estimated that other revenues will change between -5 and +2 percent over the next three years. The results of their estimates for "state aid," "other revenue" and "fund balance" (representing carry-over money from the previous year which could be used to offset taxes) are depicted in Exhibit 6.6, on the next page.

Step Five. Estimate the Necessary Changes in Property-Tax Revenues and Rates

The method we are using envisions the property tax rate as the revenue source which "fills in" the gap between planned expenditures, given no changes in levels of services,* and other sources of revenue. The procedures in this step lead to identifying what the net effect of all the previous changes -- in enrollments, prices and "outside income" -- are likely to be on the tax levy. The tax levy is calculated by subtracting estimates of state aid and other revenue from projected expenditures (total revenue = total expenditures). In the experience depicted in Exhibit 6.6, the tax levy must yield at least 21 percent more revenue in the next year despite a nearly 1 percent decline in enrollment.

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* What all of this is leading to, of course, is a quantification of the trade-off between "less taxes" vs. less services.

Some of this increase will be offset by increases in assess valuation. Estimated changes in assessed valuation are calculated by incorporating the three values into one expected value. Having incorporated these estimates into the model, we can now proceed to estimate the required changes in the local property tax rate. As shown in the bottom line of Exhibit 6.6, the tax rate would have to be increased by 18, 11 and 6 percent, respectively, over the next three years, if all of the estimated changes come true.

Step Six. Adjust As Necessary

If the combined impact of enrollment changes and the other factors on local tax rates is acceptable, and if no changes in variable cost ratios is desired, the analysis is complete. If this is not so, the model is put to work to determine the appropriate adjustments necessary to bring tax rates into an "acceptable range." This was the case with the school district in our sample.

APPLICATION

Expenditures can be reduced by reducing fixed costs and/or by reducing variable cost ratio. Strategies for reducing costs are not discussed here. These strategies involve concerted effort at the negotiating table, in the board room, and among district personnel. However, cost reduction alternatives can be incorporated into the model, and their effect can be assessed.

The district in our example has used the model to evaluate a wide range of cost reduction alternatives. The impact of one cost reduction alternative on per pupil costs is portrayed in Exhibit 6.7, immediately following.

The new instructional and guidance ratios were fed back into the projected

Exhibit 6.7



expenditure and revenue calculations as shown in Exhibits 6.4 and 6.5, respectively.

Here is a summary of how our method has worked. Under the existing instructional ratio formula, at the elementary level, for example, the teacher-pupil ratio was 1:27 (1976-77 cost figures, which were not the ones used to calculate the present reduction, for that district showed that this ratio meant that the district spent $23,500 for every 27 students -- the dollar figure included salaries and other direct classroom instruction costs). A change in the ratio by one, meant that the desired pupil-teacher ratio became in this case 1:28. Because at the same time enrollment declined -- there were fewer "blocks" of 28 students -- the increase in the ratio led to reduced estimates of expenditures. Perhaps, the following summary will help.

Component	Under the Old Ratio Formula	Adjusted Ratio Formula to Reduce Costs
Instructional Staff Ratios (teachers per pupil)		
● Elementary	1:27	1:28
● Junior High	1:19	1:20
● Senior High	1:19	1:20
Guidance-counseling ratio: counselor per pupil	1:350	1:400
Subtraction from estimated expenditures due to enrollment decline between current year and first planning year	$ 96,000	$ 674,000
Base salary in the first planning year	$ 18,534,000	$ 17,956,000

In other words, under the existing ratios (1:27, 1:19, 1:19, 1:350) we could only subtract $96,000 in expenditures for personnel due to enrollment decline between the current year and planning year 1. (See the second column in Exhibit 6.5.) Under the new ratios of cost reduction, $674,000 could be subtracted instead. Hence, in planning year 1 the base salary figure would be $17,956,000 rather than $18,534,000. That change would work its way down through the projected expenditure calculations, would reduce the percentage change in local tax expenditure calculations, and would end up reducing the percentage change in local tax effort. Other cost reduction alternatives can be worked through the model in the same way.

EXHIBIT 6.1: CALCULATION OF BASIC RATIO FORMULA BASED ON 1976-77 COST STRUCTURE

COST DETERMINANTS	COSTS			STUDENTS AND BUILDINGS	TEACHERS	BASIC RATIO FORMULA
	SALARIES	OTHER COSTS	TOTAL			
Elementary -- Ratio 1/27	$ 347	$ 1,238	$ 5,585	6,391	238	$23.5/27 students
-- Building Staff	1,955	573	2,528	13		$194.5/building
Jr. High -- Ratio 1/19	$ 2,068	$ 570	$ 2,638	2,085	113	$23.2/19 students
-- Building Staff	412	129	541	3		$182.2/building
Sr. High -- Ratio 1/19	$ 4,117	$ 1,296	$ 5,413	4,286	227	$23.8/19 students
-- Building Staff	1,022	437	1,459	3		$486.4/building
Guidance -- Ratio 1/350	$ 431	$ 128	$ 559	6,371	18	$31.1/350 students
Transportation	$ 521	$ 691	$ 1,212	13,213		$9.2/100 students
Facilities	1,371	1,635	3,006	20		$150.3/faculty
Educational Operations	1,208	884	2,092			Fixed
District Operations	1,018	3,678	4,696			Fixed
Operating Cost	18,468	11,261	29,729			
Non-Operating Costs	166	1,219	1,385			
Total Budget	$18,634 (60%)	$ 12,480 (40%)	$31,114			

Exhibit 6.2



SHORT-RUN TOTAL COST RELATIONSHIPS FACING THE DISTRICT

*All costs are stacked on top of one another; total costs are read as the top variable cost line.

Exhibit 6.3

SHORT-RUN UNIT COST RELATIONSHIPS
FACING THE DISTRICT



*Assumes uniform mix of grade levels.

Exhibit 6.4



UNIT COSTS FACING THE DISTRICT OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS

(current dollars)

Exhibit 6.5: A Probability Table for Cost Estimates over Three Years

CURRENT BASE YEAR		YEAR + 1					YEAR + 2					YEAR + 3				
	Base	Less Reduction Per Ratio Formula	Pessimistic	Most Likely	Optimistic	Expected Value	Less Reduction Per Ratio Formula	Pessimistic	Most Likely	Optimistic	Expected Value	Less Reduction Per Ratio Formula	Pessimistic	Most Likely	Optimistic	Expected Value
Assigned Probability			.2	.6	.2			.2	.6	.2			.2	.6	.2	
SALARIES Base	$18630	-$96	$18534	$18534	$18534		-$204	$20226	$19666	$18534		-$166	$22084	$20874	$18940	
Estimated Change			+10%	+4%	+7%			+10%	+7%	+4%			+10%	+7%	+4%	
Total Projected			20430	19310	19870	$19870		22250	21040	19870	$21050		24290	22340	19700	$22200
OTHER COSTS Base	$12480	-$64	$12416	$12476	$12416		-$136	$13484	$13234	$12984		-$111	$14729	$14175	$13649	
Estimated Change			+10%	+6%	+8%			+10%	+8%	+6%			+10%	+8%	+6%	
Total Projected			13620			$13370		14830	14290	13760	$14290		14729	15320	14470	$15320
PROJECTED EXPENDITURES Change from prior year	$31110		$34050 +9%	$33240 +7%	$32480 +4%	$33240 +7%		$37080 +9%	$35330 +6%	$33630 +4%	$35340 +6%		$40490 +9%	$37660 +7%	$34170 +2%	$37520 +6%

Exhibit 6.6. Estimated Changes in Revenue and Required Tax Levy (in thousands)

ESTIMATED CHANGES IN REVENUE AND REQUIRED TAX LEVY (IN THOUSANDS)

CURRENT BASE YEAR		YEAR + 1				YEAR + 2				YEAR + 3			
	Base	Pessimistic	Most Likely	Optimistic	Expected Value	Pessimistic	Most Likely	Optimistic	Expected Value	Pessimistic	Most Likely	Optimistic	Expected Value
Assigned Probability		.2	.6	.2		.2	.6	.2		.2	.6	.2	
STATE AID													
Estimated Change	$11600	-17%	-10%	-5%		-5%	0%	0%		-5%	0%	0%	
Total Projected		$ 9630	$10440	$11020	$ 10350	$ 9150	$10440	$ 11020	$10300	$ 7699	$10440	$ 11020	$ 10300
OTHER REVENUE													
Estimated Change	$ 2200	-5%	0%	-2%		-5%	0%	2%		-5%	0%	+2%	
Total Projected		$ 2090	$ 2200	$ 2240	$ 2180	$ 2000	$ 2200	$ 2280	$ 2170	$ 1900	$ 2200	$ 2320	$ 2160
FUND BALANCE	$ 1500	$ 690	$ 690	$ 690	$ 690	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
REQ. TAX LEVY													
Change from Prior Year	$16500	$21640 +31%	$19910 +21%	$18480 +12%	$ 19980 +21%	$25930 +20%	$22690 +14%	$20330 +10%	$22870 +14%	$28789 +15%	$25020 +10%	$ 20830 +2%	$ 26060 +10%
TOTAL REVENUE	$31800	$34050	$33240	$32430	$ 33240	$37080	$35330	$33630	$35340	$40490	$37660	$ 24170	$ 37520
ASSESSED VALUATION													
Estimated Change	$18000	+2%	+3%	+4%		+2%	+3%	+4%		+2%	+3%	+4%	
Total Projected		$183600	$185400	$187200	$ 185400	$187300	$191000	$194600	$191000	$191000	$196730	$202500	$196730
TAX VALUATION		$117.86	$107.39	$ 98.72	$ 107.77	$138.44	$104.42	$119.74	$119.74	$156.49	$127.18	$102.86	$127.38
Change from Prior Year	$491.67	+29%	+17%	+8%	+18%	+17%	+11%	+6%	+11%	+13%	+7%	-2%	+6%

PART C:2. METHOD TWO: EXPLAINING COSTS AND EXPENDITURES

INTRODUCTION

Method Two and its report formats (we will continue to use examples and data from the same school district) can answer the often pointed question: "where has the money gone to since we have fewer pupils, or the same or lower level of services?" The answers (always multiple, never simple and singular) arise out of a reconstruction of the district's recent financial history, i.e., its spending behavior and the factors affecting that behavior.

INGREDIENTS

In general, the factors affecting a district's spending behavior are the same as those which cause fiscal strain, namely: changes in enrollments, changes in price-levels per input, and changes in the mix of inputs. Because this method is concerned with the question of where the money has gone to, rather than where it has or will come from, revenues are not any ingredient in the present recipe.

An historical perspective suggests that if a district's expenditures at one point in time can be expressed as a function of enrollments, price levels, and mixes of resources, then it is also possible to depict *changes* in district expenditures as a function on changes in enrollments, price levels, and resource mixes. Expenditures in the most recent fiscal year can be described as a function of enrollments, price levels, and resource mixes during that year. The same can be done for any other period -- one, two or three years ago, etc. Expenditures three years ago, for example, can be described as a function of the enrollments, price levels, and resource mixes in that year.

This method, by using the present and the three-year-old formulations for the district, can derive measures of changes in expenditures which are attributable to changes in enrollments, changes in prices, and changes in input mixes. Consider first the changes in expenditures *which can be attributable to changes in enrollments*. A rough estimate can be derived by using new enrollment data combined with old price data and old resource mix data. In like manner, the change in total expenditures between the two periods which is attributable to changes in price levels can be derived by using new price level data combined with old enrollment data and old input mix data. And, changes in expenditures which are attributable to changes in input mixes can be derived by using new resource mix data combined with old enrollment data and old price data.

Please note another important difference. In Method One, our concern was, to put it bluntly, to depict the trade-off between present service levels and tax rates. For that reason, its "ingredients" held constant the mix of inputs. In this method, we want to identify the impact of changes (those that have already occurred and possible future changes) in input mixes.

PROCEDURES

Step One. Gather Enrollment, Price-Level and Input Mix Data for Two Time Periods

An example of such a gathering is depicted in Exhibit 6.8 and 6.9. Enrollments and pupil-teacher ratios for the major programs for the two periods are listed in Exhibit 6.8. Program expenditure information was combined with staffing ratios to develop eleven measures of input mixes (Exhibit 6.9). As an example of how resource mix was defined, the first row entry on Exhibit 6.9 reads as follows:

> "For the K-6 program, a total of $5,990,000 was spent in 1976. For every 28.5 students in this program, $25,200 was spent. In 1980, $8,016,000 was spent on this same program. For every 25.2 students, $35,300 was spent."

By referring back to Exhibit 6.8, we know that 6,772 students were served in this program in 1976 in classes where the pupil-teacher ratio was 28.5. In 1980, 5,830 students were served in this program in classes where the pupil-teacher ratio was 25.2. Similar price and input mix factors were developed for the other major categories of expenditure of the school district.

Total expenditures captured by this particular formulation were $27,457,000 five years ago, and $40,696,000 last year. Actual expenditures in the district were higher by several million dollars in both periods, reflecting expenditures for debt service, tuition, and fund transfers which had been excluded. The subsequent steps in the analysis will help us to determine how much influence each of the three factors had on the increase between the $27.4 million five years ago and the $40.6 million last year.

Step Two. Determine the Effects of Changes in Enrollments upon Changes in Total Costs

To do this we use some of the data from Exhibits 6.8 and 6.9 -- specifically new enrollments, old input mixes and old prices. These data are presented in Exhibit 6.10. Notice that in this example, total expenditures attributable to enrollment declines actually dropped from $27,457 to $26,427. (Per pupil expenditures increased from $2,078 to $2,194.) The decline in total expenditures resulting from enrollment declines should not be surprising since the effects of changes in resource mixes and the changes in price levels have been removed.

Step Three. Determine the Effects of Changes in Price Levels on Changes in Total Costs

Using different data from Exhibits 6.8 and 6.9, we go through a process like that in Step 2. This time, however, we use new price levels, old enrollments, and old resource mixes. When this is done as in Exhibit 6.11, for each "program," the total costs jumps to $38,487 from $27,457, a major part of the distance between $27,457 and $40,696.

Step Four. Determine the Effects of Changes in Resource Mixes on Changes in Total Costs

As in the previous two steps, we draw upon one category of new data and two categories of old data. In this instance, new resource mix data is combined with old enrollment and old price level data and portrayed in Exhibit 6.12. The impact of changes in resource mix alone causes total costs to jump to $30,404 from $27,457.

Step Five. Compare the Relative Effects on Total Costs of Changes in Enrollments, Price Levels, and Resource Mixes

The summary statistics from Exhibits 6.11 through 6.12 are presented in Exhibit 6.13. That data shows that for *this particular* school district price level changes are by far the greatest factor affecting fiscal strain. Changes in resource mix account for a moderate amount of fiscal strain felt in this district. Enrollment decline by itself has not greatly affected costs.

EXHIBIT 6.8 ENROLLMENTS AND INPUT MIXES. FOUR YEARS AGO (1976) VS. NOW (1980)

COST DETERMINANTS AND FACTORS	"OLD" (1976) STATUS			"NEW" (1980) STATUS		
	No. of Students	No. of Teachers	Student-Teacher Ratio	No. of Students	No. of Teachers	Student-Teacher Ratio
Enrollments: K - 6	6772	238	28.5	5830	231	25.2
7 - 8	2056	113	18.2	1914	105	18.3
9 - 12	4244	227	18.7	4064	232	17.5
Special Education	141	-	-	230	-	-
TOTAL ENROLLMENTS	13,213	-	-	12,043	-	-
Students Receiving Guidance	6300	18	350.0	5983	19	315.0
Buildings: K - 6	13			13		
7 - 8	3			3		
9 - 12	2			2		

NOTE: INCREASES IN ANY FACTOR DESPITE ENROLLMENT DECLINES ARE UNDERLINED.

EXHIBIT 6 . 9 PRICE LEVELS OF INPUT MIXES. FOUR YEARS AGO (1976) VS. NOW (1980)

INPUT MIXES: PROGRAM COST FACTORS		EXPENDITURES FOR 1976 (in $000's)		EXPENDITURES FOR 1980 (in $000's)	
Category	Component	Total	Per Unit: Teacher-Pupil Ratio Divided into Total Expenditures	Total	Per Unit: Teacher-Pupil Ratio Divided into Total Expenditures
Student Determinants	K - 6	$ 5990	$ 25.2/28.5 pupils	$ 8160	$ 35.3/25.2 pupils
	7 - 8	$ 2632	$ 23.3/18.2 "	$ 3553	$ 33.8/18.3 "
	9 - 12	$ 5677	$ 25.1/18.7 "	$ 8327	$ 35.9/17.5 "
	Guidance		$ 30.7/350.0 "	$ 813	$ 42.9/315.0 "
	Special Ed.	$ 770	$ 5.5/100.0 "	$ 1978	$ 8.6/100.0 "
	Transportation	$ 1241	$ 9.4/100.0 "	$ 2454	$ 20.4/100.0 "
School Determinants	K - 6	$ 2558	$ 196.8/building	$ 3594	$ 276.5/building
	7 - 8	$ 676	$ 225.3/building	$ 761	$ 380.5/building
	9 - 12	$ 1945	$ 648.3/building	$ 2828	$ 942.7/building
	Facilities Management	$ 2190	$ 109.5/facility	$ 3355	$ 167.7/facility
TOTAL EXPENDITURES		$23,679		$35,823	

EXHIBIT 6.10: EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ENROLLMENTS ON TOTAL COSTS: FOUR YEARS AGO VS. NOW

		"New" Enrollment ÷ "Old" Input Mix	"Old" Rates ($000's)	Costs ($000's)
Student Determinants	K-6 (5830/28.5)	205	$25.2	$5166
	7-8 (1914/18.2)	106	$23.3	$2470
	9-12 (4069/18.7)	218	$25.1	$5472
	Guidance (5983/350)	18	$30.7	$ 553
	Special Education	230	$ 5.5	$1265
	Transportation	102.43	$ 9.4	$1132
School Factors	K-6	13	$196.8	$2258
	7-8	2	$225.3	$ 451
	9-12	3	$648.3	$1945
	Facilities	20	$109.5	$2190
District Operation		-	$3225	$3225
				$ 26,427

EXHIBIT 6.11: EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN PRICE LEVELS ON TOTAL COSTS: FOUR YEARS AGO VS. NOW

		"Old" Rates ($000's)	"New" Rates @ 1.4 ($000's)	"Old" Enrollments ("Old" units)	Cost ($000's)
Student Determineation	K-6	$25.2	$35.3	238	$8401
	7-8	$23.3	$32.6	113	$3684
	9-12	$25.1	$35.1	227	$7968
	Guidance	$30.7	$42.9	18	$ 777
	Special Education	$ 5.5	$ 7.7	141	$1086
	Transportation	$ 9.4	$13.2	132.13	$1744
School Factors	K-6	$196.8	$275.5	13	$3582
	7-8	$255.3	$315.4	3	$ 946
	9-12	$648.3	$907.6	3	$2723
	Facilities	$109.5	$153.3	20	$3066
District Operations		$3225	$4515	-	$4515
					$ 38,487

EXHIBIT 6.12: EFFECT OF CHANGES IN INPUT MIXES ON TOTAL COSTS: FOUR YEARS (1976) VS. NOW (1980)

COST DETERMINANTS CATEGORY OF DETERMINANTS AND COST RATIOS		UNDER "OLD" ENROLLMENTS BUT "NEW" UNITS	UNDER "OLD" UNITS ($000's)	TOTAL COST (in $000's)	
Student Determinants:	K-6 (6772/25.2)	269	$ 25.2	$ 6,779	
	7-8 (2056/18.3)	113	$ 24.1	$ 2,723	
	9-12 (4244/17.5)	243	$ 25.6	$ 6,221	
	Guidance (6300/315)	20	$ 30.6	$ 612	
	Special Education	141	$ 66.1	$ 830	
	Transportation	132.13	$ 14.6	$ 1,929	
School Factors:	K-6	13	$197.5	$ 2,568	
	7-8	3	$271.8	$ 815	
	9-12	3	$675.4	$ 2,020	
	Facilities	20	$119.9	$ 2,398	
District Operation		-	$ 34.79	$ 3,479	$30,404

EXHIBIT 6.13: COMPARING THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF ENROLLMENT, INPUT MIXES AND PRICE LEVEL CHANGES, FOUR YEARS AGO VS. NOW (1976 - 1980)

ENROLLMENT	"OLD"	"OLD"	"OLD"	"NEW"	"NEW"
INPUT MIX	"OLD"	"OLD"	"NEW"	"OLD"	"NEW"
PRICE LEVEL	"OLD"	"NEW"	"OLD"	"OLD"	"NEW"
TOTAL COST ($000's)	$27,457	$38,487	$30,404	$26,427	$40,697
DIFFERENCE FROM 1976 (in $000's)		$11,030	$ 2,947	($ 1,030)	$13,239
COMBINED EFFECTS (in $000's)					$12,947
MEASUREMENT ERROR (in $000's)					$ 292

PART D:1. THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CLOSURE: THE ISSUES AND THE EVIDENCE

At some point, the cost-volume calculations described in Parts C:1 and 2 will suggest that the cost-ratios (for the most part composed of the ratio of pupils in a classroom per teacher) necessary to live within the existing revenues dictate larger and hence fewer classes, and hence some consolidation of facilities. At this level, the economic argument for closure may seem clear and compelling.

But the cost savings of closing a particular school or set of schools are less compelling and much more difficult to document, and as such are much more open to controversy. For example, in a controversy over school closings in Newton (Massachusetts) in the late 1970's, the school district projected a savings of 47 cents on the total tax rate resulting from the closing of one school. Opponents argued that the actual savings would be only 3.44 cents when one took into account the additional costs of crossings, busing, and property devaluation (as reported in Johnson, 1978:26). Citizens in Lexington (Massachusetts) and in Montgomery County (Maryland) argued (unsuccessfully in each case) against the presumption that smaller schools are less desirable and, hence, inherently less cost-efficient.

The actual figures will differ but the above argument is typical of school closure controversies. Its form is, has and will be repeated in community after community. Without getting deeper into the details and merits of the opposing arguments in the Newton, Lexington and Montgomery County cases, we do offer the following summary of what is known about the economies of school closings and about the issues of size, transportation, cost savings, etc., raised in these prototypical controversies.

"What is known" is contained in a handful of useful but methodologically heterogeneous studies, surveys and local task force reports. As is the case on many issues on the topic of school management in retrenchment, the "evidence" provides some guides, and some caveats, rather than a blueprint of what will always work. For example:

(1) *The economics of small school vs. large school*. A whole volume could be written on the issues of school size vs. efficiency and educational quality. Good resources of information on that issue are the "Best of ERIC" summaries on "school size" produced by the ERIC Center on Educational Management at the University of Oregon. In this context, the following "facts" are most important.

(a) An early and pioneering survey of school closure practices (Andrews, et al., 1974) found that the smaller the school the more likely it was to be closed. Andrews also found that financial considerations were, as one would expect, paramount in closure decisions and that the professional consensus was that small schools with enrollments under 200 were untenable to maintain.

(b) Additional support for "200 pupils" as the cut-off point of absolute facility inefficiency comes from a highly influential Montgomery County (Maryland) *Task Force on Small Schools Report of 1973*, which concluded that: as school size decreases, per pupil costs increase until school size reaches 300 - 500 (Note: this was the optimum school size reported by respondents to the Andrews, et al., 1974 survey), and that below 300 pupils costs start to increase quite sharply. These figures mean that a school with 200 pupils will cost, on the average, 20 percent more per student than a school with 300 students, and 25 percent more than a school with 500 to 600 students. This conclusion served as the touchstone for the conventional wisdom about school closure. The Montgomery County findings were widely cited in task force reports and executive recommendations of several school districts caught caught in the controversy over school closure, including Lexington (Massachusetts), Niles Township (Illinois), and Birmingham (Michigan).

(c) One very useful caveat against the presumption that small schools are inherently inefficient is offered by Stanton Leggett's discussion of the costs of maintaining small schools. That discussion, entitled "Sixteen Questions to Ask -- and Answer, Before You Close A Small School" is contained in the April 1978 issue of the *American School Board Journal* (see Exhibit 6A, on the page immediately following). Leggett's general point, well taken, is that whether smaller schools are in fact inefficient depends on how a given school district defines efficiency, and on what measures it uses to account for each school site as a cost-center.

(2) *Closing schools and transportation costs*. This is a very common challenge of citizen/community opponents to school closure proponents. Ironically, the period of school closure coincided with the so-called "energy crisis" and the consequent rise in transportation costs. A specially commissioned case analysis of school closure and consolidation in Preston County (West Virginia), see Appendix, showed that transportation costs all but wiped out the actual cost-savings of school closings.

(3) *School closings and property devaluation*. Property devaluation is a common complaint of opponents of school closings. The evidence, as summarized in Fact Sheet 3, in Section Four, does not support that assertion directly: there is no documented evidence showing that closing a school actually depressed the market or assessed value of homes in an area previously served by a school that had been closed.

(4) *School closings and cost savings*. Existing evidence on this issue lends *prima facie* support to citizens' opposition groups claim that the cost savings projected for specific school closure proposals are unrealistic. For example:

(a) The pioneering study by Andrews, et al., 1974, revealed that the estimated in-building cost savings obtained by elementary schools ranged from $30,000 to $140,000 per school. Out of 60, only 13 districts in the Andrews survey had calculated the actual cost savings obtained after the schools were closed. Those 13 districts concluded that fewer actual dollars had been saved than had been projected. Sixty-seven percent of the districts responding to Andrews' survey concluded that they actually saved no money, or that actual costs (of consolidation, closure and mothballing of closed buildings) exceeded the in-building costs.

EXHIBIT 6 A: "SIXTEEN QUESTIONS TO ASK -- AND ANSWER -- BEFORE YOU CLOSE A SCHOOL"

Research shows that it is the smaller (and older) schools which are most likely to be closed. Financial analysis validates this practice by showing the dis-economies of small schools. Writing in the April 1978 issue of the American School Board Journal, Stanton Leggett challenges school managers to re-examine the assumptions upon which such analyses are based. He asks: "Are there any ways in which a small neighborhood school can operate so that per-pupil costs will not be significantly out of line when compared to those of large consolidated schools?" His answer: "Maybe." And, Leggett suggests, the locally appropriate answer will emerge if managers consider the "following list of things before closing down a school." Note: We only list those questions which challenge the conventional presumption that small schools are necessarily inefficient.

[1] Don't jump to conclusions about enrollment projections. Like most things, school-enrollment cycles change...consider absorbing the cost of unused space now against the possible cost of building a new school ten or fifteen years down the road. Advice: Keep a safe fudge factor active in planning your school system's population trends.

[2] Take a hard look at your current staffing policies. The small school, through a combination of teachers, aides, and flexible assignments, had fit the staff, program and school enrollment into a neat -- and economical -- package.

[3] Try "family grouping" when there are too few children in a grade. Children never did arrive at school in nice, neat groups of 25 or 30 per grade. Try combining classes and use the advantages offered by split grade -- younger children learning from older. Call it the ungraded classroom -- a major advantage to this approach is flexibility; in a small school a child can be moved to other classes for different subjects without throwing that child into a group of strange children.

[4] Reconsider ways to provide services such as art, music or physical education: Consider scrapping the itinerant teacher concept. It may upset some union leaders, but consider asking your teachers to try their hands at teaching art, music, or physical education during the regular teaching day. The usual allocation of expensive specialist time is so brief that it is little more than a break for the classroom teacher. Or consider keeping all special subject teachers located in one place to serve all of your elementary schools. Like this: Once a week, every seven or eight weeks, half of the elementary school students spend an intensive period on special subject projects -- learning a dance, drawing murals, preparing a gymnastic routine. Instead of the usual scattershot approach to instruction, these concentrated periods of learning give children a chance to become intensive-

SOURCE: Abridged from LEGGETT, S. (1978). "Sixteen Questions to Ask -- and Answer -- Before You Close a Small School." American School Board Journal (April 1978). Pages 38 - 39. (Permission pending.)

EXHIBIT 6 A: (continued)

ly acquainted with a subject. When half the students are attending the special subject center, teachers can devote extra time to helping the remaining children with problems in reading, mathematics, or spelling.

[5] Examine overhead. Then re-examine it. Make sure your per-pupil instruction cost is being evaluated accurately. Many school system budgets have a built-in prejudice against small schools. For example, some special costs -- such as that for speech therapy teachers -- are divided equally among schools rather than prorated on the time such a teacher spends in each school.

[6] Examine and change the role of the school principal. In a small school, the salary of a full-time principal can add measurably to the cost of per-pupil instruction. The problem: Most school principals spend little time teaching. Consider adapting a model used in British lower schools where the principal is in classrooms at all times and serves as an instruction leader for the entire school.

[7] Ask faculty to help manage the school -- you may be surprised at the reaction. This may be an extension of number six, but your school board should ask the hard question: Is a principal really needed in a small school? After all, with a highly trained corps of teachers, there should be a number of tasks they can manage on their own. Teachers can meet and allocate school resources and operate within the framework and guidelines of the system. Most paperwork assignments can be handled by a competent secretary, and faculty planning might be accomplished when children are away on intensive away-from-school training (number four).

[13] If you haven't already done so, consider central food preparation.

[14] Use technology to reduce costs. Before you hire a subject specialist or experts from that vast army of unemployed teachers, consider purchasing audiovisual equipment. In Hillside, Illinois, advanced mathematics is taught in elementary schools by using a voice transcriber and having one teacher specialist prepare lessons from a central location. The results have consistently exceeded the scores posted in traditional mathematics enrichment classes, and the use of a learning machine can be an inexpensive -- and efficient -- method of teaching.

[15] Don't let the cost of extra space destroy the small school's budget. Right at the moment your enrollment may be down and the extra space is costing your board plenty in cleaning, repairs and energy costs. So look for creative and constructive ways to use the extra space. Perhaps part of the school can double as a public library branch -- with another governmental unit picking up part of the tab.

[16] Operate a small school (or any school) on a program budget. If each school has an individual program budget, then the public can be brought in and asked for ways to help keep down the cost of operating that school. If parents see that the pie -- money for energy, teachers, janitorial and special services -- is being split up fairly among all schools, then the decion to close or cut back services to a small school can be accomplished with diminished public resistance.

(b) Cibulka's (1982a) ten-city study of decline management* revealed that in addition to consuming "enormous [uncalculated] administrative time," the cost - savings of school closures "rarely exceeded $250,000 per year, per school" (p. 8).

(c) Michael Berger of Vanderbilt University undertook a study of 59 case-studies of decline management and questioned whether: given comparable declines in enrollment, there was any difference, per pupil expenditures, between districts that had a faster consolidation rate. That is, did districts which close move schools and quicker save money? His findings were as follows: Districts which consolidate their schools faster (i.e., close more schools) do not differ in their per pupil expenditures from districts which consolidate more slowly (Berger, 1982a:19).

In light of this evidence, or rather in light of practitioner's intuitions, we were told by school administrators in Arlington (Virginia) and in Flint and Birmingham (Michigan) that currently school departments stress the cost avoidance, and not the cost-reduction, potential of controversial school closings. Some ways and means of documenting the "cost avoidance benefits" of school closure decision rules are presented in the next section.

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* The ten cities were: Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angelas, Milwaukee, New York, New Orleans, and Chicago.

PART D:2. THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CLOSURE: EXAMPLES OF POLICY APPLICATIONS

What costs can be saved by closing schools depends, of course, on how buildings are analyzed. In this section, we offer three examples of local school district decisionmaking and analytical procedures -- from San Jose (California), from Birmingham (Michigan), and from San Diego (California).

EXAMPLE ONE: SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

Many school systems use building capacity standards as the measure of underutilization, and hence, by implication, of economic efficiency. San Jose, California, uses a class-size standard as a measure of building use. Their decision rules, as listed on page 5 of their December 1979 Final Report of the District Study Committee on Declining Enrollments are as follows:

- Determine the number of classrooms or teaching stations designated as the space at each site to house thirty students and an instructor.
- Divide by thirty, the number of students in attendance at each school to arrive at the number of rooms/teaching stations required to provide an instructional space for the group.
- Subtract the second procedure from the first to determine the number of remaining rooms/teaching stations.

The report goes on to suggest that "...the result represents, in theory, the unused or leftover and therefore the 'underutilized' space which could be made available for purposes other than regular classroom assignment such as special education, media-center, music and community or business use, etc."

EXAMPLE TWO: SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

The application of educational, e.g., optimum class size standards, to the analysis of building capacity, makes sense but also introduces additional complexity into decisionmaking and analysis. Some of this complexity is revealed in the following excerpt, quoted in full from pages 1 - 3 of the San Diego Unified School District's Final Report (of June 6, 1982) of the Advisory Committee on Utilization of School Facilities. The Report notes that:

> Identifying underutilized schools in the San Diego Unified School District is not an easy task. The Advisory Committee on Utilization

of School Facilities has found it difficult to define "capacity." The district's capacity figures do not always prove to be the best indicator of the utilization of a school site. The district's capacity figures do not always prove to be the best indicator of the utilization of a school site. The committee found many schools which are at or near stated capacity, yet are actually serving many fewer students than the school was designed to hold.

There are several indicators why it is difficult to use capacity as an indicator of underutilized school space. First, there are several definitions of capacity: operating, current, total, and maximum capacity. Current capacity was selected as the factor for determining to what extent a school site is being used.

The impact of using other definitions can best be illustrated by using the capacity figures given for Weinberger Elementary School. The capacity sheet from "An Inventory of School Facilities: Their Utilization and Capacity," for Weinberger Elementary School shows a current capacity (existing program and other authorized uses) of 210 pupils. The enrollment for October 9, 1981, was 143, which leaves the school 67 students under capacity. Dividing the current capacity by the enrollment indicates the school is 68 percent utilized. However, the total potential capacity of Weinberger if every classroom was used only for regular students and contained 30 students per class would be 420 pupils. When this capacity figure is divided by the enrollment, the percentage of utilization drops to 34 percent.

Another way of looking at the utilization of Weinberger is to note that only half of the fourteen classrooms are being used for regular K-6 classroom activities. Furthermore, the capacity sheet does not indicate maximum capacity, which is a measure of the site's capacity to hold additional portable classrooms.

At Weinberger, half of the classrooms have been exempted from regular classroom space by moving the district administrative and counseling personnel to another location. However, such movement of programs may not always be possible. Whether the "authorized other uses" are site specific and not easily movable should be indicated on the capacity sheet.

A second factor impacting capacity is the changing educational needs of San Diego students. Many schools in the district now serve both regular and handicapped student populations through the use of bungalows now no longer have those bungalows. To increase the size of these schools will require the moving in of portables as is the case in the Beale-Ross merger where three new bungalows will be needed in order to accomplish the merger.

A fourth factor which the committee feels must be considered in computing total capacity is the use of regular classrooms in order to provide schools built in the early sixties with what the district now

SECTION IV.

ATTACHMENT A

ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS CAPACITY AND UTILIZATION - 1981-82 SCHOOL YEAR

School WEINBERGER
Grades Served K-6
Address 6269 Twin Lakes Drive
Principal A. Allan Brown

SCHOOL WEINBERGER
CURRENT CAPACITY 210
ENROLLMENT OCTOBER 9, 1981 143

I. CAPACITY OF EXISTING CLASSROOMS:

	Number of Classrooms			Capacity of Exist. Clsrms @ 30 Stu.ea.	OPERATING CAPACITY of Existing Clsrms w/Existing Prgms & Other Author. Uses	
	Perm (1)	Port. (2)	Total (1)+(2) (3)	(Col. 3x 30 Stu.) (4)	Per Clsrm. (5)	Total (Col. 5x Col. 3) (6)
a. KNDG. CLSRMS (SINGLE SESSION)	1		1	30	30	30
b. CLSRMS ASSIGNED FOR GRADES 1-6	6		6	180	30	180
c. CLSRMS ASSIGNED FOR SPEC. ED:						
d. CLSRMS AUTHOR. FOR OTHER USAGE:						
Reading Teacher						
Resource Specialist	1		1	30	0	0
Media Center	1		1	30	0	0
Lounge						
Math Resource Center	1		1	30	0	0
Student Services	4		4	120	0	0
e. TOTAL CLASSROOMS →	14		14			
f. Percent of Total Classrooms	100					
g. Total Capacity @30 Students per Classroom →				420		
h. Total Operating Capacity With Existing Prgms and Other Authorized Uses → (Sum of Column 6)						210
i. Operating Capacity Adjustment if Double Session Kndgs are required. → ______ Kndg Classes @ 30 Students for Each P.M. Session						+
j. Current Capacity Before Other Adjustments (Sum of Items h an i) →						210
k. Other Capacity Adjustments (Explain Below) →						
l. CURRENT CAPACITY FOR 1981-82 SCHOOL YEAR →						210

II. CAPACITY VS. ENROLLMENT

a. Enrollment as of October 1981 → 143
b. Number of Students Over/Under Current Capacity → 67
(Subtract Item II-a from Item I-l)

III. CHANGE IN CURRENT CAPACITY FROM PREVIOUS YEAR

Current Capacity 1980-81 298
Current Capacity 1981-82 210
Change in Current Capacity - 88

Explanation of Change:
Moved Project SHAPE and DCH Program
Added Student Services Program

IV. SITE DATA (Completed by Central Office)
Acreage: Total 12.26 Net Usable 9.64
Original Const. Date 10-15-63
Major Additional Construction: None
Date: ______ Nature: ______

V. APPROVALS:

Al Brown 10-27-81
Principal Date

D L McClure 11/16/81
Elementary Division Date

RCP/ff
Form Originated 10/31/80

> considers an adequate core facility (i.e., teachers' lounge, cafeteria/auditorium, library-media center, and appropriate space for math and reading labs used as part of pull-out programs). Many of the schools built in the sixties operated without these basic facilities when they were at their peak enrollment. The committee feels the total capacity figures should reflect a minimum core facility as a gauge of how many students the site can accomodate.

EXAMPLE THREE: BIRMINGHAM, MICHIGAN

As even more subtle analysis of the issues involved in thinking and deciding about building capacity is represented in the position paper written by a school board member from Birmingham, Michigan.* This position paper presents a useful corrective to a more common and architecturally-derived definition of capacity in terms of maximum number of pupils allowed for at the time the building was built. Its author argues that the notion of "building capacity" changes with changing definitions of education and offers the following analysis (the quote directly, with some abridgment):

> Policymakers who wrestle with the acute problem of rapidly increasing or decreasing enrollment are faced with the question of effective enrollment size at the building level. One group is primarily concerned with maximums before a building program is initiated, the other with minimums before closing a building. Both are pressured by a decade of steeply rising educational costs and a public who demands accountability for student achievement.
>
> It probably comes as no surprise to these decisionmakers that there is no one ideal enrollment size at any level; elementary or secondary ...Hence, optimum building enrollment size may be seen as a function of local board policy decisions. It involves the interaction between building size (number of rooms) and community values as to what services should be offered at the building level. Using an equation:

$$\text{OPTIMUM CAPACITY} = \frac{\text{RESOURCES}}{\text{SERVICES (VALUES)}} = \frac{\text{BUILDING ROOMS}}{\text{PUPIL SERVICES PER BUILDING}}$$

---

* "A Position Paper: School Building Enrollment -- What Size is Instructionally Wise and Cost Beneficial?" by Sylvia P. Whitmer, Birmingham Board of Education, October 1980. Communicated to the Institute for Responsive Education, September, 1981.

One can clearly see that building capacity can change without any structural change. (Editor's note: This point was illustrated by a comparison of "Building M" at two points in time, in 1968 and in 1979. In 1968 that building comfortably held 715, but in 1979 at 520 pupils that building is nearing capacity due to changes in board policy regarding services to be offered. See Figure 1 on the next page.)

> Under the board decisions of 1979 [therefore], the building has changed its capacity. The only factor which does not require board decision is the actual physical number of classrooms per building. All services require difficult policy decisions related to a balance between consumer expectations and funding level.

[Editor's note: This is followed by a proposal for a decisionmaking process based on the equation: optimum size (i.e., "real" full capacity) = resources/services (values). We have summarized that discussion, using language from the original, in Figure 2, below.]

FIGURE 1: HOW BUILDING "M" LOST STUDENTS BUT REMAINED AT FULL CAPACITY.

FACTORS NOT SUBJECT TO BOARD POLICY	BUILDING "M" IN 1968	BUILDING "M" IN 1979
● ENROLLMENT	715	520
● NUMBER OF ROOMS	22	22
FACTORS SUBJECT TO BOARD POLICY: I.E., SERVICE LEVELS REFLECTING COMMUNITY VALUES		
● CLASS SIZE MAXIMUM (1968)	36	
● CLASS SIZE MAXIMUMS (1979); K - 1		26
2		27
3 (1980)		36
3 (1981)		28
● STAFF ASSIGNMENT (I.E., PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO)	27/1	17/1
● ROOM USE: REGULAR CLASSROOMS	22	18-1/2
LEARNING RESOURCE ROOM	MUSIC AND ART ROTATE IN CLASSROOMS	1
GIFTED PROGRAM: MUSIC-VOCAL AND BAND	GIFTED AND SPED ARE CENTRALIZED	1
ART		1
COMMUNITY EDUCATION		1/2
	22	22

FIGURE 2: EQUATION OF DECISIONMAKING FACTORS



FACTORS WHICH THE SCHOOL BOARD HAS TO KNOW ABOUT

INFORMATION WHICH MUST BE GATHERED

- CURRENT CONDITIONS OF BUILDINGS
- ENROLLMENT: CURRENT AND PROJECTED
- REVENUES: PROJECTED MILLAGE LEVEL AND ANTICIPATED STATE AND FEDERAL SUPPORT

INFORMATION ABOUT RESOURCES

OUTCOME: AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF OPTIMUM BUILDING SIZE, TO BE USED IN FACILITIES DECISIONS

VALUE DECISIONS ABOUT SERVICES LEVELS

VALUE, I.E., POLICY CHOICES WHICH NEED TO BE MADE

- SERVICES FOR STUDENTS: OPERATING PHILOSOPHY ON GRADE ORGANIZATION AND CLASS SIZE
- EQUITY
  - -- EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF SERVICES PER BUILDING, I.E., HOW MUCH CENTRALIZATION
  - -- EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF BUILDINGS GEOGRAPHICALLY AS RELATED TO HOME SITES
  - -- OPERATING PHILOSOPHY ON EXTRA SERVICES
  - -- DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR MANDATED PROGRAMS

FACTORS WHICH THE BOARD HAS TO DECIDE

APPENDIX: DOES SCHOOL CLOSURE AND CONSOLIDATION SAVE MONEY? A CASE ANALYSIS OF PRESTON COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA*

INTRODUCTION

Part D:1.1 above suggested how difficult it is to actually document the cost-savings of closing schools and consolidating facilities. Part D:1.4 offers some local policies which model how cost-of-maintenance and cost-avoidance considerations are factored into the decision rules about which schools to close. In this section, we continue the discussion of the economic inefficiencies of small schools, a discussion begun in Part D:1.2, above. Specifically, we offer data on the economic impact of Preston County's (West Virginia) consolidation of eight high schools into three.

BACKGROUND AND METHOD

The Preston County school district is rural, sparsely populated, and relatively poor -- it is below United States averages on most SES indicators. Like many school districts, Preston County experienced bitter conflict over consolidation -- the conflict included four school bond elections (see Section Four, Part D:1.2, above), citizens' protests and "school strikes," and was eventually resolved in the defeat (in May 1976) of a school bond election which documented a community-wide rejection to the costs involved in not following the school districts' plan to consolidate facilities from eight (prior to 1976) into three high schools. The community (in May 1976) rejected the costs involved in the citizens' plan (which would have kept six out of eight, grade 7 - 12 high schools, open) and *de facto* voted in favor of the school district's plan to create three consolidated high schools. The differences between the two plans are depicted on Table A, on the page immediately following.

The data used to estimate the impact of consolidation on school costs

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* This section was authored by W. Timothy Weaver, Principal Investigator of this handbook project, with assistance of Ron Binkney.

TABLE A: ENROLLMENTS AND STUDENT TEACHER RATIOS UNDER THE TWO PLANS

Under the School District's Plan to Consolidate Eight into Three High Schools, 1978-79 Data.*

Schools	Enrollments	Teachers	S/T **
West (9 - 12)	468	23.5	19.9
East (7 - 12)	508	24.3	20.9
Central (9-12)	712	29.5	24.1
Central Junior (7 - 8)	212	18.3	11.5
Aurora Junior (7 - 8)	60	4.5	13.3
Newburg Junior (7 - 8)	57	3.8	15
	2,017	103.9	- -

Under the Citizens' Plan to Limit Consolidation to Six (rather than three) High Schools.

Schools	Enrollments	Teachers	S/T
Valley (9 - 12)	387	16.0	23.6
Newburg (9 - 12)	193	10.3	18.7
Kingwood (7 - 12)	611	26.5	23.1
Tunnelton (7 - 12)	332	18.0	18.4
Aurora (7 - 12)	177	11.0	16.1
Terra Alta (7 - 12)	386	19.5	19.8
Fellowsville (7 - 8)	111	6.2	17.9
	2,188	107.5	- -

* Under the plan in existence, the closed high schools are not abandoned as school facilities but were still in use as elementary and/or junior high schools. Capital costs for reopening the three high schools are included here but were estimated to be about $1.5 million or roughly one-third of the capital outlay needed to produce the original consolidation from six to three high schools (also not included here).

** Student-teacher ratio per school building.

was prepared by Preston County school officials. The data consists of cost comparisons between operational expenditures required to provide a consolidated program, and expenditures required to provide a non-consolidated program as proposed by the citizens' proposals (see Table A).

COST COMPARISON: DOES CONSOLIDATION SAVE MONEY?

The data on cost comparisons are organized as follows: the projected current budget for fiscal year 1979-80 for operating secondary schools in the attendance districts affected by consolidation is compared to an estimated FY 1979-80 budget for operating secondary schools under a non-consolidated program. All budgetary figures were provided by the school superintendent and prepared by his staff. Budget figures do not include capital costs. The figures include six categories of expenditures: transportation; professional staffing; materials acquisition, required of either plan in addition to those under fixed costs; clerical and custodial staff; operational maintenance costs (heat, lights, etc.); and fixed school district costs. Only three categories of costs vary significantly across plans: professional staffing, transportation and materials acquisition.

Under the non-consolidated school plan, the cost estimates are not based on a pre-existing program (i.e., the program in effect before consolidation in 1977). The non-consolidated high school plan would have offered essentially the same high school curriculum in six high schools as was offered under consolidation to three high schools. Thus, cost estimates for professional staffing under either plan are based essentially on the same curricular assumptions.

The consolidation plan (actually in effect at the time of the collection of budgetary data) included the following schools: three high schools (grades 9 - 12); two unconsolidated junior high schools (grades 7 - 8); and two consolidated junior high schools (grades 7 - 8). Under the non-consolidation plan there would have been the following schools: six high schools, five of which contained grades 7 - 12 and one grades 9 - 12; and one consolidated junior high school (grades 7 - 8). The combined secondary enrollment for the affected attendance area and calculated in the two cost estimates was 2,040 students. The professional staff totaled 104 full-time equivalent positions.

The summary table following (Table B) shows that the net operating cost difference between the two school plans is about $59,000, or a difference of roughly between one and two percent of the total operating budget. Even allowing for considerable disputes about final and exact costs of each of the categories of expenditures under the two plans, it is apparent that trans-

TABLE B: COMPARISON OF OPERATIONAL COSTS FOR TWO SCHOOL PLANS: CONSOLIDATION AND NON-CONSOLIDATION

Cost Factor	Consolidation	Non-Consolidation	Net Difference
a. Professional staffing	1,792,617	1,952,924	
b. Transportation	873,390	751,060	
c. Custodial/ clerical	172,149	168,531	
d. Operation/ maintenance	326,105	327,383	
e. Materials		20,800	
f. Fixed costs	618,398	618,398	
	3,782,659	3,839,206	- 56,547 (.0149)

portation costs roughly offset the net savings in professional staff which accrue to consolidating six small local high schools into three relatively small consolidated high schools.

CONCLUSIONS

This finding for Preston County is not atypical. Tompkins and Sher (Sher, ed., 1976) found in reviewing the literature on school consolidation and the economics thereof, that some economy of school costs can be achieved for schools under 200 pupils in size. However, the authors found also that most of the savings can be attributed to increasing pupil-teacher ratios and the failure to account for transportation and other related diseconomies. The data from Preston County tend to be consistent with this finding. Transportation costs offset the economies derived from closing three of six high schools even when either the six-school plan or three-school plan offers essentially the same curriculum. John Grasso's analyses of class size increases in basics (see earlier section) for one of three affected attendance areas tends to verify the Sher and Tompkins conclusion that one of the "hidden costs" of increasing efficiency in reorganized districts is an enlargement of class size. On the other hand, the classes with reduced enrollments tended to favor students who did not have to travel long distances.

White and Tweeten (1973) report a similar finding regarding transportation diseconomies in Oklahoma. When transportation diseconomies were considered, the "optimal" school district size, in terms of economic efficiency, was reduced by about 25%. When population density is considered, transportation diseconomies vary inversely with transported students per square mile.

SECTION SEVEN

SECTION SEVEN: PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE CURRICULUM

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CONTRIBUTORS: Part C:1 was prepared by Guilbert Hentschke, Dean of the Graduate School of Education at Rochester University. W. Timothy Weaver, Professor of Education at Boston University, and Principal Investigator of this handbook project, prepared the materials in Part D:2.3, and the Appendix. In the latter, he was assisted by Ron Binkney, Graduate Assistant at Boston University. Conversations with Joan Wofford, President of Learning Resources, Inc., of Lincoln, Massachusetts, helped us to clarify the issues discussed in Part B and Part C:3. Also invaluable was the advice and insight provided by Ron Sealey -- President of the Boston-based Institute for Law and Education -- on the topic of merit-based RIF. See Part D:2.1.

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PART A: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND OVERVIEW

Much of the conflict which complicates retrenchment policymaking is created by school managers' application of the decision rule: "each dollar spent to meet fixed costs is a dollar not available for program" (Illinois, Aurora School District, 1980:81). Attempts to reduce fixed costs, i.e., close schools, phase out other services threatened with large dis-economies of reduced scale, lead to precisely those cutbacks which are most contested. And, although this decision rule may seem intuitively clear to educators, that clarity is often difficult to communicate, especially in the heat of public debate. All cuts are justified in the name of minimizing damage to program. Yet, William L. Boyd's studies of retrenchment politics in 15 suburban school districts showed much confusion over program. One school board expressed a typical complaint "what is the educational program that the staff assured us is being protected by or preserved within the proposed cuts?" (Boyd, 1979:363).

This section contains materials which help managers to communicate an answer to the above question.

In Part B, we collect all of the available evidence about the impact of enrollment decline and of cutbacks made in response to either enrollment or fiscal decline.

More specifically, Part B summarizes the evidence about the impact of enrollment decline on program and curriculum; and overviews the evidence about the program impacts of cutbacks; and discusses the impact of school closure at both the elementary and secondary level.

Part C presents two methods for identifying and documenting the program issues at stake in cutback decisionmaking. C:1 presents a method for estimating the impact of enrollment declines on curricular offerings. C:2 presents a method for projecting enrollment by course offerings. Part C:3 catalogs some recommendations and advice on preserving the curriculum in times of decline.

Part D discusses ways and means of factoring educational "program-preservation" considerations into school closure and RIF.

The Appendix includes a report of a specially commissioned longitudinal study (from 1976-77 to 1981-82) of the impact of high school closure and consolidation on the achievement levels, course selection and participation behavior of high school students from schools closed in Preston County, West Virginia.

PART B: PROBLEMS ANALYSIS INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUES

In the last chapter of the 1983 Annual Yearbook of the American Educational Finance Association, William L. Boyd (1982b) noted a surprising lack of emphasis on and attention to, in the literature at least, the programmatic and curricular impact of enrollment decline and fiscal retrenchment. Prior to producing this handbook, we undertook a systematic survey and review of the literature from 1972 to May 1981 (see Zerchykov, et al., 1982) and reached a similar conclusion.

But as we delved deeper into the "fugitive" local school district literature on decline, and as we listened to more local managers, we found much concern about the curricular impact of decline and uncertainty as to how that concern could be documented and integrated into decisionmaking.

One explanation for the relative lack of literary concern is that enrollment decline was first felt at the elementary level, and at that level the major policy issues posed by decline impacted upon finances and buildings rather than upon program. The elementary curriculum is basically homogeneous; the secondary curriculum is more differentiated and as such is much more susceptible to changes in enrollment *per se* (because some aspects of the curriculum can only be maintained if enough students choose a particular offering, e.g., a French IV course with two enrollees is a "dead" course). Moreover, the range of possible cutbacks available at the secondary level should enrollment declines precipitate or coincide with fiscal austerity are more apt to point towards changes in staff and program rather than facilities.

As the demographics lead to under-enrollment at the secondary level it can be expected that program and curriculum issues will become more salient. A recently published (1981) National Institute of Education handbook on *Planning for Declining Enrollments in Single High School Districts* pioneered in signalling the kinds of curricular decisions which declining enrollment in high schools will face in the very near future. It also contains a highly useful synthesis of the difference between decline at the high school level vs. at the elementary level and of the implications of those differences for the tasks of decline management. Exhibit 7A, on the next page, summarizes that synthesis.

A second reason for the lack of discussion of curricular issues was that there was and is no definitive research knowledge directly pertinent to the key choices facing decline managers: what are the programmatic consequences of small vs. larger schools: What increases in pupil-teacher ratios are educationally sound? Volumes have been written on both topics, yet a scientific consensus has yet to emerge.

Finally, to date, the much smaller stock of research studies which deal exclusively with the impact of decline on program -- which we define as curriculum offerings, student services and student outcomes -- offer a mixed picture. In fact, the studies we have been able to collect do not add up to a unified or coherent body of knowledge (see Summary Chart 7A, following). They are heterogeneous in findings, in methodology, and in their approaches to decline -- the latter reflecting, in part, their place in the history of studies of decline.

Two general kinds of studies give us our knowledge of what happens to school programs in decline. The first kind -- cross-sectional studies -- compare differences among growing or stable and declining districts, and on that basis draw inferences about the impact of decline. The second kind -- loosely termed "impact studies" -- draw longitudinal, before and after comparisons, noting what has changed, in terms of district practice (kinds and level of services) or student outcomes, as districts move into enrollment declines, and/or retrenchment.

THE EVIDENCE: CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES

Rodekohr (1976) represented a pioneering effort to identify the impact of decline, based on a survey of 73 Colorado school districts (matched to compare different rates of enrollment change in districts of a comparable type). His impact data consisted of (a) documentary data about student outcomes --

EXHIBIT 7A: SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGH SCHOOL AND ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DECLINE

A 1981 National Institute of Education handbook on managing decline in single high school districts offers the following analysis.

FACTOR OF COMPARISON	HIGH SCHOOL DECLINE	ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DECLINE
Program: Impact of Reduced Enrollments	...the high school offers specialized courses and individual students take varied programs. The number and variety of courses have increased greatly over the past 10 years. Declining enrollment may be unevenly distributed over courses and programs, and thus will not be as visible as in the elementary school setting.	Classes in each grade are similar. Impact of enrollment decline is more clearly visible.
Staff	The high school faculty consists of specialists who are certified according to state regulations by subject area and grade span...just as there has been increasing diversity of courses in the high school over the past decade there has also been increasing faculty specialization. It is much more difficult to shift faculty within the high school than it is in the elementary schools.	Elementary faculty consists of generalists, easier to shift elementary faculty around.
Public Opinion and the Politics of Decline Management	Parental and community expectations strongly favor a "comprehensive" high school which offers many program options for students with different interests, goals, and needs.	The elementary school does not have such diverse demands put on it.
Range of Policy Options	In the high school, beyond a certain point, consolidation of classes is not practical and surplus space is not likely to be as great an issue, particularly in single high school districts. The focus of planning will be on programs and staff.	Because elementary school decline can be met by shifting students and teachers, consolidating classes and even schools, surplus space is often a key focus of planning.

SOURCE: Adapted and abridged from Bussard, E. and Green, A.C. (1981), Planning for Declining Enrollments in Single High School Districts. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, National Institute of Education.

SUMMARY CHART 7A: INVENTORY OF STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF DECLINING ENROLLMENTS AND FISCAL RETRENCHMENT ON PROGRAM

REFERENCE	TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTION	STUDY DESCRIPTION: SCOPE, DATA BASE AND MEASURES OF IMPACT	LEVEL: ELEMENTARY OR SECONDARY
Boyd, 1982c	What has been the perceived impact of cutbacks on program? -- What are the educational and social advantages or disadvantages of having fewer children in school -- What are the effects of consolidation of schools and programs on educational service delivery	Comparative case studies of 15 suburban school districts in decline in the Northeast and upper Midwest. Qualitative case studies. Impact as perceived by interview respondents.	Elementary
Dembowski, et al., 1979	What is the effect of decline on school instructional programs? Does decline adversely affect equity initiatives in instructional programs? How does decline affect the range of courses being offered? What is the impact on program quality and innovation?	Most comprehensive extant study of the impact of decline. A nationwide survey of a sample of 320 school districts broken down by size, region and percent student population change. Survey questionnaire. Received a 31 percent response rate -- 94 school districts. Impact measured by survey response data: self-reports and perceptions.	Secondary
Richards and Cohen, 1981	How are elementary school children affected by school closure and and merger? Are some children better able to adjust to school closure and merger? What makes the difference?	Single case study. Impact measured by pupil outcome data, sociometric measures of pupil behavior, and parent and staff questionnaires. Impact study of 143 elementary school children -- second through fifth grades -- affected by two school closings in Ithaca, New York.	Elementary

SUMMARY CHART 7A: INVENTORY OF STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF DECLINING ENROLLMENTS AND FISCAL RETRENCHMENT ON PROGRAM (continued)

REFERENCE	TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTION	STUDY DESCRIPTION: SCOPE, DATA BASE AND MEASURES OF IMPACT	LEVEL: ELEMENTARY OR SECONDARY
Richards and Cohen, 1981 (cont'd.)	Are children's attitudes merely a reflection of parents' attitudes towards closure/merger? What closure/merger practices can lessen the adverse impact on children?	Included children anticipating a school closing in the near future, children whose school had closed nine months earlier, and children whose school hosted the students from the school that closed.	Elementary
Rodekohr 1976	What is the perceived impact of decline on program quality? Are districts in decline less likely to engage in program innovation? Do levels of student achievement and attainment differ with rates of decline?	Impact measured by "hard," pupil outcome data, and "soft" self-reports on a survey instrument. Survey included 73 Colorado school districts.	Secondary
Wilken and Callahan, 1978	What is the impact of decline on school programs as perceived by school officials?	Survey, statewide in Iowa. Finance data from public records 1972-75. Program impact data from interviews with school officials in 55 Iowa school districts which experienced decline.	Elementary and secondary
Weaver, see Appendix to this section	Impact of high school closure and consolidation on program and on student outcomes. Specifically, does consolidation:	Single case study. Longitudinal impact analysis of one age-cohort's school career as affected by high school closure and consolidation in Preston County, West Virginia.	Secondary

SUMMARY CHART 7A (continued)

REFERENCE	TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS	STUDY DESCRIPTION	LEVEL: ELEMENTARY OR SECONDARY
Weaver (cont'd.)	-- lead to an expanded curriculum and does such a curriculum benefit all students equally -- increase extra-curricular participation -- increase school retention, or decrease dropout rates -- lead to improved student learning	All hard data based on existing administrative records on pupil outcome. Compared student outcomes for those affected vs. unaffected by closure and consolidation.	Secondary

achievement, and retention and (b) self-reports about changes in the quality of program. Wilken and Callanan (1978) conducted a similar kind of intrastate study (55 Iowa districts) using a similar logic of inference and similar self-report data about service offerings and survey respondents' judgements about changes of program quality in their districts.

To date, Dembowski, et al. (1979), represents the only nationwide study (N = 94 districts) of the impact of decline on program. Like Rodekohr and Wilken and Callahan, he compared declining districts with non-declining districts, and, similarly, relied on survey data -- opinions about program quality change and self-reports about changes in services and practices. Dembowski, however, also elicited data about materials replacement, innovations in teaching, and enrollments in courses of study.

Evidence from the studies about the impact of decline on programs is summarized in Fact Sheet No. 5 on pages 314-315, below. The main findings are summarized in terms of four dimensions -- perceptions of program quality change, changes in school services, in practices, and changes in student outcomes.

It is interesting to see, although the studies are not strictly comparable, that the later the date of fact-finding and publication, the more pessimistic the findings. Rodekohr did find that declining districts were more likely to feel that program quality had deteriorated, but found no more concrete measures of any adverse impact of decline. Wilken and Callahan concluded that (1978:293-295):

> ...perceptions about the impact of enrollment change on the quality of specific services are very similar in decreasing and increasing enrollment school districts. Respondents in school districts with increasing enrollment think that educational services have been deteriorating most rapidly in the same areas cited by respondents in school districts with decreasing enrollment.

More ominous data (more in line with the anecdotal and task force literature based information about decline) comes from Dembowski's survey* He found

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* Summaries of the study's findings can be found on pp. 173-175 of the November 1980 issue of Educational Leadership, and in the May 1981 issue of Phi Delta Kappan, pp. 655-657.

FACT SHEET NO. 5: THE WEIGHT OF THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF DECLINE AND FISCAL RETRENCHMENT ON SCHOOL PROGRAM AND STUDENT OUTCOMES

CATEGORIES OF IMPACT	MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS	REFERENCES
Program: Perceived quality of	Mixed: those favored a more uniform back to basics curriculum felt no deterioration, others did.	Boyd, 1982c
	Higher percentage of declining enrollment districts felt a lowering of program quality, and the steeper the decline, the more negative the perception.	Dembowski, et al., 1979; Rodekohr, 1976
	Little difference in perception between decline and non-decline districts.	Wilken and Callahan, 1978
	Teachers, in decline districts, were more likely than other role groups to feel a deterioration in program quality.	Boyd, 1982c; Wilken and Callahan, 1978
Curriculum: Course offerings and diversity	The overall impact of steep decline is towards a narrower, more homogeneous curriculum.	Boyd, 1982c; Dembowski, et al., 1979
	At the elementary level, retrenchment preserves the "three R's" but cuts art and music, and related "humanities" programs.	Boyd, 1982c
	At the secondary level as overall school enrollments decline, so do student enrollments in various courses of study. Language arts, social studies, fine arts seem particularly susceptible to enrollment loss.	
	Elementary school consolidation did not lead to an expanded curriculum...	
	But high school consolidation did.	Weaver, 1983
Services: Special and compensatory education	No adverse impact of decline: proportion of resources devoted to, and pupils served by, special ed increased.	Boyd, 1982c; Dembowski, et al., 1979; Wilken and Callahan, 1978

FACT SHEET NO. 5: (continued)

CATEGORIES OF IMPACT	MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS	REFERENCE
Practices: pedagogical innovations	Decline districts are less likely to engage in innovation than others. This is especially true for smaller districts.	Rodekohr, 1976; Dembowski, et et al., 1979
New curriculum materials, the replacement cycle	In the majority of districts with declining enrollments, the length of the materials replacement cycle either remained the same or lengthened while it shortened in districts with increasing enrollment.	Dembowski, et al., 1979
Student outcomes: retention and dropout rates	Decline districts showed an increase in the dropout rate; growing districts showed a decrease.	Dembowski, et al., 1979
	Lower dropout rates and higher achievement scores are positively associated with decline. Note: author hypothesizes that this may be due to two factors: lower pupil-teacher ratios and the fact that districts most in decline are rural and socially stable and homogeneous.	Rodekohr, 1976
	Students reassigned to distant schools showed significantly higher rates of dropout.	Weaver, 1983
Academic achievement and school consolidation and closure	No impact, bad or good, on elementary school students, affected by school closure and consolidation.	Richards and Cohen, 1981
	Minimal overall impact on high school students. But math scores for reassigned students improved...if they did not have to travel long distances to the new school. Where long travel distances are involved, there is an adverse impact on all student outcomes.	Weaver, 1983
Adjustment and extracurricular participation after school closure and consolidation.	Adjustment and elementary school closure: children respond to anticipated actual closing of their school negatively, but there is little long-term effect.	Richards and Cohen, 1981
	High schoolers whose school was closed, and who attended consolidated high schools, had much lower rates of extracurricular participation.	Weaver, 1983

that:

(1) as overall enrollment declines, so does enrollment in various courses of study;

(2) declines in course enrollments are not consistent across all subject areas;

(3) language arts, social studies, as well as fine arts and foreign languages, seem to be the subject areas most negatively affected by declining enrollments (these subject areas lose out in several ways, including the number of courses taught, staff assigned to teach these courses, and actual enrollments);

(4) there is no evidence of across-the-board reductions in the number of courses offered (rather, as total enrollment declines, school districts are reducing the educational options available to students in academic and fine arts courses);

(5) while academic and arts curriculum cores are being eroded, vocational, compensatory and special education course enrollments are on the rise; and

(6) the greater the rate of decline, the more likely it is that program quality will be perceived as deteriorating; the less likely it is that school districts will engage in innovative practices, or use new materials.

In a later commentary on and summary of these findings (Dembowski and Gay, 1980:179), the authors conclude:

> The districts that were greatly affected by enrollment declines reported that the quality of their educational program deteriorated the most. Our evidence suggests that if school districts experience slight declines in student enrollment, the quality of the educational program may be increased because it is not necessary to reduce teacher staff or sell buildings. In fact, the enrollment declines offer opportunities to lower pupil-teacher ratio, and allocate extra space to worthy programs. However, as the pinch of declining enrollments is felt financially through reductions in state aid, which is based on the number of pupils, more stringent measures become necessary.

THE EVIDENCE: IMPACT STUDIES

We have often cited Boyd's (1982c) 15 suburban district comparative case study for its findings on how decline transforms the nature of politics and decisionmaking. Boyd also collected interview data eliciting respondents' -- superintendents, board members and parent activists and teacher association representatives -- perceptions of the effects of retrenchment upon program (see Fact Sheet No. 6, on the next pages).

Boyd's findings paint a picture recognizable to anyone familiar with the local district task force literature documenting local experiences with decline. Like Rodekohr, and Wilken and Callahan, and Dembowski, et al., Boyd found that special and compensatory education services were "protected" from decline. His findings are also congruent with Dembowski's discovery of the initially benign effects of enrollment decline being followed by the more debilitating impact of austerity retrenchment measures accompanying severe decline.

Boyd also discovered that there was an ideological split among perceptions of program quality. Those who favored "back-to-basics" felt less negative about the loss of certain aspects (e.g., "frills") of the curriculum. It is intriguing to speculate that the inconclusiveness of earlier survey data about perceptions of program quality change (e.g., Rodekohr, Wilken and Callahan, Dembowski, et al.) stemmed, in part, from a lack of probing about respondents' criteria of quality. It should be noted that the early to mid-1970's saw both the onslaught of enrollment decline and the growth of the "back-to-basics" ideology from a small backlash to the mainstream current of the minimum competency movement.

Adults may engage in ideological dispute about "quality" in a school program, but there is usually a common ground of concern about what "it" does to, or for, school children, and some common, albeit contested, measures of impact upon students. At the elementary level, it is ironic that much more scholarly effort has gone into trying to trace the "ecological," (i.e., neighborhood) economic and enrivonmental impact of school closure, than has gone into tracing the impact of closure on children.

One exception can be found in Richards and Cohen (1981), an interesting and methodologically subtle study of the impact of school closures on elementary school children. They studied the behavior and feelings of 134 children in grades 2-5, in Ithaca, New York. The sub-samples included: children anticipating a school closing in the near future; children whose school closed

FACT SHEET NO. 6: PROGRAM EFFECTS OF RETRENCHMENT; OF FEWER PUPILS, OF FACILITIES AND PROGRAM CONSOLIDATIONS. SOME PERCEPTIONS FROM 15 SUBURBAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS*

EFFECT	POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES AS PERCEIVED	NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES AS PERCEIVED
What are the educational and social advantages and disadvantages of having fewer children in the school?	Enables children to receive more individual attention (due to lower teacher/pupil ratios) especially for low SES, low reading level children. With fewer children it is easier to get to know their families (and vice versa). Excess space can be provided for special art, music and resource rooms. Discipline problems have decreased. Easier to have small-grouping.	Even though class sizes are lower, resource personnel had to be cut because of fewer grades at each level, not every building can support having such resident specialists. With fewer pupils the school system gets fewer dollars. There are demographic "bulges" at certain grade levels, with more students at those levels than above or below. This made it difficult to plan and allocate resources from year to year. Less flexibility in organizing programs within the building -- tracking by ability becomes more difficult as well as the matching of students to teachers compatible with their personalities and backgrounds. It becomes more difficult to solve scheduling problems of special subject teachers who might have to split their time between buildings.

(continued)

*SOURCE: Boyd, W. L. (1982c). School Governance in an Era of Retrenchment. Pages 104-117, 126-150. Dr. W. L. Boyd is also a consultant and contributing author to this handbook.

FACT SHEET NO. 6 : PROGRAM EFFECTS OF RETRENCHMENT (continued)

EFFECT	POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES AS PERCEIVED	NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES AS PERCEIVED
What are the effects of consolidation of schools and programs on educational service delivery?	Ability to have subject area classrooms (at the middle and junior high school levels). Easier to have ability grouping. Cost savings -- a school with less than 200 pupils could not financially support a resident full-time librarian even though the children, of course, deserved one. More sharing and exchange of ideas between teachers teaching the the same subjects.	With busing, participation in after-school activities declined. Loss of flexibility because, with larger classes, it is more difficult to move children around. Decline in teacher morale. Elimination of support/resource services and a hidden reduction in extra-curricular activities, art, music, etc. Shift of teachers away from their primary areas of knowledge and certification.

nine months before; and children whose school hosted the students from the school that closed. Impact inferences were drawn from a comparison of children in the first sub-sample (anticipating a school closure, controlled for grade level) with children in the second sub-sample (those whose school had already been closed). This comparison provided for an approximation of a "before and after design" (p. 10). Impact measures were drawn from indicators of feeling -- individual interviews with children rated so as to take into account both verbal and nonverbal cues, homeroom teachers were asked to rate their perceptions of each child's adjustment, and parents responded to a questionnaire eliciting their perception of their child's adjustment and their feelings about merger and consolidation -- and from indicators of fact -- sociometric data about children's friendship and interaction behaviors; pupil background data including academic achievement and grade level; and classroom ratios (the proportion of "old" to "new" children).

The data revealed that (see Fact Sheet No. 7 for a detailed summary):

- Children did react negatively to the prospect of school closing, but that this negative reaction faded once merger was completed.
- There was no long-term adverse effect on children's academic performance, nor was the level of achievement any predictor of how well children adapted to closure and merger.
- Children's adaptation was not significantly related to sex or to popularity prior to school closure.
- Age does make a difference: second and third graders remained friends almost exclusively with children from their original school; second graders have the least number of cross-school relationships, fifth graders the most.
- Classroom ratios of new to old children also make a difference: children whose classrooms had an uneven mix of children from the two schools made fewer cross-school friendships.

Richards and Cohen's study shows that the effects of school closure, even clumsily handled, on small children may not be as great as many parents fear. Adults may be more attached to their neighborhood school than children are.

Weaver's longitudinal impact study of student outcomes resulting from high school consolidation in Preston County, West Virginia, suggests the reverse:

FACT SHEET NO. 7 WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL CLOSURE UPON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN?

How are elementary school children affected by school closure and merger?	Children respond to anticipated or actual closing of their school negatively, but there is little long-term effect. This reaction is related to the immediacy of the situation: children anticipating a closure and merger are most negative (80 percent); children attending the school that hosted the new students were least negative (35 percent); while those children whose school closed nine months earlier fell somewhere in between (70 percent).
Are some children better able to adjust to school closure and merger? What makes the difference?	Child's education is not significantly related to sex, popularity, how well a child likes school, or how well the child does in school academically, socially or emotionally. Age makes a difference: second and third graders remain friends almost exclusively with children from their original school. Second graders have the least number of cross-school friendships, fifth graders the most. Presence of siblings in the new, "host" school made no difference as far as negative-positive feelings to merger.
Are children's attitudes merely a reflection of parents' attitudes towards closure/merger?	Attitudes not caused by parents. Questionnaire results show parents were unable to judge their feelings about closure/merger independently of their child's feelings.
What closure/merger practices can lessen the adverse impact on children?	Balance in merging school populations: children whose classrooms had an uneven mix of children from the two schools made fewer cross-school friendships. Should try to establish even ratios of "new" to "old" children in the classrooms. Children's greatest fear was of the "unknown" and programs designed to "make the unknown, known" may alleviate children's fears.

SOURCE: RICHARD, L. N. and COHEN, J. S. (1981). The Closing of Elementary Schools: Impact on Young Children. Final Report. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, Department of Human Development and Family Studies.

secondary school pupils may be more attached to their schools than their parents, and be more adversely influenced than usually imagined bv closure, consolidation and change. (Being older does not mean being less vulnerable*). Weaver used existing school district data. [Note: Weaver's study, offered in detail in the Appendix to this section, is a good example of how decision-makers can, and should, use existing administrative records in order to test the efficacy of past policy decisions, and, politically, demonstrate that controversial choices may have worked out all right.] Weaver tracked the "careers" -- choices in course of study, extra-curricular involvement, retention in school, and academic achievement -- of one cohort of high schoolers affected by closure and consolidations, in order to find out whether there was any difference between (a) reassigned pupils, those whose school was closed; (b) non-reassigned pupils, those attending a school hosting the reassigned pupils; and (c) unaffected pupils, those in a school which had no changes due to closure and consolidation.

What Weaver found (see Fact Sheet No. 8, on the pages immediately following) is that although consolidation did preserve, in fact, enrich the curriculum (adding more course offerings), this "good" did not benefit all students equally. Specifically: reassigned pupils took less advantage of the expanded choices, they were more likely to dropout, less likely to participate in extra-curricular activities and did not show any dramatic changes or improvement in academic performance with the exception of slightly higher math scores. Except for that one improvement, pupils traveling long distances to newly assigned schools suffered negative effects in all areas of student outcomes.

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* Gayle Dorman, Project Director at the Center for Early Adolescence, at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, reports that with the onset of adolescence, a "sense-of-belonging" to a place and a stable group of peer cohorts becomes an important part of development of a sense of efficacy, and hence of school performance.

FACT SHEET NO. 8: WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF HIGH SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION ON STUDENT OUTCOMES AND ACTIVITIES. LONGITUDINAL IMPACT DATA FROM PRESTON COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA?*

POLICY AND RESEARCH QUESTION	CRITERION AND EMPIRICAL INDICATORS: HOW DO WE KNOW IF THE POLICY OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN MET?	FINDINGS: IMPACT DATA FROM PRESTON COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA (PER CRITERION VARIABLE).
Does an expanded curriculum made possible by H.S. consolidation benefit all students equally: Did students who "lost" their school benefit from the wider range of course offerings at reassigned school?	Expanded curriculum: Number of new courses since consolidation. Compute the participation rates (in new courses) of reassigned (those whose school had been closed) vs. non-reassigned students. Participation rate is defined as a ratio: students registered in new courses divided by total students in the group.	31 new courses were offered after. The same ratio of reassigned and non-reassigned students are, on average, registered in the 31 new courses offered since (and because of) consolidation. Reassigned students take the basic courses more frequently than non-assigned students, while non-reassigned students tended to take the advanced courses with more frequency.
Does consolidation increase extra-curricular participation among affected students?	Participation rate is computed as the average number of available participations per student, compared against: participation rates of assigned students before and after consolidation, and participation rates of assigned vs. non-reassigned students after consolidation.	There was a decline in participations for reassigned students, while rates for non-reassigned students increased. For reassigned students participation declined by about 31 percent per year following consolidation.

* SOURCE: Specially commissioned study by Dr. W. Timothy Weaver (with assistance by Ron Binkney), both of Boston University, School of Education. Weaver is Principal Investigator of the project producing this handbook. See Appendix to this section for a full report on this study.

FACT SHEET NO. 8: IMPACT OF HIGH SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION (continued)

POLICY AND RESEARCH QUESTION (continued)	CRITERION AND EMPIRICAL INDICATORS (continued)	FINDINGS (continued)
Does consolidation increase extra-curricular participation? (continued)		For non-reassigned students participation rates increased 9 percent per year. Consolidation has had a profound effect on students whose schools were closed, as measured by extra-curricular involvement. Looking at all of the communities as a whole, including those where schools were not closed, the most serious injury is found among students whose local schools were eliminated.
Does consolidation increase school retention? Or decrease school dropout rates?	Retention: is defined as the continuance or discontinuance of entering a particular high school. Discontinuance may mean that a student has dropped out of school (official termination) or has transferred to another school.	The drop in retention rates was greater among reassigned pupils to distant schools, even though after consolidation overall rates did not change in unaffected communities.
	Dropout ratio: number of dropouts per 100 students enrolled compared to rate prior to, and after, consolidation.	No difference in dropout rates for non-affected schools (not merging with closed school populations), and among those continuing to attend local schools (non-reassigned) not receiving students from closed schools. Among students reassigned to consolidated schools, the dropout rate almost doubled.

FACT SHEET NO. 8: IMPACT OF HIGH SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION (continued)

POLICY AND RESEARCH QUESTION (continued)	CRITERION AND EMPIRICAL INDICATORS (continued)	FINDINGS (continued)
Do students learn more: Whatever program advantages (more courses, more sections per course, etc.) reflected in changes in student outcomes, in terms of achievement and test scores.	Grade-point averages for students affected and unaffected by consolidation. The GPA data is for a single cohort in the ninth grade in 1975-76 (the year before consolidation) and continuing in grades 10-12 in subsequent years (1976-1978).	Attendance of a consolidated high school affects GPA negatively for both reassigned and non-reassigned students. Reassigned students are more negative but differences are small.
	Test score data for affected and unaffected students: 9th and 11th grade test scores for four cohort groups beginning 1976-77 and the years subsequent (1977-80).	With the exception of math achievement the effects of consolidation on achievement, using two unaffected schools as controls, are minimal. With regard to math, the non-reassigned students have higher scores than the control group, but reassigned students do not. However, when travel distance is covaried on 11th grade math scores, reassigned students have scores higher than the control group. Longitudinal effects with the exception of language achievement in one cohort, show no significant change over time for experimental vs. control groups; the single exception shows significant decline in language skills of reassigned students who travel long distances to consolidated schools.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What does the evidence presented here, meager as it is, suggest to school managers?

One, that the impact on students of elementary school closure is probably less than imagined (Richards and Cohen, 1981).

Two, that the major impact of enrollment decline and its coincident or subsequent retrenchment is a more homogeneous, less diverse curriculum. This is due to a number of factors, coincidently occurring and difficult to disentangle: austerity decisions eliminating perceived "frills" or low volume program offerings, the demographics of lower enrollments providing fewer "bodies" (even though the proportion may be the same) for elective courses, and student choice behavior (proportionately as well as absolutely, lower enrollment in electives) reflecting the temper of the times (Boyd, 1982c; Dembowski, et al., 1979).

Three, that thus far (none of the evidence is current enough to take into account the new spirit of deregulation, and the fiscal crunch at the state and Federal levels), decline and retrenchment have not slowed the growth of special and compensatory education initiatives (Boyd, 1982c; Dembowski, et al., 1979; Wilken and Callahan, 1978).

Four, that consolidation of facilities can, of course, preserve a diverse and differentiated curriculum, but that the benefits are not distributed equally, and may not, in fact, benefit those pupils (previously assigned to schools too small to support a differentiated curriculum) who were most at-risk and were supposed to benefit the most (Weaver, 1983). One implication of this conclusion is that where student outcomes are the primary considerations, managers should be much more cautious about closing and consolidating high schools than elementary schools.

Five, the very concept of diverse and differentiated curriculum may be contestible. This was revealed most strongly in Boyd, 1982c, and is borne out in the inconclusiveness of survey response data about the impact of decline on the "quality" of program (Rodekohr, 1976; Wilken and Callahan, 1978; Dembowski, et al., 1979).

This last, and final, conclusion highlights an irony with some interesting policy implications.

The irony is this: all of the practitioner-oriented and practitioner-produced "literature" stress that decline and fiscal retrenchment requires a reduction of fixed costs (buildings and personnel serving fewer pupils) in order to preserve resources for maintaining core programs and services. It is for that reason that managers are enjoined to make targeted, rational, albeit unpopular cutbacks, and engage in rational fiscal analysis (Section Six, above), and to live with the inevitable conflict arising out of targeted cutbacks (Section Four), and use citizen participation -- messy as it can be -- to repair the damage done by redistributive decisionmaking. All of this is made necessary in the name of preserving the program. But "program" or, more precisely, the policy objective of "preserving the integrity of the curriculum," rather than being the touchstone for resolving all other policy choice conflicts, turns out to be, itself, controversial.

The policy implication is that we return, in a full circle, to the question raised by a school board member, cited in the introduction of this discussion of program and curriculum: "What is the educational program that the staff assured us is being protected by or preserved within the proposed cuts?" (Boyd, 1979:363).

Materials in Part C can help to clarify what programmatically is at stake, given certain local facts about enrollments. Like the financial analysis procedures presented in Part C, in Section Six, above, they can clarify what aspects of a program are threatened or protected or preserved, given certain conditions and actions. But like the financial analyses methods in Section Six, they cannot answer the ideological question of whether what is at stake is "good."

PART C:1. A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF ENROLLMENT DECLINES ON CURRICULAR OFFERINGS*

THE OBJECTIVE

The method represents the impact of reduced enrollment and school closings on high school curricular offerings. It offers a recipe -- a set of procedures for collecting and representing data which can represent the impact of reduced enrollment, and school closures in response to that change, on the curriculum. Specifically, it is designed to generate information answering two common questions which bedevil policymakers faced with dropping enrollment at the high school level.

One, what will be the likely effect on a high school curriculum of keeping all high schools open, even though enrollments are falling?

Two, what will be the likely effect on a curriculum of closing one or more high schools?

BACKGROUND

The method offered here has been field tested in one school district ** which, as a result of enrollment decline, is considering closing one of its five high schools. All data, tables and exhibits come from that one school district. The questions facing that district and its information needs are typical. Up to now this handbook has considered enrollment decline as a "problem" only to the extent that it creates or reinforces fiscal decline, i.e., pressures to consume a lower level of resources. But the high school curriculum, because it has grown so differentiated over time, is especially vulnerable to the diseconomies of reduced scale. Student demand, and the available pool of students from which certain course offerings can be generated, does make a difference.* Worksheet A on the next page depicts the reductions in curriculum suffered by the five high schools in the particular district in which this method was field tested.**

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* This section is authored by Dr. Guilbert Hentschke, financial consultant and contributing author to this handbook. Dr. Hentschke also authored Parts B and C of Section Six, above.

** Sequoia (California) Union High School District.

PROCEDURES

The major ingredients of this model include: data about both current curriculum offerings and proposed changes, enrollment changes, and the number and capacities of buildings. The "recipe" for using these ingredients is as follows.

Step One: Determine the Changes Possible in the High School Curriculum Which Would Reduce Staff Requirement, Yet Provide a Minimum Course Framework.

When faced with the prospect of closing schools, there is always a temptation to begin right away and make comparisons about the characteristics of specific schools. Although such comparisons must inevitably be made, every effort should be made to suppress specific comparisons at this stage because the goal at this point is to evaluate and redesign the general high school curriculum.

The process of redesigning a high school curriculum is both difficult to undertake and to describe precisely. The general guidelines for those undertaking the redesign include: (i) comply with any major assumptions, such as board policies; (ii) cost no more than the present arrangement; and (iii) maintain, preserve and possibly strengthen the program of instruction. Easy to say, but hard to do. The district we examined developed a hypothetical "average high school" whose program of instruction they redesigned. The school district has five regular high schools with an average current enrollment of 1750 students each. The average student took 5.6 classes (not including such non-classroom assignments as student clerk, attendance assistant, etc.). The average class size was 28.6, excluding special education and other classes supported by project funds or special staff allotments. In this average high school the total number of class sections was 344 (1750/28.5 x 5.6).

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* See Part C:2, below, for an example of a method of projecting enrollments by course offerings.

** All of the worksheets come from California, Sequoia Union High School District (1981). Long Range Planning Committee Report.

Twelve general alternatives were developed and evaluated by the curriculum task force in the example district. The alternatives and their evaluation are presented in Worksheet B. In the process of their deliberations, the curriculum task force started with the "current program" in their composite high school, and proceeded to "slim it down." There is no formula for achieving this. Many trade-offs must be made. Worksheet C portrays a "straw vote" of the committee in the example district when it was nearly done with its work. At that point, they had reduced their alternatives to consolidating courses, staggering them, having teachers travel to different schools, and keeping the current course in the basic curriculum.

Step Two: Project the Number of Class Sections by Department for the Composite High School

In this procedure, district enrollments are used to derive the projected enrollments for the "composite high school." In making these projections, a number of assumptions were made.

One, enrollments in each academic department would drop in the same proportion during each projected three-year period as did the total enrollment.

Two, the "minimum course framework" was to be offered, and courses deemed desirable but not necessary are listed below the dotted lines in Worksheet D.

Three, as enrollment declines, students will increasingly have to settle for second choices in order to take a full schedule of classes. Courses will be offered fewer and fewer periods, and will be closed more rapidly and frequently due to maximum enrollment having been reached.

Four, value judgements are made and noted which resulted in mechanistic projections. Sections were added, for example, to reduce scheduling problems such as academic singletons, to provide a richer variety of elective options, and to maintain some advanced academic or specialized courses.

Five, where it becomes apparent that in order to staff the projected program in the composite high school, teachers would have to be "bought" over ratio to maintain a program in a particular year, the need is recorded in the plan.

The curricular projections of the composite high school for planning years 3, 6 and 9 are presented in Worksheet E. These data are summarized by department in Worksheet F, including the number of sections over ratio that must be staffed.

In the composite high school, the total number of sections would drop from 344 to 213 over the next decade. If no over-ratio teachers were permitted in the plan, the number of sections would drop to 196.

Step Three: Portray the Trade-Off on the Curriculum of Closing One or More Schools

In general terms the curriculum trade-off can be portrayed by contrasting the effects on average school enrollments on closing one or more schools. This is portrayed in Worksheet G. In this example, the district would have to close one of its five high schools in the second planning year and another in the eighth planning year simply to maintain its current level of curricular offerings. Alternatively, it could keep its five schools open and operate its "minimum acceptable" curriculum.

Earlier, in Worksheet A, we saw the effects of enrollment declines on the curriculum in five high schools. In the previous four years the average enrollments of these schools declined from 2,129 to 1,749, or a little less than 400 students per school. In about four years into the future those schools are projected to lose another 400 students per school -- if the same set of five high schools stays open. We have portrayed the reductions required in the curriculum to keep each school open over the next decade. The "Is it worth it?" question is answered on an individual basis by comparing the "slimmed down" curriculum of the composite school with the current program in the five schools today. The reduction in offerings over the next decade will be at least as severe as those portrayed in Worksheet A.

CONCLUSION

This (and any other) methodology offered for collecting and presenting data is only offered as a suggestion about some ways that major trade-offs can be and have been portrayed. Two other sets of data can also be used to portray the curriculum trade-offs of school closings. These are contained in the following table.

Fit Between Teacher and Teaching Assignment	Student Access to the Curricular Program
Number of sections taught by faculty not trained in that subject	Number of students who had first choices honored in their course selection
Number of different subjects taught by each teacher	Percent of the average student's program which is not his/her first choice
Number of sections in which "combined" subjects are taught	

The method which we have described can clarify the "what if" question but not the "is it worth it" question.

WORKSHEET A: COURSES DROPPED IN FIVE HIGH SCHOOLS OVER THE LAST SEVEN YEARS

School A

- Art Studio I, II
- Consumer Economics
- Retail Merchandising
- Speech I
- Contemporary Writing
- Textile Arts
- World Literature
- Child Development
- Wood I, II
- Orchestra
- Solo Voice
- Choral I, II Advanced
- Harmony
- Medical Careers
- A.P. Biology
- Anthropology
- Black Studies
- California Experience
- Ecology
- Fine Arts
- Office Practice
- English S.O.L.
- Journalism
- Latin
- Metals I, II
- Jazz Band I
- Crafts
- SAT Prep/English III
- Foods I*
- Creative Arts*/Guitar*
- Yearbook**
- Spanish IV/V**

School B

- Animal Science
- Floriculture
- Ornamental Horticulture
- Speech I, II
- Intro. to Data Processing
- Italian I - V
- Anthropology
- History and Art
- Choral I
- Humanities in Three Cities
- Law Enforcement
- Harmony
- Commercial Art I, II
- Sculpture
- Art Studio
- Retail Merchandising
- Foods II
- Contemporary Writing
- Textile Arts
- Boating Operations
- Drafting IV
- Home Mechanics
- Motorcycle Operations I, II
- Dance Production
- Employment Readiness
- Modern Media I, II
- Orchestra
- Guitar
- Music-Drama Workshop
- Piano I, II
- Survival Skills/Living Skills
- A Capella
- TV Production I, II
- Stage Band
- Fundamentals of Economics
- Latin I, II, III
- Business English
- Mini-Science
- Super Market*/Consumer Economics*
- Journalism I, II, III, IV*
- Journalism**
- French III, IV, V**
- German I, II**

*Combined with other courses
**May be dropped or combined next year

WORKSHEET A: (Continued)

School C

- Crafts I
- Fashion Merchandising
- Ethics and Logic
- Beginning Band
- Electronics Music
- History of Films
- Ilios
- Reading-Typing
- Textile Arts
- Harmony
- Jewelry
- Fundamentals of Economics
- Office Practice
- Art*/Art Studio*/Photography*
- All Drafting Courses Combined
- Shorthand I, II*
- Accounting I, II*
- Drama II, III, IV*
- German III, IV*
- French III, IV, V*
- Orchestra/Jazz Ensemble*
- Yearbook I, II*
- Clothing I - V*
- Wood II/Advanced Wood*
- Metal II/Advanced Metal*
- Italian I*

School D

- Fundamental Economics
- Drafting
- East Asian Affairs
- Business Law
- Business English
- Textile Arts
- Retail Merchandising
- TV Production
- Child Development
- AV Techniques
- Sculpture
- Music Drama Workshop
- Consumer Protection
- Stage Band
- Orchestra
- Harmony
- German, III, IV
- Sociology
- Social Psychology
- Japanese
- Crafts
- Sheet Metal
- Readings in the Content Area
- General Art
- F.E.A.S.T.
- Ceramics I, II*
- All Machine Shop Courses*
- Some ESL Classes**

School E

- Ethics and Logic
- A Capella Choir
- F.E.A.S.T.
- Consumer Economics
- Fine Art
- Figure Drawing
- Marketing
- Office Practice
- Food, Facts, and You
- Life Styles
- Italian II
- French V
- Textile Arts
- AP Math
- Art*/Commercial Art*/Lettering*/Painting*
- Accounting I, II*
- Shorthand I, II*
- All Levels of Woods into One Course*
- AP Biology**
- Shorthand**

WORKSHEET B

Alternatives to Current Curriculum Organization

If small-sized schools are considered to be desirable and worthy of preservation, then means must be found to present the optimum instructional program in a more economical way. The suggestions listed for alternative consideration comply with a few key priority assumptions. The alternatives suggested must not cost more than the present arrangement, could actually produce income, or could save money. The alternatives suggested maintain, preserve, and possibly strengthen the program of instruction.

1. Consolidate choral and instrumental classes and offer them at one or two locations only.
2. Increase lecture-type classes double or three-fold and schedule them for large-area facilities (music or multi-use rooms).
3. Assign certain teachers to travel to more than one school so that specialized subject matter (e.g., advanced foreign language) could be offered.
4. Designate certain schools as specialized learning centers where only pertinent electives are offered (High School of Math/Science).
5. Combine adult education and high school student programs into the same classes.
6. Convert to community center schools where recreation department and social service rental income augments budget. Lease unused classrooms to compatible community and private agencies.
7. Schedule significant numbers of elective offerings at community colleges.
8. Use Independent Study as an alternative to scheduled electives. These "courses-by-arrangement" could allow for higher student/teacher ratios.
9. Stagger school schedules and provide transportation so that electives could be consolidated at a few schools.
10. Convert elective offerings to a semester schedule so that more elective variety and less student time commitment are possible.
11. Reduce scope of electives to a few offerings to maintain cost-effective class sizes.
12. Deliberately consolidate electives so that several related subjects and levels are offered simultaneously in one classroom.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternative Suggestions

While some of the proposed alternatives may extend the life of some elective areas, only speculation is possible on the success of some approaches and the ramifications for the teacher work load of others.

Will students and parents in sufficient numbers accept the concept of a district orchestra, drama, or industrial arts program in lieu of their traditional school orchestra, drama, or industrial arts program? If not, offering these programs at one site, as opposed to five, could accelerate the demise of the program rather than prolong its life. Transportation problems and a lack of identity with the district program could discourage enrollment in a consolidated program. A survey which questions the receptiveness of parents and students to this proposal should be undertaken before courses are consolidated at one school.

Certain schools could be designated as specialized learning centers where only certain electives such as math-science are offered. Offering a narrow range of electives to a student body would insure that classes in the specific areas could be kept filled. Students would be deprived, however, of the variety of courses that a true comprehensive high school offers.

Combining adult education with high school programs probably would boost the enrollment in electives. Some disagreement exists as to the desirability of combining adults with minors in the same classroom.

Leasing unused classrooms to compatible community and private agencies has met with mixed success in a nearby elementary district. While that district has avoided closing schools despite declining enrollment, it faces a financial crisis this spring because budgeted rental income may not materialize as a result of zoning and other legal difficulties.

Redesigning suitable courses to learning package or individual student contract formats could allow some courses in danger of being eliminated to survive. There would be some initial expense in developing the materials for such programs. The numbers in such programs would have to be kept at a manageable level if students were to receive adequate assistance and supervision.

One strategy curriculum planners utilize to preserve courses with declining numbers is to combine compatible courses into one room. Thus, French 2, 3, and 4 or Jewelry and Ceramics are taught simultaneously in one classroom. This increases the number of preparations for the teacher, however, and can decrease effective teaching.

Very few courses can be offered successfully in alternate years because continuity is often necessary to insure the continuation of a program. Some courses require skills obtained from a more basic course, while others continue to attract numbers of students because of positive word-of-mouth. Removing the course from the curriculum for a year could seriously reduce student interest in the program. Some college requirements, however, might be staggered successfully.

WORKSHEET B (continued)

Assigning teachers to two schools also has been proposed as a method of saving curriculum. Traveling teachers sometimes have difficulty maintaining continuity when moving from one campus to another. Under current contract provisions, classes are arranged so that teachers who travel do so on a preparation period, and those teachers are excused from supervising extra-curricular activities at either school. This latter compensation rarely replaces the preparation time lost on a daily basis. Removing teachers from the extra-curricular pool of teachers at a school places the increased burden of supervision on the steadily declining population of remaining teachers. While the enrollment of a school may decline, the demand for supervision of co-curricular activities may not necessarily experience a corresponding decline. This places an increased burden on the staff at a time when they find their number of course preparations increasing. Also, as a result of enrollment decline and the resulting reduction of course offerings, many teachers will be assigned to teach courses out of their area of expertise. Time consuming, costly retraining may be necessary. These pressures could result in increased absenteeism stemming from anxiety and stress-induced illness.

WORKSHEET C: "STRAW VOTE" OF THE COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM RE-ORGANIZATION

DEPARTMENT AND COURSE	OPTIONS				
	CONSOLIDATION	STAGGERING COURSES	TRAVELLING TEACHERS	MAINTAIN AT HOME SCHOOL AS BASIC	COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
ART	Students not likely to travel to a school for Art only		Possible, but, there are problems with prep. time & lab clean-up	Preferred if possible	Might be better to consolidate to a Basic Program at a home school
Ceramics					
Jewelry					
Freehand Drawing					
Adv. Art Courses					
BUSINESS					
Accounting	✓	✓			Certain basic Business courses desirable at each school i.e., Typing I & II, BEST, perhaps others
Business Law	✓	✓			
Business Math				✓	
Shorthand	✓	✓			
Typing I				✓	
Typing II/Word Processing				✓	
BEST				✓	
Personal Typing		✓		✓	
English I, II, III, IV			Not feasible for basic curriculum	✓	Basic to curriculum. Should not be cut. Elective areas need creative attention to save them.
English Skills				✓	
English Lab				✓	
English AS Program				✓	
Drama	✓			✓	
Journalism					
Yearbook					
Reading				✓	
HOME ECONOMICS					
Child Development		✓			
Clothing I, II, III				✓	
Foods				✓	
Fashion Merchandising		✓			
On Your Own				✓	

WORKSHEET C: "STRAW VOTE" OF THE COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM RE-ORGANIZATION (continued)

DEPARTMENT AND COURSE	OPTIONS				
	CONSOLIDATION	STAGGERING COURSES	TRAVELLING TEACHERS	MAINTAIN AT HOME SCHOOL AS BASIC	COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
INDUSTRIAL ARTS					
Auto	✓				
Electronics	✓				
Drafting I, II, III				✓	Drafting needed for engineering prerequisite at college
Metals I, II, III	✓				
Woods I, II, III	✓				
BIA - M & W					
LANGUAGE					
French I, II		Not viable for language		✓	Adv. classes At Community College
Advanced French III, IV, V	✓		✓		
Spanish I, II				✓	
Spanish III, IV, V	✓		✓		
German I, II	✓		✓		Travelling course
Advanced German III, IV, V	✓		✓		
Latin I, II	✓		✓		
Latin III, IV					
MUSIC					
Advanced Band	✓	Not viable for music			Orchestra may best be handled by referral to Peninsula Youth Symphony and/or other group
Orchestra	✓				
Stage Band	✓				
Choral	✓				
Band I, II	✓				
MATH					
Basic Math				✓	
Pre Algebra				✓	
Algebra I				✓	
Geometry				✓	
Algebra II				✓	
Advanced Math				✓	
AP Math					✓Canada Course
Computer Problems				✓	

WORKSHEET C: "STRAW VOTE" OF THE COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM RE-ORGANIZATION (continued)					
DEPARTMENT AND COURSE	OPTIONS				
	CONSOLIDATION	STAGGERING COURSES	TRAVELLING TEACHERS	MAINTAIN AT HOME SCHOOL AS BASIC	COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
PHYSICAL EDUCATION					
Frosh		Not feasible for PE		✓	May eliminate PE requirement for 12 and possibly 11. Could reduce to intramurals.
Soph/Jr/Sr				✓	
Age Exempt				✓	
PE Modified				✓	
PE Sub				✓	
PE Sports				✓	
SCIENCE					
Adv. General Sci.					*Could consolidate the lower level sciences into a single course. Maintain as quality a program as possible.
Life Science				✓	
Earth Science *		✓			
Physical Science		✓			
Biology				✓	
Human Biology		✓		✓	
Chemistry		✓			
Physics		✓			
AP Biology		✓			
SOCIAL STUDIES					
World Studies I, II, III				✓	
U.S. History				✓	
Government				✓	
Psychology		✓			
Economics		✓			Could open to juniors to increase population
IR		✓			
Anthropology		✓			
SAFETY ED				✓	May be out of our hands if state legislature withdraws funds
WORK EXPERIENCE				✓	
EDUCATIONALLY HANDICAPPED	✓			✓	

WORKSHEET D

MINIMUM CURRICULUM OF PROTOTYPICAL HIGH SCHOOL

ART DEPARTMENT

General Art
Two Dimensional, Beg. & Adv. (Fr. Hnd. Dr., Cartooning, Fine Art, Photog., etc.)
Three Dimensional, Beg. & Adv. (Ceram., Jewel., Crafts, etc.)

BUSINESS EDUC. DEPARTMENT

Typing, Beg. & Adv.
Shorthand, Beg. & Adv.
Accounting, Beg. & Adv.
Off. Prac./Best Wk. Exper.
Business Law
Business Math
Reading/Typing *
Typing/Rec. Keeping
Personal Typing
Bus. Leadership
Consumer Ec.
Business Eng.

CONSUMER HOME ECON. DEPT.

Clothing, Beg. & Adv.
Foods, Beg. & Adv.
Survival/Living Skills (inc. Ch. Dev./Parenting)
Fashion Merchandising
Interior Design
On Your Own *
Textile Arts
Feast

ENGLISH DEPARTMENT

English 1, 2, 3 (Rem., Reg., AS)
English 4** (Rem., Reg. and AP)
Reading
Drama, Beg. & Adv.
Yearbook
Journalism, Beg. & Adv.
Speech, Beg. & Adv.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPT.

French (I, II and III)
German (I, II and III)
Spanish (I, II and III)
French (IV and V)
German (IV and V)
Spanish (IV and V) *
Italian
Latin
Japanese

INDUSTRIAL ARTS DEPARTMENT

Basic Ind. Arts
Drafting, Beg. & Adv.
Metal, Beg. & Adv.
Wood, Beg. & Adv.
Auto
Plastics
Tech. Illus. *
Machine Shop
Intro. Electronics

MATH DEPARTMENT

Basic Math (Lab)
General Math (Pre-Alg.)
Algebra .5, 1.0, 1
Geometry
Algebra II
Advanced Math
AP Math
Computer Prob. *
Calculus
Consumer Math

SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

Gen. Science
Biology
Chemistry
Physics
Human Biol.
Adv. Biol.
Environ. Physics *
Adv. Gen. Sci.

SOCIAL STUDIES DEPT.

World Studies, 1,2,3
U.S. History
Gov't.
Electives

DRIVER SAFETY EDUC.

* Beyond minimum, but desirable.

WORKSHEET E

PROJECTION TABLE

Number of Class Sections Projected by Departments
For a Composite High School in the Sequoia District

ART DEPARTMENT	(1750) 1979-80	(1390) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
General Art	0	0	0	0
Two Dimensional, Beg. & Adv. (Fr. Hnd. Dr., Cartooning, Fine Art, Photog., etc.)	8	6	6	5
Three Dimensional, Beg. & Adv. (Ceram., Jewel., Crafts, etc.)	6	5	4	3
	14	11	10	8

BUSINESS EDUC. DEPARTMENT

Typing, Beg. & Adv.	9	8	7	6
Shorthand, Beg. & Adv.	1	1?	1*(0)	1*(0)
Accounting, Beg. & Adv.	3	2	1	1
Off. Prac./Best	5	3	3	3
Wk. Exper.	5	5*(4)	5*(4)	5*(3)
Business Law Business Math Reading/Typing Typing/Rec. Keeping Personal Typing Bus. Leadership Consumer Econ. Business Eng.	3	3	3	2
	26	22	20	18

*? To maintain the minimum offering in Shorthand and accommodate anticipated enrollment in Work Experience, .2 of a teacher over ratio must be "bought" in 1982-83, .4 in 1985-86, and .6 in 1988-89.

CONSUMER HOME ECON. DEPT.

Clothing, Beg. & Adv.	3	2	2	2
Foods, Beg. & Adv.	5	4	4	3
Survival/Living Skills (inc. Ch. Dev./Parenting)	1	1?	1*(0)	1*(0)
Fashion Merchand. Interior Design On Your Own Textile Arts Feast	3	3	2	2
	12	10	9	8

*? To maintain the minimum offering of Survival/Living Skills, .2 of a teacher over ratio would have to be "bought" in 1985-86 and 1988-89; that .2 may also have to be bought in 1982-83.

WORKSHEET E

ENGLISH DEPARTMENT*	(1750) 1979-80	(1390) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
English 1, 2, 3 (Rem., Reg., AS)	50	41	36	28
English 4** (Rem., Reg. and AP)	4	6	6	5
Reading	12	10	8	7
Drama, Beg. & Adv.	3	2	1	1***(0)
Yearbook	1	1***(0)	1***(0)	1***(0)
Journalism, Beg. & Adv.	1	1***(0)	1***(0)	1***(0)
Speech, Beg. & Adv.	1	1***(0)	1***(0)	1***(0)
	72	62	54	44

* No attempt has been made in English or any other department to isolate bi-lingual classes; they are accounted for in the total counts.

** As shown, English 4 represents a series of courses at the 4th year, not necessarily English 4 as traditionally thought of. Although enrollment decreases, 4th year English sections begin to increase in '82-'83 due to the 4th year University of California requirement and recycling necessary because of failures in competencies (course minimum objectives tests).

*** To maintain the minimum offerings of Yearbook, Journalism, and Speech, .6 teacher over ratio would have to be "bought" in 1982-83, .6 teacher over in 1985-86, and .8 teacher over in 1988-89.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPARTMENT				
French (I, II, and III)	6	5	4	4
German (I, II, and III)	3	2	2	2*(1)
Spanish (I, II, and III)	13	10	9	9
French (IV and V) German (IV and V) Spanish (IV and V) Italian Latin Japanese	2	2	2	2*(0)
	24	19	17	17

* One section, or .2 of a teacher over ratio, must be "bought" in German in 1988-89 to provide 1 section of German I and 1 section of German II-III. To maintain advanced language offerings in two languages, .4 of a teacher over ratio must be "bought" in 1988-89.

WORKSHEET E

INDUSTRIAL ARTS DEPARTMENT

	(1750) 1979-80	(1380) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
Basic Ind. Arts	3	2	2	2
Drafting, Beg. & Adv.	3	2	2	1
Metal, Beg. & Adv.	2	2	2	1
Wood, Beg. & Adv.	2	2	1	1
Auto Plastics Tech. Illus. Machine Shop Intro. Electronics *	1	1	1	1
	11	9	8	6

* This portion of the list does not include 15 district courses located at one or more schools.

MATH DEPARTMENT

	(1750) 1979-80	(1380) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
Basic Math (Math Lab)	6	5	5	4
General Math (Pre-Alg.)	7	6	5	4
Algebra .5, 1.0, I	15	12	10	9
Geometry	8	6	6	5
Algebra II	5	4	4	3
Advanced Math	3	2	2	2*(1)
AP Math Computer Prob. Calculus Consumer Math	2	2	2*(1)	2*(0)
	46	37	34	29

* To maintain advanced and specialized math sections, .2 of a teacher over ratio must be "bought" in 1985-86 and .6 in 1988-89.

MUSIC DEPARTMENT

	(1750) 1979-80	(1380) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
Choral, Beg & Adv.	2	2*(1)	2	2*(1)
Instrum. Group, Beg. & Adv.	2	2	2*(1)	2*(1)
Instrum. Individ., Beg. & Adv.	1	1	1	1
	5	5	5	5

* To maintain a viable minimum music offering, .2 teacher over ratio must be "bought" in 1982-83, 1985-86, and .4 over in 1988-89.

P. E. DEPARTMENT

	(1750) 1979-80	(1380) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
P.E. 9th, 10th, 11th	38	30	27	23
P.E. 12th	9	3*	3*	2*
	47	33	30	25

* These section numbers are calculated at 1/3 of the seniors continuing optional P.E. in '82-'83 and 1/2 in '85-'86 and '88-'89.

WORKSHEET E

SCIENCE DEPARTMENT*	(1750) 1979-80	(1390) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
Gen. Science	9	8	8	7
Biology	9	7	6	5
Chemistry	4	3	3	2
Physics	3	2	2	2**(1)
Human Biol. Adv. Biol. Environ. Physics Adv. Gen. Sci.	3	2	1	1
	28	22	20	17

* This list does not include 5 district classes in Science.

** Physics was maintained at 1 section higher than ratio for scheduling; .4 teacher over ratio would be needed, therefore, in 1988-89.

SOCIAL STUDIES DEPARTMENT				
World Studies 1, 2, 3	27	22	19	17
U.S. History	14	11	10	9
Gov't.	6	5	4	3
Electives	4	3	3	2
	51	41	36	31
DRIVER/SAFETY EDUCATION	8	7	6	5

District Classes	(1790) 1979-80	(1390) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
Science and Ind. Arts Sections	20	16	14	11
No. of Teachers	4.0	3.2	2.4	2.2
Salary/fringe Cost	$117,500	$109,993	$101,592	$114,268
Special Education				
No. of Sections	14	20*	18	14
No. of Teachers	2.8	4.0	3.6	2.8
Salary/fringe Costs	$82,300	$137,492	$152,388	$145,432

* The rise in 1982-83 is due to the population served and staffing requirements under the new Special Education Master Plan, SB 1870. Population served rises to 10%; staffing ratios average 7 to 1. Special funding is provided under SB 1870; therefore, in 1982-83 as much as 95% of the salary and fringe (?) costs are expected to be assumed by the state. The law SB 1870 sunsets in 1985 so funding by the state must be considered uncertain after that year.

WORKSHEET F

SUMMARY TABLE

Number of Class Sections Projected for a Composite High School in the Sequoia District

	Number of Class Sections *			
	(1750) 1979-80	(1390) 1982-83	(1225) 1985-86	(1000) 1988-89
Art	14	11	10	8
Business Education	26	22	20	18
Consumer Hmk.	12	10	9	8
English	72	62	54	44
Foreign Language	24	19	17	17
Industrial Arts	11	9	8	6
Math	46	37	34	29
Music	5	5	5	5
Physical Educ.	47	33	30	25
Driver/Safety Educ.	8	7	6	5
Science	28	22	20	17
Social Studies	51	41	36	31
Total No. of Sections	344	278	249	213

Estimates of the Number of Sections Required Based on Projected Enrollments

	1979-80	1982-83	1985-86	1988-89
Projected Enrollments	1750	1390	1225	1000
Total Class Enrollments, Based on 5.6 Cl./St.	9800	7784	6860	5600
No. of Class Sections Needed, Based on 28.5 Students per Class	344	273	241	196
No. of Additional Class Sections Needed for the Proposed School	0	+5	+8	+17

*These sections do not include EH, EMR, SED, or District Commute Classes

WORKSHEET G: AVERAGE SIZE OF HIGH SCHOOLS IN THE DISTRICT PROJECTED THROUGH YEAR +9 AND COMPARED SCHOOL PLANT CAPACITY

YEAR	TOTAL ENROLLMENT	TOTAL CAPACITY	FIVE SCHOOLS		FOUR SCHOOLS	THREE SCHOOLS
			AVERAGE CAPACITY	AVERAGE ENROLLMENT	AVERAGE ENROLLMENT	AVERAGE ENROLLMENT
-4	10,646	11,937	2,387	2,129		
-3	10,337	NA	NA	2,087		
-2	9,810	NA	NA	1,962		
-1	9,418	9,748	1,950	1,884		
now	8,743	9,156	1,831	1,749		
+1	8,148	8,476	1,695	1,630		
+2	7,588	8,191	1,638	1,518	1,897	2,529
+3	6,960	8,191	1,638	1,392	1,740	2,320
+4	6,511	8,191	1,638	1,302	1,628	2,170
+5	6,236	8,191	1,638	1,253	1,566	2,088
+6	5,962	8,191	1,638	1,192	1,491	1,987
+7	5,539	8,191	1,638	1,108	1,385	1,846
+8	5,141	8,191	1,638	1,028	1,285	1,714
+9	4,815	8,191	1,638	963	1,204	1,605

All enrollments and capacity figures exclude students in the self-contained special education classes.

PART C:2. A METHOD OF PROJECTING ENROLLMENTS IN COURSE OFFERINGS AT THE HIGH SCHOOL

Part C:1 described and chronicled a fact-finding and analysis procedure for identifying the impact of enrollment decline on high school course offerings. The impact occurs and there is "a problem" precisely because the high school curriculum has become so highly differentiated. In this respect, it may not be enough to know that, in the aggregate, a certain lower level of enrollments begins to create diseconomies of scale that threaten the integrity of a given range of course offerings. Planning also requires data about projected enrollments by subject and program.

One method for gathering such data can be found on pages 64-65 of a recent (Bussard and Green, 1981) National Institute of Education handbook, Planning for Decline in Single High School Districts. This "recipe," reprinted in full, is as follows.

EXHIBIT 7B: BASIC DATA -- ENROLLMENT AND STAFF PROJECTION BY PROGRAM

Basic data for the high school -- comparable to building utilization figures, and student/staff ratios by grade level at the elementary level -- are enrollment and staff projections by broad program area.

Collection of enrollment and staff figures by subject or program area for the last five years, and projection of those figures for the next five years, is the best way to test what the impact would be *if* business were to continue as usual.

Identify broad programs and subject areas -- such as art, science, guidance, foreign language. (One reason for using this is that subject areas usually correspond to teacher certification categories.) Collect total enrollment figures at all high school grades in all courses in each area. For example, under "science," total the enrollment in all science courses -- earth science, biology, chemistry, ninth-grade science, etc. Figure the total staff

(continued on next page)

SOURCE: Bussard and Green (1981). Planning for Decline in Single High School Districts. National Institute of Education, pages 64-66, permission pending.

for each program, based on full-time equivalence (full teaching staff load = 1 FTE). In a large district, this information may already be routinely collected by the district planning office. In a small district with minimal central office support, the high school principal may have to dig the information out of teacher assignment files.

Figure out program enrollment as a percentage of total enrollment for high school grades (9-12, 10-12, or 8-12, whatever you have) for the last five years. Then look at this "market share," so to speak. Has there been a trend either toward an increasing proportion of students in this program, or a decreasing proportion? If so, compute the average yearly change of percentage enrollment over the five-year period.

To project program enrollment for the next five years, multiply the average percentage, or the changing proportion, by the total high school enrollment projections for each of the next five years.

FOR EXAMPLE: IF ENROLLMENT IN ART HAS AVERAGED ABOUT 40% FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS, THEN MULTIPLY THE TOTAL BASE ENROLLMENT PROJECTED FOR EACH OF THE NEXT FIVE YEARS BY 40%. IF ENROLLMENT IN ART HAS BEEN DROPPING AN AVERAGE OF 2% A YEAR, AND THIS YEAR STANDS AT 40%, THEN MULTIPLY THE TOTAL BASE ENROLLMENT PROJECTED FOR EACH OF THE NEXT FIVE YEARS BY 38%, 36%, 34%, 32% AND 30%, RESPECTIVELY.

Then looking at the staffing ratios (program enrollment/program staff FTE) for the last five years apply the average ratio (or this year's) to the projected program enrollment figures. This will give you an estimate of staff needs in each major program area.* You might also want to use current school board policy on student/staff ratios to arrive at a staff needs estimate.

This basic information will provide initial guidance on future impacts of high school enrollment decline, if programs continue as they are now. It will give you a good idea of which program areas are "in jeopardy," how many teachers would be needed in each area, and how many students would be affected by termination of a program.

This information is of course rough, but it is a good starting place for planning. It will do the job of letting you know if, and when, high school enrollment decline will require change from business as usual.

(continued on next page)

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* It is also possible to do the same kind of projection at a finer scale, projecting individual course enrollment as a percentage of program enrollment. This might be desired in some area, such as foreign language, where you might want to focus on individual languages and where faculty is not interchangeable among languages. The smaller the numbers, though, the less reliable the projection.

SECTION SEVEN PART C:2

Preliminary development of this information should be enough to create a sense of urgency, to support a public statement by the board of education, and to justify formal development of a planning team approach to investigating enrollment decline and plans for the future. This information should be publicized in the community.

The sample below, appearing on page 65 of Planning for Decline in Single High School Districts, depicts how the worksheets used in the procedure described above would look.



Program ART

	Past (Current year –)					Current Year	Projected (Current year +)				
	CY-5 1975	CY-4 1976	CY-3 1977	CY-2 1978	CY-1 1979	1980	CY+1 1981	CY+2 1982	CY+3 1983	CY+4 1984	CY+5 1985
Total High School Enrollment (Grades 9 to 12)	997	992	983	977	950	937	880	790	730	690	665
Total Program Enrollment	488	466	432	420	399	375	[1] 334	284	248	221	200
Program Enrollment ÷ Total H.S. Enrollment	49%	47%	44%	43%	42%	40%	38%	36%	34%	32%	30%
Program Enrollment ÷ Program Staff	108.4	103.5	108	105	100	107.2	110	110	110	110	110
Program Staff (FTE)*	4.5	4.5	4	4	4	3.5	[2] 3	2.6	2.3	2	1.8

*FTE Based on full teaching load of 5 class sections @ [illegible] students

1 Program Enrollment Projection Based on:

☐ Average program enrollment/total enrollment, past 6 years = ______

☑ Average change in program enrollment/total enrollment, past 6 years = 2% Decline

☐ Other ______

2 Program Staff Projection Based on:

☐ Average program enrollment/program staff, past 6 years = ______

☑ Current school board policy on program enrollment/program staff = 110 (5 class sections @ 22 students)

☐ Current year ratio program enrollment/program staff = ______

☐ Other ______

Special Assumptions:

Decrease in percentage of art enrollment appears to reflect shift towards vocational courses. Projection assumes this decline will continue.

PART C:3. CURRICULUM PRESERVATION AT THE HIGH SCHOOL: A CATALOG OF SUGGESTIONS

In this section we continue with our focus upon the high school level. Chart 7C at the end of this subsection represents a compendium of advice and suggestions -- a policy catalog -- for dealing with the threats posed by reduced scale to the curriculum. The problem is essentially this: As overall enrollments decline there are not enough "bodies" to support the highly differentiated curriculum typical of the high school. Certain courses become consistently underenrolled and difficult to justify because lower enrollment also means lower revenues based on state aid tied to number of pupils. The result: Students in declining enrollment high schools face fewer opportunities -- for electives and for advanced courses -- than did their counterparts four or eight years ago when increasing enrollments made possible greater growth and differentiation of a curriculum.

The challenge is how to preserve the content of a highly differentiated curriculum when low-course enrollments and faculty reductions threaten to eliminate the courses which used to deliver that content. As noted by Dembowski, et al. (1981:95*):

> Clearly districts with declining enrollment cannot continue to teach the same number of courses as they did prior to the onset of the decline. Yet they must not deprive students completely of opportunities to receive a broad-based comprehensive education and to develop their individual interests and talents.

Exhibit 7B, on the next page, uses a school music program as an illustrative case to show various strategies for preserving opportunities for individual talents and interests.

It is also worthwhile to reconsider what it is that is at risk in decreasing enrollment high schools. The "what" is a highly differentiated curriculum, which is a product of history and of a particular way of looking at the

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* As we saw in Part B, Dembowski is the author of the most comprehensive nationwide study of the impact of decline on curriculum.

EXHIBIT 7B: SUMMARY OF STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH HIGH SCHOOL DECLINE

This list comes from the only (to our knowledge) and certainly the best extant handbook on coping with high school decline. Here is a summary listing of its nine strategic suggestions.*

[1] Relax, and approach normality. Already more qualified students want to be in band and orchestra than you can accomodate. So with fewer students, you'll be able to take a larger percentage, and will have greater participation.

[2] Make changes within the existing school structure. With declining enrollment in a few years, you won't be able to "field" a full orchestra or band. So, instead of pushing big ensembles, you'll shift gears to small ensemble work and emphasize instruments that can be played in smaller groups. You will have to go to a part-time teacher.

[3] Reorganize district grade structure. By bringing the ninth grade into the high school, you will be able to have a full orchestra.

[4] Share programs/services/staff with other school districts directly. You co-sponsor an orchestra and band with another high school. In fact the same teacher works with students in each district part-time, and everybody gathers at one school (or alternately each week) for large practices twice a week.

[5] Share programs/services/staff with other school districts through a regional consortium or educational service agency. Neighboring districts don't want to have joint orchestras. But you're a member of a regional consortium and some of the other districts have the same problem. The consortium decides to sponsor an orchestra. So, those of your students who want orchestra go to a central campus for practice sessions.

[6] Consolidation. By consolidating two high schools you've got enough students to make an orchestra, and have a full-time music program. The only question is which music teacher to keep.

[7] Widen or redefine clientele. Since you've got the instruments and you need more players, you choose to let anybody in the community who wants to study an instrument borrow it for lessons, practice, and join the orchestra. You may even move rehearsal time to evenings. In effect, you're creating a community orchestra, with a core of high school students.

[8] Work cooperatively with colleges and universities. Some of your advanced students join the orchestra of a local college.

[9] Work cooperatively with other community agencies, businesses and individuals. Maybe there already is a community orchestra and your students join that. Practice sessions are held in the high school.

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* SOURCE: BUSSARD, E. and GREEN, A.C. (1981). Planning for Enrollment Decline in Single High School Districts. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, National Institute of Education, pp. 38-39.

curriculum. (See Exhibit 7C for a summary of how different orientations to the curriculum are correlated with different approaches to cutback management.) What is threatened is not curriculum itself, but a particular kind of curriculum, which stems from certain policy or value choices.

Perhaps a market analogy will help. The school is the producer; its students are the consumers. The choice to have a highly differentiated curriculum creates an array of course offerings and staff assignments which can be thought of as the "supply." The number of students available to take such courses and their "consumer choices" in enrolling in one program or course rather than another can be called the "demand." The effect of enrollment decline is reduced demand relative to supply; the problem is how to preserve the educationally valuable supply in the face of decreased consumer demand leading to marginal utility considerations dictating cutbacks in courses. Offering Latin IV when only five students in two years have chosen to take it does not justify assigning a staff and time slot, even though for those students the educational experience may be invaluable -- marginal utility does not apply to them.

This market analogy is useful in that it highlights the "excess capacity" problem facing the declining high school in a way analogous to the excess problem at the elementary level. In the latter, excess is defined in terms of space and staff; in the former it is defined in terms of course offerings and staff. In each case, it is economics that makes the situation a problem. If it was economically possible to have elementary classrooms of ten pupils per teacher, and if it was economically possible to consistently have high school courses with as few as five students, there would be no problem since there is nothing pedagogically harmful in such small class sections.

The market analogy provides a convenient framework for sorting out the range of curriculum preservation options as presented in the literature summarized in Chart 7B on page 359, and as presented in Chart 7C, the "policy catalog" at the end of this subsection. The various options can be seen in terms of types of responses to the problem of over-supply (existing curriculum) relative to consumer demand (overall enrollments) and consumer choice

EXHIBIT 7C: OPTIONS IN CURRICULUM CUTBACKS AND CONSOLIDATION

A 1979 University of Nebraska handbook offers the following different ways of thinking about the curriculum and cutbacks.

Approach #1. Not All Disciplines Are Equal: Amputate Selected Programs. A school district may decide that the fine arts and music programs ...should be deleted. The problem with this approach is that for particular students, these programs are the most important in the curriculum. The fine arts and music are particularly vulnerable because they are typically more expensive, on a per-student enrolled basis, than the verbal disciplines such as English and social science and have not typically been required courses.

Approach #2. All of the Disciplines are Equal: Trim Each Program and Reduce Offerings in Each Program or Department. This could mean that low enrollment classes, such as advanced mathematics and advanced foreign languages, would be cut. It could also involve reducing the number of elective courses in departments such as English and the social sciences. Reducing electives seems less detrimental to the curriculum than eliminating advanced courses because the content from the electives could be combined in the remaining courses.

Approach #3. All the Disciplines are Equal, But Should Not Cost the Same: Allocate Resources Based on Unique Needs of a Program. Programs cost widely varying amounts of money. Decisions regarding class size and materials need not be uniform for each department in a school district and should be based on the objectives of the program and what is known from research in teaching a particular subject... It is possible to make the teacher/student ratios variable depending upon the subject being taught, the course objectives, and the nature of the student population. To insist dogmatically on a minimum number of students per teacher is not defensible economically or educationally without considering other variables. This may prove to be a very promising option, relative to reducing instructional costs, as more is learned about the relationships of class size to mastering specific learning tasks in a variety of disciplines.

Approach #4. The Formal Disciplines Are Not Necessarily Separate: Combine Programs. An innovation of the past, core curriculum or interdisciplinary studies, focused on combining disciplines to assist students in integrating learning from each discipline. These programs are still in existence, particularly in middle and junior high schools. Subjects which are most frequently combined are English and social studies, as well as science and mathematics. This approach, if carried out systematically, could be a positive one through providing an integrated approach for students and more efficiency in the personnel budget for some schools.

SOURCE: WENDEL (1979). *Maintaining Quality Education in the Face of Declining Resources. Briefings in Education Resources Issue No. 2.* University of Nebraska at Lincoln, p. 28.

(what courses are chosen by students). For example:

Response No. 1: Bring supply and demand into equilibrium by reducing consumer choice. This recognizes that over-supply is partly caused by the exercise of consumer choice, and that fewer overall consumers reduces the probability some students will choose a given course enabling it to continue to be offered. The options under this category "solve" the problem by redefining it away. For instance, this response uses enrollment decline as an opportunity to move towards a less diversified core curriculum -- valuable content and courses are filled by increasing the core requirements for graduation or making elective and advanced courses required rather than optional.

Response No. 2: Create more demand in order to fit and preserve supply. In this category of response, the objective is to maintain the currently differentiated curriculum and its delivery -- given the courses and teachers -- by increasing the overall numbers of consumers. Examples include: consolidating high school facilities; re-organizing grades so that more grades (e.g., 9-12, or even 7-12) and pupils are in the high schools, combining high school and adult education course offerings, pairing two high schools with cross-campus registration in electives and advanced courses for which neither school plan along has enough enrollment to justify offering, creating consolidated district-level courses and having interdistrict consolidated courses.

Response No. 3: Reorganize the delivery of supply in order to meet and fit lower levels of demand. Options under this category seek to preserve the content but not necessarily the organization of a pre-existing highly differentiated curriculum. They are most appropriate when consolidation (of school sites, or of courses across school sites, or even districts) is neither possible nor desirable and when fiscal pressures necessitate having a more streamlined faculty and course catalog at the high school.

Policy options under this category of responses meet Dembowski's challenge to "offer students the same opportunities even with fewer courses" and to "stop thinking of curricular offerings simply in terms of one time slot, one room, and one teacher per 15 - 25 students interested in a particular subject" (1981: 656-657). Examples include: having a more modularized curriculum with more mini-courses for shorter lengths of time, offering independent study options, having itinerant faculty for subjects with low per-building course enrollments; using televised/video-taped lectures providing content even when each individual school cannot afford to have such a teacher; and integrating the content of a previously differentiated split level -- i.e., core requirements vs. electives -- curriculum by a set of core interdisciplinary courses which integrate the content of the courses which separately could no longer be offered because of enrollment decline.

CHART 7B: AN OVERVIEW OF TYPES OF STRATEGIES FOR PRESERVING THE HIGH SCHOOL CURRICULUM (PLEASE SEE CHART 7C, BELOW, FOR A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE OPTIONS, WITH EXAMPLES AND REFERENCES)

RESPONSE NO. 1: BRING SUPPLY AND DEMAND INTO PLAY	RESPONSE NO. 2: CREATE MORE DEMAND IN ORDER TO FIT AND PRESERVE SUPPLY	RESPONSE NO. 3: REORGANIZE AND PRESERVE SUPPLY TO MEET AND FIT LOWER LEVELS OF DEMAND
A. Reform the curriculum by reducing diversity. ● increase core-curriculum requirements ● Make elective courses into required courses	B. Consolidate high school plants. C. Reorganize grade structure, i.e., move from 10-12 to 9-12, or even 7-12 high schools. D. Consolidate course offerings. ● Combine H.S. and adult ed. courses on same topics ● Pair H.S. and consolidate low-enrolled courses ● Create district-level courses ● Consider interdistrict sharing and create inter-district courses	E. Modularize the curriculum. ● Offer low-enrolled courses in alternate years ● Create more mini-courses ● Combine compatible course offerings in one room at the same time ● Offer more lecture and more independent study options ● Use itinerant teachers for low-enrollment courses ● Use technology to offer content even if you cannot afford a teacher, for that course F. Re-organize the curriculum so as to preserve content of a diversified curriculum within basic interdisciplinary courses.

CHART 7C: A CATALOG OF SUGGESTIONS FOR PRESERVING THE CURRICULUM IN TIMES OF ENROLLMENT DECLINE AT THE HIGH SCHOOL LEVEL (AS FOUND IN THE PUBLISHED AND "FUGITIVE" LITERATURES)

SPECIFIC STRATEGY/ SUGGESTION	DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION: EXAMPLES AND TRADE-OFFS	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE
RESPONSE NO. 1: BRING SUPPLY AND DEMAND INTO EQUILIBRIUM BY REDUCING CONSUMER CHOICE		
A. "Reform" the curriculum by reducing diversity.	Strengthen core requirements, make educationally valuable electives into requirements. Note: this "solves" the problem by redefining it away. It is in tune with current trends towards a more unified core curriculum, but it does not address the fiscal decline problem.	Connecticut, Amity (1982); Bussard and Green, 1981:15; Morgan and Wofford, 1977:78
RESPONSE NO. 2: CREATE MORE DEMAND IN ORDER TO FIT AND PRESERVE SUPPLY		
B. Consolidate high school plants.	Classic strategy for resolving the dis-economies of reduced scale. Can create the critical mass necessary to offer and preserve electives and advanced courses. Note: option not available to single high school districts; for others closure is apt to be as politically controversial as elementary school closure.	The most detailed and exhaustive discussion of the educational considerations in closure/consolidation can be found in all references for "California, Sequoia Union H.S. District..." See also Section Seven, Part B and the Appendix.
C. Reorganize grade structure.	Move from a 10-12 to 9-12, or 7-12 secondary school structure. Note: this will fill under-enrolled courses but not necessarily at the advanced level. There may be community opposition to having 7th and 12th graders in one building. Option is most feasible where junior and senior H.S. share the same campus.	Bussard and Green, 1981: 17-19; Michigan, Birmingham, 1980:12

CHART 7C: A CATALOG OF SUGGESTIONS (continued)

SPECIFIC STRATEGY/ SUGGESTION	DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION: EXAMPLES AND TRADE-OFFS	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE
RESPONSE NO. 2 (continued)		
D. Consolidate course offerings.	Combine relevant courses with similar content with existing adult ed. courses.	Bussard and Green, 1981: 17; California, Sequoia, 1981:19
	Pair high schools and consolidate low-enrolled courses courses.	Illinois, Aurora West, 1980:18; Michigan, Jackson
	Create district-level courses taken by all high school students who wish to enroll. Note: logistics of transportation and scheduling may be difficult. Also a 1981 study committee report from the Sequoia Union H.S. District (in California) asks, "Will students and parents in sufficient numbers accept the concept of a district orchestra, drama, or industrial arts program in lieu of their traditional school orchestra, drama, or industrial arts program? If not, offering these programs at one site, as opposed to five, could accelerate the demise of the program rather than prolong its life. Transportation problems and a lack of identity with the district program could discourage enrollment in a consolidated program. A survey which questions the receptiveness of parents and students to this proposal should be undertaken before courses are consolidated at one school."	Bussard and Green, 1981: 15; California, Sequoia, 1981:18
	Inter-district sharing: consolidate under-enrolled courses among districts. Note: logistical problems and transportation problems are compounded with this option.	Bussard and Green, 1981: 15 and 49; Olson, 1979;

CHART 7C: A CATALOG OF SUGGESTIONS (continued)

SPECIFIC STRATEGY/ SUGGESTION	DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION: EXAMPLES AND TRADE-OFFS	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE
Response No. 3: Reorganize and preserve supply in order to meet and fit lower levels of demand. Note: These options are particularly appropriate for single-high school districts and for districts in which consolidation of facilities or course offerings is not possible or desirable, and there is no philosophical support for a more unified less differentiated curriculum, and inter-district sharing is not possible.		
E. Modularize the curriculum: through more flexible and creative scheduling.	Offer low-enrolled courses in alternative years. Note: some continuity is lost. Removing the course from the curriculum for a year could seriously reduce student interest in the program.	Bussard and Green, 1981: 15; California, Sequoia, 1981:20
	Create more mini-courses. This makes it possible to serve student needs, where the number of students is too small to justify a regular semester course. But staff load increases, as does scheduling complexity. Combine compatible courses into one-room -- at the same time: e.g., two science courses, biology and chemistry labs can be combined, French 2, 3, & 4 or "jewelry" and "ceramics" or other arts classes can be combined. Note: this is time and space efficient, but very labor intensive, increasing the per-pupil number of preparations per teacher.	Bussard and Green, 1981: 17; Dembowski, et al., 1981:97
	Change notion of class: vary offerings including lectures, classes, small group discussions and independent study. This option introduces the college and university model into the high school.	Bussard and Green, 1981: 15-17; Dembowski, et al., 1981:95; California Sequoia Union H.S. District, 1981:18

CHART 7C: A CATALOG OF SUGGESTIONS (continued)

SPECIFIC STRATEGY/ SUGGESTION	DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION: EXAMPLES AND TRADE-OFFS	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE
Response No. 3 (continued)		
E. Modularize the curriculum (continued)	Note: More variation in the ways in which course offerings may require changes in facilities and space -- rooms may need to be subdivided for small group or ind. study settings, walls may need to be knocked down for lecture space; auditoriums/theatres/cafeterias normally used for extra- and co-curricular activities can become settings for instruction.	Bussard and Green, 1981: 49
	Note: For independent study, such procedures via "learning packages" and "individual contracts" could allow the content of some courses, in danger of being eliminated, to survive. But "there would be some initial expense in developing materials..." and "the numbers [of students] in such programs would have to be kept at a manageable level if students were to receive adequate supervision and assistance."	California, Sequoia Union H.S. District, 1981:18
	Continue the course offering even if it is too expensive to maintain a teacher for that offering at a school site by: -- having itinerant teachers. Note: this extends the elementary school model of itinerant "specialists" to the H.S. level. It also is the reverse of the consolidation of courses options -- instead of pupils going to the teachers, the teacher goes to the pupils.	California, Sequoia Union H.S. District, 1981:19

CHART 7C: A CATALOG OF SUGGESTIONS (continued)

SPECIFIC STRATEGY/ SUGGESTION	DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION: EXAMPLES AND TRADE-OFFS	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE
Response No. 3 (continued)		
E. Modularize the curriculum (continued)	Continue the course offering (continued) -- Using technology via taped or televised lectures: "A teacher in another school within the same district, another district, another state, or even in an agency outside education can be videotaped as he or she teaches a class. These videotapes can then be used by schools with small enrollments as a relatively inexpensive substitute for a certified teacher. Such tapes can also facilitate individualized instruction, increase interdistrict cooperation, and be easily stored and used repeatedly."	Dembowski, et al., 1981:97
F. Reorganize the curriculum along inter-disciplinary lines so as to preserve the content of electives and advanced courses.	Combine courses so as to introduce the content of under-enrolled (and at risk) courses into stable and growing areas of the curriculum. For example: ● Perhaps "American studies" may replace courses previously identified as U.S. history, literature, music, and art. ● "Communication" may replace language arts and speech. ● "Human behavior studies" might combine sociology, political science, economics, religion, psychology, and philosophy. ● "Aesthetic expressions" might integrate courses traditionally known as composition, drama, music, and literature. ● While offerings in fine arts and foreign languages may be drastically reduced or deleted from school curricula, some of their content could be integrated into other subject areas, such as history, language arts, and cultural studies.	Dembowski, et al., 1981:97

CHART 7C: A CATALOG OF SUGGESTIONS (continued)

SPECIFIC STRATEGY/ SUGGESTION	DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION: EXAMPLES AND TRADE-OFFS	EXAMPLE AND/OR REFERENCE
Response No. 3 (continued)		
F. Reorganize the curriculum (continued)	● Some of the content of social studies and science courses that might otherwise be lost because of declining enrollments could easily be used in the teaching of reading and communication skills.	

PART D:1. CURRICULUM PRESERVATION AND SCHOOL CLOSURE

Ths justification used in closing schools is almost always either: consolidated facilities will improve program offerings and services; or closure of underutilized and, hence, inefficient facilities is necessary in order to avoid sinking monies into plant maintenance that would otherwise be better spent to avoid cutbacks in program.

The response of citizen and parent opponents is equally predictable: small schools, although less efficient on paper, have warm, friendly environments; or "show us exactly how closing schools will improve program," or "why close our school -- it has a good program and its pupils are achieving above districtwide averages," or "won't closure produce disruption and discontinuity in children's schooling?"

In this discussion, we will sidestep the heated, voluminous and inconclusive discussion about the pedagogical and humanistic virtues of small vs. large schools. We will, however present examples of local policies which embody the other principles involved in typical disputes about the programmatic and curricular implications of closing schools, namely:

(1) closing schools and minimizing disruption and continuity in learning

(2) using the principle of program choice and diversity as a rationale for closing schools and as a criterion for deciding which schools to close

(3) demonstrating and documenting the program and curricular benefits of closing schools in general, or of specific schools in particular

(4) using educational quality, specifically pupil outcome criteria, in deciding which schools to close.

Together, these examples -- from the Sequoia Union High School District (California), the San Diego (California) Unified Schools, from Lexington (Massachusetts), and from New York City Community District 12, in the Bronx -- respectively, give a sampler of what kinds of local practices embody the educational and curricular decisions in school closure decisions.

CLOSING SCHOOLS AND MINIMIZING DISRUPTION OF LEARNING: SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT IN CALIFORNIA

Fortunately, practitioners have given as much attention to the impact of closure on children's continuity of progress as they have to the political and neighborhood disruption of closure. Exhibit 7D, on the next two pages, gives a summary of the 14 most recommended steps to minimize disruption.

Sequoia's school closure policy and procedure have translated that concern into exemplary, specific action and steps.

POLICY MODEL 7A: TRANSITION AFTER SCHOOL CLOSURE. PROCEDURES FROM THE SEQUOIA (CALIFORNIA) UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT

When school enrollments are determined, each school's budget, staffing and master schedule must be adjusted accordingly. Orientation programs will be held by each school for all students who are affected by the redistricting. These orientation programs will include evaluating the courses taken, developing a schedule at the new school that assures full credit for course work completed at the student's previous school, and assuring that course sequences are maintained. Orientation programs will include a tour of the school, maps, outline of program offerings, and encouragement for the new students to become involved in the school's activities.

A timeline related to the assignment of students is as follows:

DATE	ACTIVITY
1/28/82	School closure decision made by Board of Trustees and attendance boundaries established with home attendance areas identified for each student.
2/1/82	Begin communication with parents and students concerning changes in school assignment.
2/1-26/82	Open enrollment for seniors from closed school.
3/1/82	Begin registration of students for the 1982-83 school year. Begin orientation of all reassigned students

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA, SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT (1981b). "School Closure Recommendations to the Board of Trustees," p. 44.

CLOSING SCHOOLS TO PRESERVE DIVERSITY: SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

As we have seen, at the secondary level, consolidation is most often

EXHIBIT 7D: MITIGATING THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF SCHOOL CLOSURE ON CHILDREN AND PROGRAM: A LIST OF SUGGESTIONS FROM THE LITERATURE

STRATEGY	SPECIFIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN	REFERENCE*
Minimize Disruption	1. Give plenty of warning and delay implementation of the closure decision for one full year	Richards and Cohen, 1981: 96-106
	2. Do not merge with another school which may be closed, or was a candidate for closure	Richards and Cohen, 1981: 96-106
	3. Establish an even ratio of new to old children in the classrooms of the receiving school	Richards and Cohen, 1981: 72
Orient New Pupils and Families to the New Schools	4. Inform parents and students about the receiving schools, providing opportunities to meet the principal and teaching staff, planning teacher-student exchanges in receiving school classrooms for transferring students and parents, and facilitating personal parental contacts by principals of both receiving and transferring schools.	Eismann, et al., 1976:22
	5. Make receiving school personnel assignments as soon as possible after a closure decision to reduce parent, student and staff apprehensions.	Eismann, et al., 1976:22
	6. Hold joint theatrical, art or music productions by two schools.	Bussard, 1981:38
	7. Form a joint parents' organization ahead of time, or provide for merging organizations.	Bussard, 1981:38
	8. Provide for students from the closing school to try out for athletic teams, yearbook or newspaper, or other student activities that select participants the spring before the academic year.	Bussard, 1981:38

* These citations (see the Bibliography in Section Nine, Part A, below) contain useful discussions of transition strategies.

EXHIBIT 7D: (continued)

STRATEGY	SPECIFIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN	REFERENCE
Orientation (continued)	9. Provide transferring students with issues of the school newspaper from the receiving school, ahead of time. This newspaper may include background biographies of the students, or the teachers, and some general information about student activities and programs in the new school.	AASA, 1974:22-24
Preserve Continuity of Program	10. Assuring that special programs offered to students at one school will be continued at the receiving school.	Eismann, et al., 1976:22
	11. Honor requests by receiving and closure school staff members for transfers to another school in so far as possible, so that an accepting enrivonment is maintained.	
	12. Require a student program record card for each student in the district. These cards list the materials the child has used and the progress achieved. When the child moves to a new school the program card will move with him.	AASA, 1974:18
	13. Move materials and teachers to the same new school as the child.	
	14. Feed-in transitional programs should be instituted when similar reading or math programs do not exist in the new school.	

justified by the need to maintain enough enrollment to maintain a diversified curriculum. At the elementary level, the value of choice is most often expressed as some rule which requires that a school have some minimum number of classrooms per grade level. For example: every school should have at least three classes for every two grades (Arlington, Virginia); or for elementary schools, there should be at least 50 students per grade level, thus ensuring at least two different classrooms for each grade (Montgomery County, Maryland, Public Schools).

Such decision rules identify small schools for closure. The rationale is typically two-fold -- first, some choice of teachers is vital so that when necessary pupils can be placed in environments conducive to their growth; and second, the absence of two or more teachers teaching at the same level inhibits staff sharing and cooperation.

In moving toward a similar policy of flagging schools too small to allow for choice and diversity in classroom placement, the San Diego Unified School District developed a series of handouts which are exemplary in their simplicity and graphic description of what happens to choice as schools get too small.

The handouts taken from "The Elementary School Comparison Model" in their 1982 Report of the Advisory Committee on Utilization of School Facilities appear on the next three pages. The first page gives enrollment trends for three schools in the district. Page two gives a summary cost breakdown for these three schools. Page three describes the arithmetic behind the claim "very small schools present some problems which affect educational opportunities for students."

CLOSING SCHOOLS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE PROGRAM: LEXINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS*

Background

Throughout the early to mid-1970's, Lexington went through a classic school

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* Georgia Glick, Project Research Associate, did the field work and preliminary analysis upon which this case study is based.

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL COMPARISON MODEL

TEN YEAR ENROLLMENT TRENDS FOR THREE SELECTED SCHOOLS

Figure 1 shows ten year enrollment changes in three S.D.U.S.D. schools. All data are from the June enrollment for the year indicated except for 1982 which shows the January report. Schools B and C were not in existence in 1972. Both opened in 1973 with approximately 300 and 400 students respectively. A new school opened in 1979 and drew students from school B which explains the drop in the enrollment of school B for that year. The K-6 regular enrollment in January 1982 is shown in parenthesis at the end of the line for each school.

The chart illustrates a pattern repeated in a number of schools in the District. School A, once a very large school, had declined to about 650 K-6 regular enrollment by 1972 and has continued to decline since then to 226 in January of this year. Families who purchased homes in that area when it was developed still live there, but their children are no longer of elementary school age. Younger families with school age children are not moving into the area because those who live there are staying, and there are no new developments to provide large numbers of additional housing units. Other nearby schools have experienced similar reductions in enrollment. The result is a general surplus of classrooms in the area.

Figure 1
Enrollment - K-6 Regular



SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
Finance Department
February 2, 1982

ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
GENERAL FUND - GENERAL OPERATIONS
1981-82 BUDGET

	SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 226			SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 521			SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 858		
	Positions	Total Program Cost	Cost Per Pupil	Positions	Total Program Cost	Cost Per Pupil	Positions	Total Program Cost	Cost Per Pupil
INSTRUCTIONAL PROGRAM Teachers and Instructional Supplies	8.00	217 460	962.21	18.00	487 917	936.50	29.00	786 081	916.17
SITE ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM Principal, *Vice Principal, Clerical & Ofc Supplies	2.00	48 725	215.60	2.75	60 555	116.23	4.00*	96 909	112.95
HEALTH SERVICES PROGRAM Nurse & Health Supplies	.20	5 013	22.18	.20	5 038	9.67	.50	12 483	14.55
OPERATIONS PROGRAM Custodians, Custodial Supplies & Utilities	1.50	40 148	177.64	2.25	99 447	190.87	3.25	128 520	149.79
COUNSELING PROGRAM Resource Specialist, Counselors, Guidance Aides	.70	20 709	91.64	1.83	40 632	77.99	2.75	61 089	71.20
TOTAL	12.40	332 055	1,469.27	25.03	693 589	1,331.26	39.50	1 085 082	1,264.66

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*Vice Principal at School Enrollment 858 only.

HN:JT:mc

CLASSROOM ORGANIZATION FOR JANUARY 1982

Very small schools present some problems which affect educational opportunities for students. One of these is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows how teachers and students are assigned at the three schools. Many options are open to the principal in assigning students to classes at School C which has three or four classes at each grade level. It is possible to separate students who have trouble when assigned to the same classroom, break up "cliques" and other considerations which flexibility in assignment to classes can address.

In School A, this flexibility does not exist. Nearly all children must be assigned to a multi-graded class; there is almost no opportunity to move a student "for his own good" or that of his classmates; some students must stay with the same teacher for two or more years; and classroom groups must stay together through all seven years of elementary school.

Figure 3, which shows the current enrollment by grade, indicates that the problem will be aggravated next year and the year after. More than twice as many sixth graders are leaving as Kindergarten students entering first grade. In 1980-81 ten teachers were assigned to K-6 regular classes. This year eight are thus assigned, and at midyear enrollment is low enough to place the school on the borderline of being overstaffed. The trend indicates that the K-6 program will have at most seven, and probably six, classroom teachers in 1982-83.

Figure 2

C	B	A
6	6	6
6	6	6/5
6	6/5	5/4
6	5	5/4
5	5	3/2
5	5/4	2
5	4	1
5	4	K
5/4	3	8
4	3	
4	3	
4	2	
4/3	2	
3	2/1	
3	1	
3	K	
3/2	K	
2	17	
2		
2		
2		
1		
1		
1		
1		
K		
K		
K		
K		
29		

Figure 3
Enrollment by Grade (January 1982)

Grade	School A	B	C
	No. of Students		
6th	51	90	128
5th	41	97	138
4th	36	66	129
3rd	20	84	116
2nd	33	72	116
1st	22	50	111
Kdgn.	23	62	110

closing controversy. Ironically enough, the controversy was first started by a facilities study (1974) designed not to deal with declining enrollments but with the issue of equitable provision of services for children from all parts of this suburb of Boston. The facility study (in the name of equity not retrenchment) recommended closure and phase out of older, smaller schools without the facilities to support the kinds of programs children in the newer, larger buildings enjoyed.

This notion met with predictable opposition. Citizens' study committees were established, and as the debate wore on, the realities of enrollment decline and fiscal austerity intruded into the debate. The fiscal pressure was exacerbated by Massachusetts' "tax cap" limiting local spending to no more than four percent above the previous year's budget.

Opponents of closure did their homework and produced and published an Education Program Study Committee Report, which among other points raised a challenge to the notion that smaller and older schools are necessarily educationally inferior. That Committee's battle with the superintendent was a classic rehearsal of the arguments over school size and quality. The superintendent ultimately prevailed and beginning in 1978, the board closed five out of 14 schools, one in each year.

The reasons employed by the successful superintendent are intriguing. First, they stemmed from his published, point by point, rebuttal of the Program Study Committee Report. That Report took issue with premises and conclusions of the Montgomery County Task Force Report on Small Schools.

The Montgomery County report held that small schools were inherently inefficient because of the higher per pupil costs and increasing ratios of fixed to variable costs, as building size went down. The Lexington Program Study Committee Report rejected the narrow cost-accounting premises of the Montgomery County analysis. Using Lexington data, they stressed the educational school climate benefits of small schools. The superintendent's rebuttal to the Program Study Committee's Report agreed with its rejection of Montgomery County conclusions as being too narrowly economic, but disagreed with its favorable analysis of the educational value of small schools. He argued that on educational grounds small schools were inadequate because they did not provide the diversity of teachers, teaching styles, and programs enjoyed by children in the district's larger schools. Continued maintenance of such facilities, he argued, would create inequality of services and constituted a drain on resources which could otherwise go towards program improvement.*

These points became school district policy and as such established an implicit social contract between the schools and the community, whose terms could be characterized as follows: if small, old popular neighborhood schools are closed, then all children in the community will enjoy the same range of services (equity) and the cost-savings realized through school closure can finance program improvements, including those recommended by the citizens' study group opposing school closure (efficiency).

More specifically, the superintendent's case against small, older schools and for specific school closures revolved around the following specific points:

(1) Small schools do not provide for the instruction in elementary art, music and French by resident teachers in designated classrooms for those subjects.

(2) There are limited choices in terms of teachers and teaching methods.

(3) Smaller schools are less able to effectively group and concentrate services for children with special needs.

(4) There is a reduced range of contacts with peers for both students and teachers.

(5) Itinerancy means less effective use of specialists.

(6) Small schools reduce flexibility in scheduling.

(7) The higher maintenance costs of old schools means sinking money into old "bricks and mortar" instead of spending it on program improvements recommended by the Educational Program Study Committee, whose specific and concrete recommendations included:

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* The key documents in the case are: The Education Program Study Committee Report, of February 1976; the Superintendent's Analysis of School Closings of January 1977, and the Montgomery County Public Schools Report of the Small Schools Task Force, 1973.

(a) Better curriculum coordination and the creation of full-time curriculum coodinators.

(b) The establishment of a Curriculum Resource Center.

(c) A review and better use of specialists at the elementary level.

(d) Establishing and implementing a system procedure to ensure accountability and tie inputs (spending) to outputs (tangible services, programs, and outcomes for children).

The Impact

The superintendent's position and reasoning not only carried the day on the particular school closure issue in 1976-77, but became the de facto policy and set of decision rules which goverened subsequent school closure decisions.

Although feelings ran deep (in the summer of 1978 Boston University ran an Educational Policy Seminar on Declining Enrollments and one of the protagonists of the Lexington "school wars" refused to share the forum with a former opponent), it appears that the implicit social contract took root.

School closures continued, and after each closure vote, the school board increased the school's budget in order to improve program and the closure decisions became increasingly less controversial.

Cost savings were realized. In the short term, by 1979 (two years after the first controversy, and after the total closure of three schools), the school system realized a savings of $435,000. The superintendent had projected, if his long-range closure plan was implemented (which it was) that the total savings would by 1980 be in the vicinity of $835,450.

School officials interviewed in 1982 admitted that their record-keeping did not compound the cost savings, nor did their documentation use constant dollars (in 1977, few had predicted the rate of inflation in fixed costs, like fuel, which all budgets -- households, firms and public institutions -- had to bear).

Nonetheless, an analysis of school district spending (Lexington Public Schools, Budget Summary, 1982-83, p. 9 -- see following page) showed that the percent increase had been reduced dramatically after the first round of school closures (1978-79) and before the advent of Massachusetts' Proposition 2-1/2 levy limitation in 1981.

TOTAL SCHOOL BUDGET INCREASES
1967 - 1982

	Budget	Increase	Percent Increase
1967	6,927,840	712,844	11.5
1968	7,822,511	894,671	13.0
1969	8,831,353	1,008,842	12.9
1970	9,781,353	950,000	10.8
1971	10,531,353	750,000	7.7
1972	11,175,013	643,660	6.1
1973	12,023,629	848,616	7.6
1974	13,164,211	849,482	6.9
1975	14,156,244	989,104	7.5
1976	15,136,971	957,855	6.8
1977	15,746,245	609,274	4.0
1978	16,209,840[1]	463,595	2.9
1979	16,505,087	295,247	1.8
1980	17,101,538	596,451	3.6[2]
1981	17,177,233	75,695	.4
1982	17,777,012	599,779	3.5

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[1] First year of inclusion of $40,000 for school crossing guards formerly in Selectmen's Budget. Subsequent years include the amount being recommended by the Town Manager.

[2] Citizens Energy Committee Recommendations not included in operating budget.

Despite this decrease, the improvement terms of the implicit social contract had been honored. 1982 interviews showed that:

(1) The recommended Curriculum Resource Center had been established.

(2) Each school now has a resident specialist in drama, arts, language arts and social studies, and for each of the above areas, three full-time curriculum coordinators were added at the elementary level.

(3) Capital improvements were made in labs for high school science.

Refinements have been made in the district's management information system -- program budgeting, computer simulation and publication of policy analysis tests -- which make the system more accountable. That is, inputs can now be related to outputs.

But district officials admit they still have a long way to go. One of them, a veteran of the school closure wars, admitted that until prodded by the controversy and the necessity to make good on the terms of the implicit social contract, "We didn't really know what we were doing...We were," he said, "a district of schools, rather than a school district."

Implications

Objectively, the events and strategies represent somewhat of a success story. Many program improvements have been implemented since, if not because of (remember, cause and effect are difficult to pin down) school closures.

In a more important sense, the question of "since or because" is irrelevant. The fact is that Lexington school managers were able to make good on the social contract and keep their part of the bargain. Their success may have been made easier by circumstances. Lexington is a relatively affluent suburb despite some neighborhoods which are reminiscent of working class, "streetcar suburbs." But the strategy is generalizable: identify what the community really wants above all and then, persuade and be ready to prove that what "they really want" requires and can be accomplished by unpopular cutbacks.

Readers will, by now, recognize that the Lexington case is an example of the "opportunity cost" conflict management strategy outlined in Section Four, Part C:3.

SCHOOL CLOSURE AND SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS: THE CASE OF BRONX COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 12*

Lexington and the Bronx may seem worlds apart, but both communities have shared a district practice of entering educational considerations into school closure decisions. More clearly so in the Bronx than in Lexington, the necessity to close some schools was driven by finances and demographics. Since 1972, district enrollment had dropped from 35,000 to 13,000. But in the last three years, three schools were closed (one elementary, one middle and one junior high) for reasons other than enrollment decline -- for lack of instructional effectiveness. The decision rule is: if we have to close some schools anyway, close those with (a) the fewest resources -- i.e., facilities and resident specialists, and (b) those with the lowest levels of pupil progress (note: progress, not absolute levels of achievement).

As in Lexington, this decision rule grew out of community conflict and school leaders' response to that conflict. District administrators told us that prior to July 1978, schools in District 12 were closed "haphazardly and arbitrarily: (note: during that same period of time, one researcher could not even get data about exactly how many schools were in fact closed in a specified time period. Dean, 1980.). Many buildings were simply left empty, inviting crime, vandalism and, finally, the outcry of civic groups.

Current citywide policy (see Policy Model 7B, on the next page) has eliminated some of the haphazardness -- no building closure proposal will be entertained or approved by the central board unless an alternative user(s) for that space have been identified.

The policy has also eliminated the arbitrariness by a stipulation for a due process whereby a Building Review Committee (BRC) with community representation documents facility needs and uses in a given district.

When the central board study process identified that the Bronx District 12

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* James Breeden, equity consultant to this handbook, did part of the field work upon which this study is based.

POLICY MODEL 7B: NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION PROCEDURES*

ABSTRACT

In light of the decline in pupil enrollment and the City's financial plan constraints, there is a need to revitalize the existing procedures for ensuring that school buildings are used in an efficient manner that is supportive of the educational goals of the individual community school districts and the school system as a whole. The Board of Education first adopted a Resolution for the Establishment of a Policy on the Efficient Use of School Buildings on April 16, 1975. This provided an outline of the procedures by which the Chancellor could initiate reviews of all school buildings to determine if their use is "...efficient and economical. ." This circular addresses some of the problems and attempts to clarify and make more equitable the procedures and practices that have been refined in recent years. It must be emphasized that this circular addresses the procedures to be followed for school closings and does not directly alter previous circulars concerned with office space consolidation, the leasing of space or the closing of under-utilized classroom space within school buildings.

1. Building Review Committee

The responsibilities of the Building Review Committee will remain as already established. The members of the Committee shall be responsible for having in attendance those additional staff members whose expertise the Committee feels is required. The Committee will meet regularly with and have at their service the opinions of the Advisory Committee.

The Building Review Committee shall include the following membership:

1. Executive Director of Division of School Buildings
2. Executive Director of Division of Special Education
3. Executive Director of Division of High Schools
4. Assistant Superintendent of the Office of Community School District Affairs
5. Representatives of the Community School Boards (one permanent and one alternate from each borough)
6. Representatives of the Community Superintendents

A representative of the Office of Legal Services will be available to the Committee for consultation. The Building Review Committee will be headed by the Assistant Superintendent in charge of community school district affairs.

2. Advisory Committee

The Advisory Committee will serve as a resource to and meet regularly with

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* Abridged from "Procedures for Implementing the Board of Education Policy on Efficient Use of School Buildings" Special Circular No. 35, January 22, 1979.

POLICY MODEL 7B: (continued)

the Building Review Committee. They will not have any formal powers other than of an advisory nature. The responsibilities of the Advisory Committee will be limited to identifying potential alternative uses for school buildings and such other advisory functions as the Building Review Committee may request of them.

An Advisory Committee shall be established with the representatives of the following as members:

1. Director of the Office of Management and Budget
2. Director of the Department of City Planning
3. Commissioner of the Department of General Services
4. Community Planning Boards (two-at-large)
5. Parent Organizations (three)
6. Labor Unions (one each from the UFT, CSA, DC-37)

3. Establishment of Criteria

The Building Review Committee will draft criteria for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of building utilization. Some of these criteria should reflect educational programs. Upon the approval of the Chancellor, these criteria will be applied uniformly to all of the school buildings in the system. Listed below are some of the basic items which should be considered for inclusion. It will be the responsibility of the Building Review Committee to prepare the comprehensive list.

1. Rate of Utilization
2. Rate of Enrollment
3. Availability of convenient space in other school buildings
4. Projections of local enrollment trends
5. Type and age of building
6. Maintenance costs and/or anticipated capital outlays
7. Ability to maintain racial and ethnic balance
8. Effect upon Board policies concerning integration, zoning, pupil transportation, excessing of staff, and promotional policies
9. Building scheduled for replacement
10. Building housing mainly administrative offices
11. Availability of an alternative use for the structure
12. Net saving anticipated from the closing
13. Availability of other uses within the Board of Education for the building

4. School Review Procedure

The Office of Educational Facilities Planning, the Metropolitan Laboratory and the Office of Zoning will submit to the Building Review Committee and the

POLICY MODEL 7B: (continued)

relevant Community School Boards data on schools which should be considered for closing or other action.

Following this review, the Building Review Committee will submit to a Community School Board a listing of district schools which, because of the criteria, should be considered for closing. If the closing of a school would affect more than one Community School District, all of the affected Community School Boards will participate in the process.

Community School Boards will develop district plans which will include plans for closing school buildings. In developing its plan the Community School Board will hold meetings with parent groups and other interested parties. The plan must include an explanation for its proposals and must be consistent with established Board of Education policies including integration, zoning and transportation. The district plan will then be submitted to the Building Review Committee. The Building Review Committee will review the district plan. If it is approved, the plan will be sent to the Deputy Chancellor. If there are challenges to the district plan, the Building Review Committee will meet with the Community School Board in an attempt to resolve the matter. If no agreement is reached, the Building Review Committee will recommend a plan of its own and submit it to the Community School Board and the Deputy Chancellor for consideration. The Community School Board will submit their own plan to the Deputy Chancellor.

If there is a common plan submitted by the Building Review Committee and the Community School Board that the Deputy Chancellor finds acceptable, it will be submitted to the Chancellor. If the Deputy Chancellor determines that there is irreconcilable disagreement between the Community School Board and the Building Review Committee, he will review both plans, meet with the concerned parties and develop his own plan which will be sent to the Chancellor.

The Chancellor will review the recommended plan. If approved, it will be referred to the Deputy Chancellor for implementation. A copy of the Chancellor's decision will be sent to the Community School Board and the Building Review Committee.

If the Community School Board is dissatisfied with the Chancellor's decision, it can appeal to the City Board of Education using the appeals procedure contained in Section 2590 of the State Education Law.

5. Sharing of Cost Savings

It is important that a formula be devised for sharing any savings that result from the closing of a school with the affected Community School District.

This cost sharing arrangement will be prepared by the Office of the Deputy Chancellor, the Division of School Buildings and the Office of Community School District Affairs in consultation with representatives of the Community School

POLICY MODEL 7B: (continued)

Boards.

6. Alternative Use

There is the problem of vandalism during the period of Board of Education surrender and disposition by the Department of General Services. Efforts will be made to shorten the period of acceptance of surrendered schools by the Board of Estimate and to establish responsibility for these buildings during this period. Problems in this area have resulted in increasing community resistance to school closings. Vandalized surrendered school buildings have contributed to increased neighborhood deterioration and have impeded plans for disposition. Quick disposition is required since, in numerous instances, closing schools has had a negative effect upon a community.

A Task Force (whose membership will include the Office of the Chancellor, Building Review Committee, and the Advisory Committee) shall be formed to locate alternative uses for surrendered buildings in order to eliminate the negative impact of a closing upon a community. Serious consideration will be given to not closing a building site unless there is an alternative use for the structure or the site.

was to close two out of five schools flagged as being underutilized, the local district initiated its own due process and study procedures, mirroring in many respects those adopted at the citywide level. A local District Building and Zoning Review Committee was established comprised of four community school board members, one parent from each of the five "at risk" schools, two representatives of the District administrative staff, one representative from the Office of Special Education, and a representative from the teachers' union. Its purpose is "to listen to recommendations from the public, examine the facts, and present recommendations to the School Boards of District 12."* To further more community involvement, District 12 also set up a constituency subcommittee, with advisory functions to the whole committee and with representation from each of the five possibly affected schools. This subcommittee held responsibility to

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* References to the structure and function of the local district committee and subcommittee come from the "Minutes of the Building and Zoning Review Committee Meetings, March 7 and 28, of 1979."

"go back to each school and get input from their constituency" and "inform the Building Review Committee about their constituencies' concerns."

The Building Review Committee, as a whole, was not philosophically against closing schools. The Superintendent's sentiments were to try to do everything possible -- shared use, alternative community use -- in order to prevent the need for any closures. One such preventative plan would have involved busing 6th graders from overcrowded to underutilized facilities. This brought out 700 "angry" parents in opposition (more opposition than against closure) and with the political defeat of the Superintendent's proposal, some closings became inevitable.

In the course of the study process, one school defended itself against closure with a quality of education argument backed up with data showing progress in the number of students "reading on level." This led the district to evolve a policy on closures in which quality of education began to be stated and articulated by the superintendent as a criterion in school closure decisions. The criterion itself enjoyed broad support since District 12 was and is engaged in a School Improvement Initiative systemically based on the "effective schools" research and demonstration projects elsewhere initiated by the work of Ron Edmonds and Larry Lezotte. The theory and research on effective schools provided the foundation for school assessments leading to closure decisions.

Policy Model 7C, on the next page, depicts the publicly spelled out assessment criteria. Items 12 through 15 embody the instructional effectiveness criteria. Number 12 focuses on output measures, Numbers 13 and 14 focus on inputs, on resources available at that particular facility, while Item 15 addresses the "social organization" and "climate" at the school. The latter is an important part of the Bronx District 12 understanding and application of the effective schools theory and research. Effectiveness in instruction is a function of climate and expectations. The social organization of the school effects climate. Social organization consists of such factors as a history of failure and of inadequate resources and facilities -- all of which conspire to lower expectations and create what the Superintendent called "a set of building circumstances

POLICY MODEL 7C: SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA USED IN CLOSING SCHOOLS. COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 12, OF BRONX, NEW YORK.*

1. Enrollment:
2. Rate of Attendance:
3. Rate of Utilization:
4. School Location (description):
5. Consolidation Pattern if School Were To Close:
6. Transportation Needs:
7. Projected Housing:
8. Physical Condition of Building:
    - 8.1 Excellent
    - 8.2 Good
    - 8.3 Fair
9. Data on Past or Projected Maintenance Projects:
10. Yearly Costs to Maintain Building:
11. What Outside Programs/Agencies are in the Building:
12. Analysis of Reading Scores:
    - 12.1 Percentage Above Reading Level:
    - 12.2 Percentage On Reading Level:
    - 12.3 Percentage Below Reading Level:
    - 12.4 Rate of Improvement:
13. Educational Programs in the School (other than Title I & PSEN):
14. Additional Services Available to School:
15. On-Site Visits:

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* Communication to the Institute for Responsive Education, August 1982.

which mitigate against instructional effectiveness."

Through repeated open hearings at each school, the Superintendent explained the rationale for the assessment of effectiveness criteria and described in detail "the set of circumstances in this building that mitigate against instructional effectiveness." In each case, the message was threefold:

(1) the criteria are not arbitrary and capricious;

(2) the schools' social organization was linked to its resources and any pathologies are the outcome of past history and of present circumstances which present members unconsciously or unwillingly perpetuate (e.g., past failure leads to less parent support and involvement which means less resources, which leads to demoralization, which leads to low levels of expectation about pupil achievement, which leads to pupil failure -- all in a vicious cycle); and

(3) in some cases closure should be seen as an instructional remedy rather than just a financial necessity.

Although there was a consensus on the District's effective schools initiative, the application of this policy is not without its political risks. Unlike the Lexington policy of "closing-schools-to-improve-program," "disorganizing ineffective schools" can be divisive.* It appears to add insult to injury to the "disorganized" school. The Superintendent admitted that the current policy creates as much conflict and opposition as the "arbitrary and haphazard" citywide practices of school closure prior to 1978. And, when it came to the final decision, he agreed not to make the assessment data for the closed school public. Instead, he held private meetings with the affected principals' staff and parents explaining the necessity for the "remedy."

Those explanations stressed the link between resources and effectiveness. The Superintendent did not see decline as an opportunity to close ineffective schools. Instead, he saw decline as the cause. Lower levels of resources adversely affect all schools, and some schools more adversely than others. He also has little patience with those who might interpret the effective schools research as meaning that levels of resources are irrelevant, that material inputs are only weakly related to pupil outcomes. His argument is that a decline in resources is "a cause of ineffective conditions." His policies are based on the philosophy that under decline the responsibility of management is to concentrate what few resources remain, and concentration usually means school closure and consolidation.

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* In public and in private, the Superintendent repeatedly used the term "disorganized" rather than "closed," as in "we've disorganized five ineffective schools." "Disorganized" appears to try to describe what is happening to the school as a social organization rather than to the building. The main point being that the building remains a site for some valuable social activity rather than an abandoned building.

PART D:2.1: CURRICULUM PRESERVATION AND PERSONNEL: MERIT-BASED RIF

INTRODUCTION: A SIMPLE QUESTION WITH DIFFICULT ANSWERS

Throughout this section, we have often used the term, "curriculum" broadly to denote not just courses of instruction, but also pupil services and outcomes -- in short, curriculum refers to the core of what a school does and what it is. The answer to the question -- what kind of personnel policy should guide RIF if the objective (without any constraints) is to "preserve curriculum" is at once simple and extremely complex -- keep the best teachers and let the not so good go.

The answer seems simple to those parents and taxpayers who quite legitimately want their tax dollars to go to the good teachers and who incorrectly assume that it is easy and straightforward to identify who is good and who is not so good, and on that basis grade all of the teachers on a continuum which will, like a strict seniority list, determine who stays and who goes. Managers know better and appreciate or have experienced the complex problems of designing and implementing such a system.

In moving from the simple to the complex, the discussion in this subsection is addressed to both kinds of readers -- the impatient taxpayer and the constrained school manager.

THE ISSUES: TRYING TO DEFINE MERIT

The Simple Case for Merit: The Problems With Strict Seniority

One problem, often alluded to but rarely talked about directly, is that the principle of last hired, first fired, leads to the loss of lower paid teachers and the retention of those towards the top of the salary scale. The code words for describing this problem can be found in laments about "an aging work force" or "a shrinking work force, and a rising salary bill."

A strict seniority-based RIF eliminates managerial discretion. It is an automatic, self-executing policy whose consequences may be unpredictable and may adversely impact on many other policy objectives. To quote one school board member, "If you lose control over who is to be left teaching, you lose control over what can be taught and over the quality of the teaching."

It is the application of wide-open seniority bumping rights that can cause "you to lose control over what can be taught," especially at the secondary level. During the first widely publicized round of RIF's across the country, one heard many horror stories about some absurd consequences of bumping, best exemplified in the case of a Boston language arts teacher who, although she knew no Italian, bumped and took the position of a less senior but qualified teacher of Italian. Boston's current policy prevents this, and nearly all administrators we contacted report that bumping rights have been "cleaned up" with the cooperation or at least the acquiescence of even the most militant teacher unions.

The adverse effects of bumping have always been much more apparent at the secondary rather than the elementary level. In the elementary grades, the curriculum is homogeneous and tenured, certified staff are all formally interchangeable. Nevertheless, some would have a problem with the phenomenon of a 14-year veteran fifth grade teacher who taught at the first grade only for two years bumping an 8-year veteran first grade teacher who has never taught anything but first grade. Some would see that to be unfair and educationally unsound.

Trying to Define Merit: The Hard Questions to a Simple Case

Let's consider why some would find the above hypothetical example of elementary level bumping objectionable.

It seems unfair that someone who has devoted their entire professional career (the 8-year veteran first grade teacher) could be bumped by somebody with only two years of service at that position. But that same principle, if generalized into an overriding decision rule, leads right back to strict seniority. The argument could be saved with some notion that not longevity *per se* but rather long experience doing a particular kind of job with a particular age group better qualifies the first grade teacher to keep his/her job. This principle gives us the first of many possible definitions of merit.

Merit #1: The qualification earned by virtue of the benefits presumeably gained from long experience doing a specific kind of job.

The benefits in question refer to those accruing to the pupils of the more experienced first grade teacher. But now an advocate for the more generally senior, 5th grade teacher, could point out that the research evidence* on teacher experience (as defined in Merit #1) vis-a-vis pupil performance, does not confirm the presumed benefit of experience. Moreover, that advocate could argue that (a) the fifth grade teacher has an earned Masters plus twenty credits in a concentration relating to early childhood development and reading readiness, while the first grade teacher has no post-baccalaurate education, and (b) since the school district has rewarded this extra education with pay increments, it must see it as valuable for children, and (c) these degree credits make the fifth grade teacher more qualified.**

The principle developed in this latter argument provides a second definition of merit.

Merit #2: Job-related credentialed qualifications.

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* Sealey, 1981:12-15, contains a useful digest of the research on teacher effectiveness which has been used and recognized in the courts as supporting contested performance reviews. Generally, the predictors of teacher impact on student performances from weakest to strongest are: age, longevity of service, credentials, attitudes and personality, and specific behaviors.

** As will be seen below, legal considerations and legal logic are of paramount importance in the development of merit-based RIF. The above argument, especially in the concluding clause of part "b" and the parenthetical phrase preceeding it, are typical of legal and judicial reasoning on this topic. The force of an argument such as this stems paradoxically from the presumption that whatever the district does is presumed to be right and reasonable unless proved otherwise. (The burden of proof is with the plaintiff, e.g., a teacher filing suit against a merit RIF decision.) One test of the reasonableness of new policy, if contested, is its consistency with the intent of pre-existing and ongoing practices. This presumption can get school districts into trouble. Under this consistency test, a district which continued seniority RIF for administrators, while instituting merit RIF for teachers, may have to explain away why it has inconsistently applied the general principle involved in the older, seniority-based RIF practice. See Sealey, 1981.

A counter argument could be advanced in favor of the first grade teacher, who has no degree credentials beyond a bachelors degree. First, he/she could argue that there is as little (or as much) research evidence about the impact of credentials on teacher effectiveness in improving pupil performance as there is on the benefit of experience. Second, he/she could point out that in the past four years (since the district started regular and standardized achievement testing, and started making inter-building and inter-teacher comparisons) his or her classes have consistently performed well above the district average and have in all four years out-performed all other fifth grade classes in the district. This argument invokes the test of what or who is better for children. The same argument could be made on the basis of rates of pupil progress rather than comparative performance on standardized achievement tests, which becomes a third definition of merit.

Merit #3: Teacher effectiveness as indicated by the academic achievement of pupils in the classroom managed by a teacher.

This output measure of merit is rarely invoked (for an exception, however, see Behn, 1982:113, who suggests use of pupil progress rather than standardized achievement test scores). The fifth grade teacher, in rebuttal, could point to the research of the non-school and non-classroom correlates of pupil achievement, focusing on the ever present possibility of confounding factors affecting achievement irrespective of school or teacher characteristics. To continue the hypothetical example, that teacher could point to his or her consistently glowing evaluations as proof of superior merit justifying retention. The latter claim introduces the most currently common and familiar notion of merit.

Merit #4. Merit as shown in supervisors' performance evaluations.

When most professional advocates use the term "merit-based RIF" they mean something like the above, with some credit given for credentials, and for extra-curricular service to the school district. But the core of any discriminations between good vs. better teachers (if they were incompetent they could have been dismissed long ago, there is no statutory or contractual protection for incompetence, and the courts operate with a broad definition of dismissal for "just cause") in order to create a rank order RIF list, lies in the use of performance evaluation data. Much depends, therefore, on the validity and relevance of those data.

For instance, our hypothetical first grade teacher may note that the evaluation form and the glowing reviews of the fifth grade teacher make references to items like "is always cheerful and cooperative," "is well-groomed," "is very well organized," and "always ready and willing to serve on district committees," and that 60% of the form consists of similar materials.* The teacher's question becomes: what does all of this have to do with pupil learning? With this latest argument, the debate focuses on the most crucial component of any merit RIF policy: how is merit defined in terms of performance, why or how do those definitions relate to instructional effectiveness, and what data gathering procedures are used to identify such performances?

Without answers to such questions, the choice between our hypothetical fifth grade teacher and the first grade teacher looks like a standoff (see Exhibit 7E, on the next page). Any group of parents offered a choice of placing their child in either teacher's room would probably be divided. Administrators and management would react by saying "it's going to be a judgement call." But a policy of judgement calls is no policy at all. When judgements are not systematically grounded in solid knowledge about what employee performances promote the goals of the organization -- namely, teaching children -- it is not clear that the curriculum is better preserved by any of the four different definitions of merit than it would be by the original principle of seniority.

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* As part of the data gathering for this handbook, we collected performance review instruments from over 60 school districts around the country who had over the past few years (1976-1980) reported upgrading and refining their performance review standards, procedures and instruments. Items such as the ones mentioned are fairly common.

EXHIBIT 7E: A SUMMARY OF COMPETING CLAIMS TO MERIT

TEACHER "A": 14-YEAR VETERAN TRYING TO BUMP...	TEACHER "B": AN 8-YEAR VETERAN SCHOOL TEACHER
Varied career: has taught at three grade levels including two years in first grade (the first two years of employment).	All eight years were spent in teaching first grade.
Advanced degrees in areas related to first grade teaching.	No advanced degrees or credits.
Consistently glowing and outstanding performance evaluations.	Very good evaluations. No weaknesses identified in areas relaeed to direct instruction. But no superlatives in the open-ended narrative parts of the evaluation.
Test scores for classes are mixed and mediocre -- ranging from slightly above to well below district average.	Outstanding test scores. Consistently way above district average for the four years in which they were administered.
Is known to openly encourage placement of special needs and Chapter I and reputedly "troubled" children in her classroom.	Has almost a record number of parent requests for placement in his classroom. Popularity preceeded the onset of testing and information about results by teacher.
Is a frequent volunteer and participant on district and building committees.	Is a charter member and serves on the policy board of the local Teacher Center.

THE FACTS: EVIDENCE ABOUT THE RATIONALE, PRACTICE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MERIT-BASED RIF

(1) The most compelling educational argument against strict seniority-based RIF -- even purged of the worst features of bumping -- is that while seniority may be easy to implement and fair and humane to teachers (Phelan, 1982a), it is not necessarily fair to school children, absent any evidence that older teachers are "better" teachers (Behn, 1983).

(2) Conversely, there is little evidence that older teachers are less effective.

(3) There is evidence that at least on one narrow criterion -- test scores of those entering and leaving teacher training institutions -- that the most academically talented cohort of teachers are those newly graduated and hired in the early 1970's.*

(4) School districts which ignored the professional advice (Kelley, 1978; Keough, 1978b; Powell and Stemnock, 1975) and had introduced merit and performance based RIF criteria in the same year that it was used, often found themselves involved in losing court and arbitration proceedings (Johnson, 1982; Phelan, 1982). This "defeat" set back the clock, perhaps irretrievably, on personnel management and evaluation reforms. Districts reverted back to seniority and put discussions of merit "on hold."

(5) Notwithstanding the general teacher union opposition to any deviation from strict seniority-based RIF, there is some teacher opinion survey evidence suggesting a readiness on their part to endorse performance-based criteria in RIF provided that it be based on fair and objective criteria (Phelan, 1983:45-46).

(6) Case law, arising out of contests over lay-off criteria and job dismissals, does point the way towards what the courts see as fair and objective performance criteria. Put briefly, courts find "reasonable" evaluations of those on the job performances which the "weight of the [research] evidence" shows to be associated with improved pupil performances.

(7) In support of the courts' standard of reasonable school district efforts to fashion instruments grading performance, there is a growing body of research on "teacher effectiveness" (Edmonds, 1981; Lezotte, 1982). The correlates of effectiveness are well suited to use in performance evaluations, since they focus on what teachers do (on behavior) rather than on who or what teachers are (i.e., attributes such as age, credentials, longevity, or personality).

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* See Part D:2.3, below.

THE FUNCTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF A MERIT-BASED RIF POLICY

This discussion is not about personnel evaluation and management per se, but rather about a very narrow and specific aspect of personnel management; performance grading in order to establish a rank order of tenured, and otherwise minimally competent staff, for purposes of layoffs due to the necessity to reduce staff.

It is useful to reiterate this point, since, as Phelan (1983) noted in his remarks before an 1982 conference on managing decline at Vanderbilt University, part of the problem plaguing RIF is that, as a profession, school administrators are ambivalent about and unprepared for the use of evaluations for purposes other than dismissing obviously incompetent teachers or improving staff performance.

Developing Phelan's point, we can see that there are, in fact, three functions of employee evaluation -- to weed out incompetents, to improve staff performance, and to grade otherwise competent teachers on a scale of merit, that scale to be used in developing RIF policies.

Model No. 1: Weeding Out Incompetents

Objective: To identify and document sub-minimal performance, in order to either deny tenure or dismiss tenured teachers for just cause. Note: tenure is not, in the eyes of the law, an absolute protection of a job. It only becomes so, by default, when school managers have no procedures for systematically evaluating and documenting performance. Moreover, the courts' presumption is in favor of managerial prerogatives. The courts tend to bend over backwards to accomodate managerial discretion. On the other hand, lack of tenure does not leave a job-holder totally defenseless. All persons have certain inherent due process rights. Proof that a job was lost because of "arbitrary" and "capricious" behavior on the part of managers can protect even a non-tenured employee. Conversely, the absence of arbitrary and capricious behavior can justify the dismissal of a tenured employee. The upshot is that school managers who complain that state tenure or "fair dismissal" laws prevent them from getting rid of "deadwood" have only themselves, or their predecessors, to blame for not systematically documenting which "wood" is "dead."

Procedures and Documentation. Living proof that tenure *per se* and the presence of a strong teachers' union are no obstacles to dismissal for "just cause" comes from the Salt Lake City Public Schools. That district has a justifiably famous personnel evaluation. This policy assures that judgements are not made arbitrarily. First, a performance evaluation (whose criteria and procedures are part of a collectively bargained agreement) identifies sub-standard performance.* Second, this identification triggers a formal and intensive non-openended remediation process. Third, if a subsequent evaluation shows the remediation not to have produced improvement, a small committee -- including a teacher union building representative -- makes a final and unanimous decision on dismissal or retention and further attempts at remediations.

Outcomes and Relevance to Retrenchment Caused RIF. Procedures like the policy in Salt Lake City result in an either/or decision -- either the employee passes muster or he or she is dismissed. This system has been often cited as a model of performance evaluation. For example, Behn (1983:114-115) cites the Salt Lake City model as an example of the kind of trade-offs that declining school districts may strike "...in Salt Lake City, the management promised not to fire teachers because of declining enrollments; in return, however, they earned union and teacher cooperation for a policy of firing teachers more aggressively for cause." But if we abstract the Salt Lake City example into a generalizable model, we can see why it may not serve the purposes of retrenchment-driven RIF.

First, part of the deal struck between management and labor in Salt Lake City included a proviso, written into a Master Agreement, which explicitly prohibits the use of the performance evaluations in determining lay-offs triggered by retrenchment. It is for this reason that we do not include the Salt Lake City model in Part D:2.2, below, which gives a "sampler" of local policies which integrate merit considerations into decisions about those layoffs caused by retrenchment.

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* Communication and documents received by the Institute for Responsive Education (IRE) in June 1982. For more information and materials, contact the IRE Clearinghouse on the Management of Decline.

Second, it may be that only local conditions make the Salt Lake City model into an effective political compromise between teacher union interests and management prerogatives. In Salt Lake City, the number of teachers dismissed for incompetence equalled the number of teachers who would, otherwise, have had been RIF'd. This is a fortuitous coincidence -- had the enrollment and fiscal facts of Salt Lake City's situation dictated more reductions in staff than their current policy of dismissal for just cause had provided for, that district would have been in a bind, especially given the proviso that performance evaluation data could not be used in decisions affecting the layoff of competent and tenured staff.

Three, the Salt Lake City model dictates an either/or decision. If the teacher is judged incompetent, he or she is fired, whatever the district's personnel needs. That is, if the district were not faced with the economic necessity of staff reductions, this procedure might still lead to the dismissal of staff. On the other hand, the objective application of the Salt Lake City model may lead a school district to certify as competent more staff than they need or can afford to employ, given certain local circumstances.

Judgements about competence or incompetence are an either/or decision. The model does not allow for graduated judgements about the relative merits of those teachers who are established as competent. Merit-based considerations for the RIF of competent, tenured teachers require a data base which differentiates among generally acknowledged to be competent teachers. The Salt Lake City model does not do this.

Model No. 2: Clinical Supervision

Objective: To improve teaching staff performance by identifying and remedying weaknesses.

Procedures: In this model, evaluation is ongoing, both formal and informal, and is part of an effort to upgrade teaching skills. Its procedures can be identical to those described in the Salt Lake City model.

Outcome and Relevance to Merit-based RIF. The evaluation format may not lend itself to merit-RIF since the judgements of employee performance are not recorded in such a way as to draw comparisons with other staff.

Model No. 3. Performance Evaluation for Merit-based RIF

The objective is to grade teachers on an objective scale. The need is not just to weed out poor performers, but to identify the differences between good and better teachers. The performance criteria may, and probably should, be the same as in the other two models, but the judgements have to be recorded so as to permit quantitative comparisons. There is no such need in either the dismissal for just cause or the clinical supervision models.

Summary: The Difference Between Being "Fired" and Being Laid Off

The essential difference between merit RIF and the other performance evaluation models may be brought out by drawing an analogy to two other areas of practices inside and outside of education.

First, consider the different ways of evaluating pupil performance. We use diagnostic tests in order to identify areas of needed improvement. We use minimum competency tests and other similar kinds of measures to determine whether a pupil has "made the grade" and to decide about promotion and certification. There are also other kinds of measures and tests -- most notably SAT's and other grading systems -- which rigorously apply the bell curve and are used to make comparisons among students and sort out the good from the average, and the better from the good. The function of performance evaluation data for merit-based RIF is akin to the function served by SAT's or bell-curved grade point averages.

Second, it is worth reminding ourselves how employees lose or keep jobs in business and industry. They either get "fired" -- for incompetence, insubordination, etc.; or they get "laid-off" -- in which case the precipitating cause is not something the employee has done but rather the general condition of the firm, e.g., declining sales and rising operating costs. RIF is a lay-off procedure.

MERIT-BASED RIF AND THE LAW: WHAT KINDS OF POLICIES STAND UP IN COURT

The preceeding discussion points out the essential differences between the more traditional means of employee evaluation (e.g., the clinical supervision and dismissal for just cause) and the different kinds of challenges posed by the intent to use merit measures in RIF. Perhaps the biggest challenge is to devise a system that will keep you out of court, i.e., "what works" on this issue is what will stand up to legal scrutiny. This decision rule is not as callous as it sounds, since the tests applied by the courts, nicely summarized in Ronald Sealey's (1981) handbook Teacher Evaluation and the Law, push school districts into objective, quantifiable evaluations of teacher behaviors which the research shows to be most closely correlated with improved pupil performance.

The essential features of Sealey's model are depicted in Exhibit 7F, on the next page. In general, judicial criteria hold management accountable to due process considerations and implicitly prescribe policy and practice which relies less and less on "judgement calls" and more and more on objective data. Moreover, judicial tests emphasize the evaluation not of persons but of behaviors: an employee's merit lies in the facts of his or her performance, and not on an evaluator's assessment of that person's personality or other attributes.

The implications of these general points for the construction of performance evaluation measures and instruments are explored immediately below.

ASSESSING MERIT: DEVELOPING THE CONTENT VALIDITY OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION INSTRUMENTS

Introduction: Performance Evaluation As A Type of Research

The discussion which follows leans heavily and is an extended paraphrase of Sealey (1981), pages 3 - 8, 33 and 70. The expression "content validity" is Sealey's and with its connotations of research methodology, it reveals a central feature of the model: performance evaluation is, or should be, a type

EXHIBIT 7F. TEACHER EVALUATION AND THE LAW

Judicial Tests of a Valid Evaluation Policy*

(1) A good merit evaluation system is one which stands up in court.

(2) Merit evaluations which stand up in court are reasonable and fair.

(3) They are fair if they:

- Do not contradict existing statute, contract and precedents
- Do not observe without fair warning
- Treat like persons alike in like circumstances
- Follow due-process consisting of
  - public criteria
  - fair notice
  - opportunities and resources for remediation.

(4) They are reasonable if:

- Criteria evaluate performance rather than persons
- Performance is defined in inter-subjectively measureable types of behavior
- Desired performance is linked causally (given the "weight of the evidence") to desired pupil outcomes

Implications For School District Policy Development

(1) Do not initiate merit-based RIF in the first year of RIF.**

(2) Get and retain legal advice in all stages of policy design.***

(3) Canvass the research evidence on teacher effectiveness and define desired pupil outcomes in terms of measure used in that research.

(4) Translate the results of that canvassing into a policy document and manual stating desired pupil outcomes and desired teacher performance. These become formalized as the job description and conditions of employment and the criteria for merit.

(5) Test the evaluation instrument for inter-subjective validity.

(6) Train evaluation personnel in using the instrument and in giving an account of their use: e.g., mock trials with cross-examination.

(7) Implement the evaluation policy following the maxims of fairness as listed in the column to the left.

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* SEALEY (1981). Teacher Evaluation and the Law. Boston: Institute for Law and Education.

** See also Johnson, 1981; and Phelan, 1982.

*** See also Kelley, 1978; Keough, 1978; Powell and Stemnock, 1975.

of research. The research question is "how is this employee performing?" The variables include operational definitions of sought after performances. The research data consists of empirical indicators of employee performance. Its instruments are the performance evaluation instruments. Its findings are the evaluation revealed by the application of the evaluation instrument. Its conclusions are a composite score for each evaluated employee and his/her ranking in comparison to others evaluated with the same instrument. Its outcomes are not academic papers and reports, but a set of binding judgements about employees' jobs and, ultimately, decisions designed to improve teaching for children.

The analogy of performance evaluation with research is useful. It sets up the standards of rigor and objectivity that this issue deserves. The analogy also implies that designing a performance evaluation system, especially one intended to create a quantitative ranking of employees along a continuum of "merit," is not unlike constructing a rigorous research design.

A Definition of Content Validity

As is the case with any research, the data are as good as the instruments and data-gathering procedures which generate them. "Content validity" as defined and used in Sealey's model, refers to the type and source of items contained in a performance evaluation instrument, their construct and format, and their relative weighting.

(a) Content Validity and the Type and Source of Items in a Performance Evaluation Instrument. Two types of items have legally sufficient validity. These include:

(i) Items which test for those behaviors, e.g., "variability in teaching methods and approaches," which the research has shown to have high positive predictive value (based on correlation coefficients) for pupil academic performance.

(ii) Items which test for compliance with "internal: (i.e., local school district stipulated) performance standards. These are valid, even though there is no research showing that adherence to such standards, provided that it can be shown that they are "public," i.e., that the school district managers have taken steps to inform all employees of management expectations as to expected performance.

(b) Content Validity Instrument Items and Format. Items are typically phrased as questions about the employee being evaluated. To the extent possible, the question should be phrased so that its answer will contain information about overt physical behavior on the part of the teacher being evaluated. (See Exhibit 7G on the next two pages, which contains examples of exemplary performance evaluation forms, from Sealey, 1981, pages 5 and 7.)

Such a focus on behavior rather than personality promotes the inter-rater reliability of instrument items. It also is useful in terms of defending any judgement if the evaluation form contains enough space to describe in some concrete detail the rationale for the point score given to an employee on any item. A good instrument and good use of the instrument will leave enough of a written record to enable the original evaluator, or a third party, to read the evaluation and either recall or understand what kinds of observed behavior led to a particular judgement.

A good rule of thumb is to design and use evaluation instruments in such a way that the evaluator when sitting in a court witness box and being subjected to hostile cross examination can concretely explain the reasons for a particular judgement on the basis of information on the evaluation form (e.g., teacher received a "1" out of a possible "7" on the item "caring for children").

(c) Content Validity and Relative Weighting. As noted, local school districts may include local performance standards, unrelated to what the research says about teacher effectiveness. This is a local right and responsibility. Also, some of these local standards may not denote discrete behaviors. That is, concepts such as "warmth," or "enthusiasm" are what Sealey (1981:7) calls "high inference" items requiring much judgement. These are contrasted with low inference behaviors whose "item content...reflect separate and distinct units of behavior which are easier to observe: such as 'teacher asks a question,' 'teacher uses examples,' etc."

A good rule of thumb is to assign lower weights, e.g., a maximum of "5" rather than a "10" to high inference performance items, than to lower inference

EXHIBIT 7G: EXAMPLES OF ITEMS ON AN EXEMPLARY TEACHER EVALUATION FORM*

EXAMPLE A. A LOW-INFERENCE ITEM.

STANDARD: PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH STUDENTS.

USE: When teacher has been observed frequently enough so that reliable information is available.

PURPOSE: To see if teacher models an interest in individual students.

Note any information relevant to the following questions:

1. Do students seek out this teacher for personal contact? Do they show things, make small talk, seek advice?
2. Does the teacher actively seek out individual students for informal personal contacts or must they come to him?
3. Is he accessible to students before, during and after school hours?
4. When students tell him things, does he listen carefully and ask questions, or does he respond minimally and cut short the conversations?
5. When the teacher questions students in informal contacts, does he ask open-ended questions seeking their opinions, or does he ask leading or rhetorical questions that elicit only cliche responses or compliance?
6. How does the teacher react when students mention taboo topics? Can he tolerate discussion, or does he quickly close it off?
7. In general, does the teacher talk to students, or at them? Does he use a natural voice, or a special "teacher tone?"

Proficiency Value:_____Supporting Rationale: (State facts directly linked to the discrete measures in the constellation of items (1 - 7) listed above. Assess and state whether or not the evaluatee is proficient in all measures in the constellation in order to arrive at a proficiency level for the performance standard - Personal Relationships with Students. Do not use inferential language such as - Teacher is cold, curt or aloof. Rather state - Students only come to the teacher for supplies, permission or to make small talk - not for advice.)

EXAMPLE B. A HIGH INFERENCE ITEM

STANDARD: CARING FOR STUDENTS.

Proficiency Value:_____Supporting Rationale: Teacher X met with seven students on four consecutive Saturdays to finish science project; talks with

EXHIBIT 7 G (continued)

EXAMPLE B (continued)

John Besole about his personal problems after school; (dates) took Jane Doe home because she missed the bus and it was raining and cold; ask students how they were doing in the cafeteria.

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* SEALEY (1981). Teacher Evaluation and the Law. Boston: Institute for Law and Education, pp. 5 and 7.

items. Where local values make this impossible, then the evaluation instrument format should allow and, indeed, prescribe greater narrative detail explaining the inferences made and the judgement arrived at.

An even more general and stringent rule of thumb is to always, irregardless of the inference value of an item, assign more points to items embodying behaviors which the research has shown to be correlated with improved pupil performance. To quote Sealey (1981:4) directly:

> For example, variability in methods and materials is one performance standard significantly related to teacher excellence. Thus, a relatively high proficiency performance value response continuum range should be assigned (e.g., 1 - 10). If a teacher variability in methods and materials were adjudged excellent, a value of 10 would be assigned with a specific description providing the supporting rationale. Whereas, a performance standard of personal appearance which has a weak construct and predictive validity in relationship to teacher effectiveness (in low correlation coefficients) would be assigned a lower response continuum range of possible proficiency performance values (e.g., 1 - 3). Thus, a teacher whose personal appearance is excellent would receive an assigned proficiency performance value of 3; reflecting the relative unimportance of such a teacher's performance standard in determining teacher effectiveness.

This bias toward items which embody the correlates of teacher effectiveness is politically useful as well as legally sound. Such a bias sends a possible consensus-building signal to teachers and teacher unions -- "we are evaluating performance and are basing our personnel policy on the best knowledge, fallible as it is, that our profession has been able to generate about what's best for children." To the community, the signal is "this procedure may be costly, time-consuming and conflictual, but its objective is not to exercise managerial prerogatives for their own sake, but to produce better schooling for children."

POLICY DEVELOPMENT FOR INTRODUCING MERIT CONSIDERATIONS INTO RIF

The policy implications of the preceeding discussion are summarized in the following steps. (Exhibit 7H, at the top of the next page, lists the steps according to their fulfillment of the "fairness" and "reasonableness" criteria invoked in court judgements upholding performance evaluations and employee dismissal.)

Step One: *Take your time and do not implement new merit measures and apply them to RIF in the same year*. Research (Phelan, 1982; Johnson, 1981) and practice (Keough, 1978) show that this hastiness can result in a built-in recipe for failure.

Step Two: *Get legal counsel and employ it in all stages of the policy development, design and implementation*. The case law articulating the tests of "fairness" and "reasonableness" is constantly evolving. Only a practising attorney (and not any handbook) can stay on top of this evolution.

Step Three: *Define district goals for pupil performance in measurable terms*. All districts have goal statements of varying degrees of comprehensiveness and detail. The more behaviorally precise the statement of desired pupil outcomes, the easier it will be to clarify teacher responsibilities and performance standards.

Step Four: *Inventory* (and keep on updating and inventorying) *the research on teacher effectiveness*. Such an inventory can help clarify district goals about achievable pupil performance outcomes. It will also be used to construct items on the evaluation instrument. In its simplest terms, the logic is this: convert every finding about what teachers can do to improve pupil performance into a question about the behavior of teachers being evaluated, using the same descriptors as were used by the research from which a given item was derived.

Step Five: *Formulate a detailed job description for different categories*

EXHIBIT 7H: POLICY DEVELOPMENT STEPS FOR MERIT RIF

STEPS ADDRESSING THE "REASONABLENESS" TEST	STEPS ADDRESSING THE "FAIRNESS" TEST
	STEP ONE: Do not use merit in RIF in the same year as new procedures have been implemented.
	STEP TWO: Get legal counsel.
STEP THREE: Define and refine district definitions of desired pupil outcomes.	
STEP FOUR: Inventory the research on teacher effectiveness, and integrate those correlates into the job descriptions and the evaluation instruments.	
	STEP FIVE: Formulate and make public a detailed job description.
STEP SIX: Construct an evaluation instrument following the norms of content validity, which include: (a) inter-rater reliability of instrument items (b) use of discrete behavioral indicators wherever possible (c) lower point weights assigned to high inference, and non-teacher effectiveness items.	
STEP SEVEN: Field test evaluation instrument and train would-be evaluators.	
	STEP EIGHT: Consult legal counsel about the due process of implementation and application.

of instructional staff and make that public and understood. This job description should include those behaviors which are derived from the research on teacher effectiveness, plus any new or pre-existing responsibilities deemed locally important. Such a job description lists and explains the performance standards for which all staff will be accountable. Note: the "fairness" criterion dictates that this step preceed any new procedures or measures of employee performance.

Step Six: Using the job description as the outline, construct an evaluation instrument following the norms of "content validity" described earlier.

Step Seven: Locally field-test the evaluation instrument and train the evaluators. Training and field-testing can be combined because one of the tests is for inter-rater reliability on the items of the instrument. This can be tested and refined as part of the practice with using the instruments undergone by would-be evaluators.* Other components of the training might include: (a) orientation to the research upon which performance measures are based in order to allow evaluators to internalize the descriptive content and significance of those behaviors that are being evoked for and evaluated, and (b) practice responses to hostile cross-examination of judgements recorded on the evaluation form. The latter increases the courtroom skills of would-be evaluators, should the instruments and its judgements ever be contested. More importantly, the experience can dramatize the potential use and abuse of any evaluation instrument no matter how rigorously designed.

Step Eight: Consult legal counsel about due-process in the implementation and application of a new merit evaluation policy. Once the standards have been set and the instrument designed and tested, there are still a host of administrative decisions to make, including: prior notice, duration and frequency of observation, dispute resolution, remediation and re-adjustment of original score, etc. This is where the "fairness" criterion becomes paramount. Common sense is a good, but not infallible, guide to fairness and there is no substitute for legal counsel given that what is fair is a function of: statutory and case-law constraints establishing de jure and de facto employee rights; constitutional doctrines about due-process generally; and judicial reasoning about "fair play" based on the facts about past and present local practice as well as policy.

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* There is some debate in the literature as to whether the principal should, as is traditionally the case, be the evaluator. In the clinical supervision model, the principal's role as both guide and evaluator is clear and consistent. However, some have argued that it may not be useful to have building principals act as both mentors (i.e., instructional leaders) and inspectors. In the Salt Lake City model, for example, final dismissal recommendations are made by committee, in part to protect the building principals' role as instructional leader rather than punitive manager.

SUMMARY: A POLICY DEVELOPMENT CHECKLIST

The development of RIF policy based on "what is best for children" is neither quick nor easy, nor inexpensive. In this section we have discussed some of the difficulties, and have identified some guideposts, based on legal reasoning, which can facilitate policy development. These guideposts do not identify or develop a model policy, but they point towards some minimums which need to be taken into account, and they do identify some policy choices which have to be made locally. Exhibit 7I, on the pages immediately following, provides a summary checklist of those minimums and choices.

EXHIBIT 7I: MERIT-BASED RIF: A POLICY DEVELOPMENT CHECKLIST

☐ Have you engaged legal counsel to participate in and review all stages of the policy formation?

☐ What measures and standards of pupil performance are in use? To what extent are those standards/measures compatible with the independent variable measures in the research on teacher effectiveness?

☐ Have you inventoried the research evidence on teacher effectiveness?

☐ Do the performance evaluation items correspond to the behavioral indicators used as operational definitions in the research establishing the correlates of teacher effectiveness?

☐ Are the instrument items phrased in behavioral terms?

☐ Are there different instruments for different levels of teaching and different types of teaching jobs?

☐ Do the behaviors called for correspond to the official expectations about on-the-job behavior?

☐ If so, how are such expectations communicated? Is there a written, documentary record that such communication has been received and understood?

☐ Are low inference items (e.g., those for which there are clear and ambiguous behavioral indicators) more heavily weighted than high inference items which require judgements about attitude and/or intent not tied to discrete actions?

☐ Have items been checked for inter-rater reliability? How? What documentary record describes that validation?

☐ Have evaluators been trained in the use of the instrument? If so, how?

☐ Did the training include "mock trials" in which the evaluator was cross-examined and asked to justify particular judgements?

☐ How frequent are the evaluations and observations?

☐ How much warning is given?

EXHIBIT 7I: (Continued)

- ☐ Does the evaluation instrument contain enough space and do the evaluators write enough narrative explanation for key item ratings, so that one year later the evaluator (or a third party) can read the narrative and visualize the behavior taking place?
- ☐ How are the results, their rationale and implications communicated to the evaluated employee? What record is there of that communication?
- ☐ If the evaluation is challenged, what is the procedure and record of dispute resolution?
- ☐ Is there individualized remediation specifically related to the low-scoring performance review item? What record is there if remediation efforts, and of employee progress or lack thereof?
- ☐ What proportion of review instrument items refer to attitudes, demeanor, and behaviors unrelated to direct instruction and interaction with children?

PART D:2.2: MERIT CONSIDERATIONS IN RIF. A SAMPLER OF LOCAL POLICIES

Given the issue and the implications raised in preceeding parts of this section, we are convinced that curricular, political and legal considerations support the American Association of School Administrators (AASA) handbook's (Staff Dismissal, 1978) prophetic statement that mixed or hybrid systems of RIF are the "wave of the future."

In this section, we offer an illustrative sampling of such hybrid policies in ten local school districts, in nine states. An overview of those policies is provided on Chart 7D, below.

What we offer is a "sampler," not a statistically representative sample of what districts are doing nationwide. And for reasons given in the "Preface" and in Section One, we are not prepared to endorse any one policy as the "best" policy. Consequently, the sampler we present is neither comprehensive, nor exemplary, in the sense of the "best" solution to a difficult problem. Rather, it is illustrative of local responses to the issues discussed in our consideration of "what decision rules are possible and desirable, if staff dismissal policies are to be governed by program preservation and improvement objectives" in districts in which: (a) merit -- quality and qualifications criteria -- are used to temper seniority criteria; (b) the procedures followed are consistent with the legal and procedural requirements as outlined in Part D:2.1; and (c) the local response is illustrative of pragmatic solutions to the theoretical issues raised therein.

Examples of such pragmatic solutions are presented in Policy Models 7D through 7G, which follow Chart 7D. The examples expand upon some of the policies catalogued and summarized in Chart 7D. They are illustrative of a continuum of types of solutions to the reconciliation of RIF by merit vs. RIF by seniority, and they "operationalize" two different meanings of merit -- as "qualifications" indicated by credentials, and as "quality" as indicated by on the job performance measured by whatever evaluation procedure is in force in that local district.

For example, the St. Louis example, Policy Model 7D, provides equal weight to seniority and merit -- as qualification and as performance -- without any priority rules (as to which counts for more) except for the provisos that: (a) state tenure laws are obeyed, and (b) that management discretion be guided by considering what is best for the children of the district. That model maximizes management's discretion. It is also, for that very reason, more likely to be vulnerable to court challenge unless such discretion is consistent with local past practice.

The other three policy models illustrate different ways of balancing different merit criteria, as opposed to seniority criteria. As such, they limit top administrative discretion -- once the data is in -- but also for that same reason may be, generally, more defensible should there be a court challenge.

Two of the three policies assign points to teachers based on three criteria: seniority, qualifications (merit as credentials) and quality (as measured by performance evaluation). For example, Statesville, North Carolina (Policy Model 7E) gives primary weight to performance evaluation, and only secondary weight to credentials, and seniority in that order. The Janesville (Wisconsin) policy (see Policy Model 7F) uses similar categories and a similar methodology -- assignment of points along the three criteria -- but allocates the points so as to favor seniority, and to use merit ceriteria as a tie-breaker among personnel with roughly comparable seniority. That is, the Janesville policy leaves vulnerable the youngest teachers and protects the oldest teachers but subjects the middle range (11 - 25 years of experience) to merit-RIF criteria.

A fourth approach is illustrated in the Elmhurst (Illinois) policy (see Policy Model 7A). It balances merit vs. seniority RIF on a 50 percent basis. The 50 percent of the highest "quality" teachers (as based on performance evaluations, alone) irrespective of seniority, are protected against RIF. The other 50 percent, "unprotected" category, are vulnerable to RIF by seniority alone, irrespective of any marginal differences in performance evaluations.

CHART 7D: A SAMPLER OF RIF POLICIES INCORPORATING PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

SITE: BY STATE AND LOCALITY	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE RIF PROCEDURE	SOURCE: REFERENCE AND/OR AVAILABILITY
CO Adams County Schools	Collectively bargained RIF language from Adams County, Colorado, which does introduce merit criteria, although merit is defined in terms of teacher qualifications rather than teacher effectiveness in terms of outcome. In paraphrase, the Adams county policy lists the following criteria, in priority order: (a) Teaching assignments, educational preparation and training (b) Certification status (c) Seniority based upon (in this order): (i) years of service in the district (ii) length of service in current assignment (iii) number of years teaching in current area of certification (iv) total number of years teaching experience When all qualifications are equal, the tie-breaker is (i) -- time of starting employment in the district.	Nolte (1976 a:45)
IL Glencoe	Reductions among tenured teachers are made on the basis of performance, using these standards: academic and professional preparation beyong minimum certification requirements, effectiveness in teaching and related professional responsibility, and evidence of professional growth.	Divoky, (1979:40)
Elmhurst	If tenured teachers need to be released, the district establishes seniority lists for teachers grades K-6 and 7-12 (by department). Next, supervisors develop rank order performance rating based on overall teaching experience. Separate lists are established for each building in the elementary schools; for each department in the secondary schools. The top half in each case are, irrespective of seniority, protected from RIF. All teachers who fall into the lower two quartiles of the performance ratings are placed on separate lists. Teachers on those lists are dismissed in the order of lowest seniority.	IRE Clearinghouse, see Policy Model 7G

CHART 7D: A RIF SAMPLER (continued)

SITE: BY STATE AND LOCALITY	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE RIF PROCEDURE	SOURCE: REFERENCE AND/OR AVAILABILITY
MI Flushing Community Schools	Policy calls for the board to consider majors and minors, professional competence (including graduate work, evaluations and progress reports) and teaching experience, when seniority in service to the district and certification are equal.	AASA (1978:68)
MO St. Louis	The Mehlville School District R-9 provides for retaining permanent teachers in times of program elimination or reduction "on the basis of merit within the field of specialization." Reduction of staff is on a districtwide basis, with consideration given to the following factors: areas of competence indicated by certification; the individual's grade level or departmental preference and experience; seniority; quality of performance (with consideration given to regular and special evaluation reports); and skills in the areas of instructional needs of the district. The district policy notes that "if all factors are reasonably equal, seniority shall become the determining factor for retention."	IRE Clearinghouse, see Policy Model 7D
NC Statesville: Iredell County Schools	Teachers are rated on 21 personal and professional competencies. Each competency is rated satisfactory, needs improvement or unsatisfactory. In calculating points for the purpose of staff reduction, teachers are given two points for each competency rated satisfactory in the lsat two evaluations, for a maximum of 84 points. For each competency rated unsatisfactory, two points are deducted. The remaining number, the total performance score, is added to the scores for preparation/certification (maximum 14 points) and for length of service (maximum 12 points). If two persons attain identical scores, the person with seniority wins out. If the amount of seniority is the same, according to district policy, "the superintendent will make the determination as to which person is to be released based on all information available."	IRE Clearinghouse, see Policy Model 7F

CHART 7D: A RIF SAMPLER (continued)

SITE: BY STATE AND LOCALITY	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE RIF PROCEDURE	SOURCE: REFERENCE AND/OR AVAILABILITY
PA Waynesburg	Employees are ranked on the basis of the numerical ratings taking into consideration instructional skills, management ability, student reactions, professional attitude, personal characteristics and professional growth. Where there is a substantial difference among those under consideration, a formula incorporating both the numerical rating and a seniority factor is used. To the numerical rating, the district adds .2 point for each year of experience within the district. The employee with the lowest total score is furloughed first. If two or more employees hold equally low scores, furlough is determined by drawing lots. If there is no difference in numerical ratings, professional employees are retained on the basis of seniority.	AASA (1978:67)
VA Prince William County	The district bases dismissal due to a RIF, where two or more teachers have similar seniority, on the teacher's area of competence, certification, teaching endorsement, quality of teaching performance as determined by past evaluations, attendance and previous teaching experience.	AASA (1978:65)
VT Springfield	The Board can terminate up to 20 percent of the total number being laid off without regard to seniority. Factors other than seniority considered by the Board include experience, performance, staff rapport, community relations, needs of the district and community, and the teacher's health.	AASA (1978:68)
WI Janesville	Teachers are laid off according to point totals accrued under a system whereby teachers receive approximately 2 points for each year in the system beyond the first two. To illustrate, the first two years nets a total of 2 points; four years' seniority equals 7 points; nine years equals 17 points. The number of points alloted for training ranges from 1 point for a B.A. degree to 6 for an M.A. and 12 for a doctorate.	IRE Clearinghouse see Policy Model 7E

CHART 7E: A RIF SAMPLER (continued)

SITE: BY STATE AND LOCALITY	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE RIF PROCEDURE	SOURCE: REFERENCE AND/OR AVAILABILITY
WI Janesville (continued)	A teacher is allowed 0 to 5 points for "individual evaluation," which may include 1 point for extracurricular activities. If two or more teachers within a specific curriculum area or grade level have the same number of points, layoffs are determined by the date of the original teaching contract, i.e., strict seniority.	

POLICY MODEL 7D: HYBRID RIF POLICY IN ST. LOUIS, MEHLVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT.* ANNOTATED AND ABRIDGED.

Board philosophy concerning RIF	...primary consideration will be the preservation of the best possible educational program for children and youth.
Discretion in weighing the factors	Factors to be considered in staff reduction. No priority listing is intended. Various combinations of factors related to needs of district and qualifications of the individual teacher will establish priority.
Merit and program factors	■ areas of competence indicated by certification, the individual's grade level or departmental preference, and experience ■ skills in the areas of instructional needs of the district ■ quality of performance...based on regular and special teacher evaluation reports
Seniority factors	■ defined as the length of fulltime contracted employment in the district ■ if all other factors (quality, competence and performance) are reasonably equal, seniority shall become the determining factor for retention
Protection of tenure	No permanent teacher shall be placed on leave of absence while probationary teachers are retained in positions for which a qualified permanent teacher is available.
Districtwide RIF	Reductions should be made in consideration of all teachers in the district rather than building by building.

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* Policy adopted 9/11/77. Communicated to IRE August 1982. Full copies are available from the IRE Clearinghouse on Decline Management.

POLICY MODEL 7E: A COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED RIF PROCEDURE INCORPORATING SENIORITY, ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS: EXCERPTS FROM THE MASTER AGREEMENT IN FORCE IN JANESVILLE, WISCONSIN, APRIL 1981.

DECISION RULE AND POLICY CONSIDERATION	RELEVANT EXCERPT FROM THE MASTER AGREEMENT (ANNOTED AND ABRIDGED)
Protection of Tenure	Board recognized that a staff reduction policy (i.e., RIF of tenured faculty) is not an appropriate instrument to use in place of the existing non-renewal policy.
Recognition of multiple criteria	[RIF decisions] are to be based [on points earned] on the following three factors: successive years in Janesville, level of training, and individual evaluation. Teachers in the affected area [grade level organization, or subject area in H.S.] with the lowest point total will be laid off first.
Weight given to seniority -- through proportional allocation of points.	[The point allocations are depicted in Figure 3, on the next page. Maximum number of points possible for seniority alone is about 59 assuming a retirement age of 65, for "level of training" it is 12, for individual evaluation it is 6.]
-- tie-breaking provisions	[Seniority takes precedence -- if points are equal]...the determining factor will be the date when the individual signed his/her contract.
Weight given to formal qualifications -- i.e., bumping provisions	A teacher...has the right to be transferred within the district into a different field of teaching in which he/she is certifiable without the need for additional credits.

FIGURE 3. POINT SYSTEM USED IN JANESVILLE (WISCONSIN) HYBRID, COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED RIF POLICY*

SENIORITY CONSIDERATIONS		MERIT CONSIDERATIONS		
YEARS OF SERVICE	POINTS	LEVEL OF TRAINING	POINTS	INDIVIDUAL EVALUATION
1	0	Non-Degree	0	0 - 5
2	2	BA + 0	1	
3	5	BA + 6	2	1 point may be granted for extra-curricular activities
4	7	BA + 12	3	
5	9	BA + 18	4	
6	11	BA + 24	5	
7	13			
8	15	MA + 0	6	
9	17	MA + 6	7	
10	19	MA + 12	8	
11	21	MA + 18	9	
12	23	MA + 24	10	
13	25	MA + 30	11	
14	27			
15	29	Ed.D.	12	
EACH YEAR BEYOND 15 ADDS TWO MORE POINTS		MAXIMUM: 12		MAXIMUM: 6

NOTE: Different readers may disagree with the actual allocation of points, biased towards seniority. But we offer Janesville's policy as illustrative of an attempt to "quantify" the value judgements and trade-offs in any RIF policy. Also, the apparent bias towards seniority becomes less, in a district which after long term decline has an aging teacher force, e.g., where the largest block of tenured teachers are 8 - 12 year veterans in the system, a not atypical situation.

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* For related handouts, see Chart 7D, and Policy Model 7E, above.

POLICY MODEL 7 F: HYBRID RIF POLICY WEIGHTED TOWARDS MERIT USING AN EARNED POINT SCALE. IRREDELL COUNTY SCHOOLS, STATESVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

Basic Policy: Staff earn points on three criteria: performance, preparation, and certification, and length of service. Personnel with less than one year of service, and those with the lowest point scores will be released first. Seniority is the tie-breaker, staf reductions are made by category, e.g., K-3 teachers, English teachers, etc.

MERIT CONSIDERATIONS: MAXIMUM 74 POINTS			SENIORITY: LENGTH OF SERVICE MAXIMUM 12 POINTS	
PERFORMANCE: 60 POINTS MAXIMUM	PREPARATION/CERTIFICATION: 14 POINTS MAXIMUM			
Teachers are evaluated and rated on 15 personal and professional competencies. Each item is rated "satisfactory," "needs improvement," or "unsatisfactory." In calculating points for RIF, each teacher is given 2 points for each of the competencies in each of the last two evaluations for a maximum of 60 points. For each competency which is rated "unsatisfactory" 2 points are deducted. The remaining number is the total performance score.	Expired Certificate	0	Iredell	2 points per year
	Class A Certificate	4	Out of County	1 point per year
	Class G Certificate	8		
	Advanced Certificate	12		
	Actively working on any advanced certificate (minimum 8 semester hours in past 12 months)	2		

* IRREDELL COUNTY SCHOOLS, Personnel Policy, Section 4.4.5. Revised 1978. Communicated to IRE March 1982. Full copies of the Policy and Evaluation Instruments can be obtained from the IRE Clearinghouse on Decline Management.

POLICY MODEL 7C: HYBRID RIF POLICY PROVIDING ABSOLUTE PROTECTION FOR BEST QUALIFIED TEACHERS IRRESPECTIVE OF SENIORITY. ELMHURST (ILLINOIS) PUBLIC SCHOOLS*

POLICY CONSIDERATION AND DECISION RULE	RELEVANT EXCERPTS AND LANGUAGE (AGRIDGED) FROM THE DISTRICT POLICY DOCUMENTS
Basic Philosophy	[To respect seniority while still retaining the most qualified staff as measured by performance evaluations, not by credentials.]
Unit of Scope of RIF	RIF is by "area" defined as K-3, 4-6 and in Junior and Senior High by department (i.e., subject area). [But performance criteria apply to building by building, and seniority criteria apply on a districtwide basis.]
Procedures Incorporating Merit Criteria	As a first step, supervisors in each building will develop rank order performance lists, based on teacher evaluations. The top half [where odd numbers are involved, the largest "half" will be considered] in each building will be "protected" from RIF.
Seniority Provisions	[In each building] the remaining half will be vulnerable to reductions. Reductions will be made from each area (i.e., K-3, 4-6, departments at the Senior and Junior H.S.) on the basis of districtwide not building seniority.
-- Bumping	Tenure teachers who have been reduced can bump non-tenure teachers [note: not less senior, and this applies only to the unprotected staff] in a field where that teacher has legal qualifications on the basis of seniority.
-- Rehiring	

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* ELMHURST COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #205, "PROCEDURES TO BE USED FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE," March 1980. Full copy available from IRE Clearinghouse.

PART D:2.3 TEACHER "AGE" AND TEACHER "QUALITY": SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NEW EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION

Part D:2.1, above, discussed the difficulties of objectively measuring "merit." A school system which has not addressed all of those issues may find that a seniority-based RIF system may be a blessing in disguise. Why? Evidence, obtained as a result of Boston University, School of Education's Professor W. Timothy Weaver's ongoing study into the supply, demand and quality of teachers, shows that teachers graduating in the late 1960's and in the early 1970's are likely to be more academically talented than more recent graduates of teacher education.*

THE FACTS

There are of course many ways of defining "quality" of teachers. Academic talent as measured by test scores -- ACT, SAT, GRE and NTE -- is one component of anybody's definition of quality and on that component quality has decline. Consider the following facts:

- The earliest available ACT scores by field of study for college-bound high school seniors (1969-1970) suggest that those students selecting elementary teaching majors fall roughly around the population mean in English, slightly below in math. By 1976, scores for those intending to major in elementary education fall below the population mean on English and math.
- Math scores for enrolled freshmen education majors 1970-1975 show roughly the same pattern. Potential elementary education majors were closer to the population mean in 1970, and drop slightly in English, and

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* These studies have culminated in W. Timothy Weaver's. America's Teacher Quality Problem: Alternatives for Reform, prepared for Praeger Publishers, May 29, 1983.

a bit more in math by 1978. Secondary majors fall roughly around the population mean, or slightly above in English and remain there from 1970 to 1975. Math scores also tend to cluster around the mean but drop slighly below in 1975.

- The SAT scores for college-bound seniors by intended field of study are not available until 1972-73. At that time, those intending to major in all education fields combined fall below the population mean on average for both verbal and math scores. (As a point of reference, consider businessmen and women -- i.e., college-bound high school seniors -- have fallen 10 and 17 points, while potential teachers' scores have fallen 29 and 31 points.)

- The GRE scores for education majors show declines relative to the population mean from 1970 to 1975 -- the latest date for which there is data. NTE scores show roughly the same pattern.

- While the arts and sciences fields show increases between scores of college-bound seniors and scores of students intending to enter these fields four years earlier, the education scores do not (Weaver, 1978). Apparently, whatever sorting there is in teacher education, based on scholastic aptitude, the process does not result in graduates with higher test scores than the potential applicant pool four years earlier. Students graduating with arts and sciences degrees tend to have even higher test scores, relative to all graduates, while education majors tend to have lower test scores relative to all graduates (NLS, 1976).

The unavoidable conclucion is that the majority of new teacher graduates in 1976 fell into the lower half of their college class on skills measured by the SAT, ACT and NLS test battery.

THE EXPLANATION

The situation is easy to explain: the decline in test scores is the direct result of school system decline and retrenchment.

Lower enrollments, fiscal stringency and the cutbacks resulting therefrom reduced the number of teaching jobs available relative to the supply of job seekers. In the halcyon years of the 1960's, schools of education dramatically expanded their output of new graduates -- from about 220,000 graduates in 1967 to 317,000 in 1971. Students graduating in 1971 had entered colleges and universities in 1967, a year in which teachers were in short supply and following a period of several years in which jobs were plentiful and salaries of teachers were rising relative to average salaries for the economy. Unfortunately, the increasing demand for new elementary and secondary teachers slowed in 1969, and began falling rapidly throughout the decade of the 1970's, due of course to demography. In a classic case of "overshoot," schools of education enjoyed their peak years of producing new teachers four years after the job market for new teachers had begun to turn down.

The result was, first, a sudden upsurge in the reserve pool of unemployed teachers: since the mid-1970's, fewer than one-half of the new teacher graduates are being placed in teaching jobs (depending on what assumptions are used, the teacher surplus from 1969 to 1984 may approach 1.4 million). The second result was an equally sudden eclipse of student interests in preparing for teaching careers.

The latter, of course, meant declining enrollments for schools of education. Those schools, unlike public schools, could respond by trying to maintain each school's enrollment and capture a greater market share of a declining pool of clients. In a quite rational attempt to avoid disruptive losses of program and staff, schools of education began to admit more and more applicants by lowering their admissions standards.

The result: the system continued, throughout the 1970's, to overproduce teachers who were increasingly drawn from a less academically talented pool. The consequence for local school managers are counterintuitive: being in a buyers' market is not so advantageous when the available product is declining.

This consequence is produced through the normal operation of rational self-interest. It is rational for taxpayers to reduce teachers as enrollments decline. It is rational for young people not to choose a career in which there are few jobs, salary levels have dropped relative to other professions requiring an equal investment in college tuition, and jobs, especially for younger teachers, are quite insecure. It is also rational, for schools of education, to attract as many young people as possible, in part, by lowering admission standards.

SOME REMEDIES THAT WON'T WORK

The public interest is in reversing the decline-in-talent process just described. There is very little that local school managers can themselves do to arrest or reverse that process (short of the highly unlikely phenomenon of nationwide rapid increases in hiring and pay of teachers). And, Weaver's analysis (his study "built" on econometric supply and demand models simulating labor market conditions for teachers) suggests that some commonly suggested solutions will not work. (Hence, it is not worthwhile for local managers individually or collectively to lobby for them.)

Raising Admission Standards

This is the most direct response. It would (a) upgrade the talent pool of future teachers, and (b) reduce the number of job-seekers relative to jobs, thereby making an education degree more marketable and hence more attractive to the more talented students, but (c) it would also in the near term drastically reduce enrollments in schools of education. And for that very reason, it won't work.

Weaver's econometric model shows that an admission standard of a SAT score equal to the average College Board tested students seeking admission to college would produce a sharp reduction in enrollments and the firing of large numbers of faculty members.

Testing New Teachers

The employment of new teachers could be constrained by examination standards designed to offset declining quality of new graduates and others in the teacher market seeking teaching jobs. This policy would regulate teacher hiring based on the discrepancy between average scores of those available to be hired and a desired score (defined as a SAT score equal to the mean score of College Board tested students seeking admission to colleges). When few meet the standard, the hire rate will be reduced.

The results would be to (a) reduce the fraction of those in the job pool who could be lured at any given time; (b) drive up the average class size in schools as school districts find themselves unable to hire teachers to fill vacancies; (c) drive down the attractiveness of teaching and thus reduce further the quantity and quality of students seeking entrance to schools of education; (d) and drive down acceptance standards of schools of education, thus further reducing the level of quality in the system.

The consequences are counter-intuitive. It seems reasonable to attempt to preserve talent in teaching by establishing what amounts to teacher examination boards. But, unless this intervention is coupled with a means of offsetting the dynamic response of schools of education to further deterioration of the rate of applications, the testing of new teachers as a single-minded solution to the talent drain will likely fall. It seems apparent that the "artificial shortage" of qualified teachers to fill vacancies created by this policy would have a disruptive and potentially unacceptable impact on the teacher labor market. Imagine the situation in which school districts in California or Massachusetts were compelled by state law to hire from only those in the teacher pool with test scores equal to the average college freshman (a standard that would appear at least to be reasonable). Such a standard would reduce school boards' choices to about one-fifth of those entering the market and seeking teaching jobs. Two effects might be expected: (a) serious temporary shortages of qualified teachers offset only by a 50% increase in average class-size; and (b) an upsurge in competitive bidding for those qualified. The first of these effects is unlikely to be politically possible, and the second is unlikely to be economically possible, given present taxpayer attitudes (reinforced by legislative caps in California and Massachusetts).

The net result is likely to be an examination standard for new teachers that migrates to the level of talent in the test taking pool. In short, testing as a condition of employment may be widely implemented but the standards for those tests are unlikely to be set high enough to seriously restrict entry to the teacher force for political and economic reasons. But, that is exactly the consequence necessary for the policy to produce the desired objectives of preventing further talent drain.

Moreover, teacher testing will not produce any substantial change in the scholastic aptitude scores of persons entering the profession. And, it is important to understand the consequences of restricting entry to the profession to those who might comprise the upper quartile or even the upper one-half of academic ability. The majority of high school seniors who historically have sought to enter teaching come not only from families with modest annual incomes, but also rank below mean level on most achievement and aptitude tests taken by college-bound high school seniors.

Given such a restriction, school boards would find themselves competing with corporate boards, consulting and research firms, law firms, hospitals, and medical centers for the highest academic achievers in this society. The present shortage of science and math teachers is slight in comparison to the problems such a policy would create.

Raising Certification Standards

We can envision which intensifies and lengthens teacher preparation: the length of time to complete requirements for the professional certificate from four to five years. When tested in Professor Weaver's econometric model, the net effect of this change is to delay by one year the system's adjustment to the oversupply of teachers and subsequent quality decline. While this strategy has wide support, its effect on the quality problem, to the extent quality and qualification are understood to have different meanings, is likely to be inconsequential. This is not to say the policy is undesirable. It may be very desirable to increase the paper qualifications of those entering the profession, but what research there is suggests that paper qualifications are more a matter of political i.e., professional) than educational significance (cf. Weaver, 1978).

Moreover, such a policy may have several counter-intuitive effects. First, while certification may influence exit requirements, the deeper problem rests with the selection of candidates to be trained, and with the total manner in which professional educators are prepared. Certification reform may speak to the teaching competencies for which faculties of education are responsible, but the actual development of verbal and quantitative skills is more the responsibility of the arts and sciences faculty. The teacher who cannot write effectively, or explain number sets, or speak convincingly in public has failed to develop such basic skills under the watchful eyes of professors of English, mathematics and the humanities. If we wish to take seriously the idea that teacher competencies include high level scholastic skills, then it must be recognized that the entire college faculty is responsible for preparing teachers because one-half or more of the undergraduate preparation of teachers takes place in the arts and sciences departments. Second, the ultimate selection process rests with school districts. Given minimum competency requirements, the latitude will remain broad. Earlier findings do not suggest that school hiring practices now screen new teachers on the basis of the academic quality, and there is no reason to believe that competency-based certification will change that condition much (Weaver, 1979).

A FINAL NOTE: A NEW TEACHER SHORTAGE?

Just as we are now beginning to understand the effects of enrollment decline on the post-secondary schools which prepare public school teachers, the boom-bust cycle is shifting. The projection data reported (NCES, Condition of Education, 1982) show that overall teacher demand will begin to increase around the middle of the decade. Given a depletion of the teacher reserve pool, the most likely scenario for the period 1985-1990 is a shortage of new teachers to fill demand, bearing in mind that the demand increases will be primarily at the lower grade levels. If history repeats itself, the shift from declining to increasing demand will create a shortage of new teachers for 5 - 8 years to be followed by another period of oversupply. The restoration of quality will be gradual and it will probably take another ten years to reach the level of talent seeking entry to the field in the period of the late 1960's.

MATH AND SCIENCE TEACHER SHORTAGES

Shortages of math and science teachers are already being reported, particularly in economic regions where private sector competition is high (Useem, 1982). Solving this problem, as a separate matter, would require differentiating salary incentives. Where competitive wage bidding results in math and science majors rejecting teaching as a career, school systems which wish to attract highly qualified math and science teachers will be forced to offer high salary incentives. The resistance to this solution will likely come from the teaching profession itself. Merit pay and other forms of differentiating salaries, apart from seniority and credentials, have met with a less than enthusiastic response from organized teacher groups.

The paradox is that the teaching fields oversupplied now have also been in the past while others have always been in short supply historically without apparent affect on compensation policies. The science and math teacher shortage has not had the effect of attracting more students into preparation programs or into the job market. We assume this is the case not because a new law of supply and demand is at work but because demand is being satisfied at the expense of quality. Given the choice of no math or science teacher versus employing a poorly qualified teacher, school districts are forced to choose the lesser evil. Given no choice in compensation policies which fail to recognize competitive bidding differences within teaching fields, the present condition is likely to continue unless overall supply/demand conditions force all teachers' salaries higher.

Again, if history repeats itself, a relatively constant fraction of students in the total pool of school of education entrants will choose math and science teaching majors. Unless human beings become much less self-interested, no amount of "preaching" about the importance of math and science, and no amount of upgrading of math and science education programs, will change that fraction, given the job market conditions. To the extent that these assumptions prove to be correct, there may not be a rising level of "supply" of math and science teachers. If the present growth in the technology industries with accompanying demand pressure for people with quantitative aptitudes continues, and if this pressure is acting as a drain on math and science talent in teaching, the longer term solution will not occur spontaneously with a rebound in teacher hiring. The condition we see now may be expected to worsen unless and until the attractiveness of preparing to be a math and science teacher is competitive with the attractiveness of employment in the private sector.

APPENDIX: IMPACT OF HIGH SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION: A CASE ANALYSIS*

INTRODUCTION

Does an expanded curriculum, made possible by high school consolidation, benefit all students equally? Does consolidation increase student participation in extra-curricular affairs? Does consolidation increase school retention? Does consolidation improve learning results?

Any programmatic rationale for closing and consolidating high schools has to assume a "yes" answer to each of the above questions.

In this section, we offer some impact data which test each of those assumptions in one setting. The impact data come from a longitudinal study of the effects of high school consolidation in Preston County, West Virginia. After a bitter controversy, Preston County consolidated its eight high schools into five in 1977.

Preston County is sparsely settled and relatively poor. It lags behind United States averages on most SES indices. 1980-81 enrollment in all schools grades K-12 was 6,606. Enrollment projections show a continued gradual decline, levelling off at approximately 5,363 students in 1984-85. In 1976, there were eight high schools in the county, ranging in size from 24 seniors to 108 seniors. Several of the school buildings were antiquated and, indeed, two elementary school buildings were acknowledged to be structurally unsafe. The generally poor physical condition of the county's schools was uncontested by all parties in the conslidation debate. What was at issue were the putative educational and curricular advantages of consolidation.

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* This section was authored by W. Timothy Weaver (with the assistance of Ron Binkney). Weaver served as Principal Investigator for the project which produced this handbook. Weaver analyzed and updated materials on a controversial high school consolidation effort (see Section Four, Part D:1.2, above) in Preston County, West Virginia, especially for this handbook. The setting may not be nationally representative, but the issues emerging in that debate were generic and touched upon many of the policy choices focused on in this handbook.

DOES AN EXPANDED CURRICULUM BENEFIT ALL STUDENTS EQUALLY?

The public policy question is: did the students who "lost" their local high school benefit from the wider range of courses offered at their new, reassigned school?

Two sets of data are used to estimate the effect of consolidation on student distributions among various course options. The first set of data are used to compute the 1978-79 participation rates of reassigned and non-reassigned students in 31 courses new to all affected students in the three consolidated high schools. Participation rate is defined as a ratio: students registed in the new courses divided by total students in the group. The second set of data examines pre- and post-consolidation distributions of students in 14 basic courses offered before and after reorganization in the East Preston attendance area.

The data on the new course registrations shows three things: first, approximately the same ratio of reassigned and non-reassigned students are registered in the 31 courses on average (Table A). Second, reassigned students tended to take the basic courses more frequently than non-reassigned students (.289 and .241) while non-reassigned students tended to take the advanced courses with more frequency (.173 and .125). The average class sizes in the basic subjects was substantially smaller than in the advanced subjects (Table B). These data suggest a trend in which reassigned students registered more frequently for the larger basic classes and non-reassigned students for the smaller advanced classes.

The second set of data examines the course enrollments in 14 basic courses offered before and after consolidation in one of the affected attendance areas (East Preston): four English, four mathematics, three science, and three social studies courses.

Table C shows that average class sizes increased from about 24 students per class to about 26. The greatest increase is in the science group (22.2 to

TABLE A: DISTRIBUTION OF REASSIGNED AND NON-REASSIGNED STUDENTS IN COURSES NEW TO AFFECTED STUDENTS AFTER CONSOLIDATION

	Basic[a] Courses	Advanced[b] Courses	Total New Courses	Student Population
Reassigned Students	136	59	195	470
Ratio =	(.289)	(.125)	(.415)	
Non-Reassigned Students	260	186	446	1,077
Ratio =	(.241)	(.173)	(.414)	

Source: Preston County School Records as provided in "School Progress Reports," 1979.

[a] Basic Courses: reading 10-11; basic math 9; consumer math; pre-algebra; safety education; IAI; mechanical drawing 1; general music; beginning band; music appreciation; individual music; art 1; arts and crafts; world geography; personal typing.

[b] Advanced Courses: journalism; political science; economics/sociology; psychology; ecology; German II; French II; Algebra II; physics, mechanical drawing II; art II; stage band.

TABLE B: AVERAGE CLASS SIZES IN NEW ADVANCED AND BASIC COURSES IN THREE CONSOLIDATED HIGH SCHOOLS

	Basic Courses	Advanced Courses
Enrollment	240	291
Sections	16	13
Average Class Size	15.0	22.0

Source: Preston County School Records as provided in "School Progress Report," 1979.

29.3). Overall, the odds are about two to one that students in the East Preston attendance area would attend larger classes after consolidation than before. The data also show that fluctuations in class sizes before consolidation are "smoothed" afterward. The assignment of teachers before and after consolidation shows that approximately one less teacher was assigned to the

TABLE C: AVERAGE CLASS SIZE BEFORE AND AFTER CONSOLIDATION, EAST PRESTON ATTENDANCE AREA

Courses	Average Class Size (Students Per Class Section)			
	Aurora H.S. (only)[a]	Terra Alta H.S. (only)[a]	Both Schools[b]	East Preston Consolidated[c]
English 9	26.0	21.8	23.4	29.5
English 10	19.8	26.0	23.2	24.0
English 11	24.0	24.2	24.1	23.3
English 12	24.0	25.8	25.0	25.6
Total English	23.2	24.4	23.9	25.6
Math. 9	16.5	26.0	22.2	27.0
Algebra I	18.0	21.0	19.7	19.3
Geometry	16.5	--	16.5	26.0
Math. 12	22.0	23.0	22.6	25.5
Total Math.	18.2	23.1	20.8	23.6
Science 9	20.0	23.3	22.0	29.3
Biology I	35.5	26.0	28.7	25.5
Chemistry	16.0	12.0	14.0	17.0
Total Science	21.6	22.5	22.2	26.2
Am. St. I	25.7	23.4	24.3	30.0
Am. St. II	36.0	29.4	31.9	33.0
World C. I	36.0	22.8	26.6	24.7
Total Soc. St.	32.1	25.2	27.6	29.3
All listed above	23.6	25.0	24.4	26.2

Note: Data are taken from "Daily Schedules for High Schools," in "Consolidation Progress Report" to Mr. Jennings, Feb. 12, 1979.

[a] Data for Aurora H.S. and for Terra Alta H.S. are averages, computed from class enrollments for the two school years prior to 1977 reorganization (i.e., 1975-76 and 1976-77).

[b] Data for "Both Schools" are averages computed from class enrollments at either Aurora H.S. or Terra Alta H.S. for the two school years prior to 1977 reorganization.

[c] Data for East Preston Consolidated are average class enrollments for the second year of operation as a consolidated school (i.e., 1978-79). Data for the first year were not available in the sources cited in Note.

Source: Dr. John Grasso, West Virginia University, June 1980.

14 courses and a reduction in sections devoted to these basic subjects made it possible to "save" one teaching position; presumeably that position was reassigned to the expanded program. Further examination shows that the average class size in the newly added courses at East Preston is lower than the average class size in these 14 basic courses (18.4 and 26.0). Thus, an increase in enrollments in basic subjects is partly accountable for the expansion of the curriculum at East Preston.

DOES CONSOLIDATION INCREASE EXTRA-CURRICULAR PARTICIPATION?

Data from school district records (years 1975-76, 1977-78, 1978-79) are used to estimate the effects of consolidation on participation in extracurricular activities. Participation rate is computed as the average number of participations per student (activities participated in by all students grades 7-12). In some cases, a student may have participated in several activities ranging from sports to clubs. The actual number of activities of a particular student is not calculated. For 1976 (the year before consolidation), the total district-wide participation ratio was 1.25 participations per pupil, on average, grades 7-12 (Table D).

The participation data are divided into two sets: students unaffected by consolidation and students affected (reassigned and non-reassigned). The base year ratio for unaffected students was 0.99 and for affected students 1.31. Table D contains the ratios for years 1976 through 1978 for all groups as well as average annual ratio of change. The results show the post-consolidation period produced a decline in participations for affected students while for unaffected students participation rates increased. The decline in participation is unequally distributed among students affected by consolidation. For reassigned students, participation declined on average about 31% per year following consolidation. For non-reassigned students, participation rates increased 9 percent per year.

The decline in participation is assumed to be due to two factors: long-distance shuttling for the reassigned students and a net reduction in participation opportunities relative to the number of students enrolled in the

TABLE D: PARTICIPATION IN EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES 1976-1978. (NOTE: BASE NUMBER OF STUDENTS SHOWN IN PARENTHESES)

Students in Communities That Were...	Participation Ratio[a]			Average Annual Rate of Change[b] 1976-1987
	1976	1977	1978	
Unaffected by 1977 Reorganization	0.99 (487)	1.36 (497)	1.22 (513)	+11% per year
Affected by 1977 Reorganization	1.31 (2382)	1.17 (1851)	1.25 (2436)	-2% per year
--Attending Local Schools	-	1.42 (1069)	1.57 (1614)	+9% per year
--Attending Distant Schools	-	0.83 (782)	0.62 (822)	-31% per year

[a] Participation ratio is the number of total participations divided by the number of students. Participation data is taken from Weaver and Lilley, March 1979, Table 6; enrollment data is taken from Preston County Schools proposed 1979 Amendment to Comprehensive Facilities Plan, pp. B-18 through B-27.

[b] Average annual rate of change is computed using formula for increasing a sum by an interest rate compounded annually.

Source: Dr. John Grasso, West Virginia University, June 1980.

three consolidated schools. The trend over the three year period following consolidation shows monotomic decreases for the reassigned students (1.31, 0.82, 0.62) while for non-reassigned students participation increased monotonically (1.31, 1.42, 1.57). The evidence seems to suggest differential effects of consolidation dependent upon reassignment or non-reassignment.

In summary, consolidation has had a profound effect on the school experience of students whose schools were closed, as school experience is measured by student involvement in extra-curricular activities. Looking at all of the communities as a whole, including those where schools were not closed, the most serious injury is found among students whose community high schools were eliminated. The evidence is very clear that students from Aurora, Newburg, Tunnelton and Fellowsville (reassigned to distant schools) do not experience an involvement in school life in consolidated schools that even approaches the levels experienced in their original community schools.

We haven't studied systematically the actual quality of changes in school participation in Preston County, but we suspect we would find essentially what Barker and Gump found in Kansas. With regard to the quality of leadership involvements, Barker and Gump report that evidence clearly favors the small school. The authors state:

> Furthermore, a much larger proportion of the small school students held positions of importance and responsibility in the behavior settings they entered, and they occupied these positions in more varieties of settings than students of the large school (p. 196).

With regard to satisfaction, small schools reported "more satisfaction relating to (1) the development of competence, (2) to being challenged, (3) to engaging in important actions, (4) to being involved in group activities, and (5) to achieving moral and cultural values." Large schools reported more satisfaction with "gaining 'points' via participation" (p. 197).

Writing in the same book, W.J.Campbell concludes:

> This study of consolidating effects suggests that if the small local students were transferred to a county high school they would probably undergo the following changes in experience: an increase in the number of school settings...; and a decrease in (1) external pressures aimed at increasing their participations in extracurricular activities; (2) sense of personal responsibility associated with extracurricular activities; (3) number of school settings penetrated to the performance level; (4) range of supervisory settings penetrated; (5) number of school settings judged to be most worthwhile; and (6) number of satisfactions associated with physical well-being, acquired knowledge and developing intellectual interests, developing a self-concept and zest for living (p. 125).

DOES CONSOLIDATION INCREASE SCHOOL RETENTION?

Data for the school years 1975-76 (the year before consolidation), 1976-77, 1977-87 and 1978-79 from school district records are used to compute two sets of estimates on the effects of consolidation: (a) high school dropout rates, and (b) pupil retention rates. The term "dropout" is defined as an official termination of a student at the high school level (not transferring to another school).

The dropout rate is estimated by computing the number of dropouts per 100 students enrolled in grades 11 and 12. Table E shows the following: (a) no difference in dropout rates for students in unaffected communities (not reorganized) and among those continuing to attend local but reorganized schools (non-reassigned); and (b) among students reassigned to consolidated schools, the dropout rate approximately doubled after the 1977 school reorganization.

Pupil retention rates show essentially the same pattern (Table F). Retention rates did not change after the 1977 reorganization in the unaffected communities. Retention rates fell among both groups of affected students (reassigned and non-reassigned) but the drop in retention rate was greater among students reassigned to distant schools (14.7 and 5.5 points).

DO STUDENTS LEARN MORE?

Two sources of data are used to estimate the effects of consolidation on student achievement. The first source of data consists of annual cumulative grade-point averages for students affected and unaffected by consolidation. The second data set consists of test scores for affected and unaffected students. The grade-point average data is for a single cohort in the ninth grade in 1975-76 and continuing in grades 10, 11 and 12 in subsequent years (1976, 1977, 1978). For each subject school district officials provided the cumulative GPA for 10th, 11th and 12th grades. The test score data consists of 9th and 11th grade test scores for four cohort groups beginning in 1976-77 (the year before consolidation) and the years subsequent (1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80). The analysis of achievement data is reported below.

Grade-Point Average (GPA)

Post-consolidation GPA (cumulative annual GPA for students in 12th grade in 1978) is regressed on prior GPA (10th and 11th grade) and on other school and personal characteristics: IQ, sex, attendance of vocational school, attendance and reassignment to consolidated school, attendance but not reassigned to consolidated school, unaffected (not attending consolidated school).

TABLE E: HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT RATES, 1975-1979

Students in Communities That Were...	Dropout Rates Per Hundred[a]			
	Prior to 1977 Reorganization		After 1977 Reorganization	
	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79
Unaffected by 1977 reorganization	18	21	22	20
Affected by 1977 reorganization				
-- attending local schools	17	18	17	16
-- attending distant schools	21	21	40	17

[a] Rates per hundred = (a + b) times 100.00 where
a = number of dropouts, from memo to W.T. Weaver from P.W. Rosier, Assistant Superintendent, "Summary of Drop-outs (1975-79)," dated July 20, 1979.
b = number of 11th and 12th grade students enrolled from each attendance area, from Myers and Rosier, 1979, pp. B-18 through B-27)

Source: Dr. John Grasso, West Virginia University, June 1980.

Table G shows that 12th grade GPA is most powerfully explained by 11th grade GPA followed by 10th grade GPA. But independent of the effects of prior GPA, the data show that attendance of a consolidated high school affects GPA negatively for both reassigned and non-reassigned students. Reassigned students are more negatively affected but differences are small. For both affected groups the effect of attending a consolidated school is about one-quarter point lower (e.g., about the differences between an average "B" and a "B-").

Effects of Consolidation on Achievement Test Scores

The test score data used to estimate the effects of consolidation on achievement consists of the following:

a. 9th grade total scale scores on the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills for reading, language and mathematics and total battery; scores exist for students tested in the 9th grade and again in

TABLE F: RETENTION OF STUDENTS IN HIGH SCHOOL, 1974-1979

Students in Communities That Were...	Pupil Retention Rates[a]		Change In Average Retention Rate[d]
	Average Rate For Two Years Prior to 1977 Consolidation[b]	Average Rate For Two Years After 1977 Consolidation[c]	
Unaffected by 1977 Consolidation	94.5	94.5	0.0
Affected and Attended Local Schools	95.2	89.7	-5.5 points
Affected and Attended Distant Schools	99.0	84.3	-14.7 points

[a] Pupil retention rates computed by (a-b) times 100.0, where a = number of 10th and 11th grade students in a year
b = number of 11th and 12th grade students in following year

[b] Includes simple average of rates for:
(1) 1974-75 10th and 11th graders vs. 1975-76 11th and 12th graders
(2) 1975-76 10th and 11th graders vs. 1976-77 11th and 12th graders

[c] Includes simple average of rates for:
(1) 1976-77 10th and 11th graders vs. 1977-78 11th and 12th graders
(2) 1977-78 10th and 11th graders vs. 1978-79 11th and 12th graders

[d] Simple difference in rates.

Source: Dr. John Grasso, West Virginia University, June 1880.

TABLE G: REGRESSION FOR GRADE POINT AVERAGE OF STUDENTS IN PRESTON COUNTY

Dependent Variable	Mean	S. D.
12th Grade GPA	2.79	0.78
Explanatory Variables	**Coeff.**	**t-value**
IQ score	.002	1.04
Sex (1=male)	-.127	-2.24
Vocational student (1=yes)	.079	1.49
11th Grade GPA	.595	10.02
10th Grade GPA	.194	3.34
Consolidation Status:		
--Reassigned to distant school	-.269	-3.29
--Attended local enlarged school	-.211	-2.81
--Unaffected	(reference group)	
Intercepted term	.725	--

Adj. R Squared = .64
F-ratio (7,338) = 91.25
n = 346

Source: Dr. John Grasso, West Virginia University, June 1980.

the 11th grade; separate files are created for four cohorts entering the 9th grade in Fall of 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979, and the 11th grade in Fall of 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981.*

b. 9th grade Cognitive Abilities Test** scores for students entering 9th grade in Fall of 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979.

c. Separate files exist for each cohort by community of residence and by sex.

d. Additional data on travel distance to school, averaged

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* For details, see CTBS, Expanded Edition, Level 4, Form 5, McGraw-Hill, 1974.

** For details see Technical Manual, Multi-Level Edition, Houghton Mifflin, 1974 and Examiners Manual, Form 1, Levels A-H, Grades 3-12, Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

TABLE H: SUMMARY TABLE OF TESTED SAMPLES

	Entered 9th Grade	Entered 11th Grade	Total Number of Subjects
Cohort One	1976	1978	363
Cohort Two	1977	1979	332
Cohort Three	1978	1980	373
Cohort Four	1979	1981	361

community SES variables, attendance of vocational center and school size exist for students in each of the four cohorts.

The above test score data were provided by the school district and were collected as part of the regular annual school testing program begun in 1976-1977. The data include students affected and unaffected by school consolidation over the four year period beginning in 1976-77 (see Table H). A control group exists in the form of students attending two small high schools in the district unaffected by consolidation. Both of these unaffected schools offered essentially the same program before and after consolidation.

The data analyses which follow are based on the Tallmadge and Wood (1976) model, and address collectively the following question: How much more did students in Preston County's consolidated schools learn than they would have learned without consolidated schools? This question requires an estimate of what the performance gain of students would have been without the experimental program, in this case high school consolidation.

The data are treated in two ways to answer the above question: first, the four cohort groups (years 1976-78, 1977-79, 1978-80, 1979-81) are analyzed separately as cross sections; second, the files are analyzed longitudinally for year-to-year differences (years 1976-1979). The initial testing year includes students in 9th grade in 1976 and 11th grade in 1978, providing a sample of students entering high school in the first year and subsequent years (reassigned and non-reassigned) with students unaffected in each cohort group, an estimate based on four repeated cycles of consolidation is possible. The longitudinal analysis provides an estimate of consolidation effects over time relative to the base year 1976-77.

Cross Sectional Analysis

The data for cross sectional analysis is first grouped into three samples for each of the four years: (1) students affected by consolidation and reassigned to distant schools; (2) students affected by consolidation but not reassigned; and (3) students unaffected by consolidation. The four tables that follow show the adjusted 11th grade CTBS scores (total battery, math, language and reading) for the four cohort groups: 9th grade in 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979 and 11th grade in 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981. In each of the analyses, the 9th grade test score is used as a covariate (e.g., 9th grade total battery is covaried with 11th grade total battery) to produce a net gain score. The adjusted means represent the estimated cumulative effect of the high school experience minus the effect of students' entry achievement level.

With one exception, none of the findings are significant in the four cycles of reorganization beginning in 1977-78 (see Table I on the next pages). The one exception is the 11th grade math score in the 1978-80 cohort group. The difference is small but significant (.05 level) and shows an adjusted score for the non-reassigned students approximately one-quarter standard deviation higher than unaffected students. That math score difference is explored further below.

Math Score in the 1978-80 Cohort

The table below (Table J) shows the adjusted 11th grade math scores of the three samples with the added effects of travel distance to schools. The results show that the F ratio is smaller (4.608 and 3.853) but the difference among means remains significant. When distance traveled to school and 9th grade math aptitude are combined with 9th grade math CTBS score as covariates, the adjusted F ratio declines to a level just below statistical significance at .05 (Table K).

TABLE I: ADJUSTED MEANS OF 11TH GRADE CTBS SCORES FOR STUDENTS AFFECTED AND UNAFFECTED BY SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION. ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE USING 9TH GRADE CTBS SCORE COVARIATED.

TEST ITEM	UNAFFECTED	AFFECTED (REASSIGNED)	AFFECTED (NOT REASSIGNED)	F RATIO
1976-79 Cohort	N = 77	N = 100	N = 186	
Total Battery	601.9	607.5	605.2	0.361
Mathematics	585.5	590.7	596.4	1.503
Language	572.9	587.1	578.0	1.790
Reading	614.8	606.0	606.4	0.719
1977-79 Cohort	N = 50	N = 88	N = 194	
Total Battery	599.0	614.9	605.1	2.241
Mathematics	571.9	590.6	582.4	1.978
Language	586.9	600.2	589.3	1.423
Reading	614.0	614.4	609.9	0.306
1978-80 Cohort	N = 60	N = 105	N = 208	
Total Battery	578.1	587.2	591.7	2.064
Mathematics	555.9	568.9	578.6	4.608*
Language	577.0	565.5	574.3	1.020
Reading	590.8	598.3	595.9	0.351
* (.05)				
1979-1981 Cohort	N = 63	N = 99	N = 199	
Total Battery	593.1	597.9	603.1	1.604
Mathematics	569.7	576.6	582.6	1.550
Language	585.9	583.9	586.4	0.078
Reading	602.3	603.7	607.9	0.394

TABLE J: ADJUSTED 11th GRADE MATH SCORES FOR STUDENTS AFFECTED AND UNAFFECTED BY SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION

Analysis of Covariance Using 9th Grade Math Scores and Travel as Covariates (1978-80 Cohort).

Unaffected	Affected (Reassigned)	Affected (Not Reassigned)	F
n = 60	n = 105	n = 205	
555.1	573.9	576.3	3.853*

N = 373 df = 2,368

* (.05)

TABLE K: ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE USING 9th GRADE MATH SCORE (CTBS), TRAVEL AND COGNITIVE ABILITY IN MATH (CATM) AS COVARIATES (1978-80) COHORT

UNAFFECTED	AFFECTED (REASSIGNED)	AFFECTED (NOT REASSIGNED)	F
554.3	571.2	577.8	3.483

N = 373 df 2,368

The three student samples are recomposed in order to examine pair-wise differences in adjusted 11th grade math scores. Table L shows the results of comparing 11th grade means of two groups: students unaffected by consolidation and students affected but not reassigned. The difference between the groups is significant (F = 9.101, p = .01).

TABLE L: PAIR-WISE COMPARISON USING ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE WITH 9th GRADE MATH SCORE AS THE COVARIATE (1978-80 COHORT)

UNAFFECTED	AFFECTED (NOT REASSIGNED)
n = 60	n = 208
556.5	579.0

N = 268 df = 1,265

* (.01)

Students unaffected by consolidation, in this cohort, begin 9th grade with an average math score about 9 points higher than those attending consolidated schools (but not reassigned). After adjusting 11th grade scores the unaffected students average about 23 points lower than the affected students in math achievement.

The next table (Table M) shows a pair-wise comparison of students unaffected and affected (reassigned to distant schools). The 11th grade scores are adjusted by 9th grade math scores. The difference is not significant.

However, when distance traveled to the school is entered as a covariate (Table N), the difference between those affected (reassigned) and unaffected increases to a level of significance (F = 4.25, p = .05).

TABLE M: PAIR-WISE COMPARISON USING ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE WITH 9th GRADE MATH SCORE AS COVARIATE (1978-80)

UNAFFECTED		AFFECTED (REASSIGNED)	F
558.3		571.4	2.055
N = 165	df = 1,162		

TABLE N: PAIR-WISE COMPARISON USING ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE WITH 9th GRADE MATH SCORE AND TRAVEL AS COVARIATES

UNAFFECTED		AFFECTED (REASSIGNED)	F
n = 60		n = 105	
551.1		575.5	4.250*
N = 165	df = 1,162		

* (.05)

It appears from this cohort analysis that the students attending consolidated schools and bused long distances did not benefit from whatever factor produced the net gain for consolidated students not bused. (Table O shows the average travel distance from home to school for each of the three groups affected and unaffected by consolidation.) This finding, though, limited to only one of four cohort groups (the others showing no difference) suggests that achievement in mathematics might have been affected by consolidation but the effect is paradoxical: for those students living relatively close to the school

TABLE O: AVERAGE TRAVEL DISTANCE FROM HOME TO HIGH SCHOOL FOR STUDENTS AFFECTED AND UNAFFECTED BY CONSOLIDATION

UNAFFECTED	AFFECTED (REASSIGNED)	AFFECTED (NOT REASSIGNED)
5.7 miles	16.1 miles	3.5 miles

there appear to be benefits; for those living a long distance from the school those benefits are cancelled by the travel factor.

It would appear that in the four cycles of consolidation (1978-1980), the effects of consolidation, using as an experimental group students from reassigned and non-reassigned communities, are about what would be expected if there had not been consolidation. In short, the treatment groups, minus control groups, yield no significant effects that can be attributed to consolidation (with the exception of the one math score noted).

Longitudinal Analysis

Test score data for each of the four years of consolidation are treated as separate samples to determine year to year differences. Each of the three student groups (unaffected, affected/reassigned and affected/non-reassigned) is analyzed separately using the 9th grade score as a control variable and 11th grade score as the dependent variable. Tables P - R report the results for each of the three groups.

TABLE P: ADJUSTED 11th GRADE CTBS SCORES FOR AFFECTED BUT NON-REASSIGNED STUDENTS N = 787 of 3,782

Test Item	1978 n=186	1979 n=194	1980 n=208	1981 n=199	F
Total Battery	608.5	605.1	597.6	610.8	2.011
Math	596.8	584.8	585.7	589.6	2.097
Language	586.9	590.0	583.5	593.6	1.345
Reading	615.9	608.3	606.2	611.4	1.316

The results generally show year to year fluctuations in adjusted 11th grade CTBS scores but the only significant change across years is in the

TABLE Q: ADJUSTED 11th GRADE CTBS SCORES FOR AFFECTED AND REASSIGNED STUDENTS N = 392 of 3,387

Test Item	1978 n=100	1979 n=88	1980 n=105	1981 n=99	F
Total Battery	598.8	599.0	581.6	588.4	3.414
Math	582.9	584.4	566.8	574.5	2.476
Language	580.3	584.1	556.7	572.7	4.920
Reading	599.6	598.1	594.3	592.6	0.393

TABLE R: ADJUSTED 11th GRADE CTBS SCORES FOR UNAFFECTED STUDENTS WITH 9th GRADE CTBS SCORES COVARIED N = 250 of 3,245

Test Item	1978 n=77	1979 n=50	1980 n=60	1981 n=60	F
Total Battery	587.9	587.4	576.4	588.1	2.470
Math	576.9	565.1	553.1	565.3	2.438
Language	571.9	575.1	573.9	580.5	0.2805
Reading	615.3	603.2	591.4	597.4	2.138

affected/reassigned student group. The data appear to show a decline in language skills for students affected by consolidation and traveling long distances to school ($F = 4.920$, $p = .05$).

SUMMARY

Achievement Outcomes: Grade Point Average

The findings in Preston County are consistent with the literature on GPA, which shows a high degree of association between teacher evaluations of student performance and independent measures of student cognitive skills. Moreover, the association holds even after the effects of such factors as SES and type of school program are controlled. This is true nationally and it is true in Preston County.

The best single predictor of future scholastic success for students during after high school appears to be high school record (Fetters and Melone, 1978;

Brenner, 1968; Ford and Campos, 1977; Meyer, 1972). School performance based on grades has proven to be a better predictor of job success than either SAT or ACT scores alone and equally as predictor of job success relative to test scores (Brenner, 1968). Under these circumstances, it seems important to take seriously the effects consolidation may have on grades.

In the Preston County data, two findings are important. First, GPA declines after consolidation for both reassigned and non-reassigned students. Second, the decline for reassigned students is greater, and particularly among those reassigned, boys' grades tended to decline more than girls'. The negative effects of non-involvement, distance traveled to school, and adjustment to a larger school with reduced opportunities to become an integrated part of school life, all may contribute to GPA declines for reassigned boys.

Achievement Outcomes: Test Scores

Three basic findings emerge from the four year period following consolidation: (1) with the exception of math achievement in one of four cohorts, the effects of consolidation on achievement using two unaffected schools as controls, are minimal; (2) with regard to the single exception, math, the non-reassigned students have higher scores than the control, but reassigned students do not; however, when travel distance is covaried on 11th grade math scores, reassigned students have scores higher than the control; and (3) longitudinal effects, with the exception of language achievement in one cohort, show no significant change over time for experimental or control groups; the single exception shows significant decline in language skills of reassigned students who travel long distances to consolidated schools.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings in Preston County are consistent with two decades of research into the effects of schooling on achievement. Some schools simply produce better results than others but the factors which explain those differences have virtually nothing to do with consolidation, the quantity or variety of course offerings, school size, teacher credentials, facilities, materials, or funds expended. The differences have a great deal to do with students' entry aptitude, family background, and perhaps the manner and intensity with which individual teachers conduct their lessons (Summers, et al., 1979) but these conditions are wholly separate and independent of the community schools versus consolidation argument. As we have outlined, in Preston County achievement benefits over a four year period cannot be attributed to consolidation. It turns out that the odds of attending the "best" high school in the county, in terms of producing total achievement gains, favor neither community high school (unconsolidated) nor the three consolidated high schools. The odds of achieving higher than average math scores favor the non-reassigned students while the odds of achieving lower than average language scores favor (or disfavor) the reassigned students -- both groups attending consolidated schools.

Therefore, the initial research question, do students learn more as a result of consolidation, must be answered negatively in Preston.

Math achievement increased for those students geographically closest to consolidated schools and who on average attended more of the smaller classes newly created for those consolidated schools. On the other hand, achievement in language skills among the reassigned student group declined over the four year period (but not for any other group). The reassigned students were bused long distances, compared to non-reassigned students, and tended on average to be in larger, basic courses, but less frequently in smaller advanced courses. Finally, the data on GPA tended to show larger decreases for reassigned students than non-reassigned students.

In summary, the data from this study tend to show the following: (1) on the whole, test score results are consistent with previous studies: minimal effects but where significant effects are found, the conditions described tend to be consistent with previous research, i.e., where students benefit from consolidation, conditions tend to be optimal (limited travel and small classes) and where students show deteriorating skills over time, conditions are sub-optimal (long travel distance and underrepresentation in small classes); (2) financial gains in operating costs appear to be the product of increased class sizes, and such gains are off-set by transportation diseconomies; (3) participation in the extra-curricular activities falls dramatically for students bused long distances to consolidate schools, while those nearby tend to have increased opportunities; and (4) the community division regarding support for consolidation appears on the surface to be a function of SES factors, but further probing reveals a significant common concern that transcends education and wealth, namely, distance a child will be removed from home and community by the location of new, consolidated schools.

SECTION EIGHT

SECTION EIGHT: PRESERVING EQUITY

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PART A: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND OVERVIEW

We define equity initiatives as those *de jure* entitlements that previously disadvantaged populations (disadvantaged either by racial or linguistic minority status and the resultant discrimination, or by having educational needs previously unmet by the regular school program) now enjoy, often as a result of external mandates. Operationally, equity means school desegregation, special and compensatory education, and affirmative action in hiring and retaining school staff.

Thus defined, equity issues pose some rather special problems for decline managers.

Because many, indeed most, equity initiatives are externally mandated, there is very little that local school managers can do to or for equity initiatives as the school system retrenches. An equity entitlement, as long as it establishes a legal liability on the part of the school system (James Breeden offers the succinct definition of "equity as anything that can get you into court, if you don't do it") is thus protected from local cutback. And this fact is recognized in much of the professional literature which treats equity initiatives as an external constraint (see the concept of "curriculum statutes" in Hentschke, 1981), or an externally imposed "educational overburden" (Minnesota, 1976). Thus understood, equity is a "constant" rather than a "variable" in retrenchment decisionmaking.

Second, because external mandates create an entitlement for targeted groups in the schools' population, they create some very special and powerful interest groups, thus complicating an already complicated political landscape for school systems in decline.

Third, any more deregulation may provide school systems with more discretion, but that will not eliminate local pressure for the "educational overburden" of equity. The interests and interest groups created by externally mandated entitlements will not disappear simply because external mandates are related. Deregulation, in fact, turns an external constraint into a local problem.

The local problem is exacerbated by yet another historical feature of equity initiatives: their introduction into schooling and their expansion coincided generally with the period of growth in public education. The way in which equity became a part of the educational system betrays the characteristics of that historical period. Equity initiatives were classic examples of the "additive" response: for every new problem, demand or need, create a separate program thereby adding additional components to the school system.

In retrenchment, such additive responses are not available; benefits and operations are to be preserved by redistributing rather than disbributing resources.

Part B:1 of this section explores the implications of this new reality. Part C discusses the implications of those trade-offs and suggests some new ways of thinking about equity, ways which do not presuppose additive responses. Part D discusses the issues involved in three categories of equity initiatives: special education, desegregation, and affirmative action.

PART B. THE PROBLEMS OF EQUITY AND RETRENCHMENT

INTRODUCTION: TWO DEFINITIONS OF EQUITY

Our judicial system applies the term "equity" to that category of decisions in which the formal aspects of due process provide little guidance, and in which simple precedent does not apply, but the substantive notions of justice embodied in those precedents dictate that a decision render a verdict which redresses a prior injustice and directs the defendant (or the state) to compensate the plaintiff for that prior injustice.*

The operative terms here are "redress," "prior injustice" and "compensate." This notion of equity underlies and connects the two definitions of equity as presented in Part A: (a) more broadly, as anything that will get you (the school district, as a category of defendants) into court if you do not do it; and (b) more operationally, those services and opportunities -- like special and compensatory education, desegregation and affirmative action which mandate a certain type of compensation to categories of the population who were (as categories, not necessarily individuals) previously underserviced or denied equality of opportunity (redress of prior injustice).

The "compensation" criterion implies that equity entails an entitlement to certain services irrespective of economic constraints or marginal utility considerations which question the strictly economical sense of expenditure to serve the last ("marginal") child of special needs. In short, a right once recognized in law cannot be denied because of cost-considerations.

The notion of a "defendant" creates a corresponding obligation on the part of all school districts, guilty or not (in terms of the record of past injustices) to honor that entitlement, and hence allocate resources.

The notion of a "plaintiff" targets special populations as uniquely entitled to specific kinds of services. Inclusion into the category of special population is sometimes automatic -- i.e., race (for desegregation) or native language (for bilingual education) -- and is sometimes criterion-governed but de facto discretionary, relying on local school districts to do the category-testing necessary to establish a given child as "eligible" and hence entitled to a specific equity program. Examples of such procedures are local diagnostic screening for "special needs" labeling, and testing for "one year below level," for inclusion into Chapter I (formerly ESEA Title I).

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* A.L. Melden (1980). Rights and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press.

The idea of "redress of prior injustices" underscores the redistributive implications of equity initiatives. This redistributive impact was latent or invisible in times of growth of enrollments, budgets, and of programs. The concept of "redress" becomes controversial when enrollments and budgets are declining and programs are being cut back.

BACKGROUND

We have purposefully chosen to focus on the juridicial notion of equity in order to underscore an historically significant and currently pertinent fact: school districts as a group, if not individually, were pushed and pulled, often unwillingly, into establishing equity initiatives. Local education agencies were pushed by the stick -- court orders arising out of civil rights and child advocacy court suits which created the constitutional basis and political impetus for Federal and state mandates requiring local equity initiatives -- and pulled by the carrot -- categorical aid programs enabling local education agencies to provide the services and opportunities required by such mandates. In brief, equity was seldom a local idea; the locals if left to their own devices and their own resources would not, if history is any guide, have voluntarily made equity initiatives.

This historical fact explains much of the ambivalence and confusion about equity in times of decline. How that is so is examined immediately below.

SECTION EIGHT PART B

AN INTEREST GROUP ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTING EQUITY

Equity, Retrenchment and the Beneficiaries of Equity Initiatives

On this as on many other issues, the problem is in the eyes of the beholder. If history is any guide, equity populations have much to be concerned about in the current coincidence of retrenchment and initiatives for Federal deregulation -- i.e., more local discretion and flexibility in meeting mandates for services and programs. If deregulation continues to be the point of making equity expenditures almost totally discretionary, and hence held hostage to interest group politics, then equity populations will be at a special disadvantage because of their minority status. Those populations were "previously underserviced" precisely because they were politically weak. But now such populations are not defenseless. Deregulation is advanced in order to allow locals more flexibility in meeting their obligations to provide services and opportunities. It will not wipe away such obligations and corresponding entitlements. Regulations and statutes may change, but the court decisions enunciating the principles of a free and equal education remain standing. Any retreat from school districts' equity obligations may once again trigger a round of litigation, similar to that of the 1960's, thereby causing history to repeat itself.

Equity, Retrenchment and the General Population

Observers like Behn (1980), Boyd (1982b), and Berger (1982a) have often noted that part of the problem of decline management is that consumers of schooling services feel subjectively "entitled" to benefits -- like a neighborhood school, a band or athletics program, or a secure teaching job -- taken for granted in periods of growth and prosperity. All such benefits are at risk as school districts retrench.

Equity initiatives, however, establish real, legal entitlements. As such equity programs can appear to be, paradoxically, a privileged class of services which are protected from retrenchment. And, this protection furthermore may mean that further cuts have to be made in other non-protected areas of the program. This perception can, of course, lead to a political backlash from those who do not benefit from equity protection.

Equity, Retrenchment and the Managers' Dilemma

Managers are, as is often the case, stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place; between their professional responsibility and legal liability to protect equity, and the backlash of other consumers of schooling. It is also argued that since equity requirements reduce managerial discretion and mandates are never fully funded, managers are placed in untenable positions of making deeper cuts in non-mandated programs and justifying the same by defending programs that were externally imposed (Chart 8A on the next page summarizes the different perspectives on special education mandates from William L. Boyd's sample of 15 retrenching school districts).

But even at this level of political analysis, there is another side to the story.

First, mandates are at least partially funded and as such are a source of additional revenue. Boyd's (1982c) study found that some managers were able to use entitlement funding as a means of preserving staff positions and paying for portions of administrative salaries.

Boyd's data also showed that the preservation of special education did not imply a re-distribution of resources: what was preserved because of external funding and not at the expense of other programs. This fact can explain the uneven evidence of the impact of retrenchment upon equity (summarized in Fact Sheet No. 9, following). Externally funded and non-redistributive initiatives fare well, non-funded redistributive initiatives (like affirmative action) suffer.

Equity initiatives provide other benefits also. For example:

- Because they are externally imposed (i.e., mandated), they narrow the scope of conflict with which managers must deal. That which is outside of local discretion and control is, like enrollments and birth rates, not anything

CHART 8A: SPECIAL EDUCATION MANDATES AND EQUITY AND RETRENCHMENT: THE VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES OF 15 SUBURBAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS*

THE VIEWS: TRADE-OFFS AND ALLEGATIONS	THE EXPERIENCES: BEHAVIORS AND PRACTICES REPORTED BY INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS
Are mandates insuring the survival of programs sorely needed by a majority of children with special needs, and preventing those who care more about cost-cutting than education from damaging the schools and the special programs needed?	Yes, mandates do preserve and hold harmless. This is consistent with nationwide evidence from earlier studies (see Fact Sheet No. 7, above). Proportion of staff resources and facilities going to SPED has risen, even when enrollments and budgets have declined and pupil characteristics have remained unchanged.
Or, do mandates hinder school districts from concentrating resources where they will do the most good?	There is some evidence that shifting staff to positions partially or totally funded by entitlements is a self-conscious entrepreneurial strategy used to solve budgetary problems.
And, distort the schools' ability to prepare children for what lies beyond elementary school by improperly designating them as needing special settings?	There is some testimony that coincident with decline, retrenchment and consolidation more children are apt to be referred (rather than dealt with individually by the classroom teacher). But it is not clear whether this is due to: (a) a greater willingness on the part of teachers with larger consolidated teaching loads to refer "problem" pupils or (b) more sensitive diagnostic procedures, or (c) an informal response to the fact of more facility space available for SPED, that fact being one consequence of declining enrollments.
Is the professional and career structure of the teaching profession being altered in harmful ways by the impact of special education funding on the occupational structure of teachers.	In the districts studied, there was evidence that more and more teachers, whose work history and interest was in other areas, began in "defensive credentialling" to get advanced degrees and credits in SPED.

*SOURCE: Boyd, W.L. (1982c).

FACT SHEET NO. 9: WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF DECLINE AND RETRENCHMENT ON EQUITY INITIATIVES?

CATEGORY OF INITIATIVE AND THREAT	FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS	REFERENCES
Special and compensatory education and program cutbacks, and consolidation.	No impact. As systems retrench special education programs have been held harmless and have in fact grown in absolute and in relative terms.	Boyd, 1982c; Dembowski, et al., 1979; Hickrod, 1976; Wilken and Callahan, 1978.
	Consolidation of facilities (and hence, of pupil population) has allowed school districts to increase the concentration of Chapter I (née Title I) eligible pupils, thus allowing for better service via external funding for disadvantaged learners.	Hickrod, 1976.
	Proportional increases in special education, appearances notwithstanding, did not come at the expense of regular programs, and in fact this growth can be partially explained as a strategy of shifting costly capacity -- staff and space -- onto external funding.	Boyd, 1982c.
School desegregation and consolidation.	There is no data that apart from court-ordered and sometimes court-designated plans, consolidation prompted by enrollment decline produced a net gain in desegregation.	Colton and Frelich, 1979; Deane, 1981.
	The best statistical predictor of which schools were closed in NYC (1977-80) is the pupil characteristics of the school in question: the higher the proportion of minority and low-income pupils the higher the probability of that school being closed.	Dean, 1981*.
	The application of racially (and class neutral) economic efficiency criteria to school facilities -- i.e., age, size, maintenance and capital improvement costs -- led to a disproportionate closure of facilities in poor and minority neighborhoods.	Colton and Frelich, 1979*.

* Denotes single case studies -- cases may be multiple but the unit of analysis is one school district.

FACT SHEET NO. 9: (continued)

CATEGORY OF INITIATIVE AND THREAT	FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS	REFERENCES
RIF and affirmative action.	Data are difficult to collect because of: (1) sporadic LEA data-bases, (2) inconsistent definitions of RIF -- lay-off of tenured vs. non-tenured faculty -- and (3) court contests which block data-gathering. Women and minorities are at risk in RIF: nationally. In NYC, between 1970 and 1973, number of minority teachers increased by 32%; by 1978 the proportion was down to 13%.	ECS (1977); and Vincent, 1978.

that managers can be held culpable for.

- One of the stickiest points and a constant source of community conflict over retrenchment and consolidation is the symbolic attachment to the neighborhood school. Boyd (1982b) had suggested that one political strategy is to reorganize buildings and mix pupils (for other reasons), before closing schools. Here, school desegregation, especially if it is imposed, can be an opportunity. Once the bond of the neighborhood school is broken, consolidation and closure is easier.

- Court-mandated school desegretation can provide yet another kind of opportunity for school managers. In a recent survey of litigated desegretation initiatives in retrenching districts, David Colton (1983) found that managers were able to use the requirements as an opportunity, often with the help of Emergency School Aid money (ESAA) to effect program improvements, otherwise too costly if financed totally out of local resources.

CONCLUSIONS: FROM POLITICS TO POLICY

The intersection of retrenchment and equity is exceeding complex, with some counter-intuitive implications. Externally-mandated equity initiatives provide a protection for politically unpopular schooling services, and an umbrella for effecting other kinds of necessary but unpopular reorganizations and consolidations of facilities and services made necessary by retrenchment. But with increased fiscal stringency at the state level, and some movement towards some Federal deregulation, both the fiscal cushion and the political umbrella provided by external mandates may not continue indefinitely. There may be a need for a new public policy for equity which can, in the short run, demonstrate to the general public that existing equity initiatives do not rob Peter to pay Paul, and in the long run, justify policies in which equity is not dependent upon incremental and outside funded additions to the school program.

Some preliminary notes towards such a public philosophy are offered in a specially commissioned analysis, by James Breeden, the equity consultant to this handbook project, in Part C which follows.

PART C. TOWARDS A NEW WAY OF THINKING ABOUT EQUITY

INTRODUCTION

We asked our consultant for equity, James Breeden, to respond to our analysis presented in Part B, above, of the risks posed by the clash between the requirements of retrenchment and equity. In response, Breeden challenges all of us to think more broadly and historically. Such a perspective, he argues, can make us distinguish between ends and means, and can lead to fresh thinking. Breeden's main argument, presented below, is this: (i) the mission of equity did not just originate in the creation and expansion of categorical equity programs and mandates of the 60's and 70's; (ii) that response was necessary and made sense at a time of growth, but (iii) retrenchment brings fiscal pressures which (iv) require us to think of new means to bring about equity.

SCHOOLS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN INSTRUMENTS OF EQUITY

The language of equity is inscribed in the foundation of public education in the United States. Over time, as secondary education has become virtually universal, issues of equity or equality have been embodied in pragmatic standards as well as ideal aspirations. A notion of equality underlay the Supreme Court decision of Plessy vs. Ferguson in 1898, which accepted racial segregation as did a different notion in Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954 which struck down racial segregation. Equality defined the common curriculum for prospective citizens and employees (and the special version for the wives and mothers of male citizens and employees) as it did the legislation which has required equivalent curricular and extra-curricular provisions for male and female students.

Public education per se is an instrument of equity or equality. Overall, then, the resources allocated to public education as distinguished from those allocated to other institutions and purposes is some rough measure of the value of equity or equality at a given point in time.

TWO NOTIONS OF EQUALITY: AS FAIR SHARES AND AS FAIR PLAY

Public schooling has always been a redistributive instrument for providing fair shares in order to ensure fair play. The distinction between the two notions of fairness are spelled out by William Ryan in his book, Equality. Ryan makes a distinction between the notion of "equality" as fair play (roughly, the opportunity to compete for resources) and equality as fair shares (again, roughly, the assurance of a common set of resources). Equality as fair play serves to explain and justify inequality. Equality as fair share serves to guide public policy with respect to resource allocation and decisionmaking power.

In the sphere of public education, the ideas associated with the common school (the site for acquiring the experiences, skills, and information that all community members should possess) tend to cluster around the fair share notion of equality. On the other hand, differentiated curricula and hierarchical categorization of graduates are practical embodiments of the fair play explanation of inequality.

In the area of public schooling, the criterion of a fair share is most compelling. That is, one might argue that fair play in competition is the appropriate standard for justifying inequality in the society generally, while at the same time, affirming that fair shares ought to be the principal of equality governing the allocation of resources within the public school system.

WHY FAIR SHARES ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE FAIR PLAY

Students enter and progress through public schools with personal endowments and social circumstances that are not equal. It is clear that unequal allocation of resources specifically not determined by individual competition is necessary to attain the standard of fair shares. At its least controversial level, this suggests that the student arriving in school at the first grade with skills in reading at the level of the third grade should not have the same allocation of resources for reading instruction that a peer not knowing how to read at all receives. This illustration, in part, begs the question. Yet is should be clear, if there were a choice between instructing the non-reading entrant in the rudiments of reading and advancing the level of attainment of the precocious reader, the resources would go to the non-reader. Implicit in this position are criteria for both the content of public schooling and for instructional effectiveness and its corollary, successful learning.

HOW WE JUDGE WHETHER SCHOOLS ATTAIN THEIR EQUALITY MISSION

The equality mission of the public school is judged by objective criteria of content and success -- in the sense that these criteria are set by several levels of community consensus in some areas implemented through school policy and in all areas through school curriculum. Within that context, equality means systematic, successful progress through the curriculum such that at each point, the preconditions for success at the next higher stage have been attained. Therefore, at the conclusion, a student attains "graduation." The student is certified as prepared to move to employment, training, or post-secondary education as he or she might choose. At this point, the exit criteria of the public school must correlate itself with the entry criteria of the next set of institutions which the student may choose to enter. Indeed, it is at this intersection where community consensus on the instructional effectiveness of schools and the correlative learning success of students is made operational. It is therefore at this intersection that a judgement may be made about whether the allocation of resources to public schools is generally unsatisfactory or that the allocations to particular students or categories of students is unsatisfactory. (In the former case, there is not necessarily an issue of equity/equality. It may be that the public school, in general, is perceived to be leaving too great a gap between the evidence justifying exit and the attainments required for productive performance after entry to the next institution.)

The equity/equality issue arises when some set of students is determined to be on the less preferred side of the gap between successful entry and satisfactory performance. Problems are characteristically resolved by allocation of some greater amount of instructional resources to the students affected adversely. Clearly, the criteria applied are variable over a wide range of circumstances and may be historically defined. For example, with larger numbers of women entering the labor force, the criteria of female success for exit from school may now be perceived and defined differently. More recently, standards for the handicapped have been raised with changing legal definition and social perceptions.

HOW EQUALITY CONSIDERATIONS TRIGGER EQUITY INITIATIVES

Equity/equality issues demonstrated at the exit-entry boundary are addressed by increasing resource allocations to the adversely effected population. For obvious reasons, such changes are politically more acceptable if they are made with new resources, thereby not decreasing resources allocated to populations viewed as instructed effectively and learning successfully.

The point deserves some attention, however, before moving on. The place of equality in the foundation of public education has been such that, by and large, it has been understood to be a local operating assumption. Typically, matters of "previously underserved populations" have been addressed only after a dispute has been resolved in favor of such populations over the resistance of the local authorities who, on their part, have contended that the grievance was without merit.

EQUITY IN "NORMAL" PERIODS OF GROWTH: THE ADDITIVE RESPONSE

Typically, to the extent that resolution of the dispute required an increased allocation of resources to bring about equality, resources were added on to the total resources already available for public education. Apart from the source of intitial resistance to the claims of racial minorities, females and handicapped persons, once the resolution had been achieved, there was a "win-win" set of circumstances. New programs were supported with new funds. Although some raised the spectre of taking resources from "regular programs" to meet the costs of transportation or special classrooms for handicapped students, in practice the resources were increased to serve expanded notions of equality.

HOW RETRENCHMENT CHANGES THE CONDITIONS OF EQUITY

The condition of declining resources changes the picture. Within the context of absolute reduction in resources, claims for equity become claims for increases in resources -- at least relatively and perhaps absolutely. That is to say, unless means are found to reduce costs of transportation, transportation will take a larger slice of a level or lower total budget. This fact sharpens the potential for conflict -- and, to the degree that a particular minority equity interest is defended or protected externally makes the immediate experience of a zero-sum game more controversial.

With this general background, let us turn to specific approaches to equity issues -- methods for making decisions. The approaches are not one single set of steps since it is not possible to trade-off values as if they could be assigned definable weights. Each approach rests on and generates a set of considerations and a set of data -- in some instances practical and readily available, in some instances desirable but not really empirical.

LIVING WITH EQUITY IN RETRENCHMENT: "COSTING-OUT" MANDATES

Example One: The number of students not proficient in English which requires organization of a class for a language group or the number of students who can be serviced at a given time in a SPED class varies with regulations. Such regulations have the virtue of being translatable into precise formulae on the basis of resource requirements that can be calculated. It is then possible to indicate the costs for particular programs under an assumption of perfect efficiency. Moving through such a process allows calculation of costs of deviation from greatest efficiency as well as identification of the causes of deviation. Following such an exercise, it is possible to determine whether measures can be taken that will make for more efficient allocations of resources within the rules governing those allocations. In some instances, it may be determined that regulations have been implemented in ways that are more costly than necessary.

Example Two: Special education regulations in Massachusetts direct that a certain number of students in a classroom must have a certified teacher. An additional number can be accomodated with the addition of an aide. Since certified teachers' salareis are more than twice the salaries of aides, a table for the least costly mix can be easily generated. Obviously, the table will show a bias toward employment of non-professionals. However, if those with hiring authority in the program have a preference for certified teachers, the least costly option will not be exercised without pressure, even though explicit regulations designed to ensure equity permit such decisions.

Example Three: Also from special education, this example has to do with the cost implications of the decisionmaking process. Massachusetts law has a bias toward "the least restrictive environment" for students requiring special education. While the bias springs from educational and social considerations, it has an obvious and profound consequence in terms of resource allocation. Each time a student is referred to a special classroom with a lower student-teacher ratio, the cost in terms of per-student expenditure for salary as well as the requirement for physical space is increased. To the degree that there is a bias toward referring the student with special education requirements out of the regular classroom, there is a corresponding, upwardly-weighted shift of resources from regular classrooms to special education classrooms. Bluntly stated, some definable number of such decisions results in the elimination of a position for a special education teacher or aide. (On a per pupil basis, even an aide is more costly than a regular teacher because of class size limitations.)

The general approach, then, is to translate regulations into formulae that allow determination of most efficient allocation of resources and examine the causes and consequences of deviations in terms of resource allocations.

An approach which follows naturally upon costing out mandates is to determine the alterability of the mandates themselves. In some instances, regulations may be waived or changed. Often the regulations in their quantitative form are not grounded in either experience or theory. They are no more than reasonable judgements arrived at in a loosely defined set of circumstances. Where resource decline creates a sharply defined set of circumstances around matters of cost, regulatory authorities may be willing to make changes or to waive rules on application backed up with satisfactory justification. Pressures of reduced funds prompted the Massachusetts State Board of Education, for example, to consider a variety of regulation changes in terms of their effects on carrying out the purposes of both bilingual education and special education. Some were ultimately carried out in 1981.

Finally, an approach to the cost of carrying out mandates is to risk or formally pursue a court test. It is frequently not self-evident that regulations intended to further equity concerns are sustainable in a court of law. Obviously, such a course has its own costs associated with it. Nonetheless, there has been a swing of the pendulum in some courts -- costs have placed boundaries on the range of remedies that appears satisfactory.

THINKING OF OTHER WAYS TO ACHIEVE EQUITY

The above discussion of costs (and remedies) involves more than financial analysis, it enters in the far trickier area of moral calculus. Current approaches view equity issues as resolved, in principle, by zero-sum games -- improvement in the situation of one is accompanied by a less satisfactory improvement in the situation of another. This calculus is, of course, associated with the competitive "fair play" notion of inequality as contrasted with the cooperative "fair share" notion of equality. The contrasting notion is that the sum of the value of the community is increased by attending to the needs of the population for whom the schools are less effective and who are, therefore, less successful in the communities/institutions which they enter.

Such a notion is embodied in current initiatives to increase the instructional effectiveness and the distribution of effective instruction and successful learning across economic, racial, linguistic and handicapped groups. This initiative is an equity matter. Unhappily, it is only rarely so treated. Ron Edmonds has been successful, among others, in gaining support for the proposition that instructional effectiveness criteria should be neutral with respect to "class." While some are offended at the modesty of this indicator, its general achievement would represent a qualitative improvement in the performance of U.S. public schools.

The school effectiveness thrust has two benefits.

First, as defined by Edmonds, it revives the old and unifying (rather than divisive) ideal of a common school. The last 75 years has seen a movement toward finding satisfactory resolution of equity problems in terms of differentiation of curriculum and more refined classifications of students. (Desegregation is a significant and major exception.) While there is a bias towards this approach in special education and, even more, with non-English proficient students, there is a strong current of criticism (in part supported by those who favor the notion of equality as fair shares of common resources) that questions whether separate can be equal in any satisfactory sense. Differentiated treatment can be the basis for specific focus on solution of individual problems. On the other hand, there have been many occasions where differentiated curricula have been found to discourage curricula.

Second, the school effectiveness thrust focuses on outcomes, on what schools do for all pupils. It creates a standard of equity which may be more meaningful than the preservation of inputs and compliance to the letter of external mandates. In the absence of outcome measures, it is difficult to determine the educational effects of any particular combination of cuts triggered by a reduction of resources as far as equity is concerned.

PART D:1: SPECIAL EDUCATION AND RETRENCHMENT

INTRODUCTION

Public Law 94-142, known as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, and various state laws which have preceeded and succeeded it, are model cases of establishing an entitlement and a corresponding legal liability to a specific service for a specific type of child. Special education is also the most widely distributed entitlement: it affects even the most socially homogeneous school districts, districts which by their very nature do not have to deal with the issues of desegregation and affirmative action.

BACKGROUND: WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF DECLINE ON SPECIAL EDUCATION

Fact Sheet No. 9 showed that impact to be minimal: the evidence so far is that special education initiatives have, indeed, been "held harmless." In fact, as enrollments have declined and as programs have been cut back, the proportion of students, staff and resources, assigned and allocated special education has risen.

Reasons for this are not difficult to see. Although special education and compensatory education mandates are often, as local managers frequently complain, "not fully funded," they are to a certain extent externally funded, thus escaping the budget cutting of retrenchment.

The decline in enrollments and finances has coincided with a rise in parental consciousness about the right to special education and with increased sophistication and sensitivity in the diagnosis of special needs. Educators and managers we spoke with were of two minds about the latter. Some asserted that with increasing class size, teachers rebelled against mainstreaming and expressed this silent rebellion by increasing referrals of children for either outside of classroom settings or more pull-out help, both available only if a child was labelled as having special needs. Others said, "Of course there are more SPED kids now than before. Children we all used to think of as incorrigibly stupid or unteachable troublemakers we now have the sense and the instruments to recognize as having special needs."

One might add, to the latter statement, that there is now the liability (and in times of retrenchment, the financial incentive) to be more sensitive to special needs.

This financial incentive may provide a third reason for the growth in special education. William L. Boyd's (1982c) study of retrenchment in 15 suburbs found dramatic instances of the overall trend, reported in Chart 2A above, towards greater proportional allocation of resources to special education as enrollments and resources decline. Using interviews to investigate that phenomenon, Boyd found enough evidence to speculate that it may have resulted from "an attempt by entrepreneurial managers to solve budgetary problems" (p. 154) and "...preserv[ing] teaching staff positions wholly or partly funded by entitled programs" (p. 153). As this is done, "supply creates its own demand." Once staff resources are allocated to providing special education services, school systems have an incentive to acquiesce and co-conspire, in what some see as a classroom teacher rebellion against mainstreaming, a rebellion manifested in a higher than normal incidence of referrals for special needs diagnosis.

RETRENCHMENT, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND CONFLICT

(a) Program Preservation and Politics: Although special education is not in reality a redistributive program, it appears to be so as other non-mandated programs are being cut back. Boyd's case studies found elements of the backlash, anticipated in our interest group analysis of equity issues. However, after probing the reality behind such divergent opinions, Boyd (1982c) found little evidence that the provision of special education programs seriously distorted school systems' resource allocation decisions, and concluded that (p. 125) "...it may be that the appearance of mandated special education programs persisting while other programs, more valued by many parents and educators, are cut back in the face of decline is as much responsible for the approbrium attached to them as any real hindrance they may have on the deliverance of mainstream educational services."

(b) Conflict, Facilities, Consolidation, and Special Education. The least "restrictive environment" provision of the special education law requires school buildings to be accessible to all handicapped. Many school district policies and decision rules concerning building adequacy also address facility requirements for special education as part of their school closure policies, e.g., in Montgomery County, Maryland; San Diego; and Seattle.

The impact of these kinds of considerations on the preservation of small neighborhood schools, and hence on community conflict, is mixed.

One one hand, buildings which do not measure up to such standards and which are too old or too small to make the necessary capital improvements to be cost-effective, are put into further jeopardy for closure. The small and the old are apt to be neighborhood schools. Moreover, to the extent that local officials determine that service benefits for special needs children can be augmented by concentration and the economies of scale, the push and rationale for consolidated facilities becomes more compelling.

There is a trade-off, therefore, between the conflict engendered by closing small neighborhood schools and the best, most cost-effective facilities for special education.

On the other hand, the expansion of special education services and the room needed to house them can protect "underutilized" schools from closure.

RETRENCHMENT, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND COST-CONTAINMENT

We have noted that funded entitlements can create entrepreneurial opportunities for managers to finance parts of some staff positions. There is, nevertheless, an ever-present danger that the provision of special education can create a financial overburden on the school district. This stems from the fact that while the entitlement is open-ended, resources are finite. And, as state governments begin to feel fiscal stringency, school districts are caught in the middle.

A useful analysis of how this can happen, and what school districts can do about it, is offered in Chapter Eight of a 1979 University of Nebraska handbook on retrenchment, Maintaining Quality Education in the Face of Declining Resources (Wendel, 1976).

The handbook notes that special education is highly labor intensive, and as such very expensive. It also notes that the due process provisions of IEP's (Individual Education Plans) have hidden costs -- they involve the time and energies of personnel such as the classroom teacher and building principals whose salaries are not and could never be covered by special ed funds.

Some expenses can be cut by more vigorously honoring the spirit and letter of the "least restrictive environment" policy, i.e., mainstreaming. This option is possible for districts with declining enrollments who have not yet consolidated facilities or staff. Their smaller class sizes make mainstreaming possible and effective. As consolidation increases class size, we have seen evidence from Boyd's study of the opposite effect. There are more referrals, more pull-outs and, hence, more need for special education staff and placement into separate settings with distinct staffing paid for out of entitlement funds. Indeed, Wendel (1979:52) notes: "...the placement of handicapped students is a collective bargaining issue in many school districts and teachers are asking for reduced class size and planning time if they are to serve mildly handicapped students."

Wendel's analysis concludes with some suggestions for preserving special education initiatives without putting undue strain on a district's resources.

He urges that districts re-examine their standard operating procedures and look for inefficiencies in the management of the referral process. "Presently, there is a tendency to have each level of the placement process -- referral, screening and formal test -- duplicate some of the information in the preceeding stages" (Wendel, 1979:52). The response should be a more centrally managed referral system .

Wendel also urges (p. 54) more "rigorous identification procedures" especially for the mildly handicapped. One effect, of course, is to reduce the number of expensive and labor intensive separate placements. The effect is to increase mainstreaming.

To that end, Wendel offers a third recommendation: more indirect service and support to classroom teachers enabling the system to honor the "least restrictive environment" value, contain costs, and still meet the child's special need. Placing a mildly handicapped or learning disabled child into a classroom situation lacking in individualized attention is as bad as warehousing him in inappropriate separate settings. Indirect service requires "...providing classroom teachers with process knowledge in planning for students [with special needs]." The district can provide "...through consultation with regular classroom teachers the skills [they need] in adjusting the curriculum to meet the needs of individual students, with the classroom teacher taking major responsibility for implementation of the program."

Wendel acknowledges but does not resolve the problem of how increased responsibility is to be balanced with increased teacher load caused by consolidation. One possible resolution is to adjust officially-set maximum class sizes -- pupil-teacher ratios, so as to take those "increased responsibilities" into account.

Such ratios are often at the heart of local school districts' decision rules about school capacity, or program and course-offering preservation, consolidation or re-organization.

Precedents exist in various state and local pupil weighting formulas. For example: the 1977 school finance reform legislation in South Carolina, established for funding purposes a system of pupil weighting, by age group and by need -- recognizing that some pupils are more "expensive" to serve than others. On that scale, a special education child is indexed at 1.7 (in contrast to a 1.0 whild who is a regular pupil in grades 3 through 6). Similar pupil weighting formulas are commonly found in other states including Florida and Iowa. The South Carolina legislation also targets maximum class sizes (again, a not uncommon practice). Other states have similar provisions. For example, West Virginia has a similar state rule about maximums, and in so doing it uses the same pupil weighting index. The more special needs children there are identified and mainstreamed into a regular classroom, the smaller the maximum number of "bodies" there are to be in that classroom. As this handbook goes to press, school officials in Montgomery County (Maryland) and in San Diego are reportedly firming up decision rules about teacher-pupil ratios in order to take the indirect services strategy of special needs pupils into account.

This pupil weighting strategy is also not without its own trade-offs. It does take teachers' legitimate concerns about class load into account. If the weighting formula is based on existing state formula, management is in a strong bargaining position should the placement of special ed pupils become a negotiating issue. If the reward to teachers for having more mainstreamed special needs pupils is a reduced class size, then the incentive is to mainstream, rather than "warehouse" in separate settings. But the incentive for each classroom teacher is also to have as many of their children as possible to be designated as special. This may have mixed results. Such a policy increased sensitivity to special needs (which is good); it also increases the propensity to label children (which is bad). In strict economic terms and depending on the "arithmetic" -- of teacher salaries vs. special education staff and of existing class size standards and the pupil weighting ratios -- this approach may not save labor costs.

Another perspective and implied solution -- recognizing that indirect classroom based service is not always possible -- is offered by James Breeden the equity consultant to our handbook. His analysis suggests that the hidden labor costs of providing special education are often self rather than externally imposed and stem from conscious or unconscious policy decisions, at the local level, rather than from any state imposed requirements.

For example, special education regulations in Massachusetts direct that a certain number of students in a classroom must have a certified teacher. An additional number can be accomodated with the addition of an aide. Certified teachers' salaries are more than twice the salaries of aides. But if those with hiring authority in the program have a preference for certified teachers, the least costly option will not be exercised without external pressure even though it would be uniform to regulations designed to insure equity.

PART D:2. RETRENCHMENT AND DESEGREGATION

Notwithstanding popular emotions, desegregation is not a re-distributive issue: it does not involve robbing Peter to pay Paul, unless one accepts as legitimate (and worthy of public policy consideration -- "Peter's" interest in not having his children attend school with children who are racially different from his own). To be sure "Peter" may have a defensible and arguable interest, and even a de-facto entitlement to a neighborhood school. But the impact of desegregation falls equally upon Peter and Paul: both majority and minority parents risk losing their neighborhood school. In that respect, desegregation, in light of the analysis of conflicts presented in Section Four, Part B:1, can be seen as a "decrement" (loss of neighborhood school) uniformly distributed. In fact, as has been pointed out by civil rights advocates and desegregation monitors, desegregation often puts the "long transportation" and "loss of neighborhood school" burden disproportionately upon minority children and parents. Most often, they travel to majority children's schools rather than vice versa.

The pressure to desegregate has pre-dated the pressure to consolidate and retrench, even though the acceleration of litigation and court orders to redress _de facto_ desegregation in school districts outside of the South has has coincided with demographic and fiscal decline. This coincidence has complicated the logistics of planning for both desegregation and decline in cities such as Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis, San Jose and San Diego.

The complications are well known and a whole volume could be written about the details of those problems as they appear at the local level, in all of their infinite variety.* Perhaps the most typical dilemma in desegregating and consolidating facilities lies in the trade-off between the goals of desegregation and the goal of minimizing travel distance to the "receiving school." Where schools are organized by geographical attendance areas, and patterns of residential segregation closely parallel those attendance areas, consolidation and closure decisions made on the basis of the least distance rule can result in pupil relocation without any net gains in desegregation, as was the case in St. Louis (Colton and Frelich, 1979).

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* In the discussion which immediately follows, we focus on the problems that are actionable by local school managers. The "big problem", of course, is that in big city school systems at the same time as enrollments are declining the proportion of minority pupils is increasing making it all but impossible to significantly integrate in the absence of inter-district integration -- i.e., the metropolitan solution to desegregation.

The least distance rule can and has been used as a smokescreen to prevent or hinder the desegregation effects of consolidation. But "travel-distance" is, on its face, a valid criterion. It has to do with costs. As seen in the evidence presented in Section Seven, Part B, on the impact of consolidation on student outcomes, it impacts on pupil academic performance. The academic achievement and school participation effects of consolidation are ambiguous, with the exception of the effect of longer travel distance -- those pupils reassigned to the more distant school suffered negative consequences: the further the distance, the more pronounced the negative consequences. This finding, like much of the research on pupil outcomes, is tentative; we only mention it as a note of caution in order to highlight the complexity of the issues involved in this as in many other aspects of decline management.

More encouraging information comes from Joseph Cronin's (1977) description of how a number of Illinois cities used school closure in order to achieve an improved mix of majority and minority pupils. He warns, however (p. 10), that "(1) the community early and often be informed fully of enrollment trends and the need to close down certain facilities in the future on a racially just basis; (2) the schools closed be those with inferior educational facilities or expensive maintenance or rehabilitation costs; and (3) that the burden of closings be carried equally by families of both races, avoiding the injustice of black students bearing a disproportionate share of any dislocation or transportation required."

With respect to the first point, many school districts write in specific targets for racial mix in the schools to be created as a result of consolidation. This is the case even in those desegregating "voluntarily" according to a plan developed by the local education agency or under the threat or actuality of a court order.

For example: The Minneapolis "Action Plan" (for facilities consolidation and retrenchment -- Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1982a:93-97) reads:

> Ensure through 1986-87 that the percentage of minority students in any school will not exceed by more than 15 percent the district-wide average of minority students for the grade levels housed in a school. Significantly involve every school in the district in the desegregation/integration effort..."

The Montgomery County (Maryland) policy* guiding facilities planning and consolidation makes a similar public statement about "racial" justice. Solution Criterion (the "solutions criteria" identified what outcomes are to be furthered in any facilities changes) No. 2 reads:

> The solution shall be developed in a manner consistent with the Board of Education policy statement on Quality Education/Racial Balance. This policy sets a figure of 50 percent minority enrollment as being a source of concern, and says that feasible measures should be sought to decrease that percentage as soon as reasonably possible. The policy also says that when a school exceeds by 20 percent the countywide minority average, planning should begin to "address any trend toward racial disproportion." That countywide average in 1980-81 is 21.7 percent.

With respect to the third of Cronin's rules -- justice in the distribution of burdens -- James Breeden reports that district planners in Boston (which between 1970 and 1980 had closed 9 schools) used a "double jeopardy" decision rule in their deliberations about which schools to close. When the segregation, program and cost implications of closing one school rather than another were marginal, the decisive criterion was: how much of the school's population had been previously reassigned, how many times, and had the neighborhood already lost a school due to previous consolidation. The intent was to prevent double jeopardy, to minimize the number of disruptions in each child's school career and to spread the pain of school closure to other communities.

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* Maryland, Montgomery County, 1981b:"F.1, An Explanation of Screening and Solutions Criteria."

Boston's school closure process came after court-ordered desegregation, which had already resulted in pupil reassignment, thus breaking the hold of the neighborhood school concept. That battle was fought and lost over desegregation, not over school closure. That latter preceeded with much less intense opposition that would have been expected in a neighborhood-based city. Because of a complicated set of local circumstances, the closings were court-ordered.

This latter aspect of the Boston case raises another interesting connection between desegregation and decline. Externally mandated desegregation can help in the management of decline. Efforts to integrate can use up excess space thereby keeping some buildings open. A 1982 Report of the San Diego Advisory Committee on Utilization of School Facilities reported that (Section II):

> Approximately five thousand students are transported daily from isolated minority schools to majority areas of the city as part of the Voluntary Ethnic Enrollment Program (VEEP). This program provides opportunities for majority and minority students to participate in a community exchange experience. The VEEP students directly affect the total enrollment of the schools they are attending. The committee perceives this program as an opportunity to increase enrollments in underutilized schools and to ease the problem of excess enrollment in other areas of the district.
>
> VEEP students should be considered when examining the utilization of the home school. For example, Memorial Junior High School is considered underutilized. However, over fifty percent of its resident population is transported to other areas. If these students decided not to participate in the VEEP program, Memorial would be utilized at its full capacity. Acknowledgement of this factor does not suggest a decline in the level of participation of VEEP, but does ensure that facilities would be available if future changes in student population should occur.

Desegregation orders also create not only an umbrella for consolidation but also a pretext for controversial reorganizations, and for otherwise overly costly program improvements. A useful discussion of the political, financial and program improvement opportunities made possible by court-ordered desegregation can be found in a recent paper by David Colton delivered at the 1983 convention of the American Educational Research Association (Colton, 1983), summarizing a series of studies of declining and desegregating cities (Colton, 1978; Colton and Berg, n.d.; and Colton and Hull, 1983). Colton concluded that "rather than a burden, as most cities initially anticipated, desegregation became an opportunity" (p. 9). Colton identifies three kinds of opportunities:

Political opportunities: Colton found repeated cases, like the Boston example described earlier, in which desegregation was used as a pretext for long delayed school closure.

Program improvement opportunities: "Most cities instituted magnet schools programs in the name of desegregation. These schools are direct lineal descendants of the 'alternative schools' concept of previous years; the shift of labels from 'options' to 'magnets' was a political act prompted in large measure by the availability of Federal funds for magnet schools" (p. 5). As we mentioned in San Diego's VEEP project, magnet type programs also use up excess capacity. The establishment of magnets at the secondary level is one species of the curriculum preservation strategies this handbook discussed in Section Seven, Part C:3. Magnets aren't the only initiatives. Colton also found that "in cities ordered to desegregate, school officials have learned to start loading all sorts of high-cost items onto the desegregation plan -- reorganization, curriculum reform, renovations, staff training, introduction of data management systems, and the like, solemnly declaring that these items are essential to successful desegregation; court orders then are used as levers to mobilize revenues from city, state and Federal officials" (p. 5).

Financial benefits: "Desegregation," writes Colton (p. 6), "at least in the short run has paid financial dividends...rather than being a drain on resources, desegregation has become a resource mobilization opportunity."

This conversion of problems into opportunities occurs, argues Colton (pp. 7-8), because:

> The litigation process, by its nature, invites a transformation of the problem of desegregation. The litigation process normally is divided into two discrete phases. The first phase, liability-finding,

> puts school districts into defensive postures which force a justification of the status quo, which invite district arguments that alternatives to the status quo were neither necessary nor financially sensible. There is, in short, nothing in the liability phase of a desegregation case which invites school officials to reconsider old assumptions, to invite new approaches. Moreover, to the extent that district strategists think that courts might be influenced by public opinion, there are strong inducements to issue statements that desegregation is very costly and that the financial strain of desegregation will hurt children and taxpayers. However, once the liability phase is completed, and school officials have been persuaded that, like it or not, they must adopt a desegregation remedy, the status quo no longer assumes such a dominant position. An environment for creative response to the "cost" of desegregation is developed. We observed this transformation in city after city. Liability proceedings foster defensiveness; remedial proceedings foster creative budgeting."

And creative budgeting becomes possible because "...with the Milliken case in Detroit, and with Congressional approval of the Emergency School Assistance Act and occasional state statutes such as Wisconsin's Chapter 220, the courts have been forums for connecting new fiscal demands, i.e., the costs of desegregation with new sources of funds, i.e., state and Federal treasuries..." In summary, "the courts have become levers for mobilizing funds for schools. In many cases, desegregation has produced sharp increases in district revenues."

PART D:3. RIF AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Equity understood as a redress for prior injustices and denial of equal opportunity dictates that some special protection be given to minority staff as retrenchment causes RIF. In this case, the simple fairness of last hired, first fired seems unfair. But if equity is understood as a legal, constitutional liability on the part of school districts to honor a particular entitlement, then the dictate is ambiguous. That is, unlike special education and desegregation, the political system has not yet made a clear determination converting the gains of affirmative action into entitlements. The single exception is the Singleton rule (Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District), according to which school districts under court-ordered desegregation are obliged to develop objective, non-discriminate standards prior to making staff reductions (Carr, 1980:4).

Affirmative action in RIF is also the most manifestly redistributive equity initiative: some lose, in order that others will be protected. (Note: lack of affirmative action protection has the same zero-sum effect -- only the winners and losers change places.)

Because of this, affirmative action criteria guiding RIF are often subject to contest and to court challenge. This is especially true of policies not covered under the Singleton rule (that is, policies arrived at voluntarily, often through collective negotiations) or consent decrees. Our focus is on policies of this type since they are exemplary of what local policymakers can choose to do, as opposed to what they are ordered to do by the courts. We pursued leads, from the literature* and elsewhere, on such voluntary affirmative action, but at the time of our informal survey every district contacted was facing some kind of litigation (from either minority rights or seniority rights advocates) over RIF and affirmative action. Policymakers in such situations are not willing to go on record, even if there is no court ordered gag rule in effect. We respected their desires and since the policies were being contested anyway, we cannot report on or present any examples of "what works" on this topic.

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* See Zerchykov, et al. (1982:63-65 and 159-160) for a summary of the literature on affirmative action as a principle of firing not hiring.

What works is subject to a confusing and evolving area of law. The best advice this or any handbook can give readers on the topic of affirmative action and RIF is: seek legal counsel.

SECTION NINE: READINGS AND RESOURCES

PART A. READINGS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CITED REFERENCES

The following is a list of references to the literature used and cited in this handbook. It is a selective list. A more comprehensive bibliography and review and dissection of the literature can be found in Zerchykov, et al., A Review of the Literature and Annotated Bibliography on Managing Decline in School Systems, published by the Institute for Responsive Education, in April of 1982, as part of the same effort which produced this handbook.

We include as literature many different kinds of writing; writing by analysts, observers and advisors to decline management that is available in the scholarly, professional and popular media, and in conference papers; and writing that is produced by actors in the retrenchment process, i.e., local school district task force reports, policy documents, and memoranda.

The latter is the kind of literature that is itself part of the decisionmaking process -- what is put on this kind of "paper" is intended to influence action, to pursuade, to explore options, to test trial balloons, etc. It is a rich lode of information. This kind of writing, meant primarily for local consumption, has an immediacy and a concreteness which is revealing of both the constraints and possibilities of decline management. But this local practitioner-produced literature is also truly fugitive. Some is stored and accessed through ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center). For those references we give the ERIC Accession, "ED", number as part of the reference. Much of it is not in ERIC and was obtained as part of the information gathering for this handbook. The sources, some of which were unsolicited, all understand that these materials were to be disseminated in order that practitioners can learn from the trial and errors of their peers.

All such materials, whether they identify authors or persons responsible (most are collectively produced by committee), are referenced as having institutional authors, the institution being a state or local education agency, and the reference denoting a place, with the state first, e.g. "Maryland, Montgomery County Public Schools......"

All such materials which are not in ERIC but are in our possession and are not protected by copyright or any specific requests for anonymity are available from the Institute for Responsive Education's Clearinghouse on the Management of Decline, at a cost of 10¢ per page for copying, handling and postage.

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[67.] ELMHURST (ILLINOIS) COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #205 (1980). "Procedures to be Used in Reduction in Force."

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[99.] NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (1976). Enrollment Trends: Programs for the Future. A Planning Guide for Districts with Declining Enrollments. Albany, New York: University of the State of New York and the State Education Department, Office of Research, Planning and Evaluation. 68 pp.

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102. NOLTE, M.C. (1976a). "Follow These 'How-to's' When You Must Cut Your Staff." American School Board Journal. (July). pp. 26-27, 45.

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PART B: RESOURCES: HANDBOOKS AND MANUALS

1. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS (1974). Declining Enrollment: What To Do. Volume II AASA Executive Handbook Series. Arlington, Virginia: American Association of School Administrators. 57 pp.

This handbook provides basic information and answers to common questions on topics such as: enrollment prediction, school community personnel, and facilities. The appendix also provides a fold-out timetable for decline planning and guides to the KISS enrollment projection method, school closing checklists, the Pasadena, California retirement incentive plan and sample questionnaires to study the closing of small elementary schools.

2. BOOTH, R., et al. (1980). Teacher Benefits: How to Compute Costs, Compare and Evaluate, Plus a Special Section on Negotiating Salaries. Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Association of School Boards. 53 pp. ED 184 242.

A manual intended to aid school boards in determining the costs of their benefit programs and to control expenditures to achieve maximum value for both the employer and employee. Contains step-by-step instructions and several recommendations to improve practice.

3. BORNSTEIN, L. (1978). Before You Close A School: Economic and Political Factors. A Resource Guide on Declining Enrollments. Chelmsford, Massachusetts: Merrimack Education Center. 9 pp. ED 149 448.

4. BUSSARD, E. (1978). A Concerned Citizens Guide to Community School Centers. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories.

Uses a question and answer approach to coordination of community services in surplus school space.

5. BUSSARD, E. (1979a). Community School Centers. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories.

This handbook, primarily for facilities planners and building committees, contains useful suggestions and models for planning community use of excess school space.

6. BUSSARD, E. (1979b). Managing Community School Centers. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories.

Handbook focuses on the management of a school building that also serves other community programs. Good advice on setting up an organizational structure that establishes relationships between the many users of a community school's space.

7. BUSSARD, E. (1979c). Using Surplus School Space for Community School Centers. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories. 30 pp.

Booklet explores the opportunities for reusing surplus school space as community service centers, and the issues and constraints on planning.

8. BUSSARD, E. (1981). School Closings and Declining Enrollment: A Guide to Effective Parent/Citizen Involvement. New York and Columbia, Maryland: Educational Facilities Laboratories and National Committee for Citizens in Education. 52 pp.

9. BUSSARD, E. and GREEN, A.C. (1981). Planning for Declining Enrollment in Single High School Districts. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, National Institute of Education. 78 pp.

Because of the number and specialization of courses and the specialization of the teaching staff, planning for decline in the high school is more complicated than for elementary schools. Planning in single high school districts is even more complicated since there are fewer choices that can be made. In developing this handbook, the authors (researchers at Educational Facilities Laboratories) formed a consortium of six single high school districts faced with planning for decline. This handbook presents some of the common problems, strategies, issues and concerns involved and concludes by offering concrete advice about going about the task of planning for decline.

10. COUNCIL OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES PLANNERS (1978). Surplus School Space -- The Problem and the Possibilities. Columbus, Ohio: Council of Educational Facilities Planners, International. 77 pp. ED 163 595.

A guide for decisionmaking about surplus space. Part 1 includes explanations of enrollment projections. Part 2 discusses factors inhibiting new uses for surplus school facilities, and offers suggestions for using school space. Concluded with a description of one school's (Niles East High School in Illinois) conversion into apartments, a community art center, and a community recreation center.

11. EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES LABORATORIES (1976a). The Secondary School: Reduction, Renewal and Real Estate. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories. 63 pp. ED 131 558.

Updates enrollment projections for high schools and analyzes the special problems they face. Provides suggestions, specifically for high schools, for alternative use of surplus space and for providing educational service to an expanded clientele.

12. EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES LABORATORIES (1976b). *Surplus School Space: Options and Opportunities. A Report*. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories. 75 pp. ED 126 614.

Discusses the many factors that influence re-use planning -- population trends, state law, zoning ordinances -- and provides examples of alternative use of surplus school facilities. Specifically addressed to citizen members of facilities planning committees.

13. EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES LABORATORIES (1979). *A Resource Book on Community School Centers*. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories. 26 pp.

A guide to the concepts of and literature and resources on community school centers and interagency cooperation designed to be useful to the concerned citizen.

14. EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (1973). *Some Local Policies on Reductions in Force for Professional Personnel. ERS Information Aid No. 15.* Arlington, Virginia: Educational Research Service, Inc. 18 pp. ED 078 554.

Offers 16 examples of reduction in force policies and provisions that may be of use to school districts developing their own RIF policies.

15. EISENBERGER, K.E. and KEOUGH, W.F., Jr. (1974). *Declining Enrollment: What To Do. A Guide for School Administrators to Meet the Challenge of Declining Enrollment and School Closings. AASA Executive Handbook Series, Volume 2*. Arlington, Virginia: American Association of School Administrators. 57 pp. ED 111 094.

Described by "The Best of ERIC" as "the major sourcebook on school closing," this report provides information on aspects of school closing beyond the economic, such as: community, staff, and student polls; simulation exercises; and community task forces. Also includes a school closing timeline, a description of criteria for closure, a discussion of alternative use, a school closing checklist, and enrollment forecasting methods.

16. FONSTAD, C. (1979). *Planning for Better Education in Wisconsin. Data Supplement: Declining Enrollments. Bulletin No. 8338*. Madison, Wisconsin: Wisconsin State Department of Public Instruction, Bureau for Administrative Services. 535 pp. ED 168 222.

Part I contains guidelines on using the cohort-survival technique for projecting enrollments.

17. HURNARD, J.R. (1972). *The Development of a Procedure for Improving Decisions About School Attendance Areas. A Technical Paper*. Eugene: Oregon Bureau of Educational Research and Service. 29 pp. ED 066 805.

As part of a 20-year organizational plan, a large city school district set out to develop clearly defined attendance areas for each of its schools. This report describes a process of subdividing the district into manageable components, developing a data base, an interactive computer program, and a school district model based on U.S. Census blocks.

18. JOHNSON, S.M. (1978). *Declining Enrollments in the Massachusetts Public Schools: What It Means and What To Do*. Boston, Massachusetts: Massachusetts State Department of Education, Bureau of Education Information Services. 73 pp.

A handbook to assist local decisionmakers. Part One presents an overview of decline in Massachusetts -- its extent and repercussions. Part Two, of most use to a national audience, outlines procedures used by LEA's as they respond to decline. Features are: suggestions about policy options for facilities, planning, personnel adjustments, and program. Of special interest are the handbook's guidelines and instruments for: projecting enrollments via cohort-survival ratio techniques, conducting facilities and staff inventories, and planning and involving the community in school closure decisions. Handbook also contains a discussion of court cases, equity considerations, and collective bargaining agreements as they pertain to RIF. A selective 17-item, annotated bibliography is included, organized around: fiscal impact of decline, facilities and staffing, enrollment projections, and school closings and district reorganization.

19. KELLEY, E.A. (1978). *Reduction in Force: Policies, Practices and Implications for Education*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Division of Educational Services, Teachers College and the Division of Continuing Studies. 85 pp.

Good review of the state policies, local practices and trade-offs involved in RIF policies.

20. McISAAC, D.N., et al. (1972). *Enrollment Projections: ENROLV 2*. Madison: Wisconsin Information Systems for Education Department of Educational Administration, University of Wisconsin. 46 pp. ED 974 715.

Describes ENROLV 2, an enrollment projection method using FORTRAN. The program is designed to forecast public school student enrollment from a sample background data matrix. The reliability of this method is also estimated in this report.

21. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (1977). *Michigan's School Enrollment Decline: Projections and Implications*. Lansing, Michigan: Michigan Department of Education. 95 pp.

Readers outside Michigan will find certain sections of this report useful, including: a section on "school closing guidelines"; a section on enrollment projects including a cohort-survival technique worksheet; and a detailed discussion for assessing and evaluating facilities. Also contains a 27-item annotated bibliography.

22. MINNESOTA STATE PLANNING AGENCY (1976). *Planning Assistance Manual: Managing School Districts with Declining Enrollments*. Prepared in cooperation with the Minnesota State Department of Education and the Minnesota Association of School Administrators. St. Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota State Planning Agency. 79 pp.

A comprehensive planning manual. Aimed at Minnesota school districts, its suggestions and techniques are transferrable. The focus is on how to develop the local data base necessary for rational planning and on reading that data base and projecting the policy trade-offs of alternative courses of action. Topics include: enrollment projections, budgeting, analyzing staff and facilities, closing a school, referenda, and community involvement.

23. NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION (1978). *Declining Enrollments: Its Challenge for Urban School Boards. Report of the Committee on Declining Enrollments Council of Big City Boards of Education*. Washington, D.C.: National School Boards Association. 26 pp.

A "primer" directed at big city boards of education providing an overview at the key issues involved in responding to decline. Special focus is on finance, school closings, and community involvement.

24. NATIONAL SCHOOL PUBLIC RELATIONS ASSOCIATION (1976). *Declining Enrollment: Current Trends in School Policies and Programs*. Arlington, Virginia: National School Public Relations Association. 65 pp. ED 130 450.

Overview of the major issues, techniques, policies, and practices involved in responding to decline. Based on a nationwide survey of school districts, this document includes guidelines for making accurate enrollment projections, for using practices such as magnet schools to defuse community conflict, and for community involvement via advisory commitees and task forces. Document concludes with a series of five mini-case studies of promising practices including those in Salt Lake City, Utah; Illinois; Monroe County, Indiana; Great Neck, New York; and Montgomery County, Maryland.

25. NEILL, S.B. and CUSTIS, J. (1978). Staff Dismissal: Problems and Solutions. Arlington, Virginia: American Association of School Administrators. 80 pp.

A primer of RIF and dismissal which provides facts, suggestions and guidelines on subjects such as: alternatives to dismissal, evaluation, due process, building a dismissal case, dismissal hearings, how 12 dismissal cases were won or lost, and how-to information on developing RIF policy.

26. NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (1972). Enrollment Forecasting Handbook: Introducing Confidence Limit Computation for a Cohort-Survival Technique. Framingham, Massachusetts: New England School Development Council.

Technical manual describing the cohort-survival method of projecting school enrollments. Discusses the factors influencing future enrollments and various problems of data collection and analysis. Also provides sample forms for projecting enrollments and explains the procedure for calculating confidence limits for enrollment estimates.

27. NEW JERSEY SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION (1979). School Staff Evaluation in New Jersey. Philadelphia: Research for Better Schools, Inc. 259 pp. ED 185 101.

This handbook recommends and explains processes that will help school districts in complying with New Jersey State Regulations for the evaluation of tenured teaching staff. The handbook is in three sections:

(1) the regulations, roles and responsibilities of boards of education and of school administrators, and a management plan.
(2) detailed recommendations on carrying out a staff evaluation program
    a) record keeping
    b) indicators of effectiveness
    c) reporting
    d) development of district policy
(3) information on developing policy guidelines, developing job descriptions, superintendent evaluation, school board evaluation, and legal issues.

The report also provides: examples of district policies, a matrix of staff responsibilities, methods of data collection, job descriptions, and rating scales for evaluating superintendents, school boards and teachers.

28. NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (1976). Enrollment Trends: Programs for the Future. A Planning Guide for Districts with Declining Enrollments. Albany, New York: University of the State of New York and the State Education Department, Office of Research, Planning and Evaluation. 68 pp.

Handbook is organized in terms of the major steps which are involved in planning for decline: "collecting demographic data and defining the decline problem; developing and approving strategies to follow to plan solutions; analyzing current and future program needs; and analyzing fiscal implications of future program, staff and facility needs." The book emphasizes the interrelationship of decline issues and stresses the importance of developing local data bases for rational planning. Suggestions are illustrated by references to local district practices. Appendices contain a facilities inventory checklist, a "how-to" section on closing down and mothballing a school, and a 20-item annotated bibliography, including 8 references to local district reports documenting responses to decline.

29. OREGON STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (1977). Reduction in Force: Suggested Policy Guidelines for School Districts. Salem, Oregon: Division of Administrative Support. 20 pp. Ed 137 904.

Provides a planning guide for RIF. Strong emphasis on outlining due-process considerations governed by law, contract, and fairness. Provides staff-inventory procedures and guidelines.

30. PHAY, R.E. (1980). Reduction in Force: Legal Issues and Recommended Policy: NOLPE Monograph Series. Topeka, Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems in Education. 54 pp. ED 195 013.

Briefly explains some of the causes of RIF and how RIF differs from dismissal for cause. Some of the legal issues involved with RIF are discussed, including: the authority of the board to eliminate positions; methods of determining what employees to terminate; allegations of bad faith; consolidating districts; the merger of districts for desegregation; bumping; transfers; the reduction of teachers to part-time status; timely notice; hearings; and burden of proof. A model RIF procedure is included in the appendix.

31. PHI DELTA KAPPA, COMMISSION ON DECLINING ERNOLLMENTS (1973). Howard Public Schools, Anywhere, U.S.A. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa. 42 pp.

A mock task force report for a typical school district facing typical problems of decline. Contains a discussion of the key issues involved in decline, methodologies for resolving those issues, and a detailed secton on the policy trade-offs of alternative responses to decline.

32. POWELL, J.F. and STEMNOCK, S.K. (1975). Local Policies for Reduction in Force. ERS Information Aid. Arlington, Virginia: Educational Research Services, Inc. 18 pp. ED 105 574.

Concise overview of staff reduction problems, including newly gained job security rights of non-tenured teachers and court mandated affirmative action requirements. Overview is of 70 policy questions regarding RIF procedures. Also included are sample RIF policies and contract provisions from 16 school districts.

33. SARGENT, C.G. and HANDY, J. (1974). Fewer Pupils/Surplus Space: A Report. New York: Educational Facilities Laboratories. 55 pp. ED 093 046.

One of the first resource books on surplus space and school closing. Identifies and suggests some rules of thumb based on responses to interviews and questionnaires from 100 randomly selected school districts nationwide. Also, contains a detailed discussion on alternative use of surplus space.

34. SEALEY, RONALD W. (1981). Evaluation of Educational Personnel and the Law. Boston: Law and Education Institute. 73 pp.

An exceptionally thorough guide to evaluation, this handbook is designed to help administrators design evaluation procedures that will hold up in court. Describes a performance evaluation model and provides detailed guidelines for both the process and the substance of evaluation. This handbook also discusses judicially recognizeable performance standards. Sealey discusses several hypothetical evaluation cases and provides sample forms in an appendix. Also contains an extensive bibliography.

35. THOMPSON, S. (1978). Class Size. ACSA School Management Digest, Series 1, No. 12. ERIC/CEM Research Analysis Series No. 39. San Francisco: Association of California School Administrators. 45 pp. ED 154 471.

Public perceptions and teacher support make the question of class size appear simple. Both groups support the "smaller is better" idea, however, this review of the research finds no evidence of a substantial effect on educational achievement. This is so because educational achievement has so many variables, many of which cannot be measured and, possibly because the benefits of small classes are simply not testable. Research shows that schools have maintained a commitment to lower pupil-teacher ratios and decreased class size with little encouragement from the research in times of both declining and rising enrollment. Smaller classes require more staff, which could help mollify teacher organizations in time of decline, but they also raise costs. A weighting system that accounts for students with special needs is also described. Good, concise review of the literature and research.

36. WAKEFIELD, H.E. and DONNELLY, R.A. (1978). Declining Enrollments. Winneconne, Wisconsin: Wisconsin Association of School Boards. 95 pp. ED 193 753.

A handbook targeted at members of Wisconsin school boards who require information for decisionmaking. Contains information about: (1) the extent of decline and recent trends in population and enrollment in the country and the state; (2) school closure and planning for closure, comments from school district officials on the impact of closure, and examples of school district criteria for closure decisions; (3) educational alternatives to school closing, including: magnet schools, year-round schools, the campus plan, the Princeton plan, and education parks; (4) community-use alternatives; (5) staff reduction techniques, including early retirement incentives, part-time appointments, and long-term leaves.

37. WENDEL, F.C. (ed.) (1979). Maintaining Quality Education in the Face of Declining Resources. Briefings in Educational Resources Issues Number 2. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska. 181 pp. ED 176 366.

Focusing on the management issues created by declining enrollments and resources, this handbook presents an analysis of the problem and suggests possible ways of dealing with them. It includes: cost-benefit models for choosing among alternative courses of action; a rational model for reviewing curriculum offerings, policies and procedures for dealing with RIF, information on the impact of alternative responses to decline on special education, and details on school closings and consolidation. The handbook also contains an extensive 50-page annotated bibliography. A series of appendices contain "how-to" material on budgeting.

38. ZIRKEL, P.A., and BARGERSTOCK, C.T. (1980). The Law on Reduction in Force: A Summary of Legislation and Litigation. Arlington, Virginia: Educational Research Service, Inc. 74 pp.

Provides an in-depth discussion of the legal issues associated with RIF, including: an overview of RIF statutes, statutory interpretation, just or good cause, order for suspension or dismissal, limitations on bumping, tenure, order for recall, procedural due process for RIF, negotiability, and affirmative action. Also includes a short glossary of legal terms.

POSTSCRIPT

INTRODUCTION

In the Executive Summary, we condensed what had been learned as a result of our analysis of the existing scholarly and experiental evidence of how school districts have adapted to the drive to lower levels of resource consumption. This discussion addresses the relevance of our analysis for the future of public school management.

FUTURE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL MANAGEMENT: LOOKING FORWARD VS. LOOKING BACKWARD

A distinguishing and useful feature of this handbook is its compilation of more than a decade of documentation and advice about decline and the cross-fertilization of that advice with recently emerging evidence about the impact of different ways of managing decline. The resulting cross-fertilization confirms some aspects of the conventional wisdom about "good" decline management; it questions other aspects; and it identifies knowledge gaps in still other aspects. But is all this too late?

The German philosopher, G.W. Hegel, coined the aphorism, "The owl of Minerva flies at dusk." Since Minerva was an ancient Greek goddess of wisdom, his point, applied generally to all social and historical knowledge, was that such knowledge was like Monday morning quarterbacking, available only after the fact.

There is some indication that this handbook is going to press, in the late spring of 1983, at the "dusk" of a decade-long era of retrenchment. The popular media are full of references to a coming baby boomlet (whose dimensions were three times revised upward since the project which produced this handbook began). The media are full of alarm and handwringing about coming teacher shortages, and contains some portent, given the current concern about productivity, of a renewed national initiative to improve and invest in public education.

Does this mean that the era of scarcity is over? The answer is not clear. It remains to be seen, for example, whether increased enrollments and the push for higher standards will be accompanied by increased revenues and fiscal support for public schooling. There is yet no evidence that tax and revenue caps in states like California, Massachusetts (where they are in place already) and Indiana or New Jersey, where they are under consideration, will be dropped or reconsidered. The baby boomlet will not save the secondary schools from having to deal with declining enrollments in this decade. Nor will the period of growth be any more uniform than the period of decline in birth rates. The impact will be differential. Some districts and areas of the country will continue to decline, others will grow. Some areas of the country are anticipating severe teacher shortages (Utah, for example) while Boston and New York City are both contemplating another round of layoffs in the spring of 1983. There is evidence (Cibulka, 1982a) that for big city schools the era of retrenchment is here to stay because: (i) they have been less quick to affect cutbacks as enrollments have declined; (ii) the baby boomlet is not apt to affect them, (iii) they [the big city school districts] will continue to have fewer children overall but more costly (i.e., more special needs) students to educate, and (iv) most importantly, their retrenchment is, and will continue to be, driven by a declining tax base. An eroding tax base and patterns of urban disinvestment are not unique to big cities alone. The same phenomenon can be seen in many smaller cities, and "ex-urbs," especially communities in the upper Midwest and the Northeast that were built around declining, "smokestack industries."

Does the portent of growth for other than big city districts render useless the lessons of retrenchment? We think not. Many of the lessons are applicable to school management in growth as well as in decline. That conclusion is one of the important issues of this handbook.

LOOKING BACKWARD AND FORWARD: THE LESSONS OF RETRENCHMENT

We began the production of this handbook with a distinct impression, supported by the extant literature on decline, that the management of retrenchment is profoundly and qualitatively different than the management of growth and stability. Further investigation and analysis showed us that this impression was only about two-thirds correct.

It is true that retrenchment changes the content of decisionmaking, from deciding "who gets what, how and why" to deciding "who loses what, how and why."

It is also true that retrenchment changes, perhaps irrevocably, the political landscape of school policymaking. The shift from distributive ("who gets...") to redistributive ("who loses...") politics depletes, and perhaps forever changes, managers' stock of political resources -- their means of persuading, justifying and building support for policy decisions. Charisma and deference to professional expertise are like the secrets of a magician. Once they are exposed, they are not easily recovered, even when material circumstances change.

Our analysis in Section Four suggested, contrary to our own initial assumptions, that the best politics consists of technical planning and good sound data based management. We argued, following Robert Behn's notion of "opportunity costs," that the best conflict management strategy is to isolate the opposition and build a supportive coalition by giving the various constituencies a reason for supporting the cutbacks. Such reasons consists of a documentation of what "goods" -- schooling services -- are at stake in not cutting back.

In Sections Six through Eight, we have identified the issues, have presented some methodologies, and catalogued local school district examples of documenting a variety of "goods" -- economy, curriculum and equity -- at stake in choices governing cutback management.

Consider the types of policy questions raised in those Sections: how cost and program effective are small vs. large schools or classes? Does consolidation save money and/or improve services for children? At what point is a given level of enrollment not sufficient to guarantee a good program (i.e., enough choice of teachers per grade level or courses per building)? How, irrespective of statutory, contractual or political constraints, does one objectively identify what staff characteristics are most effective (and hence should be considered in any RIF policy) in improving learning and, hence, important to consider in RIF policies?

Note the essential features of such questions: They are characteristic of the questions raised in political contests over retrenchment, contests full of either guesswork or partisan analysis of what facts are available. They are also (or should be) characteristic of the policy issues inherent in all resource allocation decisions in education. They point towards what economists call the "production function" of any organization, the mix or level in inputs that produces the desired kind or amount of outputs.

"Production-function" questions since they pertain to the optimal (given certain value choices) allocation of resources are just as pertinent to decisionmaking under growth as well as decline. The fact that such questions have been surfaced and subject to partisan fact-finding analysis in the course of retrenchment does not mean that such questions are unique to retrenchment. This is especially true if our analysis of the permanent changes in the politics of school management is correct.

GOOD MANAGEMENT IS GOOD POLITICS: FACTS DO MAKE A DIFFERENCE

The task of school management in decline would have been easier if there were more research-based answers to the kind of production-function questions raised above. The task of managing growth and justifying and getting public fiscal support for expanding capacity will be easier if more is known about what mix and level of inputs (class and school size, teacher and teaching characteristics) would be most likely to produce the desired level and mix of outputs (e.g., course offerings, student achievement, student participation in "valuable" extra-curricular activities). Such knowledge would not necessarily make decisionmaking easy. However, it could make it easier. That is, facts do make a difference. They limit the scope but not the intensity of partisan debate. If it were known, for example, that "more of X produces more of Y" (that being the classic formulation of a production-function), contestants in a policy debate could more usefully focus their arguments over questions of value, over whether "Y" is a "good" or not, or whether it is better than some other good (e.g., is an increased range of course offerings more important than an increased opportunity to participate in extra-curricular activities, given that "X" -- high school consolidation -- is not associated with any appreciable differences in academic achievement, but it associated with increased course offerings and decreased opportunities to participate in extra-curricular activities).

POLITICAL CONFLICT CREATES GOOD MANAGEMENT: THE LATENT FUNCTIONS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

The information base and the conceptual framework guiding this handbook led us to be cautionary rather than inspirational about the functions of citizen participation. This was because school professionals' expectations about the functions of citizen participation did not stand up in the light of research evidence. Much of our analysis in Section Five was designed to explore the clash of functions and to warn managers and citizens alike not to have unrealistic expectations about the efficacy of conventional mechanisms for involving the community.

More attention needs to be given to a possible latent function of citizen participation, even when it is adversarial. That function is this: the broadening of the scope of policymaking may be a vehicle to introduce educational considerations into decision rules about retrenchment.

We offer this, somewhat paradoxical, proposition as a hunch, not yet a hypothesis. It is based on the Institute for Responsive Education's experience as an advocate of the right of citizens to participate. As school systems began to retrench in the 1970's, we would get calls and letters from citizens and parents who, as one would expect, had a grievance -- they wanted to know how to protect their school from being closed, or at least how to have a say over that decision. What often happened is that those citizens and parents would look for ways to challenge the technical rationale for a proposed school closure. Their initial response would be something like "how can they close this particular school since it is such a good school," whereupon they were challenged to back up that claim -- to define and document why it is such a "good" school, given a financial and architectural analysis prepared by the school district or a consultant,* documenting why that school should be closed. Parents would side-step such architectural considerations (not wishing to join a fight with experts which they can't win) and would begin talking about educational quality, thereby injecting broader educational considerations into the debate.

We found this pattern repeated over and over again. In the early years of decline, the first symptoms were fewer people and emptier classrooms. Many school managers, faced with what was a new problem, turned to help and advice available from facilities planners and architectural consultants who were the first to see the implications of demographic changes. Emotional neighborhood opposition to the closure recommendations supported by such architectural analyses, led school managers to consider broader educational consdierations.

Once again, Lexington, Massachusetts -- whose materials and experiences are noted in early sections of this handbook -- provides a prototypical example. At the end of the 1960's, typical of the times, and typical of the culture of a professional suburb, it had what one veteran school administrator characterized as a "...laissez-faire program, we had no district program to speak of -- it was a case of letting a thousand flowers bloom." Noting a change in enrollments, the system commissioned an outside consulting firm to undertake a study of its facilities. The facilities study analyzed capacity and usage, noted the inequities between buildings of facilities and implied some need for consolidation, giving the system's smallest schools a poor grade.

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* The early 1972-76 (approx.) literature on school closure was heavily dominated by architects and architectural consideration. This was true of the local LEA task force as well as of the professional published literature. See Zerchykov, et al., 1982, Section 3.0.

Those implications were not lost on a community fearful of losing neighborhood schools. They demanded and got access to participate in the planning spurred by the facilities report and by continuing enrollment decline. One citizens study committee, implicitly rejecting the premises underlying the consultants' report, argued forcefully for the educational virtues -- affective and cognitive -- of small schools. The superintendent in his final recommendation to the Board rejected the small schools argument (in part, by suggesting that the putative virtues could not be objectively documented) and in its place offered a more empirical definition of educational quality which justified closure and consolidation.*

The Board followed the superintendent and began closing schools. But the debate had switched levels. The superintendent's rationale pointed to program rather than buildings (to education, rather than architecture). It set the precedent for further consolidation by employing a decision-rule which exemplified the opportunity-cost strategy described in Section Four, Part C:3 of this handbook. The precedent also represents an implied bargain between the schools and their community: the pain of consolidation would pay for, literally, specific program improvements.

That bargain appears to have been kept. Throughout the late 1970's. and early 1980's, the Board voted four times to close schools. In each subsequent year, the Board voted and allocated monies for program improvements financed out of the savings of consolidation. At each annual town meeting, the citizenry supported and approved increases in the school's budget up to and until the advent of Proposition 2-1/2, Massachusetts' local tax cap initiative.

We see in this history an instance of the "invisible hand" of political special interest (the desire to protect neighborhood schools) acting to promote a public good -- the forcible introduction and establishment of educational considerations into consolidation decisions. This change from the narrower architectural premises of the original facilities report and the consequences of that change (irrespective of who "won") is what we mean by the latent function of citizen participation.

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* The specifics and materials and decision-rules emanating from this case can be found in Section Seven, Part D:1.

Would educational consideration have been given such primacy, and would the schools have struck the bargain with the community that they did, if the community had passively accepted the premises of the earlier facilities report? A definitive answer is impossible, but we think not.

Did citizen participation reduce conflict? No, conflict increased and escalated as the participation mechanisms were established and set in motion.*

Did citizen participation perform the function of enhancing the school system's problem-solving capacity? The answers to this question are mixed. Participation forcibly changed the problem definition, providing another confirmation of the political science generalization that expanding the number of political actors expands and changes the content of the policy issue (Schattschneider, 1959). The study groups did do work. But at the height of the controversy, much administrative staff time and capacity was expended in trying to put out brush fires.

Did participation meet the manifest functions expected by participants? Yes and no. People did have a say. Closure of small schools may have been delayed. But schools were closed.

Did participation improve the rationality of policymaking? Without getting into extended analysis of what "rational" means, the answer is again mixed.

It did make the decisionmaking process messier, rather than tidier, thereby at once confirming the sense, and violating the direction of earlier advice about the objective requirements of retrenchment decisionmaking: centralize rather than decentralize decisionmaking, since the ability to say "no" and have it stick is crucial (Mazzoni and Mueller, 1980); and avoid fragmentation resulting from "...more individuals and agencies [becoming involved] in the decisionmaking process" (Minnesota, 1976:24).

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* For a detailed journalistic description of the Lexington controversies, see Dumanowski, 1979.

At the height of the controversy, fragmentation seemed rampant. The two study committees -- curriculum and finance -- and the administration seemed to be going in three different directions. Closure and coordination was achieved by the superintendent making his own final and independent recommendations, thereby placing himself in the dual and uncomfortable position of acting as school leader *and* (as we suggested in the analysis of mangers' political resources in *Section Four, Part C:2*, above) by assertively acting as a protagonist in an ongoing interest group debate. The lesson seems to be: in such contested situations, typical of re-distributive policymaking, the highest form of leadership is to act as one of many partisan interest groups.

The superintendent's final recommendations did not, however, rise out of a vacuum. They responded to and were forged out of the controversy and "messiness" of citizen participation. Our argument is that this participation enriched the content of his final recommendations. And that the decisionmaking precedents established in that recommendation could be, arguably, seen as leading to a better education for Lexington's school children despite, and perhaps even because of, retrenchment and the controversies surrounding it.

A FINAL NOTE: WHAT GOOD HAS COME OUT OF DECLINE?

The last sentence in the above discussion leads us to consider an issue that this handbook has so far ignored.

Much depends on what one means by decline. Declining enrollments, because they are coupled (via state aid formulas) with or have coincided with inflation and taxpayer revolts, have brought no appreciative benefits for the education of school children* except for temporary and local easing of overcrowding problems. Fiscal decline may, as was suggested by Robert Behn (see the "Introduction" to Section Three, above) challenge schools to be "leaner, more efficient, and even better."

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* The neighborhood benefits of many shared facilities programs notwithstanding.

In Section Three, we suggested how, based on a survey of the evidence on retrenchment, the formulation of Behn's challenge failed to acknowledge the organizational and political realities of school decisionmaking.

We have also throughout this handbook been quite agnostic about what is "good" in terms of a policy outcome. The redistributive nature of decline politics has led us, as noted in the "Preface," to recognize that what is good for Peter may not be good for Paul. Our responsibility and mandate has led us to warn school managers against (a) assuming there has to be a way of pleasing both Peter and Paul, and (b) assuming that their professional and institutional interests are, in a pluralistic system, any more special or privileged than those of Peter or Paul.

Given these self-imposed constraints, our handbook has searched for and has presented problem-solving approaches rather than problem solutions, as contained in Part D of Sections Five through Eight. In collecting such materials, we were led into an appreciation and an understanding of one possible benefit of retrenchment, not in terms of its outcomes but in terms of the organizational learning and capacity building made necessary by the political conflicts very often accompanying retrenchment. And that increased learning and capacity is perhaps the one positive legacy of decline.

Robert Behn is partly right in his depiction of a silver lining in the retrenchment cloud. We, however, would paraphrase and amend his statement to read: decline through the challenges to school policymaking posed by the redistributive politics of retrenchment, has led school systems to improve their problem-solving capacity. Once again, it was as if there was an invisible hand at work. Political controversy required justification, and this led to increasing sophisticated fact-finding and fact-representation methods. Or, to put the same point in terms of what used to be seen as a dichotomy between the political and the technical aspects of decline management, political effectiveness required better technical rationality.

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For an example, we can return once again to the Lexington experience. In reflecting on the school closure controversies, one administrator admitted that "...you know before [the controversies of 1975-77] we really didn't know what we were doing...citizens would raise questions for which we had no data, and even no procedures for generating such data." The second half of that conversation consisted of a description of how now they do "know what they are doing." Such knowledge is useful in growth as well as in decline.